



# **MARCVS**

**Tullius Ciceroes three  
bookes of ducties, to  
Marcus his sonne,  
turned out of la-  
tine into eng-  
lish, by Nicho-  
las Grim-  
alde.**

**Whereunto the latine  
is adioyned,**

**Cum priuilegio,**

**Anno Domini.  
1568.**







# TO THE RIGHT RE

uerend father in god, and his singular  
good Lord, Thomas, Bishop of E,  
lie, one of the king, & Queenes  
Maiesties moste honou-  
rable pryncie  
Counsel.

(.v.)



During recour-  
se of late (right  
ruered father  
to y<sup>e</sup> old Studie:  
y<sup>e</sup> I once apply  
ed in y<sup>e</sup> vniuer  
sity: & getting  
some fruite of  
quiet life to y<sup>e</sup>  
perusing, & re-

corording of those things, wher w<sup>ch</sup> in tyme  
past I felt my self greatly both delited, &  
furthered: I gaue my mind chiefly to such  
kind of lernig, as wold serue both best to  
y<sup>e</sup> orde of my study, & also to y<sup>e</sup> gouernace  
of my life, so y<sup>e</sup> cōparing mye experience,  
and reading together, I might make my  
p<sup>ri</sup>uate diligence in studyng & dooe ser-

C. g.

uice

## The Epistle.

utice to the open vse of liuinge. In folo-  
wing of whiche intent, what by encrease  
of iudgement for yerres, what by trauay-  
ling abroad in y<sup>e</sup> world, I found euer more  
& more so new profits, & commodities: y<sup>e</sup>  
wheras, me thought, I had seene but the  
shadow of thinges now I begin more to  
see (as it were) y<sup>e</sup> whole body therof. And  
most of al, this prose I haue, in y<sup>e</sup> grettest  
& most profitable part of philosophy, whi-  
che is concerning maners: & namely in y<sup>e</sup>  
bokes, y<sup>e</sup> of duties be written, by Marcus  
Tullius Cicero: a matter containing ey<sup>e</sup>  
whole trade how to liue among men dis-  
creetely, & honestly: & so rightly pointing  
out the pathwaye to all vertue: as none  
can be righter, onelye Scripture excep-  
ted. In somuche, y<sup>e</sup> when I had well con-  
sidered al together: I said with my selfe,  
concerning this, as did a certayne learned  
man, not long ago, by Homer: This is the  
first time, I haue red ouer this auto: & as  
oft as I red him, so oft so what I finde, y<sup>e</sup>  
I marked not before: & y<sup>e</sup> hath neede to be  
depeely pondered so y<sup>e</sup> I fastid, at the firste,  
he



## To the reader.

hee was easie: but now me thinks, he requires a very heedful, & a musing reader. Wherefore not without maruelous great pleasure, espying: y<sup>e</sup> either in private life, to attain quietnesse and contentacion: or in office bearing to winne fame, and honour: or in euery estate, both to auoid disorder, & enozmity, & also to keepe a righte rule, and commendable behaviour: this booke plainly is the mirrour of wisedomē, the fortres of iustice, the maister of malignes, y<sup>e</sup> schoole of téperāce, y<sup>e</sup> iewel of comelines: I wished many mo to be partners of such sweetenes, as I had partlye felt in my self: & to delectare, y<sup>e</sup> I mēt wolleffe, that I wished: I layd to, my helping hande: endeavouring, by translation, to doe lyke wise for my countrey men: as Italians, Frenchemen, Spaniards, Duchemen, & other foreynes haue liberallye doone for theirs. So, chiefly for our vnlatined people I haue made this latin writer, english: & haue now brought into light, y<sup>e</sup> frō the so lōg was hiddē: & haue caused an auncyēt writig to becō in a maner, new againe:

## The Epistle

and a booke, bled but of few, to war com-  
mō to a great many, so y<sup>e</sup> our mē, vnder-  
standing, what a treasure is among thē,  
foz the fashioning of their life, and being  
by nature most of al other nations geuen  
to ciuilitie, & humanitie, when they shall  
be ayded, & directed by these perfitte pre-  
cepts, may in all pointes of good demean-  
our, become people percerlesse. Yet iudge  
I al this labour little worthe, & small ye  
o<sup>r</sup> nothing able to preuail, without your  
honorable lordship were patrone hereof,  
to whō I do dedicate both my good hert,  
& my worke also, (I cal it mine, as Plau-  
tus, and Terence called the comedies  
theirs, which they made oute of Greeke)  
not as to teach your lordship ought, that  
you haue not already, but by your auto-  
ritie, to get it the more estimacion withe  
other. Foz as Tullies treatise beeing so  
ful of learning, asketh a lerned mā's iud-  
gement, which who so refuse, they shewe  
thēselues to be vnwise, euē so sucche a no-  
ble cōseler of Englād semeth most mete  
to receiue so noble a senato<sup>r</sup> of rome ito a  
straunge

## To the reader,

straunge region. Doubtlesse amonge so many honozable deedes of youre lordships, it shal not be the least honozable, if ye do Marcus Tullius this honour, to welcome him hither, and to be the very cause, that so famous a Romaine maye become familiar with our English men. So shall a woorthy peere bee woorthylie entreated as very curtesye requirethe, so your lordships iudgement muste needes bee wel liked, which is wont to alow on ly knowledge, & goodnesse, so wil the cōmō people moze hyely esteeme the thing, as it is expedit for the to do, and the sooner also wil they followe these holcsome lessōs, which is ful necessary, in a wel ordered state, to be short, your lordship, for a chose patron, my trāslatiō, for a welcō worke, & Tullie shal be taken for such a Tullie as he is. And like as Marcus Cicero, w<sup>th</sup> the autoritie of a father, commēded these bookes to his yong Cicero, so whē our English youth shal beholde the ōce autorised by so renered a father i god no dout, they will bee y rather in loue w<sup>th</sup> them

C. iij.



## The Epistle

them: and wil counte it pleasaunt paines  
taking here to enriche themselves w<sup>th</sup> the  
enformations of vertue, ensamples oute of  
stories, moral doctrine, politike prudence  
antiquitie, varietie of marueilous mat-  
ters: so conningly, & oratorially treated,  
and endited: as he was able to declare, &  
expresse: who was the first, and the chiefe  
y<sup>e</sup>uer cladde lady Philosophie in romaine  
attire. Thus, very lothe to let your  
lordship from your weigh-  
tie affaires, I make an  
end: & pray god, long  
to preserve your ho-  
norable lordship  
in health, with  
encrease of  
honour.

(.)

Your humble orator.  
Nicholas Grimald.

N.G.to the reader.



All thinges in the  
worlde (good rea-  
der) bee made for  
some vse, & ende,  
which end is mo-  
re worth, thā al, y  
both seruice ther-  
unto, and where  
both y end is good, & what so serues ther  
to: there y whole doing is likewise good.  
In vs the best work is, to vse our selues  
wel, and worthly: who in the order of na-  
turall thinges are of the best, & worthiest  
kinde. For what is their, y can vse it self:  
onles it be enfourmed w reason: & vnder-  
standing: Dūme creatures, & liuelesse of  
other be vled: but theselues can they ne-  
uer vse. Beastes endewed w life, & sence  
may seeme to haue some sēblant hereof:  
in y, they vse their feeding, lodginge, & o-  
ther necessities: yet therby they obtayne  
neither praise, nor dispraise: seing they do  
it not of any free choise: but oly by y mo-  
tion of kind, & as their appetite dꝛaweth  
them.

## The p̄face

them. But we, who haue the great gifte  
of wit, & reason, must not moſt of al ſtick  
ſtill in that appetite, to get nothing els,  
but pleaſure, & p̄ofite, but enſuing y<sup>e</sup> hea-  
uēly guide of our nature, muſt bee led  
to the deſire of trouth, honour, & ſeemely-  
neſſe, wherewith the more that we be dec-  
ked, adorned, & beautified, the farther we  
be from the brutiſhneſſe of beaſtes, & the  
nearer appoche we to the nature deui-  
ne. In aſmuch then as euery thing is borne  
to do, that which to his kind is moſt agre-  
able, & vs it beſemeth moſt to vſe our ſel-  
ues, our part wout dout, and our duetye  
ſhall we do beſt, if we imploy the vſinge  
of our ſelues to deedes, y<sup>e</sup> be honeſt, & cō-  
mendable. Other things when we vſe,  
as landes, houſes armour, hozſes, houn-  
des, money, clothes, or ſtuffe, we can not  
yet vſe them at al tymes, and wyth them  
wee muſt enſoyne, and buſie oure ſelues  
also, whereas the vſing of oure ſelues is  
in euery place at hande, and at no ſeaſō  
to ſeek. For whether we be doing ſom-  
what, or at reſt, whether we abide in the  
countrey,



N.G. to the reader,

countrey, or in the citie: whether wee bee occupied in earnest, or in game: no pause there is at al, but night and day wee vse our selues continually. Which thing sith in euery portion of a mannes life it hath place, if it be wel, & wisely, and conueniently done, we shal be weaiful, and in a blessed case, if vngraciously, & fondly, & wickedly, wretched shal we be, and in a woful plight. This are wee taughte to much, by the comon life of men, who for default of skil, how to behaue themselves be confounded in depe darkenes of error, & ignozaunce, & wanting the right rule, they take chalke for chesse, as the sainge is, they can not frame their affections, nor kepe them in temper. But suche manner cloudes be clerely dissolued, by y beams of Philosophie, which set befoze our eye, sight the very ends, & markes, y selfe nature hath appointed vs. For in this world here beneath are thzee kindes of liuinge wights, wherof some haue no moze, but life, as plantes, herbes, and trees growing out of the grounde, some haue not onclpe

## The preface

onely life, but senses also: as sheepe, oren  
& other beastes: y third comprehendeth  
both these: & ouer life, and senses, hath y  
souerain ruler Reason: as in the nature  
of man we se them al contoynd. It re-  
mains, therfore, & meete it is for him, for  
the doings to practise: as may both seue-  
rallye agree with eche of these parts, and  
generally with them altogether. To the  
parcel inferiour (by whiche wee receiue  
our nourishment, our growing, & the state  
of our body) welfare is appointed the vt-  
most end: wherein the thing consisteth y  
wee call profitable: which concernes the  
getting, mainteining, or recoveringe of  
helth. Of the soule, or life endewed with  
sciences, pleasures is the end, y it woulde  
enioy. The third nature, which is parte-  
ner of reason, hath this pyck to shoote at  
(if you consider it by it self alone) science,  
& knowledge of trouth: if you beholde it  
with the other two accompanied, it hath  
honestie, worship, and honour.  
These bee the verge endes, whereto  
mannes lyfe, and nature muste ende-  
uour

to the reader.

nour to attaine: hither dothe Philosophie promise to bring a man, by her information. For when she hath told in a generalltie, what is honest, comely,ailable, praise worthy, and in euery point conuenient: then may men, by intelligēce perceiuing the trouth, truly expresse y<sup>e</sup> same in euery particular dedde.

Wherfore seing reason cōteins y<sup>e</sup> whole life of man: & to it, as to their captain, the other partes be obedient, or at least wyse ought to be: first, marke we the partycular propertie of reason: then, how with y<sup>e</sup> other powers it exerciseth mā after ward the comely behauiour, & dutiful dealing in the open resort, and felowship of men. Mannes minde is contented, and satisfied with nothing so muche, as the cleere vnderstandinge, & the vnderceauable science of soothe. Chyefelye standeth his minde in contemplation of immortall, and pardurable things: therto, in such as fade, & fall, it teacheth, ordeineth, appointeth, cōmādeeth. Wherupō y<sup>e</sup> order, course, figure, light, influēce, of sūne, moone, and



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and sterrers it obserueth: conceineth the intelligences, aungels, soules, & fourmes immateriall: proceedeth frō the, and so mounteth vp to the very autho?, & p?ince of this worldes vniuersitie: whō it knoweth, & knowledgeth to be one, the best, the mightiest, the truest, the most righteous, & euerlastinge. Yet is the selfesame minde by the felowship, and company of the sences, & desires manye a time called away from that p?incipal office, to consider these vnstable, and mutable things & sometime to cast in conceit fourmes disseuered frō the mater, mathematically: and sometime to view things sensible, y<sup>e</sup> can in no wise be sondered frō the material substance: as elements, beasts, herbes, trees, metals, stōes, & such like: al y<sup>e</sup> while must nedes be sensed, & fortified with the trade of debating doubts, & discerning of trouth from vntrouth: which is the art of Logik, the very rule of reason, and instrument of al discourse.

Nowe to speake of the vsinge of the whole man, by the contynuall tenoure,  
and

to the reader.

and stedfast rate of bodles celestial, and natural, the mind of man learneth order, obedience, & conoord. For like as God go uerneth things manifolde mouable, and fallynge away, beeing himself but one, vnremouable and euer during: so reason within vs ought to rule ranging luste, & rash motions of the minde, and the other vnwoorthier, and weaker parts: beeinge it self stedfast, sage, pꝛincipall, and strong ly established.

In case a mā loue any one part of hym selfe to much: or seke after the end therof by a wrong way, and cleane oute of fashion: hee shall not leade a life all euen and straight but hooked, and croked, nor easie, and quiet, but miserable distempered. For who so be ouermuch enclined to paumpering, & pleasing of the bitall position, they be al bent to gather good, and wholly giuen to gain. They, that al onely serue their senses, & set theirs delite to feele the pleasures of y<sup>e</sup> same, be excessive either in riotting, & bāketting, or in outrageous fleshyfondinges, or in other suche pastauces

## The p̄face

pastimes, as be sensual. They, whiche hold them content to leade a life contemplatiue, hauing no regard, ne respecte to the fozenamed parcels: doo p̄roue solwe lowzing, blockish, rusticall, and farre frō al ciuillnesse of life. He, in whom reason ioincs with the senses, for to do them seruice: wil enforce him selfe to win worldlye glozy, and soueraintie.

He ȳ cā compzise in his thought no large compasse, noz depe consideration: but is faint, feeble, waueringe, and ful of infirmitie: wil shew forth himselfe chieflye with appareling, oz with some outwarde bragge, to supplie his want within.

To such sortes of annoiance, & disconuenience, light, & moderation is brought by moral doctrine: ȳ which Marcus Tullius Cicero in these bookes of duties, p̄fessieth. This learning teacheth so much to graunt ȳ vital part, and the netherest: as wil be suffisant to p̄serue the life in helth, and welfare. It willethe also ȳ feeling p̄rtiō so to take fruitiō of plesures: ȳ neyther it defraude the lower parte of  
the



to the reader.

the profits thereto appropriat, nor with  
importune egginge annoyne the mynde  
whiche aspreth vnto veritie of oppini-  
ons, and vprightnesse of maners.

Without mo wordes, it assigneth that  
foz to raygne, which is bozne to raigne,  
and that to bee obeyssaunt, which is fra-  
med foz obeyssaunce.

Nowe, when a man is so instructed in  
philosophy, that he can ful cōuenientlye  
liue sole, & at point deuise by himself, he  
must be brought forth abrode into y face  
of the worlde, to the intent he may pro-  
cure, not only that becomes him selfe to  
do, but also the welth of other folke. Hee  
must remēber the thre folde state, & di-  
uersitie, y hec hath espyed, & practised in  
him self, & must transferre the same to y  
gouernance both of his household priuat-  
ly, & of the whole comōz openly. So shal  
y meanest sort, like y bytal parcel in mā  
be occupied about y most seruile, & nede-  
full woorkes, men of middle degree, like  
the sensiuē soule, shall attend to affayres,  
& sciences moze liberal. The nobilitie in  
y cōmon gouernemēt, like reason in the  
nature



## The preface

nature of man, shall rule all the multitude. That thing also doth Tully touch in this treatise, and sheweth men in authoritie their duties, both in warre and peace, whereby they maye make themselves, & their subiects happy & fortunat. And not only them, but all sorts of men he admonisheth, what they haue to doe, throughout their life, according to their age, trade, and estate, with respect to the circumstances of times, places, & persons. In the first booke, he first deuideth dutie into the perfit, and the meane: leaving the one (whiche belongeth to the ende of good, and is in it selfe right) to men of perfeccion, & prosecuting the other in certein rules, & preceptes, so that thereby euerye man maye frame & order his life. When hee leades vs to the spending out of duties, by taking aduise first about the choise of honest thinges, & refusall of the vn honest. Afterwarde hee sets forth the original causes, & the chief partes of honestye, with theire duties, and properties. At the last, hee warneth vs to discerne the more, or mooste honest thing

to the reader.

thing from the lesse or least, and alwaies,  
in the vse thereof, to preferre the greter.  
In the second, reherling profitable, and  
vnprofitable things: he sheweth, howe  
to attaine, & to vse the profitable, & howe  
to eschew the cōtrary, & in the ende ma-  
kes a cōparison of p̄ofites, teachinge to  
preferre the greter before the smaller, or  
the mo before the fewer.

In the third, hee compareth profit wyth  
honesty, & wyth euery parts thereof, not  
as if there could in dede be cōtrary be-  
twene them, but he meanes the p̄ofite,  
whiche semeth not honest, & the honestye  
whiche seemeth not profitable, or of ey-  
ther of them the apparaunt shew, & hee  
tels vs, what is to be doone, when these  
seeme so to strins, one w<sup>o</sup> an other, that  
honesty allureth vs one way, and p̄ofite  
callethe vs another waye.

Thus the whole matter is referred,  
& applied to honestie, and p̄ofite, twoe  
p̄ncipal points of good, the third (which  
we cal pleasure, & is placed by the Peri-  
patetikes in the nōber of good things)  
Tullie like a Stoike, doth but briefely

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touch as a thing impertinent . But of the other two places, containing all the doings of men, Cicero hath tolde hys minde, & left it vs in this booke: euen as fully, as in his life time hee conceiued it in his hed. For who euer saw in so few leaues so much morall doctrine, & politickall, set out w<sup>th</sup> so many connyng cases, and feates oratoriall: What a sort of stories be there so notable of themselves, so handsomely applyed, so elegantly tolde: You shal not lightly read the like, within so little compasse, in anye historian, that of purpose dothe nothing els.

How finely, & featly, bee h<sup>y</sup> poets verses alledged: With what a discrecion are some ancient w<sup>riters</sup> reproued: W<sup>ith</sup> what what subtelty & finesse of wit be certein cōtrouersies debated: Either of the chief philosophie, or of all humanitie what point is there lacking: Aristotle artificially hath w<sup>ritten</sup> of manners: but what for h<sup>y</sup> lightsomnesse & eloquent hādlinge of h<sup>y</sup> treatise, what for the latine tonge, which we do vse moze then the Greeke: Tullye is aboue him, Panetius wrote of



to the reader,

of due & full demeanour: but though his  
worke in some points was Tullies pa-  
terne: yet in all points, by all their iudge-  
ments, y<sup>e</sup> euer saw them both: Tully is a-  
boue him. Xeno the Stoik wrote of due-  
ty: but seeing dyuers Greekes, who are  
Tullies inferiours, were as good as hee:  
certesse Tullie is aboue him. Possidoni<sup>9</sup>  
a Rhodian, medled w<sup>th</sup> the same matter:  
but nothing to Tullius. So did Hecato,  
but nothing to Tullius. And manye o-  
ther mo of later time: but lord, how farr  
be they frō Tulli<sup>9</sup>? Tulli<sup>9</sup> in his graue-  
peres, after he had heard a nōber of le-  
rned men: after hee had redde the moſte  
approued autho<sup>rs</sup>: after he had endyted  
so manye volumes: and his stile was  
waren ripe, his wit sage, his learninge  
full, his iudgement perfit: enterprised to  
draw this draught, & made it of such ex-  
cellence, as wee may well wonder at in  
blewing, & yet not attaine in folowing.  
Tullius, hauing doone many glorious  
acts, in a state of gouernemēt most tri-  
phāt, lerned y<sup>e</sup> most part of these lessons  
by experience. Tulli<sup>9</sup> out of the Greeke

CC.iii.

autho<sup>rs</sup>



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authors, of whome also some had bene  
gouernours in flourishing empires, trans-  
lated a great deale. Tullius to Marcus,  
his welbeloued sonne, abydyng euē at  
Athens, amonge the best Philosophers,  
was not afrayde to sende this parcell of  
philosophy. No doubt as welcō yt was  
to the learned Athenians, as y<sup>e</sup> Greekes  
doinges were to the Romaynes, or as  
notw adayes, the French and Italians  
wel framed wrytinges were to those  
Englishmen, that vnderstande them,  
yea and so muche the more welcome, as  
it was a rare thinge then, to see that  
kinde of knowledge expessed in pure  
latine. But in Rome, in Italie, in Eu-  
rope, in all quarters, where latin speche  
hadde place, & so it was embraced at  
all times, of al menne, in euerye degree,  
order, and estate. Rulers haue here found  
muchē wittye policie, appertaininge to  
the gouernaunce of realmes. Houshol-  
ders, and parentes haue pyked out of  
these bookes vertuous instruccions for  
their childezen & their seruants. Doctors,  
and diuines haue heere mette w<sup>th</sup> mozell  
sentence

to the reader,

sentence, and ensamples, verie excellēt.  
Ciuil lawyers haue espyed, touchynge  
iustice and equitie, both rules appointed  
and cases discussed.

Scholemen haue taken herehence pzo-  
blemes, & questions, to debate at large,  
and haue fetched from hence philosophi-  
cal cōclusions, with reason; & argumēt;  
to pzoue, & to dispzoue. Oratoures haue  
bene well furnished herebye w̄ sundrye  
graces and ornaments of spech, & in the  
like maner of mater, haue marked, how  
to bestow their stile. Rhetoriciā, who  
for their exercise, doe vse declamations,  
haue taken out of this common places,  
like large fieldes, wher men may walk  
at libertie. Scholemasters neuer wiste  
of syner phzases, for to make theyr scho-  
lers acquainted wyth the verie veyne  
of the latine language. At selue wordes,  
al men, that of wisedome bee studious,  
may get somewhat herein to sharpe the  
wit, to stozē the intelligence, to fesde the  
mynd, to quicken the spzite, to augment  
the reason, to directe the appetite, to  
frame the tong, to fashion the maners,

## The p̄face.

moreouer to rule, to obey, to dispute, to determine, to teach, to perswade, and to euery nedeful purpose in a mans life.

Onlesse the self thing witnesse as much as I say, let me not be credited: but i case both the booke speak for it selfe: & to my testimonial I am able to adioine prince ly peres, wel beknowne & well appued: then shal both y<sup>e</sup> worthynesse o<sup>f</sup> y<sup>e</sup> work & also the weight of the auctozitie winn credit & assent. Tullies duties whē Cesar Augustus had redde ouer, still standing on his feete: as he again deliuered them to his nephew, of whō he had thē: Eloquent (quoth he) was this man, eloquent he was in dede: & one y<sup>e</sup> loued wel his countrey. Tullies duties had Scuerus, the noble emperour, in so greate price, and reputacion: that of al the Romanes bookes, to read thē, he thoughte him best apayd. Tullies duties haue I knowen good clerkes, & wel learned men beare about in their bosōes, laying it full neare their hartes, y<sup>e</sup> they woulde haue lodged in their heades: and entierely louinge Tullies heauenlye companye,  
which



## To the reader.

Which way so euer they went. Tullies  
duities did Erasmus, the Roterdame,  
so greatly commend: y in making men-  
tion of the, he could not choose but break  
foorth into these woordes. What wix-  
teth an ethnike all this to ethnikes: a  
profane man, to the profane: Yet in his  
precepts of conuersacion. O lozde, what  
an equitie, what an holynesse, what sin-  
ceritie, what veritie: How wel doth all  
together accord with nature: how is all  
framed euen by good reason: What a  
consciēce requirerth he of such as gouerne  
the state: How plainly setteth hee befoze  
our eies the maruailous & the amiable  
beutifulnes of vertue: How much, how  
religiously, yea howe like a diuine both  
he teach of helping, & relieuing other mē:  
of getting and maintaining of lone, and  
friendship: of the contempt of those vani-  
ties: for which the common sort of Chri-  
stien folke will either do, or suffer, they  
care not what: Fynally he deemeth the  
full worthy, & ful meete both for schoole  
masters in their schooles to reade vntoo  
the youth: & also for olde menne againe  
and

## The p̄face

and againe to vse, and to peruse.  
These riches, and treasures of witte,  
& wisdom, as Cicero transported out  
of Greece into Italy, so haue I fetched  
from thence, & conueied them into Eng-  
land & haue caused also Marcus Tullius  
(more then he could doe, when hee was  
aliue) to speak English. Marueylous  
is the matter, flowing the eloquence, rich  
the store of stuffe, & full artificial the en-  
diting, but how I, in our maner of speech  
haue exp̄essed the same, the more the  
booke be p̄used, the better it may chaunce  
to appere. None other translatiō in our  
tong haue I seene, but one, whiche is of  
al men of anye learning so well lyked, y  
thei repute it & count it as none, yet if ye  
list to cōpare this somewhat w̄ that no-  
thing, pauētare this somewhat will seme  
somewhat the more. Howbeit loke, what  
rule the Rethoriciā giues in p̄cepte, to  
be obserued of an Oratour, in telling of  
his tale, y it be short, & w̄out ydle wordz,  
y it be plaine & w̄out dark sence, y it bee  
prouable, & w̄out anye swaruing from  
the truth, the same rule should bee vsed

## To the reader.

In examining, & iudging of translation.  
For if it bee not as brieve as the verie  
authoꝝs text requireth, what so is added  
to his perfect stile, shal appeere superflu-  
ous, & to serue rather to the makinge of  
some paraphrase, oꝝ cōmentarie. Ther-  
to, if it be bitered with ynkehorne terms,  
& not with vsuall wooꝝds, oꝝ if it be pha-  
sed w<sup>th</sup> wꝛasted oꝝ farrefetched fourmes  
of spech, not fine, but harsh, not easie,  
but hard, not natural but violent it shal  
seme to be. When also, in case it yeld not  
the meaning of the authoꝝ, but eyther  
folowing fāsy, oꝝ misledde by erreure,  
forsakes the true paterne, it cannot bee  
appꝛoued foꝝ a faithfull & sure enterpre-  
tation, whiche ought to be taken foꝝ the  
greatest pꝛaise of all. These points as I  
haue studied to perfourme, so where I  
haue not alwaies attained vnto them,  
I shal desire you, gentle reader, gentlie  
to consider both the excellēcy of the au-  
thoꝝ, who is a pfect orator, & also y<sup>e</sup> gret-  
nesse of the matter, whiche is profounde  
philosophie. Peruerthelesse such as be ex-  
quisite in both the lāguages already, mat  
(And



## The preface

(¶ that with some profit, & pleasure) trye  
what I haue done, & what they can doe,  
all vnder one: if, laying my translation  
aparte, they wil set the latine befoze the,  
& so assay their owne baine. Eytther they  
shall like themselves the better, when  
they conferre it w<sup>th</sup> my pooze woorkma-  
ship, or els perchance conne me y<sup>e</sup> more  
thank fo<sup>r</sup> attēpting folowing, & accōpli-  
shinge of this enterpryse. Bee it so, one  
hath neither the latine, no<sup>r</sup> the englische  
eloquence: yet by the benefite of nature,  
syth a man may do much: namely if hee  
thereto adioin vse, & exercise, here is fo<sup>r</sup>  
him occasion both to whet his wit, & al-  
so to fyle his tong. Fo<sup>r</sup> although an en-  
glissh man hath his mother tongue, and  
can talk apacc, as he lerned of his dam:  
yet is it one thing to tittle tattle, I wot  
not how, or to chatter like a iay: & an o-  
ther. to bestow his woordz wisely, order-  
ly, plesantly, & pithily. Such as haue en-  
glissh meatly well, & but a smattering or  
small tast in the latine, whiche nōber is  
gret amōg y<sup>e</sup> scholers of this realm: mai  
hereby fall into such acquaintance, and

to the reader.

familiaritie with this most excellent latine manne: that neither shal his deuise seeme harde, no? his art obscure, no? his stile strage. I dare wel say, if this worke happe into a good studentes hande, hee wil not thinke it ynough to runne ouer it once, as wee fare with trifles & toles: but aduisedli, & w<sup>th</sup> good leasure, it. or itt. or v. times, hee will read it, & read it, & read it again: first, by h<sup>e</sup> p<sup>r</sup>incipall poitz, by h<sup>e</sup> definitions, & the deuisions: to see, what is treated, howe farre foozthe, in what order, and with what vartety, then, to marke the p<sup>r</sup>ceptes, reasones, conclusion, & common places. After, vnto the saide places to referre all the stories, with the verses poetical. Finally, as well in the englishe, as the latine, to weigh wel properties of wordes, fashions of phzases, and the ornaments of both. Moreover, manye clarkes haue I knowne, eare this, which could conceaue & vnderstand ful wel, whose tounge neuerthelesse in vtterance & vse of speache was in a maner maimed. Yea & some, that coulde also speake latine readely,  
and

## The pface.

and wel fauoredlye, who to haue doone  
as muche in our language, and to haue  
handled the same matter, woulde haue  
bene half blank, what neede mo words.  
I desire, my trauaile none other wyse  
to be take in woꝛth, then the diligent p-  
user shal in effect finde fruit therof.

Now therefore, good reader, fare you  
wel, and remember, how vnfit (as Ari-  
stotle saith) and vnprofitable hearers of  
moꝛall science yongmen bee, as long as  
either they folow their youthly affectiōs  
or doe continue vnskilfull, & rude in the  
dedees, y of duitie belong to mans lyfe.  
For, al the while, they yelde thē selues  
to be led away of their madde moodes,  
if you talke to them of vertues, and of  
maners, ye doe but singe the deasse a  
song. And howe shall they bee able to  
iudge, what is discretly, rightfully, ba-  
kantlye, moderatlye, & woꝛthelye done,  
who nelther haue anye such qualitie, noꝛ  
vnderstand by experience anye point of  
y same. Yet for as much as it must of ne-  
cessity be known, what is vertue & vice,  
befoꝛe a man can wel & wiselye liue, em-  
bracing



to the reader.

bracing the one, & eschewing the other  
either to make sounde the sicke mynde  
(in case it be diseased, and hath a wyl  
to be relieved) take this doctrine, as a  
medecine, or els to confirme the whole,  
that is to meane: in case you have bene  
wel and honestly trained up, more per  
fectlye to perceiue the path of good ma  
ners, wherein you may walke with en  
tire delite, and come to the honour of a  
laudable life. Thus haue I holden you,  
good reader, with my homely tale: now  
wil I not bozow your patience any lon  
ger, but for your gentlenes and studious  
disposition, will streight way sende you

from the scholer to the maister: and

from mee to the speeche of

this diuine oratour &

worthy philo

sopher.

(.:.)



## MARCVS

Tullius Ciceroes first  
booke of duties, to  
Marcus hys  
sonne.

## MARCI TVL-

lij Ciceronis de offi-  
cijs ad Marcum fi-  
lium. Lib. I.



Althoughe you  
sonne Marke,  
hauinge nowe a  
pere hard Cra-  
tippus, and y<sup>e</sup> in Athens,  
must needes flowe full of  
rules and lessons of philo-  
sophie: because of the pas-  
sing great excellency both  
of your teacher, and of the  
citie: wherof the one maye  
stowe you with knowledge  
the other with ensamples:  
yet as mye selfe, to mine  
owne furdereunce, haue e-  
uermore ioined the latyne  
with the greeke: and haue  
done that, not onely in phi-  
losophie: but also in the  
practise of oratory: I thik  
it meete for you to doe the  
same, y<sup>e</sup> a like you may bee  
in the redines of bothe the  
kindes of eloquence. To  
the which purpose verely,  
we (as we suppose) haue  
brought great ayde to our  
countrimen: that not onely



Vanquã te Mar-  
ce fili annum iam  
audientem Cra-  
tippũ, idq; Athenis, abun-  
dare oportet præceptis in-  
stitutisq; philosophiæ, pp-  
ter summam & doctoris  
authoritatẽ, & vrbis: quo-  
rum alter te scientia auge-  
re potest, altera exemplis:  
tamen vt ipse ad meam vti-  
litatem semper cum græcis  
latina coniuxi, neque id in  
philosophia solum, sed e-  
tiam in dicendi exercitati-  
one feci: idem tibi censeo  
faciendum, vt par sis in  
vtriusque orationis facul-  
tate. Quam quidem ad  
rem nos (vt videmur)  
magnum attulimus adiu-  
mentũ hominibus nostris:  
vt non modo grecarum  
A. i. littera-



## de Officiis.

litterarū rudes, sed etiam the ignorant of the grecke  
 docti aliquantū se arbitré- tongue, but also the lear-  
 tur adeptos et ad dicendū, ned recker. theselues ther-  
 et ad iudicādum. Quāob- by to haue attained some-  
 rem disces tu quidem ā quēt, and also to iudge mēt.  
 principe huius etatis phi- wherfoze you shal lerne in  
 losophorū, & disces quā- decde of the pzince of philo-  
 diu voles (tā diu autē vel- sophers in this age: & you  
 le debebis, quoad te quā- shall learne so long as you  
 tum proficias non pœnite- will (so long perdie oughte  
 bit) Sed tamē nostra legēs you to bee willpnge, as it  
 non multum ā Peripateti- shall not repent pce howe  
 cis dissidentia, quoniam v- much pce profite) But yet  
 triq; & Socratici & Plato- readinge nipe bookes, not  
 nici esse volumus, de reb; greatlpe variant from the  
 ipsis vtere tuo iudicio: ni- Peripatetiks, because we  
 hil enim impedio, oratio- wil be both Socraticiās, &  
 nem autem latinam effici- Platonians, of the verpe  
 es profectō legendis no- matters vse your owne  
 stris pleniorē. Nec vero iudgement: for I nothinge  
 arrogāter hoc dictum ex- let you: but of trouthe, by  
 istimari velim: nam philo- readynge my woakes you  
 sophādi scientiam conce- shall make youre latine  
 dens multis, quod est ora- tongue the fuller. Noz yet  
 toris proprium, aptē, dis- I woulde haue this sup-  
 stincte, ornatēque dicere posed of a baunt to be spo-  
 (quoniā in eo studio etatē ken. For geeuing place to  
 cōsūpsi) si id mihi assumo, many in the knowledge of  
 philosophye, yf I take  
 vpon me that, which is an  
 oratours ozopertie, aptly,  
 orderly & finely to speake:  
 beca: se I haue passed my  
 times: that study, I serue  
 after

after a certayne sorte, as in  
 mine own right, to challeng  
 it. For which cause, I ear  
 nestly exhort you, my Cice  
 ro that diligently you read  
 not only my orations, but  
 these bookes also. of philo  
 sophie, whiche now we lste  
 to those haue euened the  
 selues in quantitie. For  
 there is a greater force of  
 eloquence in those: but  
 thys euen, and tempered  
 kynde of style is also to be  
 regarded. And this truely  
 I see, hath happened to  
 none of the Greekes, as  
 yet: that one mā trauayled  
 in both the kindes: and fo  
 lowed as wel that lawier  
 ly trade of plding, as this  
 quiet forme of reasonyng  
 except perchaunce Deme  
 trius Phalerius may bee  
 confited in this nūber, who  
 was a subtle reasoner, no  
 vehement oratour, pleasāt  
 yet, so as you may knowe  
 hit in for Theophrasti scho  
 lar. But howe muche we  
 haue profited in bothe, I  
 referre it to other mennes  
 iudgement: certes we haue fo  
 lowed both, I thinke verely  
 Plato

videor id meo iure quodā  
 modo vindicare. Quāob  
 ré magnopere te hortar  
 mi Cicero: vt nō solū ora  
 tiones meas, sed hos etiam  
 de philosophia libros, qui  
 se iam illis ferē aquarunt,  
 studiosē legas. Vis enim di  
 cēdi maior est in illis: sed  
 hoc quoq; colendū est æ  
 quabile, et tēperatum ora  
 tionis genus. Et id quidem  
 nemini grēcorū video ad  
 huc contigisse, vt idem v  
 troq; in genere laboraret,  
 seq̄returq; et illud forense  
 dicēdi, et hoc quietū dispu  
 tandi genus. Nisi forte De  
 metrius Phalereus in hoc  
 numero haberi potest, dis  
 putator subtilis, orator pa  
 rū vehemens: dulcis tamē  
 vt Theophrasti discipulū  
 possis agnoscere. Nos au  
 tem quantū in vtroq; pro  
 fecerimus, aliorum sit iu  
 diciū, vtrumq; certē  
 secuti sumus. Equidem &

## de Officiis.

Platonē existimo, si genus  
id forense dicendi tracta-  
re voluisset, grauissime, et  
copiosissime potuisse dice-  
re. Et Demosthenē, si illa  
quæ a Platone dedicerat,  
tenuisset, & pronunciare  
voluisset, ornate, splen-  
dideq; facere potuisse. Eo-  
demq; modo de Aristote-  
le et Isocrate iudico: quo-  
rum vterq; suo studio de-  
lectatus cōtēpsit alterum.  
Sed cū statuissem aliquid  
hoc tēpore ad te scribere,  
et multa posthac, ab eo ex-  
ordiri volui maximū, qd' et  
ætati tuę esset aptissimum,  
& authoritati meę grauif-  
simum. Nam cum multa  
sint in philosophia et gra-  
uia et vtilia accurate, co-  
pioseque a philosophis dis-  
putata: latissime patere  
videntur ea, quę de offi-  
ciis tradita ab illis precep-  
ta sunt. Nulla enim vi-  
tę pars, neq; publicis, neq;

Plato coulde haue spoken  
very grauelpe, and plenti-  
fully if he would haue prac-  
tysed the lawelyke sorte of  
pleading, & also Demosthe-  
nes could haue donne full  
finely, & semely, if he hadde  
kept stil. & would haue vt-  
tered those things, whiche  
hee learned of Plato. And  
after y same sorte I iudge  
of Aristotle, & Isocrates:  
either of whiche delighted  
w his owne study, despised  
y other. But when I had  
determined to writ some-  
what vnto you at this sea-  
son, & many thingz hereaf-  
ter: I was most willynge  
to begynne w that, whiche  
both for youre age shoulde  
be fittest, & for my autho-  
ritie y grauest. For wheras  
manye matters in philo-  
sophie, bothe weightie and  
profitable, bee diligentlpe,  
and plentifullpe disputed  
by philosophers, those see-  
me most largely to sprede,  
whiche of duties bye them  
haue beene taughte and  
prescribed. For no parte  
of mannes lyfe, neyther  
in comen, nor priuate  
affayres



affaires, neither in matters  
 abroad, nor at home, ney-  
 ther if ye doe ought alone,  
 nor if ye contracte with a-  
 nother, may be without du-  
 tie: and in regarding there  
 of resteth al honesty of life,  
 & in despising the same, dis-  
 honestie. And this no dout  
 is a common matter with  
 all the philosophers. For  
 who is he, which geueing  
 no rules of duitie, dare  
 name himself a philosopher  
 But there be sundrye doc-  
 trines, whiche in setting  
 forth the endes of goodde  
 and badde, do misturne all  
 dutie. For who in such wi-  
 se appointeth the souerain  
 good that it hath nothing  
 adioined with vertue: and  
 measureth the same by his  
 commodities, and not by  
 honestie: it cometh to passe  
 that this man, if in hym-  
 selfe hee agree, and bee not  
 sometime ouercome with  
 the goodnesse of nature:  
 canne vse neither friendship  
 neyther iustice, nor libe-  
 ralitie: and in noe wise  
 doubtlesse, canne hee be a  
 manly man, whose iudgeth  
 paine the vtterest euil: nor  
 he

priuatis, neq; forētib⁹, ne-  
 que domesticē in rebus, ne-  
 que si tecū agas quid, neq;  
 si cum altero cōtrahas, va-  
 care officio potest. In eiq;  
 colendo sita vitę est honestas  
 omnis, & in negligēdo  
 turpitudine. Atque hęc qui-  
 dē questio communis est  
 ōniū philosophorū. Quis  
 enim est, qui nullis officij  
 pręceptis tradēdis philoso-  
 phū se audeat dicere? Sed  
 sunt nonnullę disciplinę  
 quę propositis bonorū et  
 malorū finibus, officiū om-  
 ne puertunt. Nā qui sum-  
 mum bonū sic instituit, vt  
 nihil habeat cum virtute  
 coniunctum: idque suis cō-  
 modis, non honestate me-  
 titur: hic si sibi ipse consē-  
 tiat, & non interdum na-  
 turę bonitate vincatur, ne-  
 que amicitiam colere pos-  
 sit, nec iustitiā, nec liberali-  
 tatē. Fortis vero dolorem  
 sumum malū iudicans, aut

## de Officiis.

Temperans, voluptatē sum  
 mū bonū statuēs, esse cer  
 te nullo modo potest, quē  
 quanquā ita sūt in prōptis  
 vt res disputatione non e  
 geat: sunt tamē à nobis a  
 lio loco disputata. Hē dis  
 cipline igitur, si sibi cōsen  
 taneē esse velint, de officio  
 nihil q̄ant dicere: neq; vl  
 la officij p̄cepta firma,  
 stabilia coniuncta naturæ  
 tradi possūt, nisi aut ab ijs  
 qui solam, aut ab ijs qui  
 maxime honestatem pp  
 ter se dicāt expetendā. Ita  
 que pp̄ria est ea p̄ceptio  
 Stoicorū, et Academicorū  
 et Peripateticorū, quo  
 niā Aristonis, Pyrrhonis,  
 et Herilli iāpridē explosa  
 sententiā est, qui tamē ha  
 berēt ius suū disputādi de  
 officio, si rerū aliquē delec  
 tū reliquissent, vt ad officij  
 inuentionē aditus esset. Se  
 quimur igitur hoc qui  
 dem tēpore et in hac que  
 stione potissimū Stoicos:

he a tēperat man, who cōfi  
 teth pleasure the greatest  
 good, which poits though  
 they be so apparant that  
 thing nedeth no disputaci  
 on: yet they be debated by  
 vs in another place. These  
 doctrines then, yf they wil  
 in theselues accorde, can  
 say nothing of dutie: ney  
 ther of duie can there bee  
 geuen any p̄cepts, sure,  
 stedfast, and with nature  
 agreable, but by thē, who  
 maintaine that either one  
 ly, or chiefly, honestie for  
 it self is to bee em̄braced.  
 And therfore the teaching  
 thereof properly belongs  
 to the Stoikes, and Aca  
 demikes, & Peripatetikes  
 because Aristoes, Pirho  
 es & Herillus opinion lōg  
 sing hath been hist out of  
 scholes, who neuerthelesse  
 should haue their lawefull  
 libertie to reason of dutie,  
 yf theye hadde leste any  
 chōpse of thinges, that to  
 the outfindynge of dutie  
 there might haue been an  
 entrie. Wee will followe  
 therfore at this season,  
 and in this matter,  
 chieflye the Stoikes, not  
 as a

as a trāslator, but as we non vt interpretes, sed (vt  
 are accustomed, we will solemus) e fontibus eorū,  
 draw out of their fountains iudicio, arbitrioque nostro  
 after our own mind, & iud- quātum quoq; modo vide  
 gement as much & in such bitur hauriem⁹. Placet igitur  
 sort, as shal seeme good. (quoniā disputatio o-  
 It lyeth me then, sithen nis de officio futura est)  
 al my discourse must be of ate definire quid sit officii  
 duitie, to desyne before, ū qd' à Panetio pretermis-  
 what is duitie, whiche sum esse miror. Omnis e-  
 maruaille, was ouer sea- nim, que a ratione suscipi-  
 ped of Paneti⁹. For euery tur de aliqua re institutio,  
 teching of any mater, & by debet à definitione pficis-  
 an ordely trade is takē in ci: vt intelligatur quid sit  
 hād, must begin & processe de quo disputetur. Omnis  
 at a definition, that it may de officio duplex est q̄stio,  
 be perceiued, what & thing vnum gen⁹ est, qd' p̄tinet  
 is, whereof the treatinge ad finē bonorū: alterū qd'  
 goethe. Al the question of positū est in p̄ceptis, qui-  
 duitie is twofolde. bus in ōnes p̄tes vsus vitæ  
 One cōfirmari possit. Superioris  
 kinde there is, that belon- generis huiusmodi exēpla  
 ges to the ende of good, an- sūt. Omnia ē officia per-  
 other that standeth in p̄-fecta sint: nūquid officium  
 cepts, by the which & tra- aliud alio maius sit: et que  
 de of life may be fashioned sunt generis eiusdē. Quo-  
 in euery condiction. Of the rum autem officiorum  
 former kynde suche exam- precepta traduntur: ea  
 ples there bee whether all the quanquam pertinent ad  
 ducties bee p̄fite, or noe: A. iij. finem  
 whether one duety be mo-  
 ze than an other: & suche,  
 as bee of the same sorte.  
 But those duities, wher-  
 of p̄ceptes bee geuen,  
 though they appertaine to



## de Officiis.

finem bonorum tamen id minus apparet, quia magis ad institutionē vitę cōmunis spectare videntur: de quibus est nobis his libris explicandū. Atq; etiam alia diuiso est officij. Nā et medium quoddā officium dicitur, & perfectum. Perfectum officiū rectum (opinor) vocemus, qd' gręci κατόρθωμα Hoc autem commune officiū καθήκον vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt: vt rectum quod sit, id perfectum officium esse definiant. Medium autem officiū id esse dicūt quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. Triplex igitur est, vt Panetio videtur, consilij capiendi deliberatio. Nam honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant, id quod in deliberationem cadit in quo considerando, sepe animi in contrarias sententias

the ed of good, yet & same doth lesse appeare, because they seme rather to belōg to the framing of life, of which in these bookes, we haue to opē our mind. And also there is another diuision of duitie. For there is saide to bee both a certaine meane duitie, and a perfit. I suppose, we may cal the perfit, or the right duitie, Rectū, which as & Greekes do termi κατόρθωμα & this meane or cōmō duty Commune, which theye call καθήκον And those theye doe thus define, & & same, which is Rectū, they define to be & perfit duitie: & that, theye say is the meane duitie, for the whith a probable reason may be rendered, why it is done. Aduisement then in counsel taking is threefolde, as seemeth to Paneti<sup>9</sup>. For first mē dout, whether it, & falleth in aduise mēt be honest to be done, or dishonest: in weying wherof many tyes mens minds are diuerslye drawn

drawen into contrary opi-  
nions. Nexte, they searche  
and cast whether it, wher  
vpon they take aduise-  
ment, to com-  
maund, and pleasantnesse of  
lyfe, to ryches, and plenty  
of goods, to power, and  
sway of rule, wherby they  
may helpe bothe them sel-  
ues, and theirs, all whych  
aduise-ment falleth into the  
nature of profit. The third  
kynde of douting is: when  
it, that appeareth to be pro-  
fitable, seemeth to strue  
with honestye. For where  
as profite dothe seeme to  
drawe to her honestye con-  
trarywise, to cal backe to  
her: it cometh to passe,  
that the minde in aduising  
is haled to and fro, and it  
bringeth a perplexed study  
of ymaginacion. Whereas  
in deuidynge, it is a foule  
fault to leaue out any thin-  
ge twoo thynges bee over-  
slipped in this diuision.  
For not onely wheather  
the thyng bee honest, or  
dishonest, is vsed to  
aduise vpon: but also twoo  
honest thynges layed be-  
fore vs wheather is y  
better: and lykewise twoo  
pro-  
distrahuntur: Tum autem  
aut inquirunt, aut consul-  
tant ad vite commodita-  
tem iucunditatemque, ad  
facultates rerum, atque co-  
pias, ad opes, ad potentia,  
quibus & se possint iuuare  
& suos, conducat id nec-  
esse, de quo deliberant, q̄ de  
liberatio omnis in ratione  
utilitatis cadit. Tertium du-  
bitandi genus est, cū pug-  
nare videtur cū honesto  
id, quod videtur vtile. Cū  
enim utilitas ad se rapere,  
honestas contra reuocare  
ad se videtur, fit ut distra-  
hatur in deliberando ani-  
mus, afferatq; accipitem cu-  
ram cogitandi. Hac diuisio  
ne ( cum preterire aliquid  
maximum vitium in diui-  
dendo sit ) duo præter-  
missa sūt. Nec enim solum  
vtrum honestum an tur-  
pe sit, deliberari solet: sed  
etiam duobus proposi-  
tis honestis vtrum honest-  
ius . Itemque duobus

## de Officiis.

propositis utilibus, utrum uti  
 lius. Ita quia ille triplicem  
 putauit esse rationem: in qua  
 tres partes distribui debere  
 reperitur. Primum igitur est  
 de honesto, sed de honesto  
 dupliciter, tum pari ratione  
 de utili: post de comparatione  
 eorum differendum. Principio  
 generi animantium omni  
 est a natura tributum, ut  
 se, vitam, corpusque tueatur,  
 et declinetque ea, que ei nosci-  
 tura videatur: omniaque, que  
 sint ad viuendum necessaria  
 inquirat, et paret, ut pastum,  
 ut latibula, ut alia eiusdem  
 generis. Comune autem ani-  
 mantium omnium est coniunc-  
 tionis appetitus, procreandi  
 causa, et cura quedam eorum,  
 que procreata sunt. Sed in-  
 ter hominem et beluam hoc  
 maxime interest, quod hec  
 tantum quantum sensu mo-  
 uetur ad id solum quod adest  
 quodque presens est se accom-  
 modat, paululum admodum  
 series preteritum, aut futurum

profitable things set be-  
 fore vs, whether is y more  
 profitable. So y way whi-  
 che he toke to be but thre-  
 fold, is found meete to be di-  
 uided into siue ptes. First  
 then wee haue to treat of  
 honestie but y in two soz-  
 tes, next, as many ways of  
 profit, lastly, of y comparisō  
 of the both. Fro the begin-  
 ning, to euery kinde of ly-  
 uing creature, it is geuen  
 by nature, to defend himself  
 his life, & his body, and a-  
 uoid those things, which  
 may seme likely to be har-  
 meful, & seeke, and get all  
 things that be necessary to  
 liue withal, as feeding, as  
 couertis, as other of the sa-  
 me sort. The appetite also  
 of comminge together for  
 engendring sake & a cer-  
 tain tendernes ouer the y  
 bee engendred, is a comon  
 thing to all liuing creatu-  
 res. But betwene mā and  
 beast, this chiefly is y dif-  
 ference, y a beaste, so farre  
 as he is moued by sece, be-  
 deih, himself, to that onely  
 which is presēt, & at hand,  
 very smallye perceiuyng  
 ought past, or to come, but  
 man,



man whoe is partaker of reason, whereby hee seeth the sequel; beholdeth grounds & causes of things, is not ignorant of their proceedings, and as it were their foregoings, cōpareth similarities, & with things present, ioineeth and knieth things to come, doth soone espie the course of his holie life, & to the leading thereof purueith things necessarie. And the saue nature, thorough the power of reason, wynneth man to inā, to a fellowship both in talk & also of life, & engendreth a certaine speciall fauoure chiefly to themward, that are of them begotten, and stirreth by the companies of men, that they bee willing both to be assēbled together, and also to bee seruisable one to another. & for those causes that theye study to puruey such things, as may furnish them for their appoyntment, and for sustenance, not onely for themselves, but for their wives, childre, & other whome they hold deare, and ought to defend, which care sur-

Homo autem quoniam rationis est particeps, consequētia cernit, principia et causas rerū videt, earumque progressus, et quasi atecessiones non ignorat: similitudines cōparat: rebusq; presentibus adiungit, atq; annectit futuras: facile totius vitæ cursum videt, ad eamq; degēdam preparat res necessarias. Eadēq; natura vi rationis hominem cōciliat homini et ad orationis, et ad vitę societatem. Ingeneratq; in primis præcipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt: impellitq;, vt hominum cōtus & celebrari inter se, et sibi obedire velit: ob easq; causas studeat parare ea, quę suppetēt et ad cultū et ad victū, nec sibi solis sed coniugi, liberis, ceterisq;, quos charos habeat, tuerique debeat. . Que cura

## de Officiis.

excitatur etiam animos,  
et maiores ad re gerenda  
facit. Inprimisq; hominu  
est ppria veri inquisitio, at  
que inuestigatio. Itaq; cu  
sumus necessarijs negotijs,  
curisq; vacui, tu auemus a  
liquid videre, audire, ac di-  
scere, cognitionemq; reru  
aut occultaru, aut admira-  
biliu ad bene, beateq; viuere  
du necessaria ducimus. Ex  
quo intelligit, quod veru,  
simplex, sinceruq; sit, id es-  
se nature hominis aptissi-  
mu. Huic veri videndi cupi-  
ditati adiuncta est appetitio  
quedam principat: vt nemi-  
ni parere animus bene a na-  
tura informatus velit, nisi  
precipiendi, aut docendi, aut  
utilitatis causa iuste et legi-  
time imperati, ex quo ani-  
mi magnitudo existit, hu-  
manaruq; reru contemptio.  
Nec vero illa quia vis natu-  
re est rationisq; qd vnum  
hoc aial scitit quid sit ordo

reth by also menz spirites,  
and makes them of more  
courage to doo theire busi-  
nes. Also searchynge, and  
tracynge oute of trouthe is  
chieflye mans proppertye.  
Therefore when wee bee  
boorde of necessarye cares,  
and businez, then wee couet  
to see, to heare, & to learne  
someswhat, and we thynke  
the knowledge of thinges  
eether hydden, or wond-  
rous verbe necessarye to  
good and blisseful life. Whe-  
reof is gathered that what  
so is true, simple, & pure, is  
fittest for the nature of man.  
There is ioynd to this  
loue of espying the trouthe  
a certain desire of souerein-  
tye, so as a well framed  
mynde by nature is wyl-  
lyng to obey noe man, but  
him, that enstrueth, and  
teacheth: or him, that for  
cause of his weale, iustlye  
and lawefully gouerneth,  
wherin standeth the great-  
nes of courage, & cōtept  
of worldly vanities. And  
that trulye is no small po-  
wer of nature & reason, &  
this creature onely perceiue  
what is order: what it is, &  
become

becommeth in dedes, and  
 words: & what is measure  
 And therefore, of those sa-  
 me things which be discer-  
 ned by sight, no other cre-  
 ature perceiueth the beau-  
 tie, the grace, and the pro-  
 porcion of partes. Whiche  
 nature and reason couep-  
 ing from the yes to y<sup>e</sup> mind  
 dothe moze iudge a beaw-  
 tie, a stedfastnes, and an or-  
 der in counsellcs, & dedes  
 fit to be obserued: and ys  
 hedeful, y<sup>e</sup> it do nothing vn-  
 comely, or womannishlye:  
 & therto both in al though-  
 tes & dedes, y<sup>e</sup> nothing wā-  
 tonly either it doo, or ima-  
 gin. Of whiche thinges is  
 forged, & made that honestie,  
 y<sup>e</sup> we seke: which thou-  
 ghe it be not auauaced, yet  
 honestie it is, & we truelpe  
 say, though of no man it be  
 commēded, is yet commen-  
 dable by nature. You see,  
 sonne Mark, y<sup>e</sup> very four-  
 me doubtlesse, and (as it  
 were) the face of honestye:  
 which in case it might bee  
 beholden swithe the eyes,  
 would stirre vp (as sayth  
 Plato) a marhelous loue  
 of wotledome.

quid deceat in factis dictis-  
 que qui sit mod⁹. Itaq; eo-  
 rū iporū, quę aspectu sētiū-  
 tur, nullū aliud animal pul-  
 critudinē, venustatē, cōue-  
 nientiam partiū sētit. Quā  
 similitudinē natura ratio-  
 que ab oculis ad animum  
 trāsferēs multo etiā magis  
 pulchritudinē, constantiā,  
 ordinē in consilijs, factisq;  
 conseruandū putat: cauet-  
 que ne quid indecore, effē-  
 minatēue faciat: tū in ōni-  
 bus et opinionibus et fac-  
 tis ne quid libidinosē aut  
 faciat, aut cogiter. Quibus  
 ex rebus cōflatur, et effici-  
 tur id qd' qrimus honestū,  
 qd' etiā si nobilitatū nō sit  
 tamē honestum sit: quod-  
 que verē dicimus etiam si  
 a nullo laudetur, laudabile  
 esse natura. Formā quidē  
 ipā Marc fili, et tāquā faciē  
 honesti vides: quę si oculis  
 cōneret, mirabil' amor' (vt  
 ait Plato) excitar' sapiētie.

But



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Sed ōne qd' honestū est, id  
quatuor partiū oritur ex  
aliqua. Aut enim in pspici-  
entia veri, solertiaq; versa-  
tur: aut in hominū societa-  
te tuēda, tribuēdoq; quod  
suū est cuiq;, et rerū cōtrac-  
tarū fide: aut in animi ex-  
celso, atq; inuicti magnitu-  
dine ac robore, aut in ōni-  
ū, quę fiunt quęq; dicūtur  
ordinē et modo, in quo in-  
est modestia & tēperātia.  
Quę quatuor quāquā iter  
se colligata, atq; implicita  
sūt: tamē ex singulis certa  
officiorū genera nascūtur  
velut ex ea parte, quę pri-  
mō descripta est (in qua  
sapiētia et prudētia poni-  
m<sup>r</sup>) inest, indagatio atq; in-  
uentio veri: eiusq; virtutis  
hoc munus est propriū. Vt  
enim quisq; maxime pspi-  
cit, quid in re quaq; veris-  
simum sit, quiq; et acutissi-  
me & celerime potest &  
videre et explicare ra-  
tionem, is prudentissi-  
mus & sapientissimus est.

But all that is honest,  
springeth out of some one  
of 4 fower braunches. For  
it is occupied either in the  
insight of trouth, and skil-  
fulnesse, or in preseruing  
fellowship of men, and gee-  
uing euery body his awn,  
and keeping a faithfulness  
in contraites, or in 4 great-  
nesse and myghtinesse of  
haute, and unconquerable  
courage: or els in the  
orde, and measure of all  
things, that are done, and  
saide, wherein resteth dis-  
cretion and temperaunce,  
which forder, though they  
be linked, & tangled toge-  
ther: yet certaine seuerall  
kinds of duties do growe  
out of euery one of the, as  
out of 4 braunche, 4 firste  
was descriued (wherein  
we place wisdome & pru-  
dence) issues 4 searching, &  
tryng out of trouthe: and  
this is the verie propre  
worke of that vertue, for  
who so thorowseeth most  
what in euery case is tru-  
est: and whoe most wittily  
; and redily is a-  
ble bothe to see, and gee-  
ne the reason: hee woo-  
thelye is wont to bee re-  
vuted the wittiest, and the  
wisest

myself. wherefore to this  
vertue trouth is apointed,  
as the mater wherupon to  
worke, and wherein to be  
occupied. But to the other  
three vertues are assigned  
necessities, to get, & keepe  
those things, whereby the  
trade of mā's life is main-  
teined: to the intent the fe-  
lowship, & neighbourhood  
of men be preserved: & the  
worthines, and greatnesse  
of courage may shine abro-  
ade: not onely in augmen-  
ting of substance, and pro-  
curing of commodities both  
to him and to his, but also  
inuche more in despisinge  
of the same. But ordre, &  
stedfastnesse, and measure  
keeping, and such like, ha-  
ue to do in that kind: wher-  
unto must be ioyned a cer-  
taine doing, and not onely  
an earnest occupping of  
wit. For applying a cer-  
taine mean, & ordre to such  
things as be medled with-  
in mans life, wee shall ob-  
serue both honestie, and  
comelincesse.

Now of those four pla-  
ces, wherinto we haue di-  
uided y nature & strength  
of boe

haberi solet. Quocirca  
huic quasi materia quam  
tractet, & in qua versetur,  
subiecta est veritas. Reli-  
quis autem tribus virtuti-  
bus necessitates propositę  
sunt ad eas res parandas, tu-  
endasq; quibus actio vite  
continetur, vt et societas  
hominum, coniunctioque  
seruetur, et animi excellē-  
tia, magnitudoq; cū in au-  
gēdis opibus, vtilitatibusq;  
et sibi et suis comparādis,  
tūm multo magis in his  
ipsis despiciendis eluceat.  
Ordo autem et cōstantia,  
et moderatio, et ea, quę sūt  
ijs similia versantur in eo  
genere, ad qd' adhibenda  
est quędā actio, nō solū mē-  
tis agitatio. His enim reb?,  
quę tractātur in vita, mo-  
dum quendam adhibētes  
& ordinem, honestatem  
& decus conseruabimus.  
Ex quatuor autem locis  
in quos honesti naturam,

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vimque diuissimus, primus ille qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanā. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et sciētię cupiditatem: in qua excellere pulchrū putam<sup>r</sup>: lūi autē et errare, nescire, & decepti, et malū, et turpe ducimus. In hoc genere et naturali, et honesto, duo vitia vitanda sunt: vnū ne incognita p̄ cognitio habeamus, ijsque temerē assētiāmur, qd' vitiū effugere qui velit (ōnes autem velle debēt) adhibebit ad cōsiderādas res, et tempus, et diligentiam. Alterum est vitium, quōd quidam minis magnū studium, multamque operam in res obscuras, atque difficiles conferūt, easdemque non necessarias. Quibus vitij declinatis, qd' in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis opere curaque ponetur, id iure laudabi-

of honestie, & same first, & consisteth in knowledge of trouth, toucheth mā's kind nerest of all. For we be all drawn, and lede to a desire of knowledge, and science: wherin to passe other, we think it a goodlye matter: but to slide, to erre, to bee ignorant, to bee deceyued, we count it both euill, and dishonest. In this kinde, of vertue, whiche is both naturall: & honest, two fautes must be atoyded: one, that wee take not thinges wee know not, as though wee knewe them, & rashlye assent to them, which faulte who so wil eschewe (& all ought to be willing) must employ to the considering of matters both leasure, & diligence. In other faulte there is, that some bestow ouer gret study, & to much trauaile, in dark, and difficult thinges, and the same nothing necessary, whiche faultes auoided, whatsoeuer laboure, and diligence shall bee spent in honest thynges, and woorthye of knowledge, the same of right shal bee commended as



as in Astrologie, we haue heard what Caius Sulpitius was, in Geometrie, we knew what Sextus Pompeius could do, vnt in logia, mo in & ciuil law, which sciences be all occupied in tracynge out the trouthe, wyth the studie wherof to be drawen from traualing in matterz, it is against dutie. For vertuez whole praisse consisteth in doing, from which yet oftentimes there is hadde a resting while, and there be graunted manye recourses againe vnto study, yea and the musinge of the mynde, that neuer ceaseth, maye continue vs in the studies of contemplacion, euen wout our traualle. But let euery thought, and mouing of the mynde be occupied either in taking of aduysment about honest matters, and pertainig to the good, and blissfull lyfe, or els in studies of science, and knowledge. And thus haue we spoken of y first fountaine of dvytye. But of the other thre vertues remaynyng, that kynde

tur: vt in astrologia C. Sulpitium audiuius: in Geometria Sextum Pompeiū ipsi cognouimus: multos in dialecticis, plures in iure ciuili, quę omnes artes in veri inuestigatione versantur: cuius studio a rebus agendis abduci cōtra officiū est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit: a qua tamen sepe fit intermissio, multiq; dātur ad studia reditus: tum agitatio mentis quę nunquā acquiescit, potest nos in studijs cogitationis, etiam sine opera nostra cōtinere. Omnis autem cogitatio, motusq; animi, aut in cōsilijs capiendis de rebus honestis, & pertinentibus ad bene, beateq; viuendū, aut in studijs scientię, cognitionisq; versatur. Ac de primo quidem officij fonte diximus. De tribus autem reliquis latissimē

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 B.i.



## de Officiis.

patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos, & vite quasi communitas continetur. Cuius partes due sunt. Iusticia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur: & huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem, vel liberalitatem appellare licet. Sed iusticie primum munus est, vt ne cui quis noceat, nisi laceffit in iuria, deinde vt comunibus p comunibus vtatur, priuatis autem vt suis. Sunt autem priuata, nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, vt qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut victoria, vt qui bello potiti sunt: aut lege, pactione, conditione, sorte.

Ex quo fit, vt ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur: Tusculanus Tus-

extendeth fardest, wherein is contened the felowship of men among themselves and (as it were) the interpartening of mans lyfe.

Whereof there beetwoe partes: Justice is one, in the which is the greatest brightnes of vertue, wher of good men beare theyre name, and to this is ioyned bountifullnesse, which same we may terme either gentlenesse, or liberality.

But the principal duety of iustice is, that no manne hurt another, vnlesse he be prouoked by wronge: the next, that he vse thingz common, as common, & thingz priuate, as his own. Now be it by nature, thingz priuate bee none, but eyther by auncient possession, as of theirs who in old time came into waste grounds, or by victorie, as of theirs who got thingz in warre: or by lawe, couenaunt, condition, or lotte. Whereof it comes to passe, that the ground Arpinas is counted the Arpinatians: the ground Tusculan & Tus-

culantens. And after thys  
 sorte is the peyntyng out  
 of priuate possessions.  
 whereupon seying there is  
 made a mans owne of eue-  
 ry one of those thynges  
 which by nature were com-  
 mon, let euery one enioye  
 that to euery one is befallē  
 More than that, if any mā  
 will couet to him selfe, hee  
 shall breake the lawe of  
 mans felowship. But by  
 cause (as it is notably wri-  
 ten of Plato) we be borne  
 not for oure selues alone,  
 but somedeale of our birth  
 our countrey, somedeale our  
 parētis, somedeale our frēds  
 do claime, and (as liketh y  
 Stoikes) whatsoeuer ys  
 bredde vppon earth, all to  
 the vse of manne is crea-  
 ted, but man for mannes  
 owne cause is begotten,  
 that they among theselues  
 one maye helpe an other,  
 hercin we be bounde to fo-  
 lowe natur our leader: and  
 to sette abroade that maye  
 serue for common commo-  
 dities, by enterchaunge of  
 duties in geuīg & taking,  
 and also by artes, by tra-  
 uaille

culanorum. Similisq; est  
 priuatarum possessionum  
 descriptio. Ex quo, quia  
 suum cuiusque sit eorum  
 que natura fuerant comu-  
 nia, quod cuique obigit,  
 id quisque teneat. Eo, si  
 quis sibi plus appetet, vio-  
 labit ius humane societa-  
 tis. Sed quoniam (vt pre-  
 clare scriptum est a Pla-  
 tone) non nobis solum na-  
 ti sumus: ortusque nostri  
 partem patria vendicat,  
 partem parentes, partem  
 amici, atque (vt placet  
 Stoicis) que in terris gig-  
 nuntur, ad vsum homi-  
 num omnia creari, homi-  
 nes autē hominū causa  
 esse generatos, vt ipsi in-  
 ter se alij alijs prodesse  
 possint: in hoc naturam  
 ducem debemus sequi, &  
 communes vtilitates in  
 medium afferre mutatio-  
 ne officiorum, dando ac-  
 cipiendq;, tum artibus,

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tum opera, tum facultati-  
bus deuincire hominū in-  
ter homines societatē. Fū-  
damentum autem iustitię  
est fides, id est dictorum,  
conuentorumq; cōstantia  
et veritas, ex quo, quāquā  
hoc videbitur fortasse cui  
piam durius, tamen aude-  
amus imitari Stoicos, qui  
studiosē exquirunt vnde  
verba sint ducta, creda-  
musq; quia fiat quod dic-  
tum est, appellatā Fidem.  
Sed iniustitię duo genera  
sūt: vnū, eorū qui inferūt:  
alterum, eorum qui ab ijs,  
quibus infertur, si possent,  
non propulsant iniuriam.  
Nam qui iniuste impetum  
in quēpiā facit, aut ira, aut  
aliqua perturbatione inci-  
tatus, is quasi manus vio-  
lenter videtur afferre so-  
cio: qui autē non defendit  
nec obsistit, si potest iniu-  
rię, tam est in vitio, quā  
si parentes, aut amicos aut  
patriam deserat.

uayle by riches, to knit the  
felowshippe of man wpyth  
man.

But faithfulnessse is the  
foundaciō of iustice, which  
is in sword, and couenant,  
a trowth, and stedfastnesse,  
where vppon though thys  
shall seeme to some per-  
chaunce ouerharde: yet let  
vs be bolde to folowe the  
Stoicks whiche heedeful-  
ly serche out from whence  
woordes bee fetched, and  
let vs thinke, that it is cal-  
led faithfulnessse, because it  
is fulfilled, whyche was  
faithed.

Contrarywise, there be  
twoc Kindes of iniustice.  
One, of such as offer it: an  
other, of those who though  
they be able do not defende  
wzong from thē to whō it  
is offered. For who so vn-  
iustly doth make assault vpon  
anye man, either styr-  
red by choler, or any passiō  
he seemeth as w violence,  
to kyll his felow, & who so  
defendeth not, not w stan-  
deth iniury if he be able, is  
as farre in faulte: as if hee  
should forsake his parents  
his frendes, or his cōntrey  
And



And in deede those iniur-  
ries that are doone of pur-  
pose to hurt, do oftē times  
arise of feare, when hee  
who intendeth to hurt an-  
other, is afrayde that vn-  
lesse hee doe it to the other  
he may him self be touched  
w<sup>th</sup> some discommodity.

And for the moste parte  
many menne take occasion  
to doe wrong, of intent to  
compassse those thinges y<sup>e</sup>  
they haue coueted: in whi-  
che kynde of vyce, coue-  
tousnes, moste largely she-  
weth her selfe. For w<sup>th</sup> st-  
standinge ryches bee co-  
ueted, bothe for necessarie  
vses of the lyfe, and also to  
enjoy pleasure.

But in those in whō there  
is a greater courage, coue-  
ting of money hath an eye  
to power, and ablenesse of  
pleasurīg, as of late Mar-  
cus Crassus denyed anye  
substāce to be gret inough  
for him, that in a common  
weale woulde bee a prince:  
while hee were not able w<sup>th</sup>  
his reuenue to mainteine  
an army. Superuouse fur-  
nitures do also delite, and  
countenance of life, w<sup>th</sup>

B. iii.

syne-

Atq; illę quidem iniurię,  
quę nocendi causa de in-  
dustria inferuntur, sepe a  
metu proficiscuntur: cum  
is qui alteri nocere cogi-  
tat, timet, ne nisi id alteri  
fecerit, ipse aliquo afficia-  
tur incommodo. Maximā  
autem partem ad iniuriā  
faciendam aggrediuntur  
nonnulli, vt adipiscantur  
ea quę concupierunt: in  
quo vicio latissimē patet a-  
uaritia. Expetuntur autē  
diuitię, tum ad vsus vitę  
necessarios, tum ad perfru-  
endas volaptates. In qui-  
bus autem maior est ani-  
mus, in his pecunię cupi-  
ditas spectat ad opes, et  
ad gratificandi facultatē,  
vt nuper M. Crassus nega-  
bat vllam satis magnam  
pecuniam esse ei, qui in re-  
pub. princeps vellet esse,  
cuius fructibus, exercitum  
alere non posset. Delectāt  
etiam magnifici appara-  
tus, vixq; cultus, cum

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elegātia & copia. Quibus rebus effectū est, vt infinita pecunię cupiditas esset.

Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocēs vituperāda est, sed fugienda sēp iniuria. Maxime autē adducūtur pleriq; , vt eos iusticię capiat obliuio, cū in impiorū, honorū, glorię cupiditatē inciderit.

qd' enim apud Ennium,

**NULLA SANCTA**

**SOCIETAS, NEC FI-**

**DES REGNI EST,** Id

latius patet. Nā q̄cquid eu-

ijsmodi est in quo nō pos-

sint plures excellere, in eo

plerūq; fit tāta cōtētio, vt

difficillimū sit factā serua-

re societate. Declarauit id

modo temeritas C. Cēsaris

qui oīa iura diuina &

humana puertit ppter eū

quē sibi ipse opinionis er-

rore finxerat principatū.

Est autem in hoc genere

molestum, quōd in maxi-

mis animis, splēdidissimis-

q; ingenijs plerūq; existūt

synnēsse, and plenty. By which meanes it is come to passe that endlesse is the desire of riches.

And truelye the enlargement of a mannes priuate goodes, hurtfull to no body, is not to bee dispraised, but euermore iniurie is to be shonned. But the moste parte of menne chiefly be brought to forgette iustice: when they fall into the desyre of rule, honour, or glorye. For that whiche is in Ennius,

In Empire is no godlye felowship, nor no faith, reacheth further. For what souer is of suche sorte, wherein many cannot bee chiefe, therein commonlye happeneth so greate contention, that verie harde it is to keepe a godly societie. The stoyme of Caius Cesar declared that of late who tourned topsettozie al the lawes of God, and manne, for that soueraineties sake, whiche he to himselfe, by the erreure of his owne conceit, had imagined. And in this kynd, it is a griefull case, that desires of ho-

of honoz, rule, power, & glo-  
ry be cōmonly in y<sup>e</sup> greatest  
corages, & goodlyc wits.  
Wherefore the more heede  
must be taken, y<sup>e</sup> we offēde  
no thing in that behalfe.

But there is a great di-  
fferēcie in al iniustice, whē  
ther the wrong bee done of  
any sturre of y<sup>e</sup> mynd, whē  
che cōmonly is but short, &  
for a season, or els of pur-  
pose & aduisedlye. For the  
harmes bee calier, that be-  
fall of some sodaine mode,  
thā such as bee done being  
deuised and prepared for.  
And thus wee haue sayde  
enough of doing iniury.

But there are wont to  
bee many causes why wee  
refuse to defend an other, &  
do leaue our duitie. For  
men bee vnwilling to take  
vpon the either displeasure  
or trauaile or charges, or  
els they be so geuē to negli-  
gence, slouthfulnes, ydle-  
nes, priuate studies, or cer-  
teine businesse, that they  
suffer them to be helplessse,  
whom they ought to saue  
harmedlesse. Wherefore we  
must looke lest it bee not  
sufficient, that is spoken of

honoris, imperij, potentie,  
glorie cupiditates. Quo  
magis cauēdū est, ne quid  
ī eo genere peccetur. Sed  
in omni iniusticia p multū  
interest vtrū pturbatione  
aliqua animi, quē plerūq;  
breuis est, & ad tēpus, an  
consultō & cogitatō fiat  
iniuria. Leuiores enim sūt  
ea, quē repentino aliquo  
motu accidūt, quā ea, quē  
meditata & preparata in-  
ferūtur. Ac de inferenda  
quidē iniuria satis est dic-  
tū Pretermittēdē autē de-  
fensionis, deserēdiq; officij  
plures solēt esse causę. Nā  
aut inimicitias, aut laborē  
aut etiā negligētia, pigri-  
tia, inertia, aut suis studijs,  
quibusdamuē occupati-  
onibus sic impediuntur,  
vt eos quos tutari debe-  
ant, desertos esse patian-  
tur. Itaque videndū est, ne  
non satis sit id, quod apud



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Platonem est in Philosophos dictum: quod in veri inuestigatione versentur, quodque ea, quę plerique vehementer expectunt, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemnant, & pro nihilo ducāt, propterea iustos esse. Nam dum alterum iusticię genus assequuntur, in inferenda, ne cui noceant, iniuria, in alterum incidunt. Discēdi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ad Rempublicam ne accessuros quidem putat, nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri, nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit: si est voluntarium. Sunt etiam qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendę, aut odio quodam hominum suum se negotium agere dicant, ne facere cuiquam

Plato touching the Philosophers, that therefore thei be iust, because thei be occupped in tracing out trouthe: and because they despyse, and set at noughte suche thinges as the moste part of men greedely desire and amōg them selues are wont to be at daggers drawīg for y same. For while they attaine one kinde of iustice, that they hurte no man with doing of iniury, they fal into the other. For beyng letted with the study of lerning, they forsake them, whom they ought to defende. And therefore hee thinks they woulde not enter into y comon weale, were they not compelled. But it were moze reason, that voluntarily it shoulde bee doone. For what so is righte doone, the same thereby is iust, if it bee voluntarie. There bee also who cyther for loue of sauinge theire substance, or a certaine hatred to men, do say, that they meddle onlpe with their own matters, lest the maye seeme to doe any

anye bodye wzonge, who, whie they be boide of one kind of iniustice, do runne into the other. For they forsake the selowshippe of life, beecause they bestowe no study, no labour, noz substance vpon it.

Seeing then after the declaring of the two kindes of iniustice, wee haue ther to ioynded the causes of eyther kynde & haue sette out those things afore, where in iustice is contained, wee may easely iudge, what ys the duitie of euery season, excepte wee fauoure oure selues to farre. For it ys harde to haue a carefulnes ouer other mens matters, although that same Chremes in Terence counteth nothing straunge to hym, of ought that perteynes to manne.

¶ Neuerthelesse, because we perceiue and feele those thinges moze, that do happen to oure selues, eyther luckely, or vnfortunatelly, than such as befall to other which (as ye would saye) we behold a great way of, we iudge otherwise of the  
then

videantur iniuriâ, qui dū altero iniustitię genere vacant, in alterum incurrūt. Deserūt enim vitę societatem: quia nichil conferunt in eam studij, nihil opere, nihil facultatū. Quoniam igitur duobus generibus iniustitię propositis adiunxim⁹ causas vtriusq; generis, easque res ante cōstituiamus, quibus iusticia cōtinetur: facile quod cuiusq; temporis officium sit, poterimus (nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus) iudicare. Est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum, quāquā Terētianus ille Chremes humani nihil a se alienum putat. Sed tamen quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus, quę nobis ipsis aut prospera, aut aduersa eueniunt, quā illa quę ceteris, quę quasi longo interuallo interiecto videmus, aliter de illis;

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ac de nobis iudicamus.  
Quocirca bene precipiunt  
qui vetant quicquid agere,  
quod dubites equum sit, an  
iniquum. Aequitas enim lu-  
cet ipsa per se, dubitatio au-  
tem cogitationem significat  
iniurie. Sed incidunt saepe  
tempora, cum ea quae maxi-  
me videtur digna esse ius-  
to homine, eoque, quod virum  
bonum dicimus, commutatur,  
fiuntque contraria: ut non  
reddere depositum, etiam  
ne furioso promissum face-  
re, quaeque pertinent ad ve-  
ritatem, et ad fidem ea ne-  
gare interdum, & non ser-  
uare sit iustum. Referri enim  
decet ad ea, quae posui in  
principio fundamenta iusti-  
ciae: primum, ut ne cui no-  
ceatur: deinde ut communi  
utilitati seruiatur. Ea cum  
tempore commutatur commu-  
tatur officium: ut non semper sit  
idem. Potest enim accidere  
promissum aliquod, & conuen-  
tum, ut id effici sit inutile,

then of our selues. Ther-  
fore they teache well, that  
forbidde to doe any thinge  
whiche ye doubt, whether  
it be right or wrong. For  
very right shineth of it self  
but doubtinge declares an  
imagination of wrong.  
But often there befall ca-  
ses, that those duities,  
whiche seeme to bee most  
meet for a iuste man, and  
him whom we call a good  
manne bee chaunged and  
become contrarious: so that  
some time it is iuste not to  
restore that is laide to kepe,  
also not to perfourme pro-  
mise with a mad manne,  
and to denye those thinges  
which concerne ones trothe  
and honestie. For it is  
meet, they bee referred to  
those foundations of ius-  
tice, whiche I laide in the  
beginninge: first, that no  
manne be hurt, nexte, that  
common profit bee serued.  
When these bee chaunged  
by time, chaunged is dui-  
tie, that it remaines not al-  
wayes a lyke. For there  
may chaunce some promise  
and couenant that may be  
unprofitable to be perfor-  
med



med either to him, to whō  
it is promised: or elz to him  
that promised it. For (as it  
is in the fables) if Neptu-  
mus had not doone that to  
Theseus hee promised,  
Theseus had not bene be-  
rest of his sōne Hippolit⁹.  
For of the three bonds (as  
is witten) that was the  
thirde, whiche in his surp  
hee asked for the deathe of  
Hippolit⁹: and when he  
had obtained it, he fell in-  
to heauy waylingz. Ther-  
fore neither those promisez  
are to bee fulfilled, whych  
are vnprofitable to them,  
to whom you made them:  
nor if they hurte you more  
then they profite him, whō  
you promised.

It is against dutie, the  
greater harme to be rather  
admitted, than the lesse: as  
if you haue appointed your  
self, with any man to come  
as his counsellor in his mat-  
ter, that is in hand: & in the  
meane seasō, your sōne be-  
gins to fall soze sick, let yt  
not be reckened against du-  
tie, not to pfourme y<sup>e</sup> pe p-  
mised: yea & he more shold  
swarue frō duty, to whō  
promys

vel ei cui promissum sit,  
vel ei qui promiserit. Nā  
si (vt in fabulis est,) Nep-  
tunus quod Theseo pro-  
miserat, non fecisset: The-  
seus filio Hippolito non  
esset orbatus: ex tribus e-  
nim optatis, (vti scribi-  
tur) hoc erat tertium,  
quod de Hippoliti inte-  
ritu iratus optauit, quo  
impetrato in maximos  
luctus incidit. Nec pro-  
missa igitur seruanda sūt  
ea, que sint ijs, quibus p-  
miseris inuilia, nec si  
plus tibi noceant, quā  
illi prosint, cui promiseris.

Contra officium est, ma-  
ius dānum anteponi mi-  
nori, vt si constitueris te  
cuiuspiam aduocatum in  
rem presentem esse ven-  
turum, atque interim gra-  
uiter ægrotare filius cœ-  
perit, non sit contra offi-  
cium, non facere quod  
dixeris, magisque ille, cui

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promissum sit, ab officio  
discedat, si se destitutum  
queratur. Iam illis pro-  
missis non standum esse  
quis non videt, quæ coac-  
tus quis metu, aut decep-  
tus dolo promiserit. Quæ  
quidem pleraque iure pre-  
torio liberantur, nonnul-  
la legibus. Existunt etiam  
sepe iniuriæ calumnia qua-  
dam, et nimis calida, et  
malitiosa iuris interpreta-  
tione. Ex quo illud, sum-  
mum ius, summa iniuria,  
factum est iam tritum ser-  
mone prouerbum. Quo  
in genere etiā in Repub.  
multa peccantur: ut ille  
qui, cum centum triginta  
dierum essent cum hoste  
pactæ induciæ, noctu po-  
pulabatur agros, quod di-  
erum essent pactæ, nō noc-  
tium induciæ: Nec noster  
quidem probandus est:  
si verum est, Quintum  
Fabium Labeonē, seu quē

promis was made, yf hee  
would complaine him selfe  
to be disapoint. d.

Now who seeth not that  
it is not meete, to stand to  
those promises, whiche a  
man hath promised beeing  
constrained with feare, or  
deluded with guyle. which  
thinges, for the most part,  
bee discharged by the Pre-  
tors court, & manye of the  
by statute.

Wronges also oftē times  
do rise vppon a certein ca-  
uillation, and ouer crafty,  
and suttile misconstruyng  
of the lawe wherevppon  
that saying, Extreme law,  
extreme wronge, is nowe  
made a well wzorne pro-  
uerbe in communicacion.  
In whiche kynde manye  
thinges bee done amisse e-  
uen in the common sweales  
matters, as he, who when  
the truce was taken with  
the enemy, for 130. dayes,  
oue rranne his land in the  
night because y truce was  
taken for daies, and not for  
nighetes. No nor yet oure  
countremā is to bee allowed  
(if it be true) y Quintus  
Fabius Labco, or any other  
man

man (for I haue nothinge but by hearesaye) being by the Senate apointed daish-man to the Polones, and Neapolitanes, about the boundes of their land, dyd commune wyth eyther of them apart, when he came to y place that they should not do, nor cohet any thing gredelye, and that rather they woulde sette backe, than encroche vppen eche other. whiche when either of them hadde so don, there was a parcell of grounde lefte in the middes. And so hee caused their boundes to bee staked out, euen as they had tolde him the residue, that was in y middes hee adiudged to the people of Rome. This plainely is to deceaue, & not to iudge. Wherefore suche wylinesse in euerye case ys to bee auoyded.

There be certeine duitys also to be obserued eue towarde them of whom you haue receiued wrong. For in reuenge, & chastisement, there is a measure to be vsed. And I wote not, whether it be sufficient for him

that

alium, (nichil enim preter auditum habeo) arbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus agri a Senatu datum: cum ad locum venisset, cum vtrisque separatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, nec appeterent, atque ut regredi, quam progredi mallet. Id cum vtrique fecisset, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum fines, sicut ipsi dixerant, terminauit, in medio relictum quod erat, Populo Roma. adiudicauit. Decipere hoc quidem, non iudicare est.

Quo circa in omni re fugienda est talis solertia.

Sunt autem quedam officia etiam aduersus eos seruanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Est enim vlciscendi & puniendi modus. Atque haud scio, an satis sit eum qui



## de Officiis,

lacefferit, iniurię suę peni-  
tere, vt et ipse ne quid tale  
posthac committat, et ce-  
teri sint ad iniuriam tardi-  
ores. Atque in Repub.  
maxime conseruanda sūt  
iura belli. Nam cū sint  
duo genera decertandi:  
vnū per disceptationē, al-  
terū per vim, cūmq, illud  
propriū sit hominis, hoc  
beluarum, cōfugiendū est  
ad posterius, si vti nō licet  
superiore. Quare suscipi-  
enda quidem bella sūt ob  
eam causam, vt sine iniu-  
ria in pace viuatur, parta  
autem victoria, cōseruan-  
di sunt ij qui nō crudeles  
in bello, nec immanes fue-  
rūt: vt maiores nostri Tus-  
culanos, Aequos, Volscos,  
Sabinos, Hernicos in ciui-  
tatē etiā acceperūt: at Char-  
thaginē & Numatiā fūdi-  
tas sustulerūt. Nollem Co-  
rinthū: sed credo illos se-  
cutos opportunitatē loci,

that began to repent hym  
of y wrong: but that he bee  
punished, that he cōmit not  
the like offence again: and  
that other also may be the  
sloower to do wrong.

And the lawe of armes  
must in any wise be kept,  
in y cōmō weal. For wher  
as there be two kindes of  
contēciō, one by reasoning  
an other by violence: & the  
first is the property of mā,  
& second, of beast: we must  
fly to the latter, if we may  
not vse the former.

Wherefore to this ende, &  
purpose wec must enter in  
warre: y wout iniury we  
maye liue in peace: & whē  
the victorpe is gotten, they  
must be saued, whoc haue  
not ben cruel, nor vnnerci-  
ful in fight: as our aunce-  
ters euen into y citie recei-  
ued the Tusculanes, & E-  
quisnes, the Volscianes,  
& Sabines, & y Vernikes:  
but they vtterly razed Car-  
tage, and Numance. Co-  
rinth I woulde they had  
not, but I beline, they  
chieflye respected the situ-  
acion: lest the verpe place  
might

might encourage them, at any time to moue warre.

After my mynd certesse, it is mere alwaies to geue counsel to peace, that shall haue in it no fraude, nor guyle. wherein if men had agreed to me, wee shoulde haue hadde, althoughe not the best, yet some comuon weale, which now is none. And not onely for them ye must prouyde, whome by force you haue subdued, but they also, who come in with yelded weapons, bypon affiaunce in the Captaine (although y<sup>e</sup> Hamme hath bated the wall) are to bee receiued. In which point, iustice hath bene so greatly regarded with our men, that they, who had taken cities to mercy, or nations conquered in warre, should be their patrones, by the custome of our ancestors. And the Iustice of warre is moste sincerely descriued, in the feciall lawe of the people of Rome. whereby it may be perceiued, that no warr is iust, but whiche either for

things

maxime ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem sententia, paci, que nihil habitura sit insidiarum semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi obtemperatum esset: etsi non optimam, at aliquam Remp. (que nunc nulla est) haberemus. At cum ijs, quos vi deuiceris, consulendum est: tum ijs, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fide con fugiunt (quamuis murum aries percusserit) recipiendi sunt. In quo tantopere apud nostros iusticia culta est, ut ijs, qui ciuitates, aut nationes deuictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum. Ac belli quidem equitas sanctissime feciali Populi Romani iure per scripta est. Ex quo intelligi potest, nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut

## de Officiis.

rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante sit, et indictum. Pompilius imperator tenebat prouinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius Tiro militabat. Cum autem Pompilio videretur vnam dimittere legionem: Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset: Cato ad Pompilium scripsit, ut si eum pateretur in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obligaret militie sacramento: quia priore amisso, iure pugnare cum hostibus non poterat. Adeo summa erat observatio in bello mouendo. Marci quidem Catonis senis est epistola ad M. filium: in qua scripsit se audisse eum missum factum esse a Consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. monet igitur, ut caueat, ne

things in claime is moued, or is proclaimed befoze, & bidden by defiaunce. Pompilius & Romans general kepte a prouince, in whose army, Catoes sonne went for a yong soldiour a warfare. And when it lyked Pompilius to discharge one legion, he discharged Catoes sone also, who serued in that legion as a souldior. But when hee, for loue of the warres, remained in & campe still, Cato did write to Pompilius, that yf hee would suffer him to remain in & army, he should sweare him souldiour agayne, because he might not lawfully fyght with the enemy, & former other being discharged. So passing gret regard they had in making their warres. There is a letter abrode, of Marcus Cato, & old man, to Marcus his sonne, wherein hee wrote that he heard, he was discharged by the Consul, being a souldiour in Macedonia, at & Persia warres. He warnes him therefore to beware, & hee enter not the



the battell: for hee deniethe  
that it is lawfull for him,  
that is no souldier, to fight  
with the enemy. And this  
also I note, that he which  
by his proper name was  
Perduellis, & is to meane  
an open enemy, was called  
Hostis, the mildnes of the  
worde asswaging the ha-  
nousnesse of the thing. For  
hee was called Hostis &  
our aunceters, whom now  
we name Peregrinus &  
stranger. That the twelve  
tables declare, Aut status  
dies cum hoste & againe,  
Aduersus hostem æter-  
na auctoritas. What may  
ther be added to this kind  
of gentlenes: to call hym  
by so faire a name & who  
you make warre. Not &  
standinge proceesse of tyme  
makethe that name nowe  
more odious: for it is gone  
from the significacion of  
Peregrinus, that is to say  
a stranger, & properlye it  
stands for him & bereth ar-  
mour agaiſt one, but whē  
ther is fighting for empire, &  
glory

prelium ineat. Negat enim  
ius esse, qui miles non sit,  
pugnare cum hoste. Equi-  
dē illud etiam animaduer-  
to, quod qui proprio nomi-  
ne perduellis esset, is hostis  
vocaretur, lenitate verbi  
tristitiam rei mitigante.

Hostis enim apud maiores  
nostros is dicebatur, quem  
nunc peregrinum dicimus  
Indicant. XII. tabule.

AVT STATUS DIES  
CVM HOSTE Itemque  
ADVERSVS HOS-  
TEM AETERNA AV-  
THORITAS. Quid ad

hac māsuetudinē addi po-  
test? eum quicum bellum  
geras, tā molli nomine ap-  
pellare? quāquā id nomen  
durū iam effecit vetustas:  
a peregrino enim recessit:  
& propriē in eo, qui con-  
tra ferret arma, remansit.  
Cum vero de imperio de-  
certatur, belloque queritur

C. i.

gloria

## de Officiis.

gloria causas omnino sub-  
esse, tamen oportet easdē,  
quas dixi paulo ante iustas  
causas esse bellorum. Sed  
ea bella, quib⁹ imperij glo-  
ria proposita est minus a-  
cerbè gerenda sunt. Vt e-  
nim cum civiliter conten-  
dimus, aliter si est inimicus,  
aliter si competitor: cum  
altero certamen honoris,  
et dignitatis est: cum alte-  
ro capitis, & famæ. Sic  
cum Celtiberis, cum Cim-  
bris bellum, vt cum inimi-  
cis gerebatur, vter esset,  
non vter imperaret. Cum  
Latinis, Sabinis, Samniti-  
bus Pœnis, Pyrrho, de im-  
perio dimicabatur. Pœni  
sedifragi, crudelis Annibal  
reliqui iustiores, Pyrrhi  
quidem de captiuis red-  
dendis illa præclara, sen-  
sentia est,

glory is sought by warre:  
yet it behooueth alwaies, &  
very same causes be ther  
in, which I declared a lit-  
tle before to be & iust cau-  
ses of warre. But these  
warres are not so cruellie  
to be made, which be pur-  
posed for the glory of epi-  
re. For as, whē we strue  
in y city, we do otherwile,  
if one be our enemy, other-  
wile if he bee but suter a-  
gainst vs: for w the one y  
strife is for honor, & digni-  
tie, w the other for life, &  
honesty: euen so war was  
holden w the Celtibers, &  
w the Cimbers, as w our  
enemies, whether shoulde  
liue, & not whether shoulde  
rule, but w the Latines, y  
Sabines, the Samnites,  
the Pœnes, & w Pyrrh⁹,  
the fight was about epi-  
re, & dominion. The Pœnes  
were leag breakers. Anni-  
bal was cruel, y rest were  
iust men. That is a no-  
ble saying doctlesse of Pol-  
thas, about the restoring  
of prisoners.

No golde do I craue, Nec mi aurum posco:  
 no price offer me: nec mi pretiū dederitis,  
 No hucsters of warre, Nec cauponantes bellum,  
 warremen as vve bee. sed belligerantes.  
 vvith dint for our life, Ferro non auro vitam  
 fight we, not with gold. cernamus vtriq; (hera  
 vvwhether you to raigne Vosne velit, an meregnare  
 or me the lady vvould quidue ferat fors,  
 Chace trie vve by force Virtute experiamur,  
 this ansvvere eke here: & hoc simul accipe dictū  
 vvwhose māhod the hap, Quorum virtuti belli  
 of batel vvil spare: fortuna pepercit,  
 Their fredome I pur- Eorūdem me libertati  
 pose to fauour also, parcere certum est.  
 Them geue I, thē take: Dono ducit. doq; olētib;  
 the Goddes vvil it so. cum magnis dijs.

Regalis fanē & digna  
 A princely saipng forsoth, Aeacidarum genere sen-  
 and wel beeseeming the ly- tentia.  
 nage of the Aeacidans.

Likewise if priuate men Atque etiam si quid sin-  
 driuen by occasions, shall guli temporibus adducti  
 promise oughte to the ene- hosti promiserint, est in eo  
 mye, they must kepe theire ipso fides conseruanda, vt  
 promes therin. As Regu- primo punico bello Regu-  
 lus did, that was taken of lus captus ā Pœnis:  
 the Carthaginens in the  
 first Punth warres: who,  
 when

C.ij.

cum



## de Officiis.

cū de captiuis cōmutan-  
dis Romā missus esset, iu-  
rassetq; se redditurū: pri-  
mū, vt venit, captiuos red-  
dendos in senatu non cē-  
suit. Deinde cū retineretur  
a propinquis & ab amicis:  
ad supplicium redire ma-  
luit, quā suā fidē hosti datā  
fallere. Secundo autē Pu-  
nico bello, post Cannēsem  
pugnam, quos decem An-  
niball Romam adstrictos  
misit iure iurando se reddi-  
tuos esse, nisi de redimē-  
dis ijs, qui capti erant, im-  
petrassent: eos omnes, Cē-  
sores (quoad quisque eo-  
rum vixit) qui peierassent,  
in erarijs reliquerunt. nec  
minus illū, qui iurisiuran-  
di fraude culpam inue-  
nerat.

Cū enim Annibalis per-  
missu exisset castris, redijt

whē he was sēt to Rome,  
about the enterchanginge  
of prisoners, & had ssworne  
þ he would return first as  
soone as he came, his adui-  
se was in the Senate hou-  
se, þ the prisoners shoulde  
not be restozed, afterwarð  
whē he shoulde haue bene  
stopped of his kinsfolke, &  
frends: he was moze swy-  
ling to returne to punish-  
ment, thā to break his pro-  
mes geuen to the enemye.  
And in the secōd Pūnike  
warres, after Cānas field  
þ Censors sessed at a pere-  
lye fine al those tenne (as  
long as any of thē liued, þ  
tariet stil, & were forswor-  
ne) which Annibal sent to  
Rome, vppon their othe, þ  
they shoulde returne: except  
they obtained þ rāisoming  
of those þ were prisoners  
there, & no lesse they sessed  
hī, which for þ deceiuing of  
his othe had deuised an ex-  
cuse. For when by Anny-  
bals licence, vpon his othe  
to returne, he was gonne  
about the campe, he retur-  
ned

ned him a litle while after making his excuse, that he had forgotten, I wot not what. Afterward, beyng gonne out of y<sup>e</sup> campe, hee thought himself discharged of his othe, & in words hee was, but not in dede. For alwaies in promise must be considered what ye mean, not what ye say.

But the greatest exāple of iustice toward the enemye was shewed by oure ancestors. When a runaswape traitour from Pirrh<sup>o</sup> had promised the Senate, that he would geue y<sup>e</sup> king poison, and kill hym, the Senate, and Caius Fabricius did deliuer y<sup>e</sup> runaswape traitour to Pirrh<sup>us</sup>. In such sort, & trecherie, they allowed not y<sup>e</sup> death of their enemye, and such a one, as was both mightie, & mooued warre vnprooked.

Thus of warfaringe duties ther is inough spokē. Let vs remember also, y<sup>e</sup> euen towarde the baseste sort there is a iustice to be kepte, The basest degree,

and

paulō post, quōd se oblitū nescio quid diceret. Deinde egressus ē castris, iure iurādo se solutū putabat: et erat verbis, re non erat. Séper autem in fide, quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum. Maximum autem exemplum est iustitię in hostem ā maioribus nostris constitutum. Cū a Pirrho perfuga Senatui est pollicitus, se venenum Regi daturum, et cum necaturum, Senatus, et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho dedit. Ita, ne hostis qui dem, et potentis, et bellum vltro inferentis, cum scelere interitum approba-

uit.

Ac de bellicis quidem officijs satis dictum est.

Meminerimus autem etiam aduersus infimos iustitiam esse seruandam. Est autem infima conditio &

C. iij.

fortuna

## de Officiis.

fortuna servorum: quibus and state is of slaves: whō  
 non male precipiunt, qui they, that wil ye so to use,  
 ita iubent uti, ut mercena- as hyred men, in requiring  
 riijs, ad operam exigēdam, their worke, and geuyng  
 & iusta prēbēda. Cum au- them their due, doo teach  
 tē duobus modis, id est aut you not annisse. But wher  
 vi, aut fraude fiat iniuria: as iniuries may bee doone  
 fraus quasi vulpeculę, vis two waies y is to saye, e-  
 leonis videtur: utrūque ther by force or by gyle: ge-  
 homine alienissimum: sed le seemes as of y for, force  
 fraus odio digna maiore. as of y lyon: both in trowth  
 Totius autē iniustitię nul- are verye vnfitte for man,  
 la capitalior est, quā eo- yet gyle deserueth the gre-  
 rum, qui tum cū maxi- ter hatred. But of al iniu-  
 me fallunt id tamen agūt, stice none is more pestilēt,  
 ut viri boni esse videātur. than theirs: which when  
 De iustitia satis dictū est. they begyle a man moste,  
 Deinceps, ut erat, propo- yet so handle the matter, y  
 situm, de beneficentia ac they wil seeme to bee well  
 liberalitate dicatur: qua meaning men. Of iustitia  
 quidem nihil est naturę ho here is falde ynough. Let  
 minis accōmodatius. Sed vs now speak as we pur-  
 habet multas cautiones. posed, of bountifullnesse, &  
 Videndum est enim pri- liberalitie: for nothing w-  
 mum, ne obsit benig- out doute is to the nature  
 nitas & his ipsis: qui of manne more agreeable.  
 bē benigne videbitur fieri, Notwithstanding it hath  
 diuers exceptiōs. For first  
 we must see y our bounti-  
 fulnes hurt not both thale  
 to whom bountifull ye u  
 shall seeme to bee doone.  
 and



& also other moe, next that our liberalitie be not more than our abilitie, thirdlie, & to euery man be gyuen, accordinge to his woorthynesse. For that is the foundation of iustice, whereto all these must bee applied. For boty they, & pleasure any body with that which may hurt him, whom they woulde seeme willinge to profit, ought to bee demed not bounteous, nor liberal, but pestilent flatterers, & they likewise who do hurt some, that they may be liberal to other, do fall into y same iniustice, as if they should turne other menues goodes into their owne. But there bee manye, and namely the desirous of honour and glozie, who doo catche from some, that they maye laushe to an other, & these suppose, y they shall seeme bountifull too their frendes, if they may enrich thein any maner way. But that is so farre of fro duilie that nothing may be more contrarious to dutie. We must see therefore, that

et ceteris: deinde ne maior benignitas sit, quam facultates: tum vt pro dignitate cuiq; tribuatur. Id enim est iustitię fundamentum, ad quam hec omnia sunt referenda. Nam & qui gratificatur cuiquam, quod obstat illi, cui prodesse velle videtur, non benefici, neque liberales, sed perniciosi assētores iudicādi sunt. Et qui alijs nocent: vt in alios liberales sint, in eadem sūt iniustitia, vt si in suā rem alienā conuertāt. Sunt autem multi, equidem cupidi splendoris & glorię, qui eripiūt alijs, quod alijs largiantur. Hiq; arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletēt eos quacunq; ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, vt nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, vt

C. iij.

ea

## de Officiis.

ea liberalitate vtamur, quæ  
prosit amicis, noceat nemi-  
ni. Quare L. Scyllæ, & C.  
Cæsaris pecuniarum trans-  
latio a iustis dominis ad  
alienos, non debet libera-  
lis videri. Nihil est enim li-  
berale, quod nō idē sit ius-  
tū. Alter locus erat causio-  
nis, ne benignitas maior es-  
set quam facultates: quōd  
qui benigniores esse volūt  
quam res patitur, primū in  
eo peccāt, qd' iniuriosi sūt  
in proximos. Quas enim  
copias his & suppeditari &  
qui est, et relinqui, eas trās-  
ferunt ad alienos. Inest au-  
tē in tali liberalitate cupi-  
ditas rapiēdi plerūq;, et au-  
ferendi p' iniuriā, vt ad lar-  
giēdum suppetāt copię, vi-  
dere etiam licet plerisque  
non tam natura liberales,  
quā quadam gloria in-  
ductos, vt benefici vi-  
deantur, facere multa:

we vse such liberalitie, as  
may profit our frends, and  
hinder no bodie. wherfore  
Lucius Sillaes, & Caius  
Cæsars coueyng of goodz  
from the iuste owners to  
strāgers must not be thou-  
ght liberality, for no thig  
is liberall, whiche same is  
not iust. The second point  
of exception was, y our li-  
beralitie should not be mo-  
re than our abilitie, becau-  
se whoso wil bee lauisher  
thā their goods wil beare,  
they chiefly offend in this  
that they be iniurious vn-  
to their nexte akinne. For  
they conuey y same riches  
to frende folke, whiche yt  
were moze reason bothe to  
bee delt, and left to their  
kinsfolke. And there is in  
such liberalitie a gredines  
oftentimes of catchinge, &  
pullynge aswape with in-  
iurye, that there may bee  
stoze to lashe oute. A man  
maye see some also do mu-  
che, not by nature so lybe-  
rall, as ledde with a cer-  
tayne gloze, that theye  
maye seeme bountifull,  
whiche

whiche thinges maye bee  
thought to come rather of  
a bragge thā of a free hart.

Suche a false faining is a  
nearer neibour to vanitie,  
thā either to liberalitie, or  
to honesty. The thirde res-  
traint, we spake of, is that  
in liberality ther be a choi-  
ce of woorthines, wherein  
are to be considered bothe  
his maners, vpon whō the  
benefit shall bee bestowed,  
and also his good will to-  
ward vs, & the ēterper-  
ting & fellowship of life, &  
friendly turnes done before  
to oure commodities, all  
which bee wisheful to me-  
te togeather, if not, & more  
causes, and & greatest shal  
haue in them the more  
weight.

Howbeit because we lead  
not oure life with perfyte  
men, and thoroely wise,  
but with such as in whom  
it is a goodlye matter, yf  
there be resemblaunces of  
vertue, I reckon this also  
meete to bee considered,  
that wee despise no maner  
man, in whom anye signe  
of

que proficisci ab ostentati-  
one magis quā a volūate  
videtur. Talis autē simula-  
tio vanitati est cōiunctior,  
quām aut liberalitati, aut  
honestati. Tertium est p-  
positum, vt in beneficētia  
delectus esset dignitatis: in  
quo et mores ei⁹ erūt spec-  
tādi in quē beneficiū con-  
feretur: & anim⁹ erga nos  
& cōmunitas, & societas  
vitę, & ad nostras vtilita-  
tes officia ante collata.

Que vt concurrāt omnia,  
optabile est: sin min⁹, plu-  
res causę maioresq;, ponde-  
ris plus habebunt. Quoniā  
autem viuatur non cum p-  
fectis hominibus, plenēq;  
sapientibus: sed cum ijs, in  
quibus preclare agitur si  
sint simulachra virtutis:  
etiā hoc intelligendum  
puto, neminem omnino  
esse negligendum, in  
quo aliqua significatio



## de Officiis.

virtutis appareat. Colēdū autē esse ita quenquā maximē, vt quisque maximē his virtutib<sup>9</sup> leniorib<sup>9</sup> erit ornatus, modestia, tēperātia, ac ipsa de qua iam multa dicta sūt iustitia. Nam fortis animus & magnus in homine nō pfecto, nec sapiēte, feruētior plerūq; est: illē vero virtutes bonū virum videntur pōtius attingere. Atque hęc in moribus cōsiderētur. De beneuolētia autē, quā quisque habeat erga nos primū illud est in officio. vt ei plurimū tribuam<sup>9</sup> ā quo plurimū diligimur. Sed beneuolētia non adolefcētulorum more, ardore quodā amoris, sed stabilitate pōtius. & constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, vt non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quēdā

of vertue both appere: and specially, that euery mā so be regarded, as eche man, chiefly shal bee garnished w<sup>th</sup> these gentler kindes of vertues, sober moode, tēperācie, & this same iustice, whereof alredy much hath been spoken. For a manly courage, & a great is commonly some what to feruēt in a man, & wants of perfection, and wisdomne, but those other vertues seeme rather to pertain to a good man. Thus much in manners may be considered. But concerning loue, that any man beareth toward vs, this is the chief point of duty, that we giue most to him, of whom wee are moste becloued. But wee muste measure good will, not after y<sup>e</sup> gile of yōg mē, by a certain heate of loue, but rather by assurednesse, and steadfastnesse. But in case a mannes deserting be such, that wee haue not to seeke to creepe in fauour, but to requyte his kindnesse: a certayne greater

greater care is then to bee  
 bled. For there is no duty  
 more necessariz thā requi-  
 ting of kindenesse: And if  
 Hesiodus wils ye, w<sup>th</sup> lar-  
 ger measure (if ye may) to  
 restore suche thinges as ye  
 haue borrowed to occupie:  
 what thē ought we to do,  
 prouoken by benefites?  
 Must we not doo like the  
 frutefull feeldes, that yeld  
 much more thā they recei-  
 ued: For if we stik not to  
 bestow plesures vpon thē,  
 who we hope, will profite  
 vs hereafter: what maner  
 men ought wee to bee to-  
 ward them, that haue don  
 vs good alreadie? For  
 wheras ther be two kinds  
 of liberalitie: one of doing  
 a benefite, an other of re-  
 quiting: whether we will  
 do it or no, is in our owne  
 choise: but to leaue oughte  
 vnrquired, is not lawfull  
 for a good man: so he maye  
 doo it without iniurie.  
 But there bee respects to  
 be had of benefites recei-  
 ued: and there is no doubt,  
 but most is due to the gre-  
 test.

Wherem

cura adhibenda est. Nullū  
 enim officium referenda  
 gratia magis necessarium  
 est. Quōd si ea q̄ acceperis  
 vtenda, maiore mensura  
 (si modo possis) iubet red-  
 dere Hesiodus: quidnam  
 beneficio prouocati facere  
 debemus? An non imitari  
 agros fertiles, qui multo  
 plus afferunt, quā accepe-  
 rūt? Etenim si in eos, quos  
 speramus nobis pfuturos,  
 non dubitamus officia cō-  
 ferre: quales in eos esse de-  
 bemus, qui iam profuerūt?  
 Nam cū duo genera li-  
 beralitatis sint, vnum dan-  
 di beneficij, alterum red-  
 dendi, demus necne in no-  
 stra potestate est: non red-  
 dere, bono viro non licet,  
 modo id facere possit sine  
 iniuria. Acceptorum autē  
 beneficiorum sunt delec-  
 tus habendi. Nec dubium,  
 quin maximo cuiq; pluri-  
 mum debeat.

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In quo tamen imprimis quo quisq; animo, studio, beneuolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim multa faciunt temeritate quadam sine iudicio, vel modo in omnes: vel repentino quodam quasi vento, impetu animi incitati: quæ beneficia æque magna non sunt habenda, atque ea, quæ iudicio, consideratè, constanterque delata sunt. Sed in collocando beneficio, et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sint, hoc maxime officij est, ut quisq; maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari. Quod contra fit a plerisque. A quo enim plurimum sperant, etiam si ille ijs non eget, tamen ei potissimum inseruiunt. Optime autem societas hominum, coniunctioque seruabitur, si ut quisq; erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum

wherei specially yet it is to be feared of what mynde, affection & good will, a man hath done it. For many make do many things of a certain heedynesse, without discrecion, or measure toward euery man, or els by a certain sudden braide of mynd caried, as with the wind, whiche benefites are not to be counted a like greates, as those, & bee offered with the iudgement aduisedly, and constantly. But in placing of benefit, and requiting kindnes (if all other things be correspondent) this is a principal point of duetie, & as euery man most needeth help so him most of all we ayde, which contrariwise is done of a great many, for of whom they hope moste, although hee hath no neede of the, yet to him theye are moste seruisable.

But the feloweshyppe, and neyghbourhoode of menne shall best be mainteyned, if as euery man shall bee necest vs, so on hym wee bestowe moste libera-



liberalitie. But what bee  
 natures principles of ney-  
 bozhood, & the felowshyp of  
 mā. I thinke good to fetch  
 somewhat farther of. For  
 the first is that, whiche is  
 to see in the felowshyp of  
 al mākind. The bodi wher  
 of is reason, & speche, whi-  
 che by teaching, learninge,  
 cōferring reasoning & iud-  
 ging, winneth one man to  
 an other, & ioineth thē in a  
 certain natural felowshyp.  
 For by anye thing furder  
 we differ frō the nature of  
 sauage beasts, in whō wee  
 say ostentines there is an  
 hardinesse, as in hozes, &  
 lions, but wee neuer saye,  
 they haue iustice, equitie, &  
 goodnes, for they be voide  
 of reason, & of speach. And  
 surely this is y<sup>e</sup> felowshyp  
 y<sup>e</sup> spreadeth most largelye  
 & men among thēselues,  
 and with al among all, in  
 y<sup>e</sup> which ther must be kept  
 a cōmonnes of all thyngs,  
 that nature hath bredde to  
 the common vse of man, so  
 as the things, whiche bee  
 appointed

conferetur. Sed quę natu-  
 re principia sūt cōmunita-  
 tis & societatis humane, re-  
 petēdum alti<sup>9</sup> videtur. Est  
 enim primū qd' cernitur ī  
 vniuersi generis humani  
 societate. Eius autē vincu-  
 lū est ratio & oratio, q̄ do-  
 cēdo, discendo, cōmunicā-  
 do, disceptādo, iudicando,  
 conciliat inter se homines,  
 cōiungitq; naturali quadā  
 societate. Neq; vlla re lōgi<sup>9</sup>  
 absumus a natura ferarū,  
 in quibus iesse fortitudinē  
 sepe dicim<sup>9</sup>, vt in equis, in  
 leonibus: iustitiā, equitatē,  
 bonitatē, nō dicimus, sunt  
 enim rationis, & orationis  
 expertes. Ac latissime qui-  
 dē patens hominibus in-  
 ter ipsos, omnibus inter ō-  
 nes societas hec est: in qua  
 ōnium rerum, quas ad cō-  
 munem vsū hominū natu-  
 ra genuit, est seruanda cō-  
 munitas, vt q̄ descripta sūt

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legibus, & iure civili, hæc ita teneantur, vt sit constitutum, & quibus ipsis ceteris sic obseruētur, vt in grecis proverbio est. *A-*  
*lium esse communia*  
*omnium.* Omnia autem communia hominum videntur ea, quæ sunt generis eiusdem, qd' ab Ennio positum in vna re, transferri in multas potest. vt homo, qui errati cōiter monstrat viam:

Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit,

Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat cum illi accenderit.

Vna enim ex re satis precipitur, vt quicquid sine detrimento possit commodari, id tribuatur cuique, vel ignoto. Ex quo sunt illa communia, non prohibere aquam profluentem, pati ab igne ignem capere

appointed by statutes, and the ciuill law, bee obserued in such sort, as it is ordeyned, beside which, al other things are so to bee obserued as is in the Greeke proverb: *Emonge frendes all things bee comon.* But all those things seme common to al men which be of that kind, as, being put for example bye Ennius in one thing, maye bee applied to many. The mā, that geth shewes the way vnto the wāding wight, dothe, as if he a candle should at his own cādel light. That na-theles it light himself whē lighted is the other.

For ynoughe is taught by one example: that whatsoeuer we may lende without hinderance, it bee graunted to euery bodye, yea to the vknownen.

Whereupon these thinges bee common: Not to forbidde one the rūning water: To suffer one & wyll, to take fire at our fire:

To

To geue faithfull counsell  
to him that asketh aduise:  
which thinges bee profita-  
ble to those, that receiue  
them, and nothing burde-  
nous to the geuer, where-  
fore we must both vse the-  
se thinges, & somewhat al-  
waies must we do to fur-  
der the cōmon profit. But  
sith eche pryncer mā's sub-  
stance is small, & the mul-  
titude is endlesse, that neede  
the common liberalitie must  
be referred to that end of  
Ennius: That nathelesse  
it light him selfe: So as  
there may bee an abilitie,  
wherewith we may be ly-  
beral to our owne. There  
bee ind degrees yet of the  
fellowship of men. For, to  
leane that endles number,  
there is a nuer degree, to  
bee of one countrey, of one  
nation, of one language,  
by the which men be chief-  
ly knit together. & heere  
also it is, to bee of one cy-  
tie. For there bee manye  
thinges common to citizens  
amongst

si quis velit, cōsiliū fide-  
le deliberāti dare: quē sit  
ijs vtilia, qui accipiunt, de-  
ti non molesta. Quare &  
ijs vtendum est, & semper  
aliquid ad communem v-  
tilitatem afferendum. Sed  
quoniam copiae paruae sin-  
gulorum sunt: eorum au-  
tem, qui his egeant, infinita  
est multitudo, vulgaris  
liberalitas referenda est  
ad illum Ennij finem, ni-  
hilominus vt ipsi luceat.  
vt facultas sit, qua in nos-  
tros finis liberales.

Gradus autem plures sunt  
societatis hominum. Vt  
enim ab illa discedatur in-  
finitate, propior est eiusdē  
gentis, nationis, linguæ  
qua maximē homines cō-  
iunguntur. Interius etiam  
est eiusdem esse ciuitatis.  
Multa enim sunt ciuibus



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inter se cōmunia, forū, fa-  
na, porticus, vię, leges, iura,  
iudicia, suffragia, cōsuetu-  
dines, pręterea, & familiari-  
tates, multęq; cū multis res  
rationesq; cōtractę. Arcti-  
or vero colligatio est soci-  
etatis propinquorū. Ab il-  
la enim immēsa societate  
humani generis, in exiguū,  
angustūque concluditur.  
Nā cū sit hoc natura com-  
mune omnium animatiū,  
vt habeāt libidinem pro-  
creandi: primo societas in  
ipso est coniugio: proxima  
in liberis: deinde vna do-  
mus, communia omnia. Id  
autem est principium vr-  
bis, & quasi seminariū Re-  
ip. Sequūtur fratrum con-  
iunctiones, post consobri-  
norum, sobrinorūque: qui  
cū vna domo iam capi  
non possunt, in alias do-  
mos tanquam in colonias  
exeunt.

among theselues: as lawes,  
courts, churches, galleries,  
walkes, hie waies, statutes,  
lawes, iudgemēts, boices,  
customs: & besides these,  
familiarities, & hauing to  
do in sundry matters, and  
bargains & sundry folke.

But a faster knitting of  
men together, is the felow-  
ship of kinnsfolk. For out of  
y innumerable felowship  
of mankind it is driuen to  
a little, & narrow compass.  
For where as by nature  
this is cōmon to all liuyng  
creatures, to haue a lust to  
engēdering: the first felow-  
ship is in verie wedlocke:  
the nexte in children, and  
after that, one house, and  
all thinges common. And  
this is the original of a ci-  
tie and as it were y seed-  
plotte of a common wea-  
le. Then follow the kyn-  
reds of brytherne, after of  
brothers and sisters chil-  
dren, who, whē they now  
cannot be contained in one  
house, get them abroade to  
other houses, as into new  
townes.

Then

Then foloweth entermarriages, & alliances, of whiche also mo kinsfolke doe aryse. Which multiplicacion, and succession of the roote of commō weales. Surely the matchinge of bloodes, and good wil that ryseth thereof, knittech men in loue together. For it ys a greate matter to haue the like monumentes of aunceters, to vse al one religion, and to haue y same burial places.

But of all felowshippes there is none better, none more assured, than whan good men alyke in condicions be enfellowshipt in familiarite together. For that honesty (whiche wee haue often mencioned) although we se it in another yet it moueth vs & maketh vs frindes to him in whose the same seemeth to dwel. And though al vertue allureth vs to her, and causeth vs to loue the, in whose she seemeth to harbor: yet iustice and liberality worketh that most of all. But there is nothing that winneth

Sequuntur connubia, & affinitates: ex quibus etiā plures propinqui. Quę p pogatio & soboles, origo est rerū publicarum, sanguinis autē coniunctio, & beneuolētia deuincit charitate homines. Magnum est enim eadē habere monumenta maiorum, eisdē vt sacris sepulchra habere communia. Sed omnium societatum nulla prestantior est, nulla firmior, quā cū viri boni moribus similes familiaritate coniuncti sunt. Illud enim honestum (quod sepe diximus) etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos mouet, atq; illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. Et quanquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit, facitq; vt eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur: tamē iustitia, & liberalitas id maximē efficit. Nihil autē

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amabilius, nec copulati<sup>us</sup> quàm morum similitudo bonorum. In quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eedēq; voluntates: in his fit, vt eque quisq; altero delectetur, ac se ipso: efficiturq; id quod Pithagoras vult in amicitia, vt vnus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa **communitas** est societatum, quę conficitur ex beneficijs vtrō citrōq; datis, acceptisq;. Quę mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma deuinciuntur societate. Sed cū omnia ratione, animoq; lustraueris, omnium societatum nulla est gratior, nulla charior, quàm ea, quę cum republica est vnicuique nostrum.

Chari sunt parentes, chari liberi, propinqui, familiares: sed omnes omnium charitates patria vna

neth more loue, nor suerly<sup>er</sup> knitteth men together, then a likenesse in good conditions. For in whome be like desires, & like mindes: it happeneth among them, that eyther with other ys as much delyted, as with him selfe: & it is broughte to passe, that Withagozas requires in amitie, that many become one.

That commō felowship also is great, which groweth of benefits to and fro, geuen and taken. Whiche while they bee comen frō one to an other, and pleasurefull: they among whō those happen, bee tyed in a fast felowship.

But when ye haue persced all these things in your reason, and mynd: of all felowshippes there is none more acceptable, nor dearer, then the same, whiche every one of vs hath with the common weale.

Dere be our parēts, dere be our childzen, dere be our kinsfolk, and familiars: but our countrey countrynes in yt alone all the dere



deere loue of them all : for the which, what good mā doubtles to take his death, if hee may profite y same: whereby their beastly cruelty is the more to bee abhorred : who haue rent a sunder their countrey w all maner of mischief, and both bee and haue been occupied in the vtter ouerthrowing therof.

But if question of comparison be made, to whom the greatest duty ought to be yelded: oure countrey, & Parents bee the chiefe, by whose benefites wee are most bound, our children, & all our whole family bee y next: which hang all vpon vs alone, & can haue none other refuge, then bee oure kinsfolke, that agree well with vs, which comonlye stand in the like estate.

wherefore the necessarye aydes of life bee due to the chieflly, whome I spake of before, but conuersacion and commonnesse of table, counseylinges, communicacions, exhortacions, comfortynges, yea

and

cōplexa est: pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortē opterere, si ei sit profutur⁹? Quō est detestabilior isto rum immanitas, qui lacerarūt omni scelere patriā, et in ea funditus delenda occupati & sūt, et fuerūt. Sed si contentio quēdam, & cōparatio fiat, quibus plurimū tribuendū sit officij, principes sint, patria, & parentes, quorū beneficijs maximis obligati sumus: p̄ximi, liberi, totaq; domus quę spectat in nos solos, neq; aliud vllū potest habere pfugiū. Deinceps bene cōuenientes p̄pinqui quibuscum cōmunis etiā fortuna plerumq; est. Quāmobrē necessaria vitę p̄sidia debentur ijs maximē, quos ante dixi, vita autē victusq; cōmunis cōsilia, sermones, cohortaciones, cōsolac̄ iterdū etiā

D.ij.

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oburgationis, in amicitijs and chidinges otherwhyle  
vigent maximè, estq; ea iu among frindes be most v-  
cundissima amicitia, quam sed: and that is the plesan-  
similitudo morum cōiuga test frendshippe, whyche  
uit. Sed in his omnibus of likenesse of condicionz hath  
ficijs tribuēdis, videndum poked in one.  
erit quid cuiq; maximè ne But in doing al these du-  
cesse sit & quid quisq; ties, we must mark what  
nobiscum, vel sine nobis, aut is most needefull for euery  
possit consequi, aut non man and what euery body  
possit. Itaq; non ijdē erūt is able, or vnable by vs,  
necessitudinū gradus, qui or without vs, to attaine.  
& tēporū. Sunt quedā offi- So the degrees of frend-  
cia, quę alijs magis, quam shippes shall not bee alyke  
alijs debeantur: vt vicinū with the degrees of timez;  
citius adiuueris in fructib⁹ and there be duties which  
percipiendis quā aut fra are due to some, more then  
trem, aut familiarem. At si to other some: as you shall  
lis in iudicio sit, propin- sooner helpe youre neigh-  
quum potius & amicum, bour in innunge hys corne,  
quā vicinum defende- then either youre brother,  
ris. Hec igitur et talia cir- or your familiar frend: but  
cumspicienda sunt in om- if there bee a traucrs in  
ni officio, et consuetudo, la we: you shall rather de-  
exercitatioq; capienda, vt fende youre kinsman, and  
boni, ratiocinatores offi- frende, than youre neygh-  
ciorū esse possimus & ad- bour. These therefore  
dēdo, deducēdoq; videre and suche lyke must be tho-  
rowly considered in euery  
duty: and we must so vse,  
and practise oure selues,  
that we may be good cōit-  
makers of duties, and see  
by addyng and deducting,  
what

What summe riseth of the  
rest: whereupon we maye  
vnderstand, howe much is  
due to euery manne. But  
as neither physicians, nor  
captaines, nor oratours, al-  
thoughe they haue concep-  
ued the rules of their sci-  
ence, can attaine any thing  
worthy great praise, with-  
out vse, and practise: so  
those rule of keepynge du-  
tye are in dede taught vs,  
that we our selues should  
putte them in vze: but the  
hardenesse of the matter  
also requireth vse and ex-  
ercise.

And how honestye, from  
whiche duetie springeth, is  
fetcht out of those things  
that be within the lawe of  
mans felowship: wee haue  
in a maner said ynough.

But we must note, that  
where as there bee foure  
general kindes of vertues  
pointed out, from y<sup>e</sup> which  
honestye, and duety should  
flowe: that seemes to shine  
brightest: whiche is wo-  
ught w<sup>th</sup> a great, & lofty co-  
rage, despising worldly va-  
nities. And therfore in re-  
proche

que reliqui summa fiat: ex  
quo quantum cuiq; debe-  
atur, intelligas. Sed vt nec  
medici, nec imperatores,  
nec oratores, quamuis ar-  
tis precepta perceperint,  
quicquam magna laude  
dignum sine vsu, & exer-  
citatione consequi possint:  
sic officij conseruandi pre-  
cepta traduntur, illa qui-  
dem vt faciamus ipsi: sed  
rei magnitudo vsu quoq;  
exercitationemq; deside-  
rat. Atq; ab ijs rebus, que  
sunt in iure societatis hu-  
mane, quemadmodum du-  
catur honestum, ex quo  
ortum est officiu, satis fere  
diximus. Intelligendum  
est autem cum proposita  
sint genera quatuor, e qui-  
bus honestas, officiumq;  
manaret, splendidissimum  
videri, quod animo mag-  
no, elatoq; humanasq; res  
dispitiēte factū sit. Itaq; in



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probris maximè i promptu  
 est, si quid tale dici potest.  
 Vos etenim iuuenes  
 animos geritis muliebres:  
 Illaq; virgo viri.  
 & si quid est eiusmodi.  
 Salmacida spolia.  
 sine sudore & sanguine.  
 Contraq; in laudibus, quæ  
 magno animo & fortiter  
 excellenterq; gesta sunt,  
 ea nescio quo modo quasi  
 pleniore ore laudamus.  
 Hinc rhetorum campus  
 de Marathone, Salamine,  
 Plateis, Thermopilis, Leu-  
 tris, Stratocle: hinc noster  
 Cocles, hinc Decij, hinc  
 Cn. & P. Scipiones, hinc  
 M. Marcellus, & innum-  
 rabiles alij: maximeq; ipse  
 popul' Romæ animi mag-  
 nitud' excellit. Declaratur  
 autē studiū bellicę glorię,  
 proch it is cōmonly ready,  
 if any such thing maye bee  
 saied, as this.  
 you yongmen iwis  
 cary womens hartes.  
 That virgin, a mannes.  
 Likewise if ought bee like  
 to this.  
 A goodly great spoyle,  
 at Salmacis wonne:  
 VVithout any bloode,  
 or swett was it donne.  
 And on the other syde, in  
 prayses, those deedes, that  
 be done manfully, notably,  
 and with great courage, I  
 wote not how as with open  
 mouth we cōmende. Here-  
 of came the Rhetoricians  
 large field vpon Marathon  
 Salamis, Plateias, Ther-  
 moplanes, Leuetrians, &  
 Stratocles, hereof our Co-  
 cles, hereof the Decians,  
 hereof Gneus, & Publius  
 the Scipioes, hereof Mar-  
 cus Marcellus, & other in-  
 numerable, and speciall ye  
 the people of Rome did ex-  
 ceede in greatnesse of cou-  
 rage. And their desyre of  
 martiall glozpe is declared  
 in

in that we see their images  
of honour he set up, for the  
most pte, in warlike aray.

But if that haughtinesse of  
courage which is sene in pe-  
rels, and trauailez be void  
of iustice, and doothe not  
fight for a common safety,  
but for a priuate profite, yt  
is to bee reckened faultye.  
For that not onely is not  
the property of vertue, but  
rather of brutishnesse, set-  
ting all humanitie asyde.

Therefore manlynesse is  
well defined of the **Stoicks**  
where they say, it is a ver-  
tue, that fighteth in defence  
of equitie. Wherefore no  
man that hath attained the  
glorye of manlynesse, euer  
got praise by wylie traynes  
and craftinesse. For nothig  
may bee honest, & ys void  
of iustice. A worthy saying  
therefore is that of **Pla-**  
**toes** who sayth.

That not only the kno-  
lege which is leuered fro  
iustice, is rather to be cal-  
led subteltye then wise-  
dome: but also the courag-

quod statuas quoque vi-  
demus ornatu fere mili-  
tari. Sed ea animi elatio,  
que cernitur in periculis  
& laboribus si iusticia va-  
cat, pugnatq; nō profalu-  
te communi, sed pro suis  
commodis in vitio est. Nō  
modo enim id virtutis nō  
est: sed potius immanita-  
tis omnem humanitatem

repellentis. Itaq; probè de-  
finitur a Stoicis fortitudo,  
cū eam virtutem esse di-  
cunt propugnantem pro  
equitate. Quocirca nemo  
qui fortitudinis gloriā cō-  
secutus est, insidijs & ma-  
litia laudem est adeptus.  
Nihil enim honestū esse  
potest, qd' iusticia vacat.

Preclarū igitur Platonis  
illud. Nō solū, inquit scien-  
tia, que est remota ab iu-  
sticia, calliditas potius,  
quā sapientia est appel-  
landa: verū etiam animus

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paratus ad periculū, si sua which is forward to da-  
 cupiditate, non vtilitate ger, if it bee sette on for  
 communi impellitur, au- ones own gredinesse, &  
 dacię potius nomen ha- not for a comon profit:  
 beat, quā fortitudinis. maye rather beare the  
 Itaque viros fortes & ma- name of lewde hardines  
 gnanimos, eosdem bonos then of manlynессe.

& simplices, veritatis ami- Wherefoze who be manlye  
 cos, minimequē fallaces men, & stout harted: those  
 esse volumus: quę sūt ex same wee would haue also  
 media laude iustitię. Sed be good, & plaine louers of  
 illud odiosum est, quod in trouth, & nothing at al de-  
 hac elatione & magnitu- ceitful: whiche come out of  
 dine animi facillime per- the middest of all y praises  
 tinatia, & nimia cupiditas of iustice. But this is odi-  
 principatus innascitur. Ut- ous, y in such hautinesse, &  
 enim apud Platonem est, gretnesse of courage, there  
 omnem morem Lacede- groweth a wilfulnes very  
 moniorum inflammatū esse soone, & an ouerseeking of  
 cupiditate vincendi, sic vt rule. For as it is in Plato  
 quisquē animi magnitudi- that it was al the maner  
 ne maxime excellit, ita of the Lacedemoniās, to  
 maximē vult princeps om be enflamed with desire  
 nium, vel potius solus esse of conquering: so as eue-  
 Difficile autem est cūm ry man doth most excell o-  
 prestare ōnibus concupi- ther in gretnesse of courage  
 eris, seruare equitatē quę he wil likewise be y verpe  
 highest ouer all, or rather  
 without pere. And whē you  
 couet to bee aboue all, it is  
 harde to keepe an equitpe,  
 whiche



whiche is moſte proper to iuſtice. Whereof comes to paſſe, that they cannot abyde to bee byddled neither by reaſonynge, nor by anye comon & rightſul order of law: & they become in the comon weale for the moſt part quyet geuers & part-makers, that they may attaine to the greateſt power, & bee rather by might ſuperiour, than by iuſtyce equal. But the harder it is to maiſter the affection, the worthier is y<sup>e</sup> maiſtry. For ther is no ſeaſon that ought to be without iuſtice. They therefore bee choſed manly, & of great courage, not who do any wrong, but who withſtand it. But a true, and wiſe ſtout hearte iudgeth that honeſty, which nature chiefly foloweth, to ſtande in dedes, & not in glozy: and had rather bee, than ſeeme the chiefe. For who ſo hangeth vpon the ſwauering of the unſkilfull multitude, hee is not to be counted amonge the nobber of manye menne. But as euery man is of y<sup>e</sup> higherte courage

eſt iuſtitie maximè propria. Ex quo fit, vt neque diſceptatione vici ſe, nec vilo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur. Exiſtuntq; in Repub. plerunq; largitores & factioſi, vt opes quàm maximas conſequantur, & ſint vi potius ſuperiores, quàm iuſtitia pares. Sed quo id eſt difficilius, hoc preclarius. Nullum enim eſt tempus quod iuſticia vacare debeat. Fortes igitur et magnanimi ſunt habendi, non qui faciunt, ſed qui propulſant iniuriam. vera autem & ſapiens animi magnitudo honeſtum illud, quod maximè natura ſequitur, in factis poſitum, non in gloria iudicat, principemque ſe eſſe mauult, quàm videri. Et enim qui ex errore imperite multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non eſt habendus,

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Facillimè autem ad res iniustas impellitur, vt quisq; altissimo est animo & gloriæ cupido. Qui locus est sane lubricus: quòd vix inuenitur, qui laboribus susceptis, periculisq; aditis, nõ quasi mercedè rerũ gestarũ desideret gloriã. Omnis enim fortis animus & magnus duabus rebus maximè cernitur: quarũ vna in rerum externarũ despitiẽtia ponitur, cũ persuasũ sit nihil hominẽ nili qd' honestũ, decorũq; sit aut admirari aut optare, aut expetere oportere: nulliq; neq; homini, neq; perturbationi animi nec fortunę succũbere.

Altera est res, vt cũ ita sis animo affectus, vt sup̃ dixi, res geras magnas illas qdẽ & maximè vtilis sed vehementer arduas, plenasq; laborũ et piculorũ, tũ vitę causa, tum multarũ rerum, quę ad vitam pertinent. Harũ rerum duarũ

courage, and desirous of glory, so is hee soonest edged to vniust doinges. whiche is in dedde a verie slippery place, because scarce there is anye manne found, who when hee hath sustayned trauailes, and auentured dangers, dooth not despye glory, as reward of his doinges.

A manly courage, and a greate is alwaies by twoe thinges chiefly discerned, whereof the one standes in the contempt of outwarde thinges, when it is perswaded, that a manne ought not eyther to esteem eyther wyshe, or despye anye thinge, but that is honest and seemely, to yelde to none, neyther manne, nor affection, nor chaunce of fortune. The other thinge is, that when you bee so dysposed in courage as I sayde before, ye doe greate enterprises, & those same right profitable, but yet very harde, and full of trauaile, and daunger both for life & for many things, that to lyfe do belong. All the glory & honour of these two

two things (I add thereto the profit) standes in the latter, but the cause, and meane, that makes many men, is in the former. For in it is that which maketh excellent courages, & suche as despise the worldes vanities. But this same resteth in two things, if both you iudge that onely to bee good, which is honest & al so be free from all modities of mind. For it is to be contented the part of a great, and manly courage, both to let light by those thingz, which do seeme precious, and gorgeous to the greater number, and also to despise the same, with a stedfast, and grounded iudgement: and likewise it is a signe of mightie courage, & great stedfastnes, so too beare those things, which seeme bitter & be much, & sundry waies toste in mans life, & fortune, as nothing you swarue from the ordre of nature, nor the worthines of a wise manne. And it is not meete, that he bee subdued with desire, who is

spendor omnis & amplitudo (addo etiā vtilitatē) in posteriore est: causa autē & ratio efficiens magnos viros, est in priore. In eo enim est illud, quod excellentes animos, & humanitates facit. Id autē ipsum cernitur in duobus si & solū id, quod honestū sit, bonū iudices & ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam & ea quę eximia plerisq; & præclara videntur, parua ducere eaq; ratione stabili, firmaq; cōtemnere, fortis animi, magniq; ducendum sit. Et ea quę videntur acerba, quę multa & varia in hominū vita, fortunaq; versantur, ita ferre, vt nichil a statu naturę discedas, nichil a dignitate sapientis, hoc robusti animi est: magnęque constantię. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur



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eum frāgi cupiditate: nec  
 qui inuictum se a labore  
 prestitit, vinci a volup-  
 tate. Quamobrem hec vi-  
 tanda sunt: & pecunię fu-  
 gienda cupiditas. Nihil e-  
 nim est tam angusti animi  
 tamq; parui, quam amare  
 diuitias. Nihil honestius,  
 magnificētiusq; quam pe-  
 cuniam contemnere, si nō  
 habeas: si habeas, ad bene-  
 ficentiam liberalitatemq;  
 conferre. Cauenda est eti-  
 am glorię cupiditas, vt su-  
 pra dixi. Eripit enim liber-  
 tatē: pro qua magnanimis  
 viris omnis debet esse cō-  
 tentio. Nec vero imperia  
 expetenda ac potius aut  
 non accipienda interdum  
 aut deponenda nonnū-  
 quā. Vacandum autem est  
 omni animi pturbatione,  
 tum cupiditate & metu,  
 tum etiam ægritudine, &  
 voluptate animi, & iracū-  
 dia, vt tranquillitas adsit

not subdued & feare, nor  
 that hee be ouercome with  
 pleasure, who hath shewed  
 himself vnable to be ouer-  
 come with trauaile. wher-  
 fore both these faultes are  
 to bee auoyded, and also co-  
 uetousnesse of money ys to  
 bee eschewed. For nothing  
 is so muche a sygne of a  
 small and slender courage,  
 as to loue rycheesse: nothing  
 there is honeste, and nob-  
 bler, then to despise money  
 if you haue it not: & if you  
 haue it, to bestowe it in  
 bounteousnesse and libera-  
 litie. We must also beware  
 of desire of glozy, as I said  
 to fore. For it pulles away  
 the fredome of the mynde:  
 for the which, all the ende-  
 uour of stoute harted men  
 should be. And veruſſy wee  
 ought not to seke for rule,  
 but rather not to receiue it  
 sometime, or other whyle  
 to geue it ouer. And wee  
 must be free frō al trouble-  
 some sturre of mynd: from  
 desyre and feare, frō hert-  
 sicknesse, and voluptuous-  
 nesse, and angrynesse: that  
 we may haue quietnesse of  
 mynd

minde, and voidnes of care & securitas, que afferat  
the which may bring both tum constanciam, tum e-  
stedfastnes, and also a woꝝ tiam dignitatem. Multi  
thy estimacion.

But dyuers there bee, & autem et sunt, & fuerunt,  
haue ben: whose despringe qui eam, quam dico, tran-  
that same quietnesse, that quilitem expetentes, a  
I speake of, haue wyth- negocijs publicis se remo-  
drawen them selues from uerunt, ad otiumq; profu-  
common affaires, and haue gerunt. In his et nobilissi-  
gotte them to quyetnesse. mi Philosophi, longeque  
Among these both the no- principes: & quidem ho-  
blest Philosophers, & the mines seueriet graues, nec  
berye chiefe, and also cer- populi, nec principū mo-  
taine vpright, and graue res ferre potuerunt, vixe-  
menne neither could abide runtq; nonnulli in agris  
the maners of the people, delectati re sua familiari.  
noꝝ of the rulers: and ma- His idē propositū fuit, qd'  
ny of them haue liued in de- & regibus: vt ne qua re e-  
sert places, as delyted onc- gerent, ne cui parerent, li-  
ly & their home matters. bertate vterentur: cuius  
These shoote at the same proprium est, sic viuere vt  
marke, that Kynges doo, velis. Quare cum hoc cō-  
that is, to haue neede of no- mune sit potentię cupi-  
thing, to obey no man, and dorum, cum ijs, quos  
to vse their owne libertye, dixi otiosos: alteri se ad-  
whose property is, to lyue ipisci id posse arbitran-  
as ye lyst. Wherefore sith- tur, si opes magnas ha-  
this is common both to y  
desprouis of power, & those  
(whō I spake of) y leade  
the quiet life: the one soꝛte  
do thinke them selues able  
to compasse it, if they haue  
great

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beant : alteri, si contenti sint suo et paruo. In quo quidem neutrorū omnino contemnenda est sentētia Sed & faciliior, & tutior, & minus alijs grauis, aut molesta vita est otiosorū. Fruētior autem hominum generi, & ad claritatem amplitudinemq; aptior: eorū, qui se ad Rempub. & ad res magnas gerendas accommodauerūt.

Qua propter & ijs forsitan concedendū sit, Rēpub. non capessētibus, qui excellēti ingenio, otio, doctri-  
neq; sese dediderunt. Et ijs, qui aut valitudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua grauiore causa impediti, a Repub. recesserunt, cū eius administrandę potestatem alijs, laudemq; concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, greate wealth the other, yf they be contented w<sup>th</sup> theire owne, and a lytle. Wherein verely the opinion of nother of them is vtterlye to be despised: but the life of quiet lyuers is both easier, and safer, and lesse greuous, or troublesome to other: & theirs is the profitabler for man kinde, and fytter for fame, & honour: who haue applyed them selues to the common weale, and going thorough w<sup>th</sup> great matters. wherfoze perauētūre bothe they are to bee hoīne withall, that take not in hande the common weale, who of an excellent witte haue applyed them selues to learninge: and also they, who being letted either by sickynesse, or some other moze weyghty cause, haue conuied them selues away from the common weale: when they were well content to leaue to other the auctority, and praise of rulinge the same. But to whome there ys no suche occasyon: yf they



they say they set nought by  
those thynges, that moste  
menne haue in admiracion  
as rule, and office bearing,  
too these I thinke it woꝝ-  
thee too bee compted not  
only no prayse, but also a  
faulte. whose iudgement it  
were very harde to disa-  
loue, in that they dispise  
gloꝝie, and esteeme it as no  
thinge, but they seeme too  
feare the troubles and  
grecues both of geening of  
leece, & hauing repulses as a  
certein reproch & defame.  
foꝝ there bee, who do li-  
tle agree with them selues  
in thinges that bee contra-  
rye, as somme moste ear-  
nestlye contempne pleasur  
and in paine bee somewhat  
tenderer, somme regarde  
not gloꝝie and bee broken  
wythe slaunder: and these  
thynges they doe not with  
sufficient stedfastnes. But  
all lingeringe set asyde, of-  
fices are too bee taken, &  
the common weale too bee  
serued of those, who haue  
by nature the helpes of dis-  
patch of materz. foꝝ other  
wise can neither the state  
bee

si despiciere se dicant ea,  
que pleriq; admirētur, im-  
peria, & magistratus: ijs  
non modo nō laudi, verū  
etiam vitio dādum puto:  
quorū iudiciū in eo, quod  
gloriam cōtemnant, et p  
nihilō putent, difficile fa-  
ctū est non probare. Sed  
videntur, labores, et mole-  
stias, tum offensionū, tum  
repulsarū, quasi quandam  
ignominiam timere & in-  
famiam. Sunt enim qui in  
rebus contrarijs parū sibi  
constent. voluptatē seue-  
rissimē contemnant, in do-  
lore sint molliores: gloriā  
negligant, frangantur in-  
famia: atq; ea quidem nō  
satis constanter. Sed ijs,  
qui habent a natura adiu-  
menta rerū gerendarū, ab-  
iecta omni cunctatione  
adipiscendi magistratus  
sunt, et gerenda Resp. est.  
Nec enim aliter aut regi

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ciuitas, aut declarari animi magnitudo potest. Capessentibus autem Rempub. nihil min<sup>9</sup> quàm Philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam & magnificentia & dispicientia adhibenda sit rerum humanarū (quā sepe dico) & tranquillitas animi, atq; securitas. Si quidem nec anxij futuri sunt & cum grauitate, constantiaq; victuri. Quæ eō faciliora sūt Philosophis, quō minus patent multa in eorum vita, quæ fortuna feriat; & quō minus multis rebus egēt: & quia si quid aduersi eueniat, tam grauius cadere non possunt. Quocirca nō sine causa maiores motus animorū concitantur, maioraq; efficienda Rempub. gerentibus<sup>9</sup>, quā quietis: quo magis his & magnitud' animi est adhibenda, & vacuitas ab

be gouerned, nor the greatness of courage be declared. And of suche as take vpon them the comon weale, no lesse then of Philosophers yea and I wote not whether more, must bee vled both a maiestye, and a contempt of worldye thinges (which I often repeat) & also a quietnesse of mynde, and voidnesse of care: for so they shal not bee thoughtfull, and with grauity, and stedfastnesse they shal lead their lyfe. whiche thinges bee so muche the easier to Philosophers, as y fewer thinges lye open in their life, y fortune may strike: and as the fewer thynges they stande in neede of: and because they cannot take so soze a fall, yf any aduersitie betyde. wherefore not without cause, greater mocions of myndes be stirred vp in them: and greater enterprises are meete to be compassed, by the gouernoures of the common weale, than by the quiet liuers, and therefore y more greatnesse of courage, and voidnesse of griefes ought they

they to vse. But who so doth come to the doinge of matters, let him take heed that not onely this he consider, how honest the matter is, but also y<sup>e</sup> hee haue an ablenesse to discharge y<sup>e</sup> same. In the which poynt must bee considered: that neither ouer sone he despair for dastardynesse, nor ouer muche haue affiaunce for greedynesse. And in all matters, befoze ye go about the, ther must bee vsed a diligent preparacion.

But whereas most mē suppose martiall feates to bee greater, than citie causes: this opinion is to bee abated. For manye haue sought warre ostentymes, vppon desire of gloze, and it commonly becaule the in greate swittes, and coza ges, and so much the more if they bee men fite for chivalrye, and despyous of warefare. But if we mind to iudge truly: there haue bene many cittie matters greater, and nobler than martial. For though Themistocles be rightfully commended, and his name is

more

angoribus. Ad ré gerendá auté qui accedit, caueat ne id modo cōsideret, quâ illa res honesta sit: sed etiâ vt habeat efficiēdi facultatē. In quo ipso cōsiderādū est ne aut temerē desperet ppter ignauia: aut nimis cōfidat ppter cupiditatē. In ōnib<sup>9</sup> autē negotijs priusquâ aggrediare, adhibēda est preparatio diligens. Sed cū pleriq; arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quâ vrbanas, minuēda est hęc opinio. Multi enī bella sepe quēsiuerunt propter glorię cupiditatem, atq; id in magnis animis, īgenijsq; plerūq; cōtingit eōq; magis si sint ad ré militarē apti, & cupidi bellorū gerendorū. Verē autē si volum<sup>9</sup> iudicare, multę res extiterunt vrbane maiores clarioreq; quā bellice. Quāuis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit ei<sup>9</sup> nomē

E.i.

quā



## de Officiis.

quàm Solonis illustrius: ci-  
 teturq? Salamis clarissime  
 testis victorię, que antepo-  
 natur consilio Solonis, ei,  
 quo primũ cõstituit Areo-  
 pagitas: nõ minus præclarũ  
 hoc, quàm illud iudicandũ  
 est. Illud enim semel pfu-  
 it, hoc sēper proderit ciui-  
 tati, Hoc cõsilio leges Athe-  
 nienfiũ, hoc maiorum in-  
 stituta seruantur. Et The-  
 mistocles quidem nihil dix-  
 it in quo ipse Areopagum  
 adiuuerit: at ille vere adiu-  
 uit Themistoclem. Est e-  
 nim bellũ gestũ consilio se-  
 natus eius, qui à Solone e-  
 rat constitutus. Licet eadẽ  
 de Pausania, Lyfandroq;  
 dicere: quorum reb? gestis  
 quanquam imperium La-  
 cedemonijs dilatatũ puta-  
 tur: tamen ne minima  
 quidem ex parte Lycur-  
 gi legibus & disciplinæ  
 conferendi sunt, quin e-  
 tiam ob has ipsas causas,

more famous, thā Solon:  
 & Salamis is cited a wit-  
 ness of his moste glorious  
 victorie, and it is preferd  
 above þ Counsel of Solõ,  
 wherþ he first ordeined þ  
 Areopagites, yet no lesse  
 praise worthy is this, thā  
 that to be adiudged. For  
 that but once auailed, this  
 shal for euer auaille the ciuy  
 By this counsel, the lawes  
 of the Athenians, by this,  
 the orders of their elders  
 be preserued. And Themis-  
 tocles can alegge nothing,  
 wherewith he furdred the  
 Areopage, but Solon fur-  
 dred Themistocles. For  
 the warre was mayntay-  
 ned by the aduysle of that  
 Senate, whiche bye So-  
 lon was established. Wee  
 may say as much of Pau-  
 sanias, and Lyfander: by  
 whose deedes of armes  
 though the Empire of the  
 Lacedemoniās is thought  
 to haue been enlarged, yet  
 verely theye are not to bee  
 compared in the least part  
 wpythe Lycurgus lawes,  
 and order, yea more o-  
 uer by these occasyons,  
 they

they had their armes both et paratiores habuerūt ex-  
 forwarde, and valiaūter. exercit⁹ et fortiores. Mihi q̄-  
 Neither when I was a dē neque pueris nobis M.  
 child me thought Marcus Scaurus C. Mario, neq; cū  
 Scaurus gaue place to Caius Marius: nor whē versaremur in Republica  
 I had a do in the commō Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio  
 weale, Quintus Catulus cedere videbatur. Parua e-  
 to Cneus Pompeius. For nim sūt foris arma, nisi est  
 of final force is the warre cōsiliū domi. Nec plus  
 abroad; vnles ther be good Africanus singularis &  
 aduise at home. vir & imperator in excidē  
 Nor African⁹, both a sin- da Numantia Reipub. pro  
 gular man, & captaine also fuit, quā eodem tempo-  
 did more profit the commō re P. Nasica priuatus, cū  
 weale in razing of Numās Tiberiū Graccū in inter-  
 thā at that time. Publius emit. Quanquam hęc qui-  
 Nasica, a priuat man dyd dem res nō solū ex dome-  
 furder it whē he slew Ti- stica est ratione, attingit  
 beri⁹ Gracchus. Nowbeit enim & bellicā, quoniam  
 this case in dede is not on- vi, manuq̄ue confecta est:  
 ly a city mater. For it be- sed tamē id ipsū gestū est  
 longeth also to the nature cōsilio vrbano sine exerci-  
 of martial seats: sith it was tu. Illud autem optimum  
 wroughte by force, and by est, in quo inuadi solere ab  
 strong hand. But yet that inuidis & improbis me au-  
 same was done by city cō-  
 sel, without an army. And  
 that is a goodlye saying,  
 wherewith I here, that I  
 am wont to bee touched of  
 envious, and lewde per-  
 sons.

Co

E.ij.

Cedāt

## de Officiis.

Cedant armatogę,  
concedat laurea lingę.  
Vt enim alios omittā, no-  
bis Remp. gubernantibus,  
nonne togę arma cessere?  
neque enim in Repub. pe-  
riculū fuit grauius vnquā,  
nec maius odium. Ita con-  
silijs, diligentiaq; nostra  
celeriter de manibus au-  
dacissimorum ciuium de  
lapsa arma ipsa ceciderūt.  
Quę res igitur gesta est  
vnquam in bello tanta?  
quis triumphus conferen-  
dus? Licet enim mihi M.  
fili apud te gloriari: ad quē  
& hereditas huius glorię,  
& factorum imitatio per-  
tinet. Mihi quidem certe  
vir abundans bellicis lau-  
dibus Cn. Pompeius mul-  
tis audientibus hoc tri-  
buit. Vt diceret frus-  
tra se tertium trium-  
phum deportaturum fu-  
isse; nisi meo in Rempub.

To the robe aboue ar-  
let glory belong. (mes  
And the lavvrel yeue  
place to the orators tog  
For, & I maye passe ouer  
other, did not armes yelde  
vnto the robe, when I go  
uerned the common weale  
For neyther in the cōmon  
weale was euer a sozer pe  
rel nor yet a greater hatred  
So by our counsell, and dy  
ligence, the very weapons  
full soone slidinge out of  
boldest citezens hands, dyd  
fall too the grounde. What  
enterpryse, I pray you, in  
warre was euer doone so  
great? What triumphe is  
there, with it to be compa-  
red? For I maye, sonne  
Marke, glory befoze you,  
to whom bothe the inheri-  
tance of this glorie and the  
imitatiō of my dedes doth  
pertain. Cneus Pompeyus  
a man flowing ful of mar-  
tial praises, gaue mee this  
cōmendaciō in & hering of  
many, & he said, he shoulde  
in vaine haue borne away  
the third triūph, except, by  
my furdere in the cōmō  
weale



weale, hee should haue had beneficio vbi triumpharet  
 a place, where hee myght esset habiturus. Sunt ergo  
 haue triumphed. Some mā- domesticę fortitudines nō  
 hod then is not inferior to inferiores militaribus, in  
 martiall, in which also we quibus plus etiā quā in his  
 must bestowe moze labour and study, thā in this. For opere, studijq, ponēdū est.  
 alwaies y honestye whiche Omnino enim illud hone-  
 we seke in a hautye and a stū, quod ex animo excel-  
 princely corage, is wzou- stū, quod ex animo excel-  
 ght by y strēgth of y mind, so, magnificoq; querimus,  
 & not of the bodye. Yet the animi efficitur, nō corpo-  
 body must bee exercised, & ris viribus. Exercēdū tamē  
 brought in such plight, as corpus, et ita afficiēdū est,  
 it maye bee able to followe vt obedire consilio, ratio-  
 counsel & reason, in execu- niq; possit in exequēdis ne-  
 ting matters, & sustaining gotijs, et in labore tollerā-  
 trauaile. But that honesty do. Honestū autē id, quod  
 wherafter we serch al hole exquirimus, totū est positū  
 consisteth in the care, & ca- in animi cura et cogitatio-  
 sing of the mind, wherin ne. In quo nō minorē vti-  
 they bring no lesse commo- litatem afferunt, qui togati  
 ditie, who roabed doo go- Reip. presunt, quā qui  
 uerne y cōmō weale, than bella gerunt. Itaq; eorum  
 they do, who armed do ma- consilio sepe aut non sus-  
 ke y warres. And therfore cepta, aut confecta bella  
 by their aduise oftētimes sunt, nonnunquam etiam  
 warres be either not begō illata vt M. Catonis confi-  
 or ended, and manye times lio bellum tertium Puni-  
 attempted, as by Marcus nicū, in quo etiam mortui  
 Catoes counsell, was the valuit authoritas. Quare  
 third Punik warre wher  
 in y auctoritie of the dead  
 man auailed. Wherfore ra-  
 ther

## de Officiis.

expetenda quidē magis est decernēdi ratio, quā de- certādi fortitudo. Sed ca- uedū ne id bellādi magis fuga, quā vtilitatis ratio- ne faciamus. Bellū autē ita suscipiatur, vt nihil aliud nisi pax quēsitā videatur, Fortis vero animi et cōstā- tis est, nō perturbari in re- bus asperis: nectumultuā- tē de gradu deicij, vt dici- tur: sed prēsētis animi: v- ti cōsilio: nec ā ratione dis- cedere, Quanquā hoc ani- mi, illud etiā ingērij magni est percipere cogitatione futura: et aliquāto ante cō- stituere quid accidere pos- sit in vtrāq; partē: & quid agendū sit, cū quid euene- rit: nec committere ali- quid: vt aliquando dicē- dum sit, Non putaram. Hæc sunt opera magni animi & excelsi & pru- dentia, consilioq; fidentis.

their wiselome in determi- ning, thā mālines in figh- tīg is to be desired: but we must beware that we take not vp the matter by ad- uise, moze to auoid warre thā for cause of pfit. And so let warre be takē in hād as no other thīg may seme but peaz, to haue bē fought And it is verely a tokē of a māly courage, & a cōstāt, not to be disqetēd in rough stozmes, nor in makyng a hurle to be thrust from his place, as they say but to fo- low the counsel of a prēsēt courage, nor yet to swarue frō reason. For wilst adyng the one come of courage, & other procedes of a greate wit, to fore cōceiue i mind things to come, & sō what befoze to appointe vppon, what maye befall on bothe sides, & what is to be don, whē any thing shal happē, nor to comit ought, & at a- ny time one shoulde haue cause to say, had I wyste. these be & works of a gret & losty courage, & leanyng vpon prudence, & counsell, But

But for a man to vse him  
 selfe rashely in field, & so to  
 buckle with his enemy hand  
 to hand, it is a certein bru-  
 tish, and beastly thing, but  
 when tyme is, & necessitie  
 requires, a man must fight  
 hand to hand, & prefer death  
 before slauerie & shame.

But touching the razing  
 & sackinge of cities, this  
 greatly is to be considered:  
 that nothinge rashely, no-  
 thinge cruelly be done. And  
 it is the condicio of a stout  
 hearted man, in the ende of  
 his people, to punish the offe-  
 ders, to saue the multitude  
 in euery estate to maintain  
 right, & honestie. For lyke  
 as there be (as I said to-  
 fore) who do pfer martial  
 scates before cities causes:  
 so maye ye finde many too  
 who dangerous, and hot-  
 brained deuises seeme glo-  
 riouser, & greater, than quiet  
 counsels. We must neuer by  
 seeking to escape perel, de-  
 serue too sceme cowardes  
 and dastardes, but this  
 wee must take heede of,  
 that we put not our selues  
 in daunger without cause:

for

Temere autē facie versari  
 & manu cū hoste cōflige-  
 re immane quiddā: & bel-  
 luarū simile est. Sed cū tē-  
 pus, necessitasq; postulat,  
 decertādū manu est, &  
 mors seruituti, turpitudi-  
 niq; āteponēda. De euertē  
 dis autē, diripiēdisq; vrbib;  
 valde illud cōsiderādū est:  
 ne quid temerē, ne quid  
 crudeliter fiat. Idq; est vi-  
 ri magnamini rebus agita-  
 tis punire fontes multitu-  
 dinē cōseruare; in ōni for-  
 tuna, recta atq; honesta re-  
 tinere. Vt enim sūt (quē ad  
 modū supra dixi) qui vr-  
 banis rebus bellicas ātepo-  
 nunt: sic reperies multos,  
 quibus periculosa et calli-  
 da consilia quietis cogita-  
 tionibus splēdidiora et ma-  
 iora videantur. Nūquā om-  
 nino periculi fuga commit-  
 tendum est, vt imbelles, ti-  
 midiq; videamur sed fugiē  
 dū etiā illud, ne offeramus  
 nos periculis sine causa



## de Officiis.

quo nihil potest esse stulti<sup>9</sup>  
 Quappter in adeūdis pe-  
 riculis cōsuetudo imitāda  
 medicorū est, qui leuiter e-  
 grotātes leuiter curāt: gra-  
 uioribus autē morbis peri-  
 culosas curationes et ācipi-  
 tes adhibere cogūtur. Qua-  
 re in trāquillo tēpestatē ad-  
 uersā optare dementis est,  
 subuenire autē tempestati  
 quauis ratione, sapiētis: eo-  
 q; magis, si plus adipiscare  
 re explicata boni, quā ad-  
 dubitata mali. Periculosaē  
 autē rerū attiones partim  
 ijs sūt, qui eas suscipiūt, p-  
 tim Reipub. Itēquē alij de  
 vita, alij de gloria, & bene-  
 uolētia ciuiū in discrimen  
 vocantur, Promptiores i-  
 gitur debemus esse ad no-  
 stra pericula quā ad  
 communia: dimicareq;  
 paratiūs de honore et glo-  
 ria, quā de cæteris  
 commodis. Inuenti autem  
 multi sunt, qui non modo

for there cā be nothing fo-  
 lisher, than so to do. wher-  
 fore in aduēturing dāgers  
 the gise of the phisiciās is  
 to be solowed, whoe do li-  
 ghtly cure y lightlye disea-  
 sed, but to sore siknes they  
 be driuen to minister dan-  
 gerous, & doutful medeci-  
 nes. Therfore in caline to  
 wishe a soze tēpest, it is a  
 mad mā's part, but to ma-  
 ke shift in a tempest, by all  
 maner means, it is a wise  
 mā's propertie, & so muche  
 the moze, if ye attain mo-  
 re good whē the thing is  
 paste, thā harne, whan it  
 was in dout. But y doing  
 of matters be daūgerous,  
 partly to those, which take  
 thē in hand & partly to the  
 cōmō weale. And also so-  
 me be bzought in Halarde  
 of their life, some of their  
 glory, some of the peoples  
 fauour, we aught therfore  
 to bee redier to aduenture  
 our oswn, than cōmon pe-  
 rels, & to fight soner for ho-  
 noure, & glorie, than for o-  
 ther comodities,  
 But there haue ben foude  
 many, who for their cōtry  
 were

were redy to spend not on- pecuniam, sed vitá etiá pro  
 ly their substance but also fundere pro patria parati  
 their life, & those same yet esset: ijdé glorię iacturá ne  
 would not bee contente to minimá quidē facere vel-  
 lose one iot of their glozpe, lent, ne Republi: quidē po-  
 no not though the cōmon stulante: vt Callicratidas,  
 weale would require it, as qui cū Lacedemoniorū  
 Callicratides, who when dux esset Peloponnesiaco  
 he was capteine of the La bello, multaque fecisset  
 cedemonians, in the Delo egregiē, vertit ad extremū  
 ponnesian warre, & hadde ōnia, cū cōsilio non paruit  
 done many things worthe eorum qui classem ab Ar-  
 ly, in the ende, ouerturned ginusis remouendá, nec  
 al, when he did not follow cum Atheniensibus dimi-  
 their aduise who thoughte candum putabant: quibus  
 good to transport & naupe ille respondit: Lacedemo-  
 from Arginus & not to nios classe illa amissa ali-  
 fight & the Atheniās. To am parare posse: se fugere  
 whom he made aunswere, sine suo dedecore nō posse  
 how the Lacedemonians, Atq; hec quidem Lacede-  
 & nauie being lost, mighte monijs plaga mediocris fu-  
 make forthe an other: hee it: illa pestifera, qua cūm  
 could not flee & oute his Cleombrotus inuidiam ti-  
 dishonour. And this was mens, temere cum Epami-  
 no dout, to the Lacedemo- nūda cōflixisset, Lacede-  
 nians a meetely soze plague moniorū opes corruerūt.  
 ut that was a pestelente  
 plague whereby the Lacede-  
 monians power fell flat  
 the grounde, whā Cle-  
 ombrotus, fearing enuie,  
 & rashely encountred &  
 paminondas.

How

Quanto

## de Officiis.

Quantō Q. Maximus me-  
lius? de quo Ennius.

Vn<sup>o</sup> homo nobis cūctādo  
restituit rem,

Non ponebat enim  
rumores ante salutem.

Ergo postq;, magisq;,  
viri nunc gloria claret.

Quod genus peccandi  
vitandum est etiam in-  
rebus vrbānis. Sunt enim  
qui quod sentiunt, etiam  
si optimum sit, tamen in-  
uidiē metu non audent di-  
cere. Omnino qui Rei-  
pub. præfuturi sunt, duo  
Platonis præcepta tene-  
ant, Vnum vt vtilitatem  
cīuīū sic tueantur, vt quic-  
quid agunt, ad eā referant,  
obliti commodorum suo-  
rū. Alterum vt totū cor-  
pus Reipub. curent: ne dū  
partē aliquā tueantur reli-  
quas deserāt. Vt enī tutela

How much better did Qui-  
tus Fabi<sup>9</sup> Marcius: of  
whom quoth Ennius:

One wight there is, that  
hath out welth restored  
by delays:

For he before al rumors  
did our safty set alwaies:  
wherfore in léger cour-  
se of time, the greater is  
his praise.

which kinde of misdoinge  
must be also auoided i citie  
matters. For there be men  
who, bee hit neuer so good  
y they think, yet for feare  
of euy they dare not vtter  
hit, who so shal bee gouer-  
nors of y cōmon weale, let  
thē obserue two preceptes  
of Platoes, one is y they  
so maintain the profit of y  
cōmōz, y what so euer they  
do, they referre it therto, al-  
waies forgettig their own  
cōmodities, the other is, y  
they haue care ouer the ho-  
le body of the cōmō weale  
lest while they vphold som  
one pt y rest they leue desti-  
tut. For like as gar dēship  
cuen



enen so governemēt of the  
 cōmon weale ought to bee  
 vsed to the profit of them,  
 who are committed, & not  
 of them to whō it is com-  
 mitted. But who so pvide  
 for part of the people, & of  
 part be rechles, they bring  
 in sedicion & discord, y thing  
 most hurtful to the cōmō  
 weale: wherby it befalleth  
 y some do seme people plea-  
 sers, some affectionate to  
 nobilitie, but fewe to the  
 whole. Hereof sprāg great  
 discentiō among the Athe-  
 nians: and in our common  
 weal, not only sediciō, but  
 also sore ciuile warre: the  
 which a graue & stout citi-  
 zen & worthy of rule in the  
 common weale, will fyre  
 and hate: and giue himsele  
 whole to the cōmon wele,  
 and nother hunt after ry-  
 ches, nor power: but will  
 so defende the whole state  
 as hee maye prouyde for  
 al men, nor by false accu-  
 sacyon wyll hee bynge  
 anye manne into hatred  
 or enuye: but allwayes  
 wyll so cleaue too iustice,  
 and

sic pcreatio Reip: ad utili-  
 tatē eorū qui cōmissi sūt,  
 non ad eorū quibus cōmis-  
 sa est gerēda est. Qui autē  
 parti ciuū consulūt, partē  
 negligūt, rē perniciosissi-  
 mā in ciuitatē inducūt, se-  
 ditionem atq; discordiam.  
 Ex quo euenit vt alij po-  
 pulares, alij studiosi optimi  
 cuiusq; videātur, pauci vni-  
 uersorū. Hinc apud Athe-  
 niēses magnę discordię or-  
 tē & in nostra Repub. nō  
 solū seditiones, sed pestife-  
 ra etiam bella ciuilia. Quę  
 grauis et fortis ciuis in Re-  
 pub. dignus principatu fu-  
 giet atq; oderit tradetq;  
 se totū Reip. neque opes  
 aut potētiā cōsectabitur,  
 totāq; eā sic tuebitur vt o-  
 nibus cōsulat. Nec vero cri-  
 minibus falsis in odiū, aut  
 inuidiam quēquam voca-  
 bit: omninoq; ita iustitię,  
 honestatiq; adherescet,  
 vt

## de Officiis.

vt dum eā conseruet, quē  
uis grauit̃ offendat: mor  
temquē oppetat potius,  
quā deferat illa, quē dixi.  
Miserima est omnino am  
bitio, bonorumq; conten  
tio. De qua preclarē a  
pud eūdem est Platonem  
similiter facere eos, qui in  
ter se contenderent, vter  
potius Rempu. admini  
stret, vt si nautę certarent,  
quis eorum potissimum  
gubernaret. Idemque prę  
cepit, vt eos aduersarios  
existimemus, qui arma  
contraferant, non eos, qui  
suo iudicio tueri Rempub.  
velint: qualis fuit inter P,  
Africanum, & Q. Me  
tellum sine acerbitate dis  
fencio.

Nec vero audiendi sunt,  
qui grauit̃ irascendum  
inimicis putabunt,

& honesty & while he may  
maintein it, although he so  
re offēd other, he would de  
fire death rather then for  
sake those things & I ha  
ue spoken of: Ambicion no  
dout, & struig for pmociō  
is a verpe miserable thing  
whereof it is notably said  
in & same Plato, & sebla  
bly fare they, who would  
strue together, whether of  
thē should rather rule the  
commō weale, as if & ma  
riners should be at variās  
which of thē should chief  
ly gouerne & helme. And &  
same mā hath taught vs, &  
those we take as enemies,  
which would beare armoz  
agaist vs, & not those who  
by their discrecion incane  
to preserue the cōmō wele,  
as the discention betwene  
Publius Africanus, and  
Quintius Metell⁹ was  
wout al bitterness of ma  
lice. Neither are they wor  
thy to be herd, which hold  
opinion & we should be  
thzoughly angry with our  
enemies, and doo thynke,  
it is

It is the property of a stout harted, and manly man.

For there is nothing more comendable, nothing more seemely for a great and noble man, than pleasableness and mercy. But in free cities, and where there is an equalitie of law, ther must be vsed also a myldenesse & noble courage, as they call yt: leaste if wee bee angrye cyther with commers out of tyme, or crauers without shame, wee fall into a testifne sse of mind, both vnprofitable, & hatefull. And yet meekenesse, and mercy is so to be allowed: that for the comon weales sake, a seueritie be vsed: without which, a citie can not be gouerned. But all punishment, and chastysment must bee voyde of malyce, and not be applied to serue his turne, who punisheth: or rebuketh anye man, but to the comon weales behoofe. We must also beware, that the punishment be not greater than the fault, & least al for one matter, some be corrected, some not once spokē

vnto

idq; magnimini et fortis viri esse censent. Nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et preclaro viro dignius placabilitate atq; clemētia. In liberis vero populis, et in iuris equabilitate, exercēda etiā est facilitas, et altitudo animi quę dicitur: ne si irascamur, aut intēpestiue accedētib⁹, aut imprudēter rogātibus, in morositatē inutilē et odiosā incidamus. Et tamē ita pbāda est māsuetudo atq; clemētia, vt adhibeatur Reipublicę causa seueritas, sine qua administrari ciuitas nō potest. Omnis autē et animaduersio, et castigatio cōtumelia vacare debet: neq; ad ei⁹, qui punit aliquē, aut verbis castigat, sed ad Reipub. vtilitatē referri. Cauendum etiam ne maior pōna quā culpa sit, & ne eisdem de causis alij plectantur, alij ne appellentur quidem.

Prohi-



## de Officiis.

Prohibenda autem maximè  
est ira in puniendo. Nun-  
quàm enim iratus qui acce-  
det ad pœnam, mediocriter  
illam tenebit, quæ est in-  
ter nimium & parum: quæ  
placet Peripateticis, et rec-  
te placet, modo ne lauda-  
rèt iracundiam, & dicerent  
vtiliter à natura datam. Il-  
la vero omnibus in rebus  
repudianda est, optandum  
quæ ut ij, qui præsumunt Rei-  
pub. legum similes sint: quæ  
ad puniendum non iracun-  
dia, sed equitate ducuntur.  
Atq; etià in rebus prospe-  
ris, & ad voluntatem nos-  
tram fluentibus superbiâ,  
fastidium, arrogantiâ quæ  
magnopere fugiamus. Nâ  
ut aduersas res, sic secun-  
das immoderatè ferre le-  
uitatis est, præclarâq; est  
æquabilitas in omni vi-  
ta, & idem semper vul-  
tus, eademque frons  
vnto. And in ponnishng  
we must chiefly refrain fr  
anger, for the angry man  
that goth about ponnishmēt  
shal neuer keepe that mea-  
sure, that is beetweene too  
miche, & to litte: y which  
measure liketh the pcripa-  
tetikes: & of good cause it  
liketh thē, were it so, they  
would not cōmend angri-  
nes, & sape, y it is profita-  
bly geuen of nature. But  
in al cases, y affection is to  
be refused: and it is to be  
wisshed, y such as gouerne  
the common weale be lyke  
the lawes: which be moou-  
ed to punish offēders not  
vpon any wrath. but vpon  
equitie.  
More ouer in prosperitie,  
& when things flow euen  
at our wil, let vs earnestly  
flee pride, disdainfulnesse,  
and arrogancie. For as it  
is a point of lightnesse, vn-  
measurably to bere aduer-  
sities: so it is no lesse, vnme-  
surably to vse prosperities:  
& a continual euensse in al  
a mannes life, & one chere  
euermore, and one manner  
of face is commendable,  
as

as we haue hard of Socrate, iteq; de C.  
tes, & also of Caius Lel- Lelio accepim⁹. Phillippū  
us. Certes I see, howe quidē Macedonū regē, re-  
Phillip kinge of the Ma- b⁹ gestis & gloria superatū  
doniās was excelled of his  
sone in prowesse, & glorie,  
yet in mildenesse, and ten-  
tleness, he was farre aboue  
him. wherefore y one was  
alwaies noble, the other  
oftentimes ful beastly, so y  
they seime righ:ly to teach,  
which warne vs, y howe  
much the hyper we be in de-  
gree, so much the loswlyer  
we beare our selues.

Paneti⁹ reporterly, how  
Africanus his scolar, and  
familier frend, was wont  
to say, like as horses by re-  
son of y diuers fightes of  
warres waxing ouerhote,  
& couragious, men vse to  
put to riders y theye may  
haue thē y redier, euen so  
mē vnbridled & prosperi-  
ty & ouertrasting to thēselues  
shoulde bee broughte as it  
were within the compasse  
of reason, and lerning, that  
they might thorow see the  
frailnesse of the worlde,  
and the waueringe of sor-  
tune.

ut de Socrate, iteq; de C.  
Lelio accepim⁹. Phillippū  
quidē Macedonū regē, re-  
b⁹ gestis & gloria superatū  
â filio: facilitate et humani-  
tate video superiorē fuisse  
Itaq; alter sēper magnus,  
alter sēpe turpissimus fuit.  
Vt recte præcipere videan-  
tur qui monēt, vt quātō su-  
periores simus, tantō nos  
sūmissius geramus. Paneti-  
us quidem Africanū audi-  
torem, & familiarem suum  
solitū ait dicere: vt equos  
propter crebras contenti-  
ones præliorum ferocitate  
exultantes domitorib⁹ tra-  
dere soleāt, vt his facilio-  
ribus possint vti: sic homi-  
nes secundis rebus effrena-  
tos, sibiq; præidentes, tan-  
quam in girum rationis, &  
doctrinæ duci oportere, vt  
perspicerent rerum huma-  
narum imbecillitatem, va-  
rietatemq; Fortunę

More

Atq;

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Atq; etiā in secundissimis rebus maxime est vtēdum consilio amicorū: ijsq; maior etiā quā antē tribuēda est authoritas: ijsdemq; tēporibus cauendū est, ne assētatoribus patefaciamus aures, nec adulari nos sinamus: in quo falli facile est. Tales enim nos tūc esse putamus, vt iure laudemur, ex quo nascūtur innumerable peccata: cū homines inflati opiniōib<sup>9</sup> turpiter iridentur, et in maximis versantur erroribus. Sed hec quidem hactenus. Illud autē sic est iudicādū: maximas geri res, et maximi animi ab ijs, qui Rempub. regāt, quōd eorū administratio latissime pateat, ad plurimosq; pertineat. Esse autem magni animi, & fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut inuestigarent, aut conarentur magna

Moze ouer in our hiest peritie, we must most of all take y<sup>e</sup> aduise of our frēds & wee must geue thē alfe a greater authoritie, than we did befoze, & i those seasons, we must take hede, y<sup>e</sup> we open not our eares to flatterers, nor suffer oure selues to be clawed w<sup>th</sup> flattery, wherein it is an easy thinge to bee begiled. For we think our selues suche, y<sup>e</sup> of right we may be praysed. Whercof do springe innumerable faultz, whē mē puft vp w<sup>th</sup> opiniō be shamefully scorned, & be w<sup>th</sup>apt in folish errors. But of these matters th<sup>9</sup> far we treat. This then is to bee taken thus, y<sup>e</sup> the gretest dedes & of y<sup>e</sup> gretest courage, bee done by them, whiche gouerne the cōmon weale, because their ministraciō reacheth fardest, & to most mē apperteineth. And y<sup>e</sup> there be, and haue beene manye, euen in the quiet lyfe, of great courage, which ether woulde trye oute, or take in hād certeine greates enter-



enterprises: & would keepe  
themselves within y<sup>e</sup> boundes  
of their owne matters: or  
els, placed betwene Philo-  
sophers, and those that rule  
the common weale, would  
be delited with their home  
goods: not heaping vp the  
same, by all maner of mea-  
nes, nor barring theirs frō  
the vse thereof: but rather  
empartinge them bothe to  
their frinde, & to the comō  
weale, if at any tūne there  
shoulde bee neede. whiche  
good, first, let it be wel got-  
ten, and with no dishonest  
or hateful gaine: next, let it  
bee readye to doe good, to  
many, so they bee worthy:  
lastlye, let it bee encreased  
with discrecion, diligence,  
& thrift: and not lye open  
rather to lust and ryot, thā  
to liberalitie, and bounty-  
fulnesse.

These foresaide lessons  
who so obserueth: may liue  
both honozably, grauely,  
and stoutly, and also plaine-  
ly, faithfullye, and frendlye  
for the trade of manys lyfe.  
At folowes, y<sup>e</sup> we speak of  
the other part of honestye,  
which

quēdam seseq; suarum re-  
rum finibus continerent:  
aut interiecti inter philo-  
sophos & eos qui Répub.  
administrent, delectarē-  
tur re sua familiari non e-  
am quidem omni ratione  
exaggerantes, neq; exclu-  
dētēs ab eius vsu suos, po-  
tiusq; & amicis impartien-  
tes, & Reipub. si quando  
vsus esset. Quę primū be-  
ne parta sit, nullo neq;e  
turpi questu neq; odioso,  
tum quam plurimis (mo-  
do dignis) se vtilē prębeat,  
deinde augeatur ratione,  
diligentia, parsimonia: nec  
libidini potius, luxurięq;  
quā liberalitati, & bene-  
ficientię pateat. Hęc pre-  
scripta seruanti licet mag-  
nificē, grauitē, animosēq;  
viuere: atq;e etiam sim-  
pliciter, fideliter, viteq;e  
hominum amicē. Sequi-  
tur vt de illa reliqua parte  
honestatis dicendum sit:

## de Officiis.

in qua verecūdia, & quasi  
quidem ornatus vite, tem-  
perantia et modestia, om-  
nisquē sedatio perturbati-  
onum animi, et rerum mo-  
dus cernitur. Hoc loco cō-  
tinetur id quod dici latine  
decorum potest: grece e-  
nim *πρεπον* dicitur huius  
vis est, vt ab honesto non  
queat seperari. Nam et  
quod decet honestum est  
et quod honestum est, de-  
cet. Qualis autem diffe-  
rentia sit honesti, et deco-  
ri: facilius intelligi, quā  
explanari potest. Quic-  
quid enim est quod dece-  
at, id tum apparet, cum an-  
regressa est honestas.  
Itaque nou solum in hac  
parte honestatis, de qua  
hoc loco differendū est,  
sed etiam in tribus supe-  
rioribus, quid deceat ap-  
paret. Nam et ratione vti  
atque oratione prudēter,

which remaineth, wherin  
shamefastnesse, and tempe-  
rance, as it were y<sup>e</sup> certeine  
ornament of mans lyfe, &  
sober moode, and all ap-  
peasement of passions of y<sup>e</sup>  
mynd, and the measure of  
things is scene. In thys  
place also comelynesse is cō-  
teined, the which may bee  
named Decorum in latē,  
for in Greeke it is called  
*πρεπον*. The nature here-  
of is such, that from hone-  
stye it cannot bee sondred.  
For bothe what becometh  
is honest and also what is  
honest, becommeth. But  
what difference there is  
betwene honestye & comely-  
nesse, it may sooner be con-  
ceiued then expressed. For  
what soeuer it is, that be-  
commeth, it then appeareth,  
when honestye is gone be-  
fore. And therfore not on-  
ly in this parte of honestye,  
whercof in this place wee  
haue to dispute, but also in  
y<sup>e</sup> thre former ptes it dothe  
apere what becometh. For  
as it becometh one to vse  
reasō, & spcache discretlye,

to doe, that hee should doe, & agere quod agas confi-  
advisedly: to espie & main- derate: omnique i re quid  
tain whatsoeuer is in eue- sit veri videre & tueri de-  
ry thing the trouth: so con- cet. contraq; falli, errare,  
trarywise to be beguyled, labi, decipi, tam dedecet,  
to erre, to fall, to bee decei- quam delirare, & mente  
ued, as muche it misbecō- captum esse. Et iusta om-  
meth: as to dote, and bee nia decora sunt, iniusta cō-  
distraught in mynde.

Thereto al iust thinges be tra, vt turpia, sic indecora.  
comely: all vniust thinges Similis est ratio fortitu-  
againe as they be dishonest dinis.

Like is the nature of man Quod enim viriliter ani-  
linesse. For what so is don moq; magno fit, id dignū  
manfully, & with a greate viro & decorum videtur  
courage, that dooth secme quod contra, id vt turpe,  
meete for a man, & comely: sic in decorum. Quare  
what so goeth contrarpe: pertinet quidem ad om-  
that as it is dishonest, cuē nem honestatem hoc, qd'  
so it is vncomely. dico decorum, & ita per-  
tinet, vt non recondita

wherefore this comlynesse quadam ratione cernatur  
whereof I speake, doth p- sed sit in promptis. Est e-  
taine to al honesty in dede: nim quiddā (idquē intel-  
and so pertaines, that not ligitur in omni virtute)  
after a certeine hiddē sorte quod deceat: quod cogi-  
it is seene, but stāds in opē tacione magis a virtute  
sight. For a certein thinge potest: quā re seperari:  
there is y becomineth: & y  
same is perceiued in euery  
vertue: which moze by ima  
ginaciō, than in dede, may  
be seuered from vertue.

For

F.ij.



& vt venustas, & pulchritudo corporis secerni nō potest a valitudinē: sic hoc, de quo loquimur decorū, totum illud est quidē cū virtute confusum, sed mēte & cogitatione distinguitur. Est autem eius descriptio duplex, nā & generale quoddā decorū intelligimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectū, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atq; illud superius sic fere definire solet. Decorum id esse quod cōsentaneū sit hominis excellētiē in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat. Quę autē pars subiecta generi est, eā sic definiūt vt id decorum esse velint, quod ita naturę cōsentaneū sit, vt in eo moderatio & tēperantia appareat cum specie quadā liberali. Hęc ita esse, itelligere possum?

For as goodlynesse & beauty of body cannot bee parted from health, so this comeliness, wherof we treat, is altogether blynded w<sup>th</sup> vertue, but yet in ones mynde and thought it may be desayded.

But the discription thereof is on twoc sortes. For bothe we conceaue a general comeliness to be, which in all honesty hath to doe, and an other special comeliness vnder this, whiche belōgeth to euery particular part of honesty. And y<sup>e</sup> former thus in a maner is wont to be defyned, that it is comely, which is agreeable to mans excellency, in that, wherein his nature is different from other liuing creatures. But they define the parte, which ys vnder the general, in suche wise, y<sup>e</sup> yet they wil haue it to be couēted cōely, whiche is so to nature agreeable, as it may appere both in measurableness, & temperāce, & a certein honest shewe. That these be thus meant of y<sup>e</sup> Philosophers, we may gesse

gesse by that comelinesse,  
whiche the Poets folowe  
wherof, in an other place,  
we are wont to say more,  
But then we say, the Po-  
ets kepe that grace, which  
becommeth: When it, that  
to eche personne is sitring,  
both is done, and said: as if  
either Eacus, or Hypnos  
should saye:

Wel let them hate, whyle  
they stand in feare: or this,

His childzens graue the  
parent self nowe is.

Uncomely it should seeme  
because we haue hard, that  
they were iust men. But  
Aircus saying so, it is ly-  
ked of the hearerz, because  
the speache is fitte for the  
person.

But Poets will iudge by  
the personne, what is com-  
ly for euery body: how be it  
nature her selfe hath put  
vpon vs a ysonage of gret  
excellencie, & proeminence  
aboue al other liuing crea-  
tures. Wherefore Poets in  
the great diuersitie of per-  
sons will espy what is fit  
euen for the wicked sort, &  
what becommeth them.

But

ex eo decore, quod Poetę  
sequuntur : de quo alio  
loco plura dici solent. Sed  
tum seruare illud poetarum  
quod deceat dicimus, cū  
id quod quaque persona  
dignū est & fit & dicitur.

Vt si Aeacus aut Minos  
diceret. ODERINT

DVM METVANT.

aut, NATIS SEPVL-

CRVM IPSE EST PA-

RENS: indecorum vide-

retur quod eos fuisse iu-

stos accepimus. At Atreo

dicente, plausus excitatur

est. n. digna persona ora-

tio. Sed poetę quid quęq;

deceat, ex persona iudi-

cabunt. Nobis autem per-

sonam imposuit ipsa na-

tura, magna cum excellen-

tia, præstantiaq; animan-

tium reliquorum. Quo

circa poetę in magna ve-

ritate personarum, etiam

vitiosis quid conueniat

& quid deceat, videbunt,

## de Officiis.

Nobis autem cum a natura constantie, moderationis, temperantie, veritatis partes date sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non negligere, quemadmodum nos aduersus homines geramus: efficitur, ut & illud quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet decorum, quam late fufum sit, appareat: & hoc quod spectatur in vnoquoque genere virtutis. Vt enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum mouet oculos, & delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes quodam lepore consentiunt: sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, mouet approbationem eorum, quibus cum vivitur, ordine, & constantia, & moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum. Adhibenda est igitur quedam reuerentia aduersus homines et optimi cuiusque, & reliquorum.

But seeing the parts of stedfastnesse, measurableness, temperance & chastenesse bee appointed vs by nature, & seeing y<sup>e</sup> same nature teacheth vs, not to bee rechelesse, after what sorte we behaue our selues to euery man: it comes to passe, that bothe it appeareth, how farre the compnesse which appertains to all honesty, doth reach, and this also, which is marked in euery kinde of vertue. For as the beautifullnesse of the body & proportionable makinge of the limmes moueth a mannes eyes & delecteth them euen & this y<sup>e</sup> al the partes & a certeine grace agree together right so this comelines that shyneth abroad in our lyfe, winneth their liking with whome we liue by an order, stedfastnesse, & measurableness in al our wordes & deedes. There must be vsed therfore a certeine reuerence toward menne, both to euery one of y<sup>e</sup> best, sorte, and also to the rest of meaner degree.

For



For it is not onely a signe of an arrogant bodye, but also of one altogether laswelesse, to be retchles, what euerie man thinketh of him.

But there is a differēce betwene iustice, & shamefastnesse, in euerie respect, that is to be had. It is the part of iustice, to offer men no violence: of shamefastnesse to offend no bodye wherein the nature of comelinesse is moste throughly scene. These thinges then declared: I thinke it sufficiently conceiued, what thing that is, whiche wee say, becommieth.

But the duty, that proceedeth of comelinesse, chiefly taketh this way: which leadeth to the agreeableness, & preseruation of nature, whō if we wil soloſe as gypde, we shal neuer go amisse, & shal soloſe both that, whiche hath in it switines, and through sight by nature, & that which is agreeable for the fellowship of men, and that which is earnest, and manlye. But the greatest effect of comelinesse standeth in this parte of vertue,

Nam negligere quid de se quisq; sentiat, non solū arrogātis est, sed etiā omnino dissoluti. Est autē quod differat in hominū ratioñ habēda, inter iusticiā & verēditiā. Iusticię partes sūt nō violare homines: verēditię nō offēdere: in quo maxime pspicitur vis decori. His igitur expositis quale sit id, qd' decere dicimus, intellectū puto. Officiū autē qd' ab eo ducit', hāc primū habet viā, quę deducit ad conuenientiā, conseruationēque naturę quam si sequemur ducem nunquam aberrabimus, sequemurq; & id, quod acutum & perspicax natura est, & id quod ad hominum consotiationem accommodatum est, & id quod vehemens atq; forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac in est parte,

## de Officiis.

de qua disputamus. Neq;  
n. solū corporis qui ad na-  
turā apti sunt, sed multo  
etiam magis animi motus  
probandi, qui item ad na-  
turam accommodati sūt.  
Duplex est enim vis ani-  
morum, atq; naturę, Vna  
pars in appetitu posita est  
que est, *ὁρμη* gręce, quę ho-  
minem huc & illuc rapit.  
Altera in ratione, quę do-  
cet & explanat, quid faci-  
endū fugiendū ē sit. Ita fit  
vt ratio presit, appetitus  
obtemperet. Omnis autē ac-  
tio vacare debet temerita-  
te & negligētia. Nec vero  
agere quicquā cuius nō  
possit causam probabilem  
reddere. Hec est enim fe-  
re descriptio officij. Effici-  
endū autē est, vt appetit<sup>9</sup>  
rationi obediant: eamquē  
neq; precurrant, ppter te-  
meritatem, nec ppter pi-  
gritiam aut ignaviā dese-  
rant: sintquē tranquilli,

whereof wee nowe treat.  
For not only the movings  
of the body, which agre to  
nature are to bee allowed:  
but much moze the moōs  
of the mynd, that likewise  
bee agreable to nature, are  
to be commended.

For the power of y minde  
& of nature standes in two  
partes. The one is placed  
in appetite, which i greke  
is *ὁρμη*: and thys hyther &  
thither haleth a man: that  
other hath place in reason:  
whiche teacheth and sho-  
weth plainlye, what is to  
be done, and what to be re-  
fused. So falleth it that re-  
ason ruleth, and appetit o-  
beyeth. But all our doings  
must be without rashnesse  
and neglygence: neyther  
ought a manne to doe anye  
thing whereof he is not a-  
ble to render a pꝛoouable  
cause. For this in a maner  
is the difinition of duetye.  
But we must bzīg to passe  
that oure appetites obeye  
reason: and neyther runne  
befoze it, neither for slouth  
or dasterdlynnesse, dragg be-  
hind it: & y they bee quiet,  
and

and boyde of al sturre, and trouble of minde.

whereby all steadfastnes, & measurableness shall appere in sight. For appetites which go ouerfarre astray and (as it were) ouerhotte eyther in longynge after thynges, or flceinge from thynges, bee not stayed inough by reason: these without doubtte exceede theyre boundes and measure. For they forsake, and sette aside obedience: nor yet do yelde to reason, wherevnto they be made subiect by the lawe of nature. But such motions not onely mens myndes be troubled, but also their bodies. wee may se it in the very faces of the angrie: or of them, who either with any luste, or with feare be stirred, or in ouermuche pleasure doe reioyce: for there with the countenance, voice, mouinge, & resting of them all is chaunged: Of which thynges this is gathered (to the intent wee may re- tourne to the fourme of du tie) that al appetites are to be pulled in, and asswaged

and

atque omni animi perturbatione careant, ex quo e lucebit omnis constantia, omnisq; moderatio. Nam qui appetitus longius eugantur, & tanquam exultantes siue cupiendo, siue fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, hi sine dubio finem & modum trāseunt. Relinquūt enim & abijciūt obedientiam, nec rationi parent, cui sūt subiecti lege naturę. A quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiā corpora.

Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorū, aut eorū, qui aut libidine sunt, aut voluptate nimia aliqua aut metu cōmoti gestiunt: quorum omnium vultus, voces, motur, statusq; mutantur. Ex quibus illud intelligitur ( vt ad officij formam reuertamur ) appetitus omnes contrahendos, sedandosq; esse:



## de Officiis.

excitadāq; animaduersionē & diligētiā, vt ne quid temerē, ac fortuito, incōsideratē, negligēterq; agam⁹. Nequē n. ita generati a natura sum⁹, vt ad ludū & iocū facti eſſe videamur, ſed ad ſeueritatē potius, & ad quedā ſtudia grauiora, atq; maiora. Ludo autē & ioco vti illis quidē licet: ſed ſicut ſōno & quietibus ceteris, tū cū grauib⁹ ſeriisq; rebus ſatiſfecerimus. Ipſūq; genus iocandi non p̄fuſū, nec immodēſtū ſed ingenuū, et facetū eſſe debet. Vt enīma pueris non omnē licēciā ludēdi dam⁹, ſed eā quē ab honeſtatis actionibus nō ſit aliena: ſic in ipſo ioco aliquod p̄bi ingenij lumē eluceat. Duplex ōnino eſt iocādi genus. Vnū illiberale, petulās, flagioſū, obſcœnum, Alterū elegās, vrbānū, ingenioſū, facetum, quo genere nō modo Plautus noſter,

and y wee muſt take good heed and diligence, y wee do nothing raſhly & ventu-  
turouſly, nor vnaduiſedly, and negligentlꝝ. For wee be not to this ende engendred of nature, y wee ſhould ſeeme to be created for play, and ieſt, but we bee rather borne to ſageneſſe, & to certaine grauer & greater ſtudies. Yet we may lawfully uſe ieſtinge & paſtime, but euen as we doe ſleepe, & other reſtings at ſuch time, as we haue ſufficiently ended graue, & ernest cauſes. And the veri maner of our ieſtig muſt not be to large nor vnſober but honeſt, & pleaſaunt. For as we giue not children al maner liberty of playinge but ſuche as ſwarueth not from honeſt exerciſes, ſo in our very ieſting let there appere ſome light of honeſt witte. To bee ſhort after two ſortes is the manner of ieſtinge: the one, vnhoneſt, rayling hartfull, baſewdy, the other ſyne, ciuile, witty, pleaſant. With the whyche kynde, not onely onre Plautus,

and

and the olde comedy of the  
Attikes, but also y<sup>e</sup> bookes  
of Socratical philosophers  
be wel storied: & there be of  
many men many merry said  
sawes, as those that of old  
Cato bee gathered, which  
be called ἀποφθейματα  
Easy therefore is the diffe-  
rence betwene honest, and  
dishonest iesting. The one  
is mete for an honest man,  
if it be done in season, and  
with a light harte: y<sup>e</sup> other  
meete for no man, if y<sup>e</sup> di-  
shonestie of the matter be  
increased with filthynesse  
of wordes.

Also in pastime, there is  
a certeine measure to bee  
kept: that we be not therin  
altogether excessiue, and  
puffed vpp with pleasure,  
fall into some dishonestye.  
But bothe oure Martiall  
feild, & also our exercise of  
hunting do find vs honest  
examples of pastime.

But it belongs to the  
whole discourse of diu-  
tisme to haue in minde  
howe farre mannes na-  
ture exceedeth the nature  
of beastes.

& Atticorum antiqua co-  
mœdia, sed etiã philoso-  
phorũ Socraticorũ libri re-  
ferti sunt, multaq; multo-  
rũ faceret dicta: vt ea que  
a sene Catone sũt colecta  
q̃ vocatur ἀποφθейματα  
Facilis igitur est distinctio  
ingenui & illiberalis ioci.  
Alter est, (si tempore fit,  
ac remisso animo) homine  
libero dignus. Alter ne ho-  
mine quidẽ, si rerũ turpi-  
tudini adhibetur verborũ  
obscœnitas. Ludẽdi etiam  
est quidã modus retinen-  
dus, vt ne nimis omnia p-  
fundamus, elatiq; volupta-  
te in aliquã turpitudinem  
dilabamur. Suppeditat au-  
tem & campus noster, &  
studia venandi, honesta  
exempla ludendi. Sed per-  
tinet ad omnẽ officij que-  
stionem sēper in promptu  
habere, quantum natura  
hominis pecudibus reli-  
quisque bestiis antecedit.

For

## de Officiis.

Ille enim nihil sentiāt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu.

Hominis autem mens, discendo alitur, & cogitādo semper aliquid aut inquirat, aut agit: videndiq; & audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiā si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit excusum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non refed nomine) sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamuis voluptate capiatur, occultat & dissimulat appetitū voluptatis, propter verecundiam. Ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatē non satis esse dignam hominis prestantia, eamque contemni & reijci oportere. Sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fructum de modum. Itaq; victus,

For they feele nothinge but pleasure, and therunto be caried with their whole sweigh: but mans wite is fedde with learninge: and by studying either sercheth or doth alway somewhat: and is lead with the delyte of seing and hearinge. Yea mozeouer if there be anye somewhat with the mosse enclyned to pleasure: so he be not of the bestly kynde: (for seme there be not men in deede, but in name) but if there be any man, that is some what moze greedelye mynded: though with pleasure hee bee caught, he hysdeth and dissemblethe hys appetite of pleasure, for very shamefastnesse. wherof it is soone perceiued, that pleasure of the body is not woorthie to bee matched with the excellency of man: and that it ought to be despyed, and reiected. But if there bee anye manne, who somedeale yeldeth vn to pleasure, hee must very swarely kepe a measure, in enioyng the same.

And therfore let y feeding,  
and



and apparailing of the bo-  
dy be referred to health, &  
strength, not to voluptu-  
ousnesse. And therto if we  
will consider, what an ex-  
cellency and a dignity ther  
is in nature, wee shall vn-  
derstand howe fowle it ys  
to ouerflow in rpyotte, and  
liue deliciously, and swan-  
tonly, and howe honest it  
is, to leade our lyfe sauing-  
ly, chastely, sagely, and so-  
berly.

Wee must vnderstand also  
that we be cladd by nature  
(as it were) with two par-  
sons, whereof the one ys  
cōmune, because we al bee  
partakers of reason, & the  
preeminence, wherby wee  
surmounte beastes, from  
which reason, all honestye,  
and comliness is deriued,  
and out of the whiche, the  
waye of finding duitye ys  
sought, the other ys that  
which properly to ech man  
is assigned.

For as in bodys there be  
great differēces (for some  
we see passe other in swift-  
nesse to runne, some in  
strength to wrestle, & like-  
wise

cultusq; corporis ad vale-  
tudinē referatur, & ad vi-  
res, nō ad voluptatē. Atq;  
etiā si cōsiderare volumus  
quē sit in natura hominis  
excellētia, & dignitas, in-  
telligimus quam sit turpe  
diffluere luxuria, et deli-  
catē ac molliter viuere:  
quāmq; honestum parcē,  
continenter, seuerē, sobri-  
eq;. Intelligendū etiam est  
duabus quasi nos a natura  
indutos esse psonis. Qua-  
rū vna est cōmunis ex eo,  
quod omnes participes su-  
mus rationis, prēstantiq;  
eius, qua antecellimus be-  
stijs: a qua omne honestū,  
decorumq; trahitur: & ex  
qua ratio inueniendi offi-  
cij exquiritur. Altera au-  
tem, quē ppriē singulis est  
attributa. Vt n. i corporib;  
magne dissimilitudines sūt  
(alios enim videmus velo-  
citate ad cursum, alios vi-  
ribus ad luctādum valere

itemq; in formis alijs dignitate iesse, i alijs venustatem) sic in animis existunt etiam maiores varietates.

Erat in L. Crasso, & in L. Philippo mult<sup>9</sup> lepos: maior etiam, magisq; de industria in C. Cesare Lucij fil'

At iisdē temporibus in M. Scauro, & in M. Druso adolescente singularis seueritas: in C. Lelio multa hilarita; in eius familiari.

Scipione abitio maior, vita tristior. De grecis autē dulce & facetū, festiuq;

sermonis atq; in omni oratione simulatorem, quem εἰρωνεία greci nominauerunt Socratē accepimus.

Contra Pithagorā & Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine vlla hilaritate. Calidū Hannibalē ex Pœnorum: ex nostris ducibus. Q. Maximus accepimus, facile cē-

lare, tacere, dissimulare,

wise in faces, some haue a portly looke, some an amiablenesse, so also in mynde there bee farre greater diuersities.

There was in L. Crassus, & Lucius Philippus much pleasauntnesse: but greater & more of set purpose, in Caius Cesar, Lucius sōne. And at those daies in Marcus Scaurus, & in Marc<sup>9</sup> Drusus the yong man, there was a singular grauitie: in Caius Lelius, much mirth: in Scipio his familiar, bothe greater honour seeking, & a sadder life.

But of the Grecians, Socrates, we haue heard was pleasant, & feate conceited, a merve talker, & in al his woorkes a mocker, whom the Grekes named εἰρωνεία contrarywise Pithagoras, & Pericles attained very high autoritie, without any mirth at all. Of Hannibal, Annibal was crafty: of our captainz Quint<sup>9</sup> Maximus, we haue heard say, had a marvellous conning in cloking in keeping in, in dissemblinge, in making

king

king a scale, in preventing  
the deuises of the enemy.

In which kind, y Grekes  
before all other do preferre  
Themistocles the Atheni-  
an, & Jason the Pharaia.  
And chiefly the suttile, and  
crafty dede of Solon, who  
that both his life should be  
y safer, and somewhat the  
more hee might further the  
common weale, fained him  
selfe to be madde. There  
bee other farre vnlike to  
these, plaine & open, which  
doe thinke nothinge in se-  
crete, nothing with guyle,  
meete to bee wrought, and  
bee louers of trouthe, and  
enemies to dysceite. And  
again, there be other, who  
would any thing endure, &  
do seruice to anye manne,  
so they might obtaine that  
they desire, as wee did see  
Silla, and Marcus Craf-  
sus vse them selues. Of  
which sort, wee haue hard  
Lysander the Lacedemo-  
non was the suttelst and  
coude moste abyde. And  
contrarywise, of Callicra-  
tides, who was Admirall  
of the nauie, nexte after  
Lysander.

And

insidiari, pręripere hosti-  
um consilia. In quo gene-  
re Gręci Themistoclem  
Atheniensem, & Pherę-  
um Iasonem cęteris ante-  
ponūt inprimisq; versu-  
tum & calidum factum.

Solonis: qui quo tutior  
vita eius esset, & plus ali-  
quanto Reip. prodesset fu-  
rere se simulauit. Sunt his  
alij multum dispares, sim-  
plices et aperti, qui nichil  
ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis  
agendum putant, veritatis  
vltiores, fraudis inimici.  
Itemq; alij, qui quiduis per-  
petiantur, cuius deseruiāt  
dum quod velint, conse-  
quatur: vt Syllam. & M.  
Crassum videbamus.

Quo in genere versutissi-  
mum et patientissimū La-  
cedemonium Lisandrum  
accepimus: contraque  
Callicratidem, qui pre-  
fectus classis proximus  
post Lysandrum fuit.



Itemq; in sermonibus aliū  
quidem videmus, quāuis  
prepotens sit, efficere, vt  
vnus de multis esse videat-  
ur quod in Catulo & in  
patre et in filio, itemq; & ī  
Q. Mutio Mancino vidi-  
mus. Audiui ex maioribus  
natu hoc quidem fuisse in  
P. Scipione Nasica: cōtra-  
q; patrē eius, illū qui Tibe-  
rij Gracchi conatus perdi-  
tos vindicauit, nullam cō-  
mitatē habuisse sermonis,  
nec Xenocratē quidē seue-  
rissimum philosophorum:  
ob eamq; rem ipsam et  
magnum & clarum fuisse.  
Innumerabiles aliq; dissimi-  
litudines sunt naturę, mo-  
rumq; minime tamen vi-  
tuperādorū. Admodū au-  
tem tuenda sunt sua cuiq;  
non vitiosa, sed tamen pro-  
pria, quō facilius decorum  
illud, quod querimus  
retineatur. Sic enim  
est faciendum, vt contra

And likewise we see an  
other man in talke, though  
he be of great auctority, so  
order the matter, that hee  
seemes one of the common  
sorte. Whiche in Catulus,  
both the father & the sonne  
and the same in Quintus  
Mutius Mancinus, wee  
haue scene. I haue hearde  
more ouer of myne elders,  
the same to haue beene in  
Publius Scipio Nasica.  
And contrariwise, his fa-  
ther, euen him & auenged  
Tiberius Gracchus wic-  
ked ēterprises, to haue had  
no gentle grace of speache.  
No nor Xenocrates, who  
was the sagest of the phi-  
losophers, and for the selfe  
same thing became greate,  
and famous.

Innumerable other dy-  
uersities there be of nature  
& of maners, no deal yet dis-  
praisable. But euery mā  
own guifts, not such as be  
faulty, but naturall are er-  
nestlye to bee maintained,  
where by & sooner maye &  
cōlineffe be kept which we  
do seeke. For in suche wise  
we must worke, as agāst  
all

al nature we neuer strue:  
 which thig auoided, let vs  
 folloſw our own proper na-  
 ture. So that though ther  
 be other studies grauer, &  
 better, yet let vs measure  
 our own, by natures rule.  
 For neither it is to anye  
 purpose to fighte againſte  
 nature nor to enſue anye  
 thing y<sup>e</sup> cannot atteine.  
 Wherupon it moze apperez  
 what maner of thing thys  
 cōlines is: becauſe nothig  
 becometh, Mavvger mi-  
 nerua, as they ſay, y<sup>e</sup> is, na-  
 ture ſtanding, & reſiſting  
 it. In brieſe it oughte bee  
 comly, of trouth ther is no  
 thing moze ſcemely, thā an  
 euenneſſe in al mans lyfe,  
 and euery of his doinges:  
 which you can not kepe, if  
 you counterſette an others  
 nature, and let paſſe youre  
 owne. For as we ought to  
 ble that ſpeache, which is  
 known to vs, leſt as ſome  
 men choppyng in Greeke  
 words, we be ſwoorthelpe  
 mozt at: ſo in our doings  
 and al our life, wee oughte  
 to ſhew noe contraritie.

And

naturā vniuerſā nihil cōtē-  
 damus. Ea tamē cōſeruata  
 propriā naturā ſequamur,  
 vt etiā ſi ſint alia grauiora,  
 atq; meliora, tamē nos ſtu-  
 dia noſtra naturę regula-  
 metiamur. Neq; enī naturę  
 attinet repugnare, nec quic-  
 quā ſequi, quod aſſequi ne-  
 queas. Ex quomagiſ emer-  
 git quale ſit decorū illud.  
 ideo quia nihil decet inui-  
 ta (vt aiūt) Minerua, id eſt  
 aduerſate & repugnate na-  
 tura Omnino ſi quicquam  
 eſt decorū, nihil eſt pſec-  
 to magis quām equabilitas  
 vniuerſę vitę, tū ſingularū  
 actionū, quā cōſeruare nō  
 poſſis, ſi aliorū naturā imi-  
 teris, omittas tuā. Vt enim  
 ſermone eo debemus vti,  
 qui notus eſt nobis, ne (vt  
 quidam) græca verba in-  
 culcantes, iure optimo irri-  
 deamur, ſic in actiones o-  
 nemq; vitam nullā discre-  
 pantia conferre debemus

G.i.

Atq;

## de Officiis.

Atq; hec differentia natu-  
rarū tāta habet vim, vt nō  
nunquā mortē sibi ipse cō  
sciscere alius debeat, ali<sup>9</sup> in  
eadē causa nō debeat. Nō  
enim alia in causa M. Caro  
fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in A-  
frica Cēsari tradiderūt. At  
qui ceteris forsitā, vitio da-  
tū esset si se interemissent,  
propterea quōd lenior co-  
rū vita, & mores fuerūt fa-  
ciliores: Catoni autē, cū in-  
credibilē tribuisset natura  
grauitatē, eāq; ipse ppetua  
cōstātia roborauisset, sēp;  
in proposito, susceptoq; cō-  
silio pmanisset, moriendū  
potius quā tirāni vultus as-  
piciendus fuit. Quām mul-  
ta passus est Vlisses in illo  
errore diuturno, cū et  
mulieribus ( si Cirse & Ca-  
lipso mulieres appellandę  
sunt) inseruiret, & in om-  
ni sermone ōnibus affabilē  
& iucūdum se esse vellet.

And this differēce of natu-  
re hath so greate a power  
that otherwhile some one  
man ought to kil him self,  
some other in the same qua-  
rel ought not. For Mar-  
cus Cato was not in one  
quarrel, and the rest in ano-  
ther, who yelded thēselues  
vnto Cēsar in Africa, yet  
to the reste perchance it  
should haue ben counted a  
reproche, if they had slain  
thēselues: because their life  
had been deintier, & theyre  
manners milder: but when  
nature had geuen Cato an  
vcredible grauitie, & s<sup>t</sup> la-  
me he had strengthened w<sup>th</sup>  
a continual stedfastnes: &  
alwaies had remainyd in  
his intent, and determined  
purpose, it was meete for hi  
rather to die then to looke  
vpon the tirants face.  
How many paines sustey-  
ned Vlisses, in that longe  
swandering: when both to  
women he did seruiue (vt  
Circe, and Calipso are so  
bee named weomen) and  
to al men in al his talke he  
woulde bee saire spoken:  
and



and also at home dyd beare  
 the spight of the slaues, &  
 nices, that hee might once  
 attaine to the thing, which  
 he desired. But Ajax, with  
 the corage, that he is repo-  
 zed of, had rather dy a thou-  
 sand deaths. than to suffer  
 those thigs of a other mā:  
 which diuersities whē we  
 behold, it shal be necessary  
 to wey, what eche manne  
 hath of his own, and to or-  
 der those gistes, and not to  
 haue a mynd to trye, how  
 other mens graces would  
 become him. For that bee-  
 cometh eche man, which  
 is most of aliche mannes  
 own. Let euery man ther-  
 fore know his own dispo-  
 sition, & let hym make him-  
 self a sharp iudge bothe of  
 his vices, and of hys ver-  
 tues, lest plaiers may seme  
 to haue more discretiō thā  
 we, for they do choole not  
 the beste enterludes, but y  
 fittest for them selues. For  
 who vpon their voyces be  
 holde they take Epigones  
 and Medea, who vpo ge-  
 sture, do take Menalippa  
 and

domi vero etiā contumeliā  
 as seruorum, ancillarumq;  
 pertulit: vt ad id aliquan-  
 do, quod cupiebat, perue-  
 niret. At Ajax, quo animo  
 traditur, millies oppetere  
 mortem, quam illa perpeti  
 ab alio maluisset. Quę con-  
 templantes expendere o-  
 portebit, quid quisq; habe-  
 at sui, eaq; moderari, nec  
 velle experiri quā se ali-  
 ena deceant. Id enim quę-  
 q; decet, quod est cuiusq;e  
 suum maximē. Suum igitur  
 quisq; noscat ingeniū:  
 acremq;e se & bonorum  
 & vitiorum suorum iudi-  
 cem prębeat: ne scenici  
 plus, quā nos, videantur  
 habere prudentię. Illi enim  
 non optimas, sed sibi accō-  
 modatissimas fabulas eli-  
 gunt. Qui enim voce freti  
 sūt, Epigonos, Medęaque:  
 Qui gestu, Menalippam,  
 G. ij. vel

## de Officiis.

vel Clitēneſtrā. Sēper Ruti-  
lius quē ego memini, Anti-  
opā: nō ſepe Aefopus A ia-  
cē. Ergo hiſtrio hoc vide-  
bit in ſcena quod nō vide-  
bit ſapiēs vir in vita? Ad  
quas igitur res aptiſſimi e-  
rimus, in ijs potiſſimū el-  
aborabimus. Sin aliquando  
neceſſitas nos ad ea detru-  
ſerit, q̄ noſtri ingenij non  
erūt, ōnis adhibēda erit cu-  
ra, meditatio, diligētia, vt  
ea, ſi nō decorē at quā mi-  
nime indecorē facere poſſi-  
mus. Nec tā eſt enitēdū vt  
bona, quę nobis data non  
ſunt, ſequamur, quā vt vi-  
tia fugiamus. Ac duab⁹ hiſ  
pſonis, quas ſupra dixi, ter-  
tia adiūgitur, quā caſus ali-  
quis vel tēp⁹ iponit. Quar-  
ta etiā, quam nobiſmet ip-  
ſis iudicio noſtro accom-  
modabimus, Nam reg-  
na, imperia, nobilita-  
tes, honores, diuitiæ, o-  
pes, eaquę quę ſūt hiſ con-

and Clytemneſtra. Euer-  
more Rupilius, whom I  
remember, toke Antiope,  
not often Eſopus toke Di-  
ar. Shal a plaiyer then ſee  
this in the ſtage, y a wyle  
mā ſhal not ſee in his life?  
We ſhal chiefly therfore la-  
bour in thoſe thingz, wher  
unto we ſhalbe moſt apte.  
But in caſe neceſſity ſhall  
driue vs ſometime to thoſe  
things which ſhal not bee  
for our diſpoſition, al care,  
ſtudie, & diligence muſt be  
ēploied, y if we do thē not  
comly, yet with as little vn-  
comlines as may bee, ney-  
ther ought we ſo muche to  
endeuour our ſelues to fo-  
low the vertues which be  
not geuen vs, as to flee vi-  
ces. And vnto theſe twoo  
pſons, which beſoze I na-  
med, ther is a third perſon  
ioined, which ſome chāce,  
or time caſteth on vs. The  
ſowerth alſo is y, whiche  
we ſhal faſhio to oure ſel-  
ues after our owne minde.  
For kingdomes, Empires  
nobility, honoz, riches, po-  
wer, & thoſe which be con-  
trarye

trary to these, being placed  
in fortuues hand, be orde-  
red according to the times  
but what person wee oure  
selues list to beare, procee-  
deth of our owne free will.  
And therfore some to phy-  
losophie, some to the ciuill  
law, some to eloquence do  
applye them selues, & for  
the vertues, some haue a  
more mind to excel in one,  
and some in another, and  
whose fathers or aunceters  
in anye cōmendacion haue  
ben notable, the most part  
of theires do studie in the  
same kinde of praise to ex-  
cel, as Quintus Mutius  
Publius sonne, did in the  
ciuill law: African<sup>9</sup>, Pau-  
lus sonne, in scates of ar-  
mes, but diuers dooe adde  
some of theire owne vnto  
those praises, & they recei-  
ued of theire fathers, as  
this same African<sup>9</sup> & elo-  
quence encreased & heap of  
his martial glozy, whiche  
selfsame Timotheus, Co-  
no<sup>9</sup> son, did also, who whē  
in praises of warre, to hys  
father he was not inferior  
did ioine to that commen-  
dation

traria in casu sita, tempor-  
ibus gubernantur. Ipsi autē  
quā personam gerere veli-  
mus, à nostra voluntate p-  
ficiscitur. Itaq; se alij ad phi-  
losophiam, alij ad ius ciui-  
le, alij ad eloquentiam ap-  
plicant: ipsarumq; virtutū  
in alia alius mauult excel-  
lere. Quorum vero patres  
aut maiores in aliqua glo-  
ria presterunt, student  
eorum pleriq; eodē in ge-  
nere laudis excellere. vt  
Q. Mutius P. filius in iure  
ciuili : Pauli filius A-  
fricanus in re militari.

Quidam autem ad eas lati-  
des, quas à patribus acce-  
perunt, addunt aliquam  
suam. Vt hic idem Africa-  
nus eloquentiē cumula-  
uit bellicam gloriā. Quod  
idem fecit Timotheus  
Cononis filius: qui cū  
belli laude non inferior  
fuisset quā pater, ad  
cam laudem doctrinē &  
G. iij. ingenil



## de Officiis.

ingenij gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, vt nōnulli omiffa imitatione maiorum, suum quoddam institutum consequantur: maximeq; in eo plerunq; elaborant ij, qui magna sibi proponunt, obscuris orti maioribus. Hęc igitur omnia cū querimus quid deceat, cōplecti animo & cogitatione debemus. In primis autē cōstituēdū est, quos nos et quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitę: quę deliberatio est ōniū difficilima. Ineunte enim adolescētia, cui inest maxima imbecillitas cōsiliij tūc id sibi quisq; gen<sup>9</sup> ætatis degendę cōstituit, quod maximē adamanit. Itaq; ante implicatur aliquo certo genere, cursuq; viuendi, quā potuit quod optimum esset iudicare. Nam quōd Herculem Prodicus dicit, vt est apud Xenophontem, dacion the glozpe of switte, & learninge. But it so falleth now & then, that some letting go the imitation of their aunceters, do follow a certain trade of their own, & therein, for the most part they chiefly trauaile, who appoint them selues great enterprises, being bozne of scarce knowne parētis. In our minde, and thought, then we must cast al these things, when we serche to know what becommet he. But first of al we must determine, whō, & what manner mē we wold haue our selues, & of what kinde of life. which aduiselement is y hardest of al. For at the entering into y peres of discretion, whē ther is most sēdernes of cōsēl, euery mā doth appoint him selfe the trade of lea dinge his lyfe, which he hath loued most of al, & so he is entāgled & some certein kind. & course of life, befoze hee was able to iudge, what should be best. For whereas Prodicus saythe, that Hercules (as is in Xenophon)

as sone as he waxed wher  
berded, which time is gra-  
ted of natur, to those what  
waie of liuinge eche man  
will enter, went forth into  
deserte, and there sittinge,  
much, & a long while dou-  
ted with him selfe, whē he  
beheld two waies, the one  
of pleasure, the other of ver-  
tue: whether of thē it were  
better to enter: this mighte  
peraventure happē to Her-  
cules, that was borne of  
Jupiters seede, but not so  
to vs, who do folow those  
that euery one of vs list to  
folowe, and bee allured too  
there studies, & fashions.  
And for the most parte, be-  
ing traded with our parē-  
tes preceptz, we encline too  
there gise, & maner. Other  
be caried after the iudgmēt  
of the multitude, and longe  
after those thinges moste,  
whiche to the greater part  
seeme goodliest. Many  
neuerthelesse, whether of a  
certaine luck, or of a good-  
nesse of nature, or by the in-  
struccion of there parentes  
haue folowed y right trade  
of life,

cū primū pubesceret( qd  
tempus à natura ad deligē-  
dū quā quisq; viā viuendi  
sit ingressurus, datū est, ex  
isse in solitudinem, atq; ibi  
sedentem diu secum, mul-  
tumq; dubitasse, cū du-  
as cerneret vias, vnā vo-  
luptatis, alterā virtutis,  
vtram ingredi melius esset  
Hoc Herculi Iouis fatu ē-  
dito potuit fortasse contin-  
gere, nobis non idem, quī  
imitamur quos cuique vi-  
sum est, atq; ad eorum stu-  
dia institutaq; impellimur.  
Plerunque autem parentū  
preceptis imbuti ad eorum  
consuetudinem, moremq;  
deducimur. Alij multitu-  
dinis iuditio feruntur, quē-  
q; maiori parti pulcherri-  
ma videntur, ea maximē  
exoptant. Nonnulli tamē  
siue scelicitate quadam, si-  
ue bonitate naturę si-  
ue parentū disciplina rec-

But tam vite secuti sunt viam

G. iij.

Illud

## de Officiis.

Illud autē maximē rarū genus est eorū, qui aut excellētes ingenij magnitudine, aut pręclara eruditione, atq; doctrina, aut vtraq; re ornati, spatiū etiā deliberādi habuerūt, quē potissimū vitę cursū sequi vellēt. In qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusquē naturā cōsiliū est ōne reuocandū. Nā cū in ōnibus, quę agūtur, ex eo modo quoquisq; natus est (vt supra dictum est) quid deceat exquirimus, tū in tota vita cōstituenda, multo est eius rei cura maior adhibēda vt cōstare in vitę ppetuitate possimus nobismet ipsis, nec in vllō officio claudicare. Ad hāc autē rationē quoniā maximā vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, vtriusq; omnino ratio habenda est in diligēdo genere vitę: sed naturę magis. Multo enim et firmior est & constantior:

But that kinde of men is seldome found, who after they be eyther of excellence profoundnesse of witte, or of a famous learninge, and knowledge, or with bothe these adourned, haue got a tyme to take aduilement: what race of life they wold the ratherest runne: in the whiche aduise, all a mans counsel is to bee applied to eche mans proper nature.

For sithens in al thynges that bee done, out of y nature, wherewith euery mā is bozne (as befoze is said) we serch, what becometh: then in pointing out y hole life, much moze regard therof must be had, that in y continuing of our life wee may agree w our selues, & neuer hault in anye dutie.

But to this chole seying nature hathe the greatest power, & fortune the next: ther must consideration be had of thē both alwayes, in chosing the kind of ones lyfe, butte of nature, moze. For nature is much the surer, & the stedfaster, so that



so þ fortune manye times, vt fortuna nō nūquam tan  
 as mortal her self, sec<sup>th</sup> quā ipsa mortalis cum im-  
 mortal nature to fight mortali natura pugnare vi-  
 who so then wil apply al þ deatur. Qui igitur ad na-  
 purpose of his lyfe accor- ture sue nō vitiose genus,  
 ding to the kind of his na- cōsiliū viuendi omne cō-  
 ture not corrupted, let him tulerit: ijs constantiā tene-  
 kepe a stedfastnes, for that at. Id enim maxime decet,  
 becōmeth moke of all, ex- nisi forte se errasse itellex-  
 cept perchance he shal per- erit in deligēdo genere vi-  
 ceue, that he hath gone a- te. Quod si acciderit, (po-  
 misse, in chosing hys kinde test autē accidere) faciēda  
 of life, whiche if it befall morū, institutorūq; muta-  
 (as it maye befall) there tio est. Eam mutationem si  
 must bee made a change of tēpora adiuuabūt, facilius  
 maners, & purposes. That cōmodiusq; faciemus: sin-  
 schauinge then, if time shall minus, sensim erit, pedetē-  
 further, we shal the soner, timq; faciēda: vt amicitia-  
 & more conueniently bring as quē minus delectent, &  
 to pas, if not faire & softly, minus probetur, magis de-  
 and by litle & litle it must cere censent sapiētes, sēs-  
 be done, like as frendships dissuere quā repente præ-  
 which do not deelyte vs, & cidere. Commutato autē  
 are not wel lyked, wisemē genere vite omni ratione  
 do iudge more cōuenient, curandum est, vt id bo-  
 stitche after stitche to rip, no consilio fecisse vide-  
 thā sodenly to cut a sūder. amur. Sed quoniam paulo  
 And when we haue once ante  
 changed our kinde of lyfe, heerde, & we be thought  
 we must by all means ta- to haue doone it vpon good  
 ke heerde, & we be thought aduisement.

But forasmuch as a litle  
 before

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ante dictū est imitādos esse maiores, primū illud excep-  
tū sit, ne vitia sint imitāda:  
deinde si natura nō feret,  
vt quēdā imitari possint: vt  
superioris Africani filius,  
qui hūc Paulo Aemilio na-  
tum adoptauerat propter  
infirmatē valetudinis, nō  
tam potuit patri similis ef-  
se, quā ille, qui fuerat sui. Si  
igitur nō poterit siue cau-  
sas defensitare, siue popu-  
lū cōcionibus tenere, siue  
bella gerere: illa tamē prę-  
stare debet, quę erunt in  
ipsius potestate, iustitiā, fi-  
dē, liberalitatē, modestiā, tē-  
peratiā: quo minus ab eo  
id quod desit requiratur.

Optima autē hereditas ā  
patribus traditur liberis, ō-  
niq; patrimonio pręstanti-  
or, gloria virtutis, rerumq;  
gestarum: cui dedecori ef-  
se, nefas & vitium iudican-  
dum est. Et quoniam offi-  
cia non eadem dispari-  
bus etatibus tribuuntur,

before it is said, y<sup>e</sup> we must  
follow our aunceters: firste  
be this excepted: y<sup>e</sup> their vi-  
ces are not to be folowed:  
next y<sup>e</sup> we follow the not  
in some things, that our na-  
ture wil not beare: as y<sup>e</sup> el-  
der Africanus sonne, who  
adopted this our Paulus  
sonne, could not be so lyke  
his father, because of sick-  
ly weakenesse, as the other  
was like his. In case ther-  
fore one be not able eyther  
to plede causes or to retein  
the people by orations, or  
to folow the warres, those  
things yet he ought to per-  
sourne, which shall bee in  
his power, as iustice, faith-  
fulnes, liberalitye, sober-  
mode, & tēperāce: to thirtē  
the thing which hee lokes  
may be the lesse missed in  
him. Truelye the best in-  
heritance that fathers lea-  
ue to their childrē, & more  
worthe, than all liuelode is  
the glorie of vertue, and  
worthy dedes, wherūto to  
be a stainē, it is to be accou-  
ted both vice, and shame.  
And because not alike du-  
ties are assigned to vnlike  
ages

aged, and some there be for yongmen, & some for y<sup>e</sup> elder sort, somewhat also we haue to say of this diuersitie. It is therefore a yong mans part, to reuerence his elders, & of these to choose out the best & most commended, whose counsel, & authority he may leane vnto, for the vnskillfulnesse of tender peres, must by oldemens experience be ordered and governed.

And this age specially from lust is to bee swained, and to be brought vp in labour and paines taking both of mind and body, that bothe in martial, & ciuill duities, their diligence may appere Also whē they wil refresh their wittes, & geue themselves to pastime, let them beware of intemperance, & remember shamefastnesse, which shalbe done the easier, if at such thinges also their elders wil bee in presence.

But for old mē, labors of y<sup>e</sup> body are to bee diminished & exercises of y<sup>e</sup> mynde some mete to be increased: and

alia que sunt iuuenū, alia seniorū, aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendū est. Est igitur adolescentis maiores natu reuereri ex ijsq; eligere optimos et probatissimos: quorū consilio atq; authoritati nitatur. In euntis enim etatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. Maxime autē hęc etas à libidibus arcenda est, exercendaq; in labore, patientiaq; & animi et corporis, vt eo rū & in bellicis & ciuilibus officijs vigeat industria. At que etiam cum relaxare animos, & dare se iucunditati volent, caueant intemperantiam, meminerint verecundię, quod erit facilius, si in eiusmodi quoq; rebus maiores natu interesse velint: Senibus autem labores corporis minuēdi: exercitationes animi etiam augendę videntur.

¶anda



## de Officiis.

Dada vero opera, vt et a-  
micos & iuuetutē & maxi-  
me Rēpub. consilio & pru-  
dētia quā plurimū ad-  
iuuent. Nihil autē magis ca-  
uendū est senectuti, quā  
ne languori se, desidięq; de-  
dat. Luxuria vero cū omni-  
etati turpis, tū senectuti  
fœdissima est. Sin autē libi-  
dinū etiam intēperantia ac-  
cesserit, duplex malū est:  
quod & ipsa senectus con-  
cipit dedecus: & facit ado-  
lescentū impudentiorē in-  
temperantiam. Ac ne illud  
quidem alienū est, de ma-  
gistratuum, de priuatorū,  
de ciuium, de peregrinorū  
officijs dicere. Est igitur p-  
priū munus magistratus  
intelligere se gerere per-  
sonam ciuitatis, debere-  
q; eius dignitatem & de-  
cus sustinere: seruare  
leges, iura describere, &  
ea fidei suę commissā

& they must geue their dily-  
gence, that much they aide  
their frends, & youth, & spe-  
cially the cōmon weale w-  
counsel, & wisdome. But  
nothings more of age is to  
be taken hede of, than y it  
geue not it selfe to lither-  
nes & idlenesse. As for ry-  
ot to euery age it is repro-  
cheful & for olde age moste  
shameful. But if the intē-  
perāce of lust bee ioynd w-  
it, ther is a double incōue-  
nience, beccause bothe age  
selfe taketh shame by it, &  
it causeth yōg mēs intēpe-  
rāce to be more shameles.  
And this truely is not out  
of y matter, to speak some  
what touching the duties  
of magistrates, of priuate  
men of citizens, & of stran-  
gers. It is therefore the  
pper office of a magistrat,  
to consider, he representes  
the person of the citie, and  
that he ought to maintain  
the honour, and reputaciō  
thereof, & to keepe the or-  
ders of y same, & to set out  
laws fit therfore, & to re-  
mēber, they be committed  
to

to his charge.

A priuate man it behoues  
to liue in an equalitie, and  
likenes of law w<sup>th</sup> the citi-  
zens, neither as an vnder-  
ling, & abiect, for bearinge  
himself to hys, & also in the  
cōmon weale to seeke tho-  
se things, & be quiet & ho-  
nest. For suche a one wee  
are wont bothe to call and  
count a good citizen.

But it is the duitie of a  
stranger, & alien inhabitāt  
to medle w<sup>th</sup> nothing beside  
his owne businesse, nor to  
ēquire any thing touching  
an other man, and no whit  
in a strange commō weale  
to be curious.

Thus for the most parte,  
duties shal be found ou te,  
when it shall bee soughte,  
what becommeth, & what  
is agreable for personnes,  
times, and ages. And ther  
is nothing that becomes a  
man so muche, as in euery  
doing, & takinge of aduise  
to kepe a stedfastnes.

But because the same com-  
lines appeareth in al dedes  
& wordes, & in y<sup>e</sup> mouing  
and

meminisse. Priuatum autē  
oportet æquo & pari cū  
ciuibus iure viuere, nequē  
summissum & abiectum,  
nequē se efferentem, tum  
in Repub. ea velle quæ  
tranquilla et honesta sunt.  
Talem enim & sentire bo-  
num ciuem & dicere sole-  
mus. Peregrini autem &  
incolę officium est, nihil  
præter suum negotium a-  
gere, nihil de alieno inqui-  
rere, minimeq; in aliena es-  
se Repub. curiosum. Ita  
ferè officia reperientur, cū  
queritur quid deceat. &  
quid aptum sit personis  
temporibus, etatibus. Ni-  
hil est autem quod tam  
deceat, quàm in omni re  
gerenda, consilioquē capi-  
endō seruare cōstantiam,  
Sed quoniam decorum il-  
lud in ōnibus factis et dic-  
tis, ī corporis deniq; motu  
& statu

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& statu cernitur: idq; pos-  
tū est in trib<sup>9</sup> reb<sup>9</sup>, formo-  
sitate, ordine, ornatu ad ac-  
tionē apto difficilior ad e-  
loquendū sed satis erit fa-  
cile intelligi. In his autē tri-  
bus continetur cura etiā  
illa, vt probemur ijs, qui-  
buscum, & apud quos vi-  
uamus. His quoq; de rebus  
pauca dicantur. Principio  
corporis nostri magnā na-  
tura ipsa videtur habuisse  
rationē quē formā nostrā,  
reliquāq; figuram, in qua  
esset species honesta, eā po-  
suit in prōptu: quē autem  
partes corporis ad naturę  
necessitatem datę aspectū  
essent deformē habiturę  
atq; turpē formam eas cō-  
textit atq; abdidit. Hanc na-  
turę tam diligētem fabricā  
imitata est hominum vere-  
cundia. Quę enim natu-  
ra occultauit, eadem  
omnes, qui sana mente  
sunt, remouent ab oculis

& stayng of the body, and  
the same consisteth in thre  
thinges, well sauourednes,  
order, and furniture meete  
for ones doing (some what  
hard it is to expresse, but it  
shal suffice, so it be concey-  
ued) & in these thre cōtey-  
ned is y<sup>e</sup> care also, y<sup>e</sup> we be  
aloswed of those, & whom  
& among whom wee liue.  
Of these matters likewise  
a fewe words let vs say.

First, verve nature see-  
meth to haue had a greate  
respect of our body, which  
hath set most in sight oure  
physiomye, and the rest of  
our shape, wherin there is  
an honest shewe, but shee  
hath couered, & kept close  
the parts of y<sup>e</sup> body, geuen  
for natures necessitie: whi-  
che els should haue an euil  
faouored, & foule sight.

Wennes shamefulness  
hath folowed this so con-  
ning a frame of nature.

For what so nature ha-  
th hydden: the same all  
men, who be well in their  
wits: do keepe frō the eye,  
and



if they do their endeuoure  
to serue very necessitie, as  
closely as they may: & of  
what parts of the bodye  
use is seruile, neither those  
partes, nor their seruice by  
their names they do call:  
so, y<sup>e</sup>, which to do it is no  
shame if it bee secretlye, to  
tell it is vnclerly.

And therfore neither the  
open being of those things  
is void of vnshamefastnes  
nor the talke without cly-  
things.

Neither truely are the Ci-  
nikes worthy to be hearde  
nor any of y<sup>e</sup> Stoicks, which  
are almost Cinike, who do  
reproue vs, & mock at vs,  
because we cal those thingz  
in woordes shameful to bee  
spoken vpon, which bee in  
deede not dishonest: & yet  
those thinges that bee vn-  
honest, wee terme by their  
names. As to go a theef is  
to beggyle one, to comynyt  
adourye, is a thing in de-  
de dishonest, but it is told,  
without dishonestye, like-  
wise to get children in de-  
de is honest, but to be vtte-  
red in talk it were vnclerly

ipsique necessitati dant o-  
perâ, vt quàm occultissimè  
pareant quarumque partis  
um corporis vs<sup>9</sup> sūt neces-  
sarij eas neque partes, ne-  
que earum vsus suis nomi-  
nibus appellant: quodque  
facere turpe nō est, modo  
occultè, id dicere obscœ-  
num est. Itaque nec actio  
rerum illarum aperta pe-  
tulantia vacat, nec orati-  
onis obscœnitate: Nec  
vero audiendi sunt Cyni-  
ci, aut si qui fuerunt Stoi-  
ci penè Cinici, qui repre-  
hendunt & irrident, quòd  
ea quę re turpia non sint,  
verbis flagitiosa dicamus:  
illa autem quę turpia sūt,  
nominibus appellemus su-  
is. Latrocinari, fraudare,  
adulterari re turpe est, sed  
dicitur non obscœne: li-  
beris dare operam re ho-  
nestū est, nomine obscœnū  
Pluraq;

And

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pluraq; in eā sentētiā ab  
eisdem contra verecūdiam  
disputantur: Nos autē na-  
turā sequamur. et ab ōni,  
quod abhorret ab ipsa ocu-  
lorū auriūq; appbatione,  
fugiamus. Status, incessus,  
fessio, accubatio, vultus, o-  
culi, manū motus teneāt  
illud decorū. Quibus inre-  
bus duo sunt maximē fugi-  
enda, ne quid effeminatum  
aut molle, & ne quid durū  
aut rusticū sit. Nec vērō hi  
strionibus, oratoribusq; cō-  
cedēdū est, vt his hec apta  
sint, nobis dissoluta. Sceni-  
corū quidē mos tantā ha-  
bet à vetere disciplina ve-  
recundiam, vt in scenam  
sine subligaculo prodeat  
nemo: verentur enim ne si  
quo casu euenerit, vt cor-  
poris partes quēdam ape-  
riātur aspiciantur non de-  
core, Nostro quidem more  
cū parentibus puberes filij

And mo thinges, for that  
purpose, be reasoned by  
philosophers against shame-  
fastnes. But let vs follow  
nature & shon al thinges,  
abhorre y very pleasing of  
our eye, & eare. Let our  
standing, going, sitting ly-  
ing, chere, cies, & mouynge  
of handes kepe y same co-  
lines. In which thinges,  
two faults we must speci-  
ally take hede of, y nothig  
womanishly, or daintily, &  
nothing blockishly, or car-  
terly we do. Neither must  
we agree, y these thinges  
should be seemelye in plai-  
ers, & oratozs, & left loosly  
in our selues. The custom  
of y stageplayers, euen of  
an olde order, hath so gret  
regard to shamefastnesse,  
y no man cometh on the  
stage wout breeches. for  
they are as earde, lest if it  
chaunce by any mishappe,  
y some partes of the bodye  
be discouered, they shoulde  
be scene vncomlye. And as  
the fashio is with vs, chil-  
dren growynge to mannes  
state

State bee not bathed wyth  
their parentes, nor sonnes  
in law, with their fatherz  
in lawe. Therefore thys  
kinde of shamefastnesse ys  
mete to be obserued, name-  
lye when nature her selfe  
is guide & maistrresse.

But wheras there be two  
kindes of beuty: and in one  
of them there is a louclinez  
in the other a maicesty: loue-  
linesse, we must thinke be-  
longs to the woman, & ma-  
iestie to the man. There-  
fore al maner trimming, y  
is vnfitting for man, must  
be kept from outward  
fourme, and the like faulte  
to this must be takē heede  
of in ones gestures, & into-  
uinge. For bothe the stur-  
ring lik wraistlers is often-  
times misliked: and also  
many gestures like plaiers  
are not wythout foolyshe  
topes, and in bothe these  
kindes, those thigs which  
bee right and naturall, bee  
commended. But the ma-  
iesty of the sauour ys pre-  
serued by goodnes of co-  
lour, and colour by exercise  
of body.

cum soceris quidem gene-  
ri non lauantur. Retinen-  
da est igitur huius gene-  
ris verecundia, presertim  
natura ipsa magistra & du-  
ce. Cum autem pulchritu-  
dinis duo genera sint, quo-  
rum in altero venustas  
sit, in altero dignitas: ve-  
nustatem muliebrem du-  
cere debemus, dignitatem  
virilem. Ergo et a forma  
remoueatur omnis viro  
non dignus ornatus: &  
huic simile vitium in gestu  
motuque caueatur. Nam  
et palestrici motus sepe  
sunt odiosiores & histrio-  
num nonnulli gestus in-  
eptijs non vacant: & in  
vtroque genere, que sunt  
recta & simplicia lauda-  
tur.

Formę autem dignitas co-  
loris bonitate, tuenda est,  
color exercitationib⁹ cor-  
poris.

The

H.i.



## de Officiis.

Adhibenda est præterea  
mūditiā nō odiosa neque  
exquisita nimis: tamē que  
fugiat agrestē & inhumana  
negligentiā. Eadē ratio  
est habenda vestitus: in  
quo sicut in plerisq; rebus  
mediocritas optima est.

Cauendū est autē, ne aut  
tarditatibus vtamur ī gressu  
mollioribus vt similes  
pomparū ferculis esse videamur:  
aut in festinationibus  
suscipiamus nimias  
celeritates: que cū fiūt, anhelitus  
mouentur, vultus  
mutatur, ora torquētur:  
ex quibus magna significatio  
fit nō adesse cōstantiā.  
Sed multo etiā magis  
laborandū est, ne animi motus  
a natura recedāt, quod  
assequemur, si cauebimus  
ne in perturbationes atq;  
exanimationes incidamus  
& si attētos animos ad decori  
cōseruationē tenebim⁹  
Motus autē animorū duplices  
sunt, alteri cogitaç

There must a cleanness be  
vsed befor: that is not odious  
nor curious, but onely  
escheweth carterly, and vn  
natural. siouēry. The lyke  
regard we must haue of apparel:  
wherein a meane,  
as in moste part of thinges  
is best. we must take heede  
also, we vse neither to nice  
a slownes in our pace lyke  
Pageaunts in triumphes:  
neither too muche haste in  
speede making, like wilde  
braynes. For when it happens,  
that men do so: there  
folowes shorte breathing,  
the countenance is changed,  
& the face disfigured. wher  
of comes a great presumpti  
on that they haue no stay  
eduelle.

But we must much more  
studie, that the affectiōs of  
our minde swarue not fro  
nature: which we shall attain,  
if we will beware, &  
we fall not into moods, and  
mazes: and if we will continue  
in hauing heedful minds  
to the keeping of comlynes.  
But the motions of min  
des bee of two sortes: some  
proccede of intellygence.  
some

some of appetite. Intelligence is chiefly occupied in searching out of trouble, appetite sterreth a man to be doing. Wee must provide therefore that we vse intelligence about the best matters, and that wee make our appetite obedient to reason.

And because the power of speech is great, & y<sup>e</sup> same is in two forces, the one of vehement speache, & other of comō talk: let the vehement speach, serue for pleadings in iudgements, orations in assemblies, and debatinge in the Senate-house, let talke bee vsed in companies, in disputations in meetings of familiers, & let it also be at feastinges.

Of vehement speache the Rhetoricians haue rules, of talk none at al: not w<sup>th</sup>standing I wote not whether such also may be &c.

How be it for theire studies, that wil learne, there be teachers found, but none there be, that study this, & the route of Rhetoricians all places be replenished.

Ne-

alteri appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur: appetitus impellit ad agendū. Curandum est igitur vt cogitatione ad res quā optimas vtamur: appetitū rationi obedientē prebeamus.

Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaq; duplex: altera contentionis: altera sermonis: contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, concionum, senatus: sermo in circulis, disputationibus, cōgressionibus familiarium versatur: persequatur etiam conuiuia.

Contentionis, precepta rhetorum sunt multa, nulla sermonis: quanquam haud scio an possint hec quoq; esse. Sed discentium studijs inueniuntur magistri. Huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli: rhetorum turba referta omnia

H. ij.

## de Officiis.

Quanquam quę verborū,  
sententiarumque præcep-  
ta sunt, eadem ad sermo-  
nem pertinebunt. Sed cū  
orationis indicem vocem  
habeamus: in voce autem  
duo sequamur, vt clara sit  
vt suavis: vtrumquē om-  
nino a natura petendum  
est, verū alterū exercitatio  
augebit, alterum imitatio  
presse loquentium & le-  
niter: quid fuit aliud in  
Catulis, vt eos exquisito  
iudicio putares vti literarū  
(quanquam erāt literati:  
sed et alij) hi autē optimē  
vti lingua latina putaban-  
tur: sonus erat dulcis: lite-  
rę nequē expresse, neq; op-  
presse ne aut obscurū esset  
aut pudicum, sine conten-  
tione vox, nec languens,  
nec canora. Vberior ora-  
tio L. Crassi, nec minus fa-  
ceta. Sed bene loquendi  
de Catulis opinio non  
minor.

Neuerthelesse y same pre-  
cepts, which be of wordes  
and sentences, shal apper-  
tain to tolke. But suchens  
we haue our voice to utter  
speache: and in voice wee  
seeke two thinges, that yt  
be cleere, & swete: thei both  
are to bee fetched from na-  
ture euermoze: but exercise  
wil encrease that one: imi-  
tation of treatable, & softe  
speakers wil help y other.  
what was in y Catulli, y  
ye shoulde suppose them to  
vse a perfite iudgement in  
pronouncing of letters.  
Howbeeit they were lear-  
ned: but so were other too:  
yet these were thought to  
vse the latin tongue beste.  
Their sounding was swete  
theire letters neither too  
much mouthed, nor drow-  
ned: lest either it should bee  
vnhearde, or ouer harsh.  
Theire voice was without  
straieng, neither faint nor  
shrill. The speach of Luci-  
us Crassus was moze ple-  
tiful, and no lesse feat con-  
cited, but for well spea-  
kinge, the Catulli were in  
as much estimacion.

Cesar



Cesar was lawced wyth mirth, and mery conceyts: Catullus vncle exceeded all: so that in that lawierly kind of pleading, hee with familiar speache passed the vehemence of other. In all these therfore we must labour, if in all wee searche, what becommeth.

Let then this familiar talk (in which the Socratics most excell) be gentle, and nothing obstinate let there be therein a pleasantnesse. No noz let a mā keepe out other, as though hee were entered into hys owne possession: but as in other matters, so in common talk, hee must thynke an enterchaunged course often tymes meete to be vsed. And let him see, first of all, of what matters hee speake: if they be earnest, lette him vse a sagenesse, if they be mery, a pleasantnes. Speciallly let him fore see, that his talke be wrapt not some vice in his maners whiche then chieflie is wont to befall: wheither in mockage, or earnest, men  
do

Sale vero conditus et facetijs Cesar, Catuli patris frater vicit omnes: vt in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones aliorum sermone vinceret. In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omnibus quid decent exquirimus. Sit igitur hic sermo in quo Socratici maxime excellunt lenis, minimeque pertinax: insit in eo lepos, nec vero tanquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios: sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum etiam in sermone communi, vicissitudine nonnumquam utendum putet. Ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si serijs, seueritatem adhibeat, si iocosjs, leporem. In primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus, quod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiosè de absentibus detrahendi causa

## de Officiis.

aut per ridiculum aut seuerè, aut maledicè, contumeliosèq; dicitur. Habentur autè plerūq; sermones aut de domesticis negotijs aut de Repub. aut de artiū studijs et doctrina. Dāda igitur opera est, vt etiā si aberrare ad alia cœperit, ad hæc reuocetur oratio. Sed vtcunq; aderunt res (neq; enim eijsdem rebus nec omni tēpore, nec similiter delectamur) animaduertendum est etiam quatenus sermo delectationē habeat: & vt incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi modus. Sed quoniam in omni vita rectissimè precipitur, vt perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi nō obtemperantes: sic eiusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira existat, aut cupiditas aliqua: aut pigritia, aut ignauia,

do busie theselues to speak railingly and spitefullye of y absent, to their schaunder.

But this common talk for the most part, is hadde either of household matiers or of the comon sweale or of learning, & teaching artes. wee must therefore giue good heede, that when the communicacion beegin to straye to other thinges to these it bee retourned, yea howe so euer the matter fallēs out, that is in hand. For neither all with one matter, nor at every season nor a lyke wee are delited. we must mark also, howe farre our talke hath in it a liking, and as there was a way to beginne it, so lette there be a mesurable mean to ende it.

But because it is verye well taught: that in al our life wee flee passions, that ys to saye vnmeasurable moodes of mynde not ruled by reason, lykewise oure talke muste be voyde of suche moodes, least eyther anger aryse, or somme greedynesse, or slouthfulnessse, or cowardynesse,

or some such thing appere. aut aliquid tale appareat.  
And most of all, wee must haue regard, that those whom we keepe talke, we seem both to reuerence and to loue. Maximeq; curandū est vt eos quibuscum sermonē cōferimus, et vereri & diligere videamur.

Chiding also many times comes in place as necessary: in which one must vse perauenture bothe a greater strai-ning of voice, and a sharper grauitie of words. It must also be prouided that wee seeme not to do those thinges, as irksome but as Physicians do com to searunge and cutting: so let vs seldom, and but wil-lingly fall to such manner of rebuking: & not at all vnlesse it be of necessitie, where there wil be found none other remedy. vt ad vrēdū & secādū me dici veniūt, sic ad hoc genus castigādi raro inuitiq; veniamus, nec vnquā nisi necessariō, si nulla reperi-etur alia medicina.

But yet let it be clerely without anger, wherewith nothing rightly, nothing discretely can be done. Sed tamen ira procull absit, cū qua nihil recte fieri nihil cōsideratē potest.

And for the most part, we may vse a gentle manner of rebuking, yet tempered with a grauitie, so as both a softnesse bee showed, & all might restrained. Magna autē ex parte clemēti castigatione licet vti grauitate tamen adiuncta, vt et seueritas adhibeatur, & contumelia repellatur. Atque etiam illud ipsū, quod acerbitatē

whiche



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habet obiurgatio, signifi- which chydng hath in it,  
cādū est ipsi<sup>9</sup> causa, qui ob must be declared to be bled  
iurgetur, susceptum esse. for his sake, who is chyd-  
den. It is good also, euen  
Rectū est autē etiā in illis in these braules, which bee  
cōtentionibus, quę cū ini- made with our vtterest e-  
micissimis fiunt, etiā si no- nemies, although we bear  
bis indigna audiamus, ta- wordes vnmete to be spo-  
mē grauitatē retinere, ira- ken to vs: to keepe yet a  
grauitie, & to suppress the  
cundiā repellere. Quę e- angry moode. For those  
nim cum aliqua perturba- things that be wrought by  
tione fiunt, ea nec constā- any passion, neyther can be  
ter fieri possunt, nec ijs qui constantly doone, nor allo-  
absunt approbari. De for- wed of those, that are pre-  
sent. Cuilfaoured also it  
me etiā est de seipso prę- is, to tell praises of a mā  
dicare, falsa pręsertim, & self, specially if they be vn-  
cum irrisione audientium true: and with the mockig  
of the hearers, to resēble y  
imitari militem gloriosum glorious souldiour.  
Et quoniam omnia perse- And because we go tho-  
quimur ( volumus quidē rough al matters, or at the  
certē) dicendum est etiam least be mynded so to dooc:  
We must tel also what ma-  
qualem hominis honorati ner of house, it liketh vs,  
& principis domum pla- an honorable mā, & a prince  
ceat esse: cuius finis est v- should haue. whose end is  
sus, ad quem accommo- y occupieng thereof accor-  
danda est edificandi des- ding to the which, y platte  
criptio: & tamen adhi- of the buyldinge muste bee  
benda dignitatis, com- made: & neuerthelesse there  
moditatisque diligentia. must respect bee hadde to a  
statelynesse & handsōnesse,  
in

in the same. we haue harde  
saie, it was an honour to  
Gneus Octavius, who y  
first of y family was made  
Censull: because in the pa-  
laice, he had buylded a gor-  
geous house & ful of state-  
lynesse: which whē people  
resorting thither had sene  
was thought to further y  
maister, a man newlye co-  
men vp, to the attaining of  
the Consulshippe. Thys  
did Scaurus pull downe,  
and enlarge the rounge of  
his houses. And so Octa-  
uius into his house fyrste  
brought y Consulship: this  
other a noble and famous  
mannes sonne, into his en-  
larged house not onelye  
brought repulse, but also a  
stayne and miserie. For a  
mans honour must be sette  
out by hys howse, and not  
all his honoure soughte by  
hys house: nor by the house  
the maister, but by y may-  
ster the house must bee ho-  
nested. And as in al things  
els, regard is to bee hadde  
not of a mannes selfe only,  
but of other also: likewise  
in a noble mannes house,  
into

Cn. Octauio, qui primus  
ex illa familia Consul fa-  
ctus est, honori fuisse ac-  
cepimus, quod preclarum  
edificasset i Palatio & ple-  
nam dignitatis domū: quę  
cū vulgo viseretur, suf-  
fragata domino nouo ho-  
mini ad consulatum pu-  
tabatur.

Hanc Scaurus demoli-  
tus accessionem adiunxit  
edibus. Itaque ille in suam  
domum consulatum pri-  
mus attulit: hic summi &  
clarissimi viri filius in do-  
mum multiplicatam non  
repulsam solum retulit,  
sed ignominiam etiam &  
calamitatem. Ornanda e-  
nim est dignitas domo, nō  
ex domo dignitas tota  
querenda, nec domo do-  
minus, sed domino dom⁹  
honestanda est. Et vt in cę-  
teris habenda ratio nō sui  
solum sed etiam aliorum:  
sic in domo clari hominis,

## de Officiis.

in quam & hospites multi recipiendi sunt, & admit- tenda hominum cuiusque generis multitudo, adhibenda est cura laxitatis.

Aliter ampla domus decori domino sepe fit: si est in ea solitudo, & maxime si aliquando alio domino solita est frequentari.

Odiosum est enim cum a pretereuntibus dicitur: O domus antiqua, heu quam dispari dominare domino. Quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere. Cauendum est autem, presertim si ipse edifices, ne extra modum sumptu & magnificentia prodeas, quo in genere multum malitiam exemplum est. Studiose enim plerique, presertim in hanc partem, facta principum imitantur.

into the which both manye geastes are to be receaued, & a number of men of currensie is to bee admitted: there must be made a prouision for roomethinesse.

Otherwise a large house proueth to the maister oftentimes a shame: if there bee in it a solitarinesse: and specially if once, with another maister it was wonte to be wel filled. For an odious thing it is, when of bygoers it is saide.

An ancient house, alas, we may see.

How vnlike a lord hath lordship on thee.

which a man may truely say now a daies of manye. Ye must beware also namely if your selfe bee a builder that beyonde measure, in sumptuousnesse, and great coste, you do not excede: in the whiche kinde, euene of the ensample much harm ariseth.

For diligently most menne, speciallye in this pointe, doe folloewe the doinges of princes: as of Lucius



cus Lucullus, a singular Vt Lucij Luculli summi  
man, who ensueth the ver- viri virtutem quis? at quā  
tue: How many yet haue multi villarum magnifi-  
solved the greates costy- centiam imitati sunt? qua-  
ness of his manoure pla- rum quidem certē est ad-  
ces: In whiche thinges hibendus modus, ad medi-  
there must doubles be v- ocritatemq; reuocandus:  
sed a measure, that to a eademq; mediocritas ad  
meankeping must be redu- omnem vsum cultumq;  
ced, and the same meanke- vitę referenda est. Sed  
pinge must be referred to hęc haētenus.

Now in euery dede, we In omni autē actione sus-  
take in hand, three points- cienda, tria sunt tenēda.  
are to be kept. First, that Primum vt appetitus rati-  
appetite obeye reason: for- oni paręat: quo nichil est  
nothing is more thā that, ad officia conseruanda  
for the maintaining of du- accommodatius. Deinde  
ties. Next, that it be consi- vt animaduertatur quan-  
dered, how great a thinge- ta illa res sit, quam efficere  
it is, whiche wee minde to- velimus, vt neuē maior,  
bring to passe, that ney- neuē minor, cura & opera  
ther lesse neither more care suscipiatur, quā causa  
and paine be taken, than postulet.  
case requireth. The thirde  
point is, that wee haue an  
eye to vse a measure in  
those thinges whiche per-  
taine to an honest shewe, &  
scemely grace.

The best measure is to  
kepe the very seemeliness  
wherof est optim<sup>9</sup> dec<sup>9</sup> ipsū tener<sup>9</sup>

## de Officiis.

de quo ante diximus nec  
progredi longius. Horum  
autem triū prestantissimū  
est appetitū obtēperare ra-  
tioni. Deinceps de ordine  
rerū, & tēporum oportu-  
nitate dicendum est. Hac  
autem scientia cōtinetur  
ea, quā grēci εὐταξία, no-  
minant, non hęc, quā inter-  
pretamur modestiam, quo  
in verbo modus inest: sed  
illa est εὐταξία in qua in-  
telligitur ordinis conserua-  
tio. Itaque vt eādē nos  
modestiam appellemus,  
sic definitur a Stoicis. Vt  
modestia sit scientia earū  
rerum, que aguntur aut  
dicuntur loco suo collo-  
candarum. Itaque videtur  
eadē vis ordinis & collo-  
cationis fore.

Nam et ordinem sic de-  
finiunt: compositionē re-  
rum aptis & accomodatis  
locis. Locū autē actionis,

wherof we spake before, &  
not to passe those boundes  
But of these thre the chi-  
fest is, that appetite obeye  
reion.

Hereafter touching order  
of things and opportunitie  
of times, wee haue to saye.  
And this knowledge con-  
teineth that whiche the  
greekes do name εὐταξία

not this whiche we enter-  
prete Modestia: is & whi-  
che worde Modus in com-  
prehended. But that is  
εὐταξία wherein is ment  
a keyng of order. And ther-  
fore that wee maye call the  
same Modestia thus it is  
defined of the Stoikes, &  
Modestia (that is to say)  
discrecion is & knowledge  
of settinge those thinges  
whiche are done, or sayde,  
in their pper places. And  
so of order, & plasing there  
seemeth to be al one propriy.

For thus also they define  
order to bee a framinge of  
things in apt, & cōuenient  
places.

And place they say, cōcer-  
neth

neeth the doing, opportunitie the time. And time conuenient for the dooinge, in Greeke *εὐκαιρία*, in latin is called *Occasio*, So fa-  
leth it, that this discrecion, which we interpret, euen as I saide, is the know-  
ledge of oportunitie of fitte season to do a thing.

But the same definition may be of prudence, wher-  
vpon we treated in the be-  
ginning But in this place we searche after measure  
keeping, and temperance, &  
other like vertues There-  
fore, what were the prop-  
ties of prudence, in their  
place we haue spokē But  
what properly belongs to  
these vertues, wherof here  
we haue begon to speake,  
which ptain to shamesast-  
nes, and to their likinge,  
with whom wee liue wee  
must now declare.

Such an order therefore  
in our doings is to be vsed  
that as in an oration well  
buiyded, so in mans life all  
thinges be accozdaunt, and  
agreable togither.

opportunitatē tēporis esse  
dicūt. Tēpus autē actionis  
oportunū grēce *εὐκαιρία*  
latinē appellatur occasio.  
Sic fit vt modestia, hec  
quā interpretamur (ita vt  
dixi) scientia sit oportuni-  
tatis idoneorum ad agen-  
dū tēporū. Sed potest ea-  
dē esse prudētiē definitio,  
de qua principio diximus.  
Hoc autē loco de modera-  
tione, & tēperantia, & ha-  
rū similibus virtutibus quē  
rimus. Itaq; quē erant pru-  
dētiē ppria, suo loco di-  
cta sunt. Quē autē harum  
virtutum, de quibus iam-  
dudum loquimur, quē p-  
tinent ad verecundiam &  
ad eorū approbationem,  
quibuscum viuimus, nūc  
dicenda sunt. Talis est igitur  
ordo actionū adhiben-  
dus: vt quemadmodum  
in oratione constanti, sic  
in vita omnia sint apta in-

For ter se & conuenientia.




## de Officiis.

Turpe est. n. valdeq; vitio  
 sū in re seuera, cōuiuio dig  
 nū aut delicatū aliquē in  
 ferre sermonē. Bene Peri  
 cles cū haberet collegam  
 in prētura Sophoclē poe  
 tā, ijq; de cōmuni officio  
 cōuenissent & casu formo  
 sus puer prēteriret, dixisset  
 quē Sophocles: O puerū  
 pulchrū Pericle: Pericles  
 ait. At enim prētorē So  
 phocle decet nō solū ma  
 nus sed etiā oculos abstine  
 tes habere. Atq; hoc idem  
 Sophocles si in Athletarū  
 ap, p, batione dixisset, iusta  
 reprehensione caruisset. Tā  
 ta vis est et loci, & tēporis  
 vt si quis cū causā sit actu  
 rus, in itinere, aut in ambu  
 latione secū ipse medite  
 tur, aut si quid aliud attē  
 tius cogitet, nō reprehēda  
 tur, at hoc idem si in con  
 uiuiū faciat, inhumanus  
 videatur, inscitia tēporis.  
 Sed ea quę multum ab  
 humanitate discrepant,

For a fowle hearing it is,  
 and very faultie, in a sage  
 matter to bring in any ta  
 ble talke or waton words.  
 Pericles said well, when  
 hee hadde Sophocles ioy  
 ned Prētor with him, and  
 they were comunoning a  
 bout their office, and as by  
 chaunce a well fauoured  
 chylde passed by, Sopho  
 cles sayde, Oh, there is a  
 fayre bore Pericles, hee  
 answered, It becommes  
 a Prētor, Sophocles, to  
 haue not onlpe forbearinge  
 handes, but eyes also. It  
 Sophocles had said this  
 same, where wastlers bee  
 allowed, hee had bene free  
 from iust reproof. So gret  
 a force there ys bothe of  
 place and tyme. As for ex  
 ample, if a man, that shal  
 plead: a cause, bee musing  
 to himselfe in his iourney,  
 or in hys walke, or anye  
 other thig he mindeth hede  
 fully, hee is not reprovēd,  
 but if he do ſ like at a least  
 he may be thought vnciuil  
 for hauing no regarde to ſ  
 time. Howbeit those thigs  
 which farre disagree frō al  
 human

humanitie, as if anye man  
sing in the street, or if anye  
other greate disorde there  
bee: by and by they appere  
and they greatly neede not  
our admonition, or rules:  
but so these, which seeme  
to bee small faulces, and of  
many can not be perceiued  
we must the more diligent  
lye refraine. As in instru-  
ments sounding by strings  
or blast, though neuer so lit-  
tle they iarr, yet that of a co-  
nunge manne is wont to be  
founde: so must wee liue in  
this life y<sup>e</sup> nothinge chaunce  
to iar, yea and so much the  
more, as the concord of  
deedes is greater, & better  
than of tunes. Wherefore  
as in instruments, musici-  
ans cares do feelee euen the  
least disorde, so if we wyll  
bee sharpe, and quick iud-  
ges and markers of faulces  
we shall vnderstand often-  
times greate thynges by  
small.

we shal sone iudge by y<sup>e</sup> set-  
ting of y<sup>e</sup> eye, by smoth loo-  
king, or bēding of y<sup>e</sup> browe  
by sadnes, mirth, laughter  
speaking, silēce, straining,  
vi fo  56/b/ and

vt si quis in foro cātet, aut  
si qua est alia magna puer-  
sitas, facile apparet, nec  
magnoperē admonitiōē  
& p̄cepta desiderant.

Quę autē parua videntur  
esse delicta, neq; a multis  
intelligi possunt, ab his est  
diligentius declinandū:  
vt in fidibus aut in tibijs,  
quamuis paulū discrepēt,  
tamen id a sciente animad-  
uerti solet: Sic viuendum  
est in vita, ne forte quid  
discrepet, vel multo etiam  
magis, quō maior & meli-  
or actionū, quā sonorū cō-  
centus est. Itaq; vt in fidi-  
bus musicorum, aures vel  
minima sentiunt: sic nos,  
si acres ac diligentes iudi-  
ces esse volumus animad-  
uersoresq; vitiorū, magna  
intelligemus sepe ex par-  
uis. Ex oculorum obtutu,  
ex sup̄ciliōrū aut remissi-  
one, aut cōtractionē, ex mœ-  
stitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu,  
ex locutione, ex reticētia

## de Officiis.

ex contētiōe vocis, ex sū  
missiōn, ex cēteris similib'  
facile iudicabimus, quid e-  
orū apte fiat, quid ab offi-  
cio naturaq; discrepet.

Quo in genere nō est in-  
cōmodū quale quodq; eo-  
rū sit ex alijs iudicare vt si  
quid dedeceat in illis, vite-  
mus & ipsi. Fit n. nescio  
quo modo, vt magis in a-  
lijs cernamus quā in nobis  
met ipsis si quid delinquit-  
tur. Itaq; facillimē corrigū-  
tur in discēdo, quorū vitia  
imitātur emendādi causa  
magistri. Nec vero alienū  
est, ad ea eligēda, quę dubi-  
tationē afferūt, adhibere  
doctos homines, vel etiam  
vsi peritos, & quid his de  
vnoquoq; genere officij  
placet exquirere. Maior e-  
nim pars eo ferē deferri so-  
let, quō a natura ipsa dedu-  
citur, in quibus vidēdū est  
non modo quid quisq; lo-  
quatur, sed etiā quid quis-  
q; sciat, atq; etiam qua de

and fallinge of the voice, &  
ether such like, what is sit-  
tingly done: and what tra-  
duite, and nature swar-  
ueth. In whiche kinde of  
things, it is not unconue-  
nient to iudge by other, of  
what sort eche of them ys,  
& if ought misbecometh an  
other, we shonne it also in  
our selues. For it comes to  
passe, I wote not howe, &  
we see moze in other, than  
in oure selues, if ought bee  
done amisse. And therefore  
berye soone those schollers  
bee corrected, whose faultz  
theire maisters doe coun-  
terfet, for to make them a-  
mended. For truelye out  
of the waye it is, in choo-  
singe of thinges, whypche  
bringe a doubtfulnesse to  
take learned mens aduise,  
or skilfull by experience: &  
so to searche what lyketh  
them, concerninge euerye  
kind of duitie. For y grea-  
ter part is comonly wont  
thither to bee caried whi-  
ther of verye nature they  
be led. In which we must  
see not only what ech man  
saythe, but also, what eche  
man thinketh, & for what  
cause



cause, eche mā so thinketh.  
 For as painters, and they  
 that graue images, and the  
 righte poets also, bee wil-  
 linge too haue theyr wo-  
 kes seene of all sorts of mē  
 that in case oughte bee re-  
 proued of many, it may bee  
 corrected, and therin bothe  
 with them selues, & with  
 oher they examine, what  
 is done amisse: so after the  
 iudgement of other, many  
 thinges of vs both must be  
 done, and lest vndone, and  
 also changed, & amended.

As for things, which are  
 done after custome, and ci-  
 uill ordinances, there is no  
 precept to be geuen of thē.  
 For the be precepts of thē  
 selues, neither it behoueth  
 any man to bee ledde with  
 thys error, if Socrates, or  
 Aristippus haue doone, or  
 spoken any thinge against  
 ciuill order, and custome:  
 that he shoulde thinke the  
 same lawfull for him to do  
 Ther obtained such a large  
 libertie of fault finding, by  
 their great, and heauenlye  
 gifts. But y hole fashion  
 I.i. of the

causa quisq; sentiat. Vt enī  
 pictores, & ij qui signa fa-  
 bricant, & veri etiā poetæ  
 suum quisq; opus à vulgo  
 considerari vult, vt si quid  
 reprehensum sit a pluribus  
 id corrigatur, hīq; & secū  
 & cum alijs, quid in eo pec-  
 catum sit, exquirunt: sic  
 aliorum iudicio permulta  
 nobis & facienda, & non  
 facienda, & mutanda &  
 corrigenda sunt. Quæ ve-  
 ro more aguntur, & insti-  
 tutis ciuilibus, de his ni-  
 hil est præcipiendum, illa  
 enim ipsa præcepta sunt.  
 Nec quenquam hoc erro-  
 re duci oportet: vt si quid  
 Socrates aut Aristippus  
 contra morem consuetu-  
 dinemq; ciuilem fecerint  
 locutiue sint, idem sibi ar-  
 bitretur licere, magnis e-  
 nim illi & diuinis bonis  
 hac licentiā assequebatur.  
 Cynicorū vero ratio tota  
 I.i. est

## de Officiis.

est eiicienda: est enim iimi-  
ca verecundię: sine qua ni-  
hil rectū esse potest, nihil  
honestum. Eos autem quo-  
rum vita perspecta in re-  
bus honestis, atq; magnis  
est, bene de Repub. sentiē-  
tes ac bene meritos, aut  
merentes, aliquo honore,  
aut imperio affectos obser-  
uare & colere debemus.  
Tribuere etiam multum  
senectuti, cedere ijs, qui  
magistratum habebunt:  
habere delectum ciuis &  
peregrini: in ipso quoq;  
peregrino, priuatimue an  
publicē venerit. Ad sum-  
mam, ne agam de singulis,  
communem totius generis  
hominum consiliatorem  
& cōsolationē colere, tu-  
eri, seruare debemus. Iam  
de artificijs & questibus  
qui liberales habendi, qui

of the Clinikes is utterly  
to be refused For it is ene-  
my to shamefastnes: with-  
out which, there can be no  
thing vpright, nor nothing  
honest. But those we ou-  
ght to reuerence, & geue at-  
tendance vpon thē: whose  
life hath bē tried in honest  
& worthy matters: who do  
meane wel to the common  
weal, & haue wel deserved  
or do deserue well thereof,  
& to any honour, or rule be-  
aduañced, also we must ha-  
ue olde age in great estima-  
tion: & must geue place to  
those, y beare office: & ma-  
ke difference betwene a ci-  
tizen & a strāger: & in y be-  
ry stranger also we oughte  
to consider, whether he ca-  
me of priuate businesse or  
for the cōmon weales affai-  
res. In summe (that I  
treat not of euery particu-  
lar) we are bound to loue,  
maintein, & preserue y com-  
mon attonnement & fellowe-  
ship of al mankind.  
Now, concerning occupa-  
ciōs, & gainful sciēces whi-  
che are to be cōtēd honest  
and

which are of base reputacion, thus comonly we haue learned. Firſte thoſe gapnings be diſallowed, & runne in hatred w<sup>th</sup> the all men, as the gayne of tel-ſarmers, & uſurers. Oute of eſtimacio alſo, & baſe be the gaynes y<sup>e</sup> men in wa-ges do take, whoſe labour is bought, & not their cunning. For in the y<sup>e</sup> very hyer is as it were y<sup>e</sup> obligation of their bondage.

They more ouer are to be counted of y<sup>e</sup> baſer ſort, who buy of marchants, y<sup>e</sup> oute of hand they retaille again. For no hinge they proſite, unleſſe they lye a pace, and truly diſhoneſter thing is there none, thā a baine tōg. And al kind of hād<sup>y</sup> craftſmen ſerue in mean occupacions. Neither can the workeſhop truly haue in it any gentlemanly doing, & no deale to be praiſed are theſe occupacions, whiche bee ſeruers of pleaſures: as Drinke-men, butcherz, cookes, puddingmakers, fiſhermen, whiche Terence ſpeketh of, put to theſe

sordidi ſint, hec ferè accedimus. Primum improbatur ij queſtus, qui in odio hominū incurrunt, vt portitorū, et fœneratorum. Il- liberales autem & ſordidi queſtus mercenariorū om- nium, quorū opere, nō quo- rum artes emuntur. Eſt e- nim in illis ipſa merces auc- thoramentum ſeruitutis.

Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod ſtatim vendant. Ni- hil enim proficiūt, niſi ad- modū menciuntur. Nec vero quicquam eſt turpius vanitate. Opificesq; omnes in ſordida arte verſantur. Nec enim quicquam in- genuum poteſt habere of- ficina: minimèque artes ex- probādæ, quæ miniſtræ ſūt voluptatū: cetarij, lanij co- qui, factores, piſcatores, vt ait Terentius: adde his



## de Officiis.

si placet, vnguētarios, saltatores, totūq; ludū talariū. Quibus autē artibus, aut prudētia maior inest: aut nō mediocris vtilitas queritur, vt medicina, vt architectura, vt doctrina rerum honestarū, he sunt ijs, quorum ordini conueniūt, honestē. Mercatura autē si tenuis est, sordida putāda est: si magna & copiosa, multa vndiq; apportās, multisq; sine vanitate impartiens non est admodum vituperanda. Atq; etiam si satiata quēstu, vel contenta potius, vt sepe ex alto in portum, sic ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesq; cōtulerit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nil vberius, nil dulcius, nil homine libero dignius. De qua quoniam

if ye list, perfumers, dancers, & all hazarders.

But those sciences, wherein is greater wisdom, and no meane profit sought, as physicke, castinge of buyldinges, & learning of worthy knoweledge, be honest for them, with whose estat they agree. And marchauntise, if it be small, is to bee counted of little estimation: but if it be great, and well stored, conueying many commodities round about, and disparfinge those same into many mens handes, without vaine wordes, it is not much to bee dispraised, and surdermore, if being satisfied with gaine, or contented rather, as it hath often come from the sea to the hauen so it chaunge from the hauen into landes, & possessions, it seemeth, of verie good right it may be commended. For of al things, wherout anye gayne is sought, nothing is better thā ground tilth & trimning, nothinge yeeldinger, nothing sweeter, nothing meter for a free borne man. wherof becaus

in Cato the elder we haue  
 spoken inough, thence shal  
 you take, what so to this  
 place shal appertaine. But  
 how duties do procede frō  
 those partes, which belōg  
 to honestie: I think it suf-  
 ficiently declared. Now in  
 those same things whiche  
 be honest, ther may befaile  
 oftymes a question, & com-  
 parison of two honest thin-  
 ges, whether is the honest-  
 ter, which pointe is passed  
 ouer of Panetius.  
 For where as all honestye  
 springeth out of fower b. a  
 ches wherof one is of know-  
 weledge, an other of comō  
 felowship, the third of gret  
 courage, the fowerthe of  
 measure keeping, it muste  
 nedes be, y in choosing of  
 dutie these be often compa-  
 red together. wee thinke  
 therefore, those duties bee  
 moze agreable to nature,  
 which be borowed frō com-  
 mon felowship, than those,  
 which be fetched frō know-  
 ledge, & that may be proo-  
 ued by this argument: be-  
 cause if a wise mā happen  
 on such a life, y hee bee cri-  
 tyched

i Catone maiore satis mul-  
 ta diximus, illinc assumes,  
 quas ad hunc locum perti-  
 nebunt. Sed ab ijs partib⁹,  
 quę sunt honestatis, quem  
 admodum officia duceren-  
 tur, satis expositum vide-  
 tur. Eorum autem ipsorū,  
 quę honesta sunt, potest in-  
 cidere sepe contētio & cō-  
 paratio de duobus honestis,  
 vtrum honestius, qui lo-  
 cus à Panetio est præter-  
 missus. Nā cū ōnis honestas  
 manet a partibus quatuor,  
 quarum vna sit cognitio-  
 nis, altera cōmunitatis, ter-  
 tia magnanimitatis, quar-  
 ta moderationis: he in de-  
 ligendo officio sepe inter  
 se comparētur necesse est.  
 Placet igitur aptiora esse  
 naturæ ea officia, quę ex cō-  
 munitate, quàm ea quę ex  
 cognitione ducantur. Id  
 quę hoc argumēto confir-  
 mari potest. Quōd si con-  
 tingerit ea vita sapienti, vt

## de Officiis.

omnium rerum affluentibus copijs ditetur: quantis ea, quę cognitione digna sunt, summo otio secū ipse consideret & contempletur, tamen si solitudo tanta sit vt hominem videre non possit, excedat ē vita. Princepsq; omniū virtutum est illa sapiētia, quā σοφία greci vocant. Prudentia enim, quam greci Φρόνησις dicunt aliā quādam intelligimus: quę est rerum expetendarum, fugiendarumque, scientia. Illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est diuinarum, atque humanarum scientia: in qua continetur deorum et hominū cōmunitas & societas ipsorū inter ipsos. Ea si maxima est (vt est certe) necesse est qd' à cōmunitate ducatur officiū, id esse maximū

ryched with a flowing plētie of al maner substaunce, though with verpe greate leasure he consider, and all to beeholde with himselfe those thinges whiche are woorthye of knowledg yet if his solitarines be so gret y he can not haue the sight of a mā he would wishe to be out of the world. And y wisdom which the Greekes doo terme σοφία is y princeesse of all vertues. For prudence whiche the Greekes do call Φρόνησις we take to bee of a nother nature: whsch is the knowledg of thinges to be desired, & thinges mete to be eschewed. But that wisdom, whiche I named the princeesse, is the science of heuēly, & woorldly thinges, wherin is contained the cōmoneesse of gods & men, & thaire societie, togeather. which vertue in case it bee the greatest as it is in dedde, it muste needes follow, that the dutie whiche is bozowed of commonneesse also is y greatest for



For the knowel:dg, and  
consideracion of naturall  
causes shoulde, after a cer-  
teine sort, bee maimed, and  
vnpersit, if no persour-  
maunce of deedes shoulde  
folloswe. And deedes must  
appeare in defendinge of  
mens commodities. They  
belong therefore to the se-  
lowshippe of men, and for  
that cause are to be prefer-  
red before knowledg.

And this euerie best dis-  
posed man, whan it comes  
to the point, doth shewe, &  
declare. For who is so de-  
sirefull of thoro:wiseinge, &  
lerning y nature of things  
but in case while hee were  
treatinge, and beswinge of  
matters moste worthe of  
knowledg, in the meane  
season hee should sodenlye  
heare tidinges of y hazard  
and danger of his country  
which he is able to succor,  
& withstande: hee woulde  
leauie, and sette asyde all  
those studies: yea though he  
thought, he were able to  
nūber y sters, or to mensure  
y huge cōpasse of y world  
& the same man also wolde  
do as much in his parents  
and

Etenim cognitio, contem-  
platioq; naturę manca quo-  
dāmodo, atq; inchoata sit  
si nulla actio rerum con-  
sequatur. Ea vero actio  
in hominum commodis  
tuendis maximè cernitur.  
Pertinet igitur ad societa-  
tem generis humani. Er-  
go hæc cognitioni antepo-  
nenda est. Atquē id opti-  
mus quisq; re ipsa ostendit  
& indicat. Quis est enim  
tam cupidus in perspicien-  
da, cognoscendaque rerū  
natura: vt si ei tractanti,  
contemplantiq; res cogni-  
tione dignissimas subito sit  
allatum periculum, disci-  
menq; patrię, cui subueni-  
re, opitulariq; possit, non  
illa omnia relinquat, at-  
que abijciat, etiam si di-  
numerare se stellas, aut  
metiri mundi magnitu-  
dinem posse arbitretur.  
Atq; hoc idem in parētis,  
in

## de Officiis.

in amici re aut periculo se  
cerit? Quib<sup>9</sup> rebus intelli-  
gitur, studijs officijsq; sciē-  
tię preponēda esse officia  
iustitię, quę pertinet ad ho-  
minū vtilitatem: qua nihil  
homini esse debet ātiqui<sup>9</sup>.  
Atquē illi ipsi quorū studia  
vitaq; ōnis in rerū cogniti-  
one versata est, tamē ab au-  
g<sup>9</sup>dis hominū vtilitatibus  
& cōmodis nō recesserunt  
Nam & erudiere multos,  
quō meliores ciues, vtilio-  
resq; in rebus suis publicis  
essent: vt Thebanū Epami-  
nūdā Lysias Pythagorē<sup>9</sup>:  
Syracusīū Dionem, Plato,  
multiquē multos. Nosquē  
ipsi quicquid ad Rēpub.  
attulimus (si modo aliquid  
attulimus) ā doctoribus  
atq; doctrina instructi ad  
eam & ornati accessi-  
mus. Neq; solum vi-  
ui atq; presentes stu-  
diosos discendi erudiunt

and in his friends cause, &  
perel. By whiche thynges  
it is gathered, y beefore y  
studies, & duties of know-  
ledge, y studies of iustyce  
are to be preferred, whiche  
do belong to the profite of  
men thā the which a man  
ought to hold nothig derer  
Also they who haue spent  
theire hole life, & studie in  
knowledge of thyngs, haue  
not yet withdrawn the-  
selues from helping to in-  
crease mens profits, & com-  
modities. For they also ha-  
ue entrusted many, to ma-  
ke thē the better citizens, &  
y more profitable in theire  
commō weales, as Lysias  
the Pythagoreā scholed y  
Thebane Epaminondas:  
Plato taught Dion y Si-  
racusian, & many other, ma-  
ny mo, & what soeuer we  
our self brought to the cō-  
mon weal (if any thing we  
haue brought) we came to  
it enfourmed by techers, &  
furnished with learnynge.  
And they not onely whyle  
they liue, and bee presente,  
do schole, & teache the stu-  
dents

dents of learning, but after  
their deeth also, by their mo-  
numents of learning, they  
do & same. For they haue  
not ouerpasseed one pointe,  
& concerneth, lawes, custo-  
me, & the common wealth  
knowledge, so as they may  
seeme to haue emploied their  
quiet studies to oure com-  
mon affaires.

Thus they being themsel-  
ues geuen to the studies of  
learning, and wisdom, do  
chiefly bestow their wylde-  
dome, prudence, & vnder-  
standing to mens comoditi-  
es. For the same cause al-  
so, it is better to vtter ple-  
narily, so it be discretelye,  
than without eloquence to co-  
ceine neuer so wittely, be-  
cause ones conceit serueth  
onely within it self. wher-  
as eloquence gettes with-  
in her reche those, wythe  
whō we are ioined in com-  
mon felowshippe. And as  
swarms of bees do cluster  
together, not to this end, to  
make cōbs, but being swar-  
ming by kind, they worke  
their cōbes, so men muche  
more,

atq; docent: sed hoc idē e-  
t iā post mortē monumētis  
litterarū assequuntur. Nec  
enim loc⁹ vllus pretermis-  
sus est ab ijs, qui ad leges,  
qui ad mores, qui ad disci-  
plinā Reip. ptineret: ita vt  
otiū suū ad nostrū negoti-  
um cōtulisse videantur. Ita  
illi ipsi doctrine studiis &  
sapiētiē dediti ad hominū  
vtilitatē suā sapiētiā pru-  
dētiā, intelligētiāq; potissi-  
mū conferūt. Ob eā etiam  
causā eloqui copiosē (mo-  
dō prudenter) melius est,  
quā vel acutissimē sine elo-  
quētia cogitare: quōd co-  
gitatio in se ipsa vertitur:  
eloquentia vero cōplecti-  
tur eos, quibuscū cōmuni-  
tate iūcti sumus. Atq; vt a-  
pū examina nō fingendo-  
rū fauorum causā congre-  
gantur: sed cum congre-  
gabilia natura sint fingunt  
fauos: sic homines ac  
multo etiam magis, na-  
tura



## de Officiis.

natura cōgregati, adhibēt  
 augendi cōgregandiq; so-  
 lertia. Itaque nisi ea virtus  
 quę cōstat ex hominibus  
 tuēdis, id est ex societate  
 generis humani, attingat  
 rerum cognitionē, soliu-  
 ga cognitio, et ieiuna vide-  
 atur. Item quē magnitudo  
 animi remota à cōmunita-  
 te cōiunctioneq; humana  
 feritas sit quēdā & imma-  
 nitas. Ita fit vt vincat cog-  
 nitionis studiū, cōsociatio  
 hominum, atq; cōmunitas.  
 Nec verū est quod dicitur  
 à quibusdam, propter ne-  
 cessitatē vitę, quōd ea, quę  
 natura desideraret, & con-  
 sequi sine alijs, atque effice-  
 re non possemus, idcirco  
 istam esse cum hominibus  
 communitatem & socie-  
 tatem. Quōd si omnia no-  
 bis, quę ad victum, cul-  
 tumq; pertinent quasi vir-  
 gula diuina (vt aiunt)

more than they, by nature  
 swarming, do vse ther cō-  
 ning of doing, & deuisinge.  
 Therefore onelasse y same  
 vertue, whiche cōsisteth in  
 defendinge men, that is to  
 say, the felloshship of man-  
 kind, doth meete with the  
 knowelodge of thinges: yt  
 may seeme a very bare and  
 alone wandring knowlege  
 and likewise greatnesse of  
 corage, seuered from com-  
 mon felowshippe, and ney-  
 bourhodde of men, multe  
 nedes be a certeine sauage  
 nesse, and beastly crueltie.  
 So it falles out, that the  
 accompanieng, & common  
 felloshship of men far sur-  
 mountes the studie of  
 knowelodge.

Neither is it true, which  
 is sayd of somme: that this  
 common knotte, and fellosh-  
 shippe is had among men,  
 euen for necessitie of life be-  
 cause without other, wee  
 might not get, and bynge  
 too passe those thinges, that  
 nature doothe desyre: and  
 that, if all thynges were  
 found vs, euen by the grace  
 of Godde as (they saye)  
 which

Which pertain to food, & furniture of life, the world every one of a good witte al busines laide aside, letteth himself wholly in knowledge, & science. But that is not so. For he would both flye solitarinesse, & choose a companion of studie, both to teach: & learne: both to heare, & speake. Wherefore al durtie which auailleth to mainteine neighbourhod, and fellowship of men is to be preferred aboue y<sup>e</sup> durtie, which consisteth in knowledge, & science. This question perauenture maye be wel moued, whether this common fellowship which is most of al agreeable to nature, be also alwaies to be preferred before meane, & measure keeping I thynke not so.

For there be some thinges partly so filthy, partly so hapnous, that a wyle mā would not doo the, no not to saue his countrie. As manye suche, Possidoni<sup>us</sup> hath gathered together, but some of them so foule, and so fylthy:

that

suppeditaretur: tū optimo quisque ingenio negotijs omnibus omisiss, totū se in cognitione & scientia collocaret. Non est ita, nā & solitudinem fugeret, & socium studiū quereret: tum docere, tum discere vellet tum audire, tum dicere. Ergo omne officiū, quod ad coniunctionem hominū & ad societatem tuenda valet, anteponendū est illi officio, quod cognitione & scientia cōtinetur. Illud forsitan querendū sit, num haec communitas, que maxime est apta nature, sit etiā moderationi, modestique semper anteponenda? non placet, sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, vt ea ne conseruandē quidē patrię causa sapiēs factur<sup>9</sup> sit. Ea Possidoni<sup>9</sup> collegit p multa, sed ita tetra quaedam, ita obscena vt

## de Officiis.

vt dictu quoque videatur  
turpia. Hec igitur non sus-  
cipiet quisquam Reip. causa  
nec Resp. quidem pro se sus-  
cipi volet. Sed hec comodi-  
us se res habet, quod non  
potest accidere tempus, vt  
inter sit Reip. quicquam il-  
lorum facere sapientem.  
Quare hoc quidem effec-  
tum sit in officijs deligendis:  
hoc genus officiorum ex-  
cellere, quod teneatur ho-  
minum societate. Etenim  
cognitionem prudentiam-  
q; sequitur considerata ac-  
tio. Ita fit, vt considerate a-  
gere pluris sit quam cogi-  
tare prudenter, atque hec  
quidem hactenus. Pate-  
factus est enim locus ipse,  
vt non sit difficile in exqui-  
rendo officio quid cuiq;  
sit preponendum, videre.  
In ipsa autem communi-  
tate sunt gradus officio-  
rum, ex quibus quid cuiq;  
prestat, intelligi possit:

that euen to be spoken they  
seeme shamefull.

Those therfore ought no  
man to take in hand, for the  
common weales cause, no-  
ther wold the commō weal  
for her sake haue them en-  
terprised. But this matter  
standes in better case, for  
that ther can befall no time  
that the cōmō wele should  
neede too haue a wise man  
doo any of them.

Wherefore let this be con-  
cluded, in choyse of dueties  
that suche kinde of dueties  
most excell, as concerne the  
fellowship of men. For ad-  
uised doyng will followe  
knoweledge, & wisdom.  
So it comes too passe, that  
too doo aduisedlye is more  
worth, than wiselpe too de-  
uise. And therof thus farre  
for this place is plainelpe  
nough set oute, & it is not  
hard, in serching out of du-  
ty, to perceiue, among the  
all which afoze other is to  
be preferred.

yet enē in cōmō felowship  
there be degrees of duties,  
whereby may bee knowen  
what one is aboue & other,  
to



so as y first dueties be due  
to the gods immortal, the  
second to our countrey, the  
third, to our parentes, and  
so forth by degrees, y rest  
to the rest.

Of the which matters,  
briefly debated, may be ga-  
thered, how men are wont  
not onely to doubt, whether  
a thing be honest or disho-  
nest: but also two honest  
things layde before them,  
whether is the honestest.

This point (as I  
sayde before) is  
ouerslipped  
by Panae-  
tius.

But now to the re-  
sidue lette vs  
procede.  
(:.)

vt prima dijs immortalib⁹.  
secunda patrię, tertia parē-  
tibus: deinceps gradatim re-  
liqua reliquis debeantur.

Quibus ex rebus breuiter  
disputatis, intelligi potest,  
nō solū id homines solere  
dubitare honestū ne an  
turpe sit, sed etiam  
duobus ppositis  
honestis vtrū  
honestius.

Hic locus à Panetio est (vt  
supra dixi) prætermis-  
sus. Sed iam ad re-  
liqua perga-  
mus.  
(?)

M. TVLLII CICE-  
RONIS, DE OFFICI-

is. Liber secundus.

MARCVS  
TVLLIUS CICE-

roes second boke of  
duties to Marcus  
his sonne.

VEMADMO-

**Q**uod Officia duce-  
rentur ab honestate Marce fili: atque ab  
omni genere virtutis, satis  
explicatum arbitror libro  
superiore. Sequitur ut hæc  
officiorum genera perse-  
quar, quæ pertinent ad vite  
cultum, & ad earum rerū  
quibus vtuntur homines  
facultatem, ad opes, ad co-  
pias in quo tum queri dixi  
quid vtile, quid inutile, tū  
ex vtilibus, quid utili<sup>9</sup>, aut  
quid maximè vtile, de qui-  
bus dicere aggrediar, si pau-  
ca prius de instituto, ac  
de iudicio meo dixerō.  
Quamquam enim libri  
nostri complures:



fter what sorte  
duties should be  
taken out of ho-  
nesty, son Mark  
a from enery kynd of ver-  
tue: I suppose it sufficiēt-  
lye declared in mye former  
boke. It folowes, that we  
go forward to these kindes  
of duties: which belong to  
power, to riches, to y fur-  
niture of mans life, and to  
the plentie of those things,  
y men do occupie wherein  
I saide it is sought: bothe  
what is profitable, what  
vnprofitable: & also of pro-  
fitable things which is the  
more profitable, or whiche  
y most vnprofitable. Of y  
which I wil eter to speke  
if I shal say a woorde or  
two befoze, of my purpose,  
and meaning.

For though our bokes ha-  
ue stirred by many men to  
the

the studie not only of rea-  
ding, but also of wytyng:  
per oherwise I feare, lest  
the name of philosophie be  
hateful to some good men:  
& y they maruaile, I bee-  
stow in it so much trauail,  
& time. In dede as long as  
the comon weale was go-  
uerned by the, to whō shee  
had comitted her selfe, I  
did employ al my care, and  
studie vpon it. But when  
one man kept all in thral-  
dome, & ther was no place  
at al for counsel, & authory-  
tie: & I besides had forgo-  
my copanions: of preservi-  
g the state, who had ben sin-  
guler men, neyther I ga-  
ne my self to greues, wher  
with I shoulde haue berne  
wasted, onles I had resist-  
ed the, nor again, to plea-  
sures vnscimely for a lear-  
ned man. And would god,  
y the comō weale, had sto-  
de in y state, whereun it be-  
gan: & had not light vpon  
men, who were not so de-  
sirous of altring, as ouer-  
throwing of things. For  
firste, as wee were wonte  
to dooe, when the com-  
mon weale was standing:

wee

non modo ad legēdi, sed e-  
tiā ad scribēdi studiū exci-  
tauerint: tamē interdū ve-  
reor, ne quibusdā bonis vi-  
ris philosophiē nomē sit in-  
uisū: mirenturq; in ea tan-  
tū me operē & tēporis po-  
nere. Ego autē quamdiu  
Resp. per eos gerebatur,  
quibus se ipsa comiserat, ō-  
nes meas curas cogitatio-  
nesq; in eā cōferebā. Cū  
autē dominatu vnus ōnia  
teneretur, neq; esset vsquā  
consilio aut authoritati lo-  
cus: socios deniq; tuendę  
Reip. summos viros amis-  
sem: nec me angoribus de-  
di quibus essem confectus  
nisi his restitissem: nec rur-  
sum indignis homine doc-  
to voluptatibus. Atquē v-  
tinā Respub. stetitset quo  
cæperat statu, nec in homi-  
nes non tam cōmutan-  
darum rerū quā euer-  
tendarum cupidos incidisset.  
Primum enim, vt stante  
Repub. facere solebamus,



## de Officiis.

in agēdo plus quā in scribingo operę ponerim? in pleading, & in writing: af-  
 Deinde ipsis scriptis non terward, in very writings  
 ea quę nunc, sed actiones we wold not put y things  
 nostras manderemus, vt that we do now, but our  
 sepe fecimus. Cū autem pleadings, as we haue done  
 Resp. in qua omnis mea diuers times.  
 cura, cogitatio, opera poni so But when the cōmō wele  
 lebat, nulla esset omnino: in which al my care, study  
 illę scilicet literę omnino and trauaile was wont to  
 conticuerunt forenses, & be besto wed, was none at  
 senatoriæ. Nihil autem al, verely those lawierly, &  
 gere cū animus non pos Senatehouse learnings  
 set, in ijs studijs ab initio were husht. But seing my  
 versatus ætatis: existimaui mind could not choose, but  
 honestissimē molestias de be doing: hauing ben occu-  
 poni posse, si me ad philo- pied in those studies, from  
 sophiam retulissē. Cui cū the beginning of my yonge  
 multum adolescens disce age, I thoughte sorowes  
 di causa temporis tribuissē might be put asway moste  
 postea quā honoribus in honestly if I returned my  
 seruire cœpi, meq; totum selfe to philosophie. wher-  
 Reipublicę tradidi, tan- unto when being yong I  
 tum erat philosophiæ loci, had geuen muche time, to  
 quantum superfuerat a learn it, after y I begā to  
 micorum & Reipublicę attend honours, & betooke  
 temporis. Id autem om- my self whole to the cōmō  
 ne cōsumebatur in legēdo weale, so muche leasures  
 was lefte for philosophie,  
 as remayned of the times  
 spent aboute mye frendes  
 and the common weales  
 causes. And that was  
 all bestowed in readyng,

for writinge I had no time scribendi ocium nō erat.  
 In our most miseries ther Maximis igitur in malis  
 fore, we seme to haue got- hoc tantum boni affecuti  
 ten this so great a commo- videmur: vt ea literis mā-  
 ditie, that we might put daremus, quę nec satis e-  
 those matters in writing: rant nota nostris, & erant  
 which were not sufficiētly cogitatione dignissima.  
 knowne to oure men, & yet  
 were most worthy of kno- Quid est enim, per deos,  
 wledge. For what is there optabilius sapiētia? quid  
 in factly more wishfull, thā prestati? quid homini me-  
 wisdom: what more ex- lius? quid homine digni?  
 cellēt? what to a man more Hanc igitur qui expetunt,  
 worthye? what for a man philosophi nomināt: nec  
 more honourable? They quicquā aliud est philoso-  
 then, who doo desire thys, phia (si interpretari velis)  
 be named philosophers: nei quā studiū sapientię.  
 ther is philosophie ought Sapiētia autem est (vt a  
 els, if ye will tell the mea- veteribus philosophis de-  
 ning of the worde, but the finitū est) rerū diuinarum  
 study of wisdom. And wis- & humanarum, causarum  
 dome (as it is defined of an- quę, quibus hęres continē-  
 cient Philosophers) is the tur, scientia: cuius studiū  
 science of heauēly & world qui vituperat, haud sanē i-  
 ly things, and of the causes telligo, quidnam sit, quod  
 whereby these thinges bee laudandum putet. Nam si-  
 upholden. And who so dis- ue oblectatio queritur a-  
 praiseth the study therof: I nimi, requiesq; curarum  
 wote not vereli, what ther quę conferri cum eorum  
 maye be & he would deeme  
 praise worthy. for whether  
 & delitige of & mind be sou-  
 ght & quietig of care: what  
 maye be compared to their  
 stu-

## de Officiis.

studijs potest, qui semp ali  
quid inquirūt, qd' spectet,  
& valeat ad benè beatèq;  
viuēdū: Siue ratio cōstā-  
tie, virtutisq; queritur, aut  
hec ars est, aut nulla omni  
nō p quā eas assequamur.  
Nullā vero dicere maxi-  
marū rerū artē esse, cū mi-  
nimarum siñ arte nulla sit  
hominum est parum cōsi-  
deratē loquētium, atq; in  
maximis rebus errātium.  
Si autē est aliqua discipli-  
na virtutis: vbi ea quere-  
tur, cū ab hoc discēdi ge-  
nere discesseris? Sed hec  
cum ad philosophiā cohor-  
tamur, accuratius solēt dis-  
putari: qd' alio quidā libro  
fecimus. Hoc autē tēpore  
rātum nobis declarādum  
fuit, cur orbatī Reipu. mu-  
neribus ad hoc nos studiū  
potissimum cōtulissēmus.  
Occurritur autē nobis &  
quidē a doctis et eruditīs,  
querentibus satis ne con-

studies, who alwaies gas-  
ther somwhat that tēdeth  
a auarileth wel, & swaifful-  
ly to lyue, or if the waye of  
stedfastnes, and vertue bee  
sought either this is y art  
or ther is none at al, wher  
by we maye attaine them.  
To vphold there is no art  
of y greatest things, seeing  
none of y least be wout art  
it is a token of men spea-  
king with smal aduise mēt  
and erringe in the greatest  
matter. But if there be a-  
ny science of vertue, wher  
shal it be sought, whē you  
be gone from this kinde of  
lerning.

But these thinges are  
wout to bee more exactlye  
discoursed, whē we exhort  
men to philosophic, which  
in deede we haue done, in  
another book. But at this  
present, only it was to bee  
declared of vs, why wee  
got vs chiefly to this study  
when wee were herest of  
our cōmon welth offices.

But it is gainesaid vs, &  
that of skilfull, & learned  
mē demāding whether we  
seeme to do cōstātly mough  
who



who althoughe we holde, stantē facere videamur  
 that nothing can bee surely qui cū p̄cipi nihil posse di-  
 known: yet bothe were cam⁹ tamē et alijs de reb⁹  
 wont to dispute of other cam⁹ differere soleam⁹, & hoc  
 matters, and at this same ipso tēpore p̄cepta offici  
 time we prosecute p̄ceptz psequamur. Quibus vellē  
 of dūpt. To whō I wold satis cognita esset nostra  
 oure oppinions were well sētentia. Nō enim sumus ij  
 known. For we are not quorū vageretur animus er-  
 they whole mynd wandere, nec habeat vnquā  
 reth in errour, & hath not rore, quid sequatur. Quē enim  
 at al, what to solo we. For esset ista mens, vel quē vi-  
 what a minde should thys ta potius, non solū dispu-  
 be, or rather a life: where tandi, sed etiā viuendi, ra-  
 the meane not onely of dis- tione sublata? Nos autē vt  
 puting but also of liuing is ceteri, qui alia certa, alia in-  
 taken cleane a waye. But certa esse dicūt, sic ab his  
 as other, who do say some dissentientes, alia p̄babilia  
 things be certein, some vn- cōtra alia non probabilia  
 certain: so we dissentinge esse dicimus. Quid est er-  
 from them, doe say agayne go quod me impediāt, ea  
 some thinges bee prouable quē mihi p̄babilia videāt  
 some vnprouable. sequi? quē cōtra im̄pbare  
 what is there then that atq; affirmādi arrogatiā vi-  
 shold let me to solo those tantē, fugere temeritatē,  
 thinges whiche to mee doe quē a sapiētia dissidet plu-  
 seeme prouable: which cō- rimū. Contrā autem om-  
 trariwise, to disproue, and nia disputantur a nostris,  
 to hoide the presumptiō of because  
 affirming: and to flee rash-  
 nes, which disagreth from  
 wisdomē most of all.  
 But by our men there is  
 disputing agāst al thigs,  
 because

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quod hoc ipsū probabile  
elucere non possit, nisi ex  
vtraq; parte causarū esset  
facta cōtētio. Sed hęc ex-  
planata sunt in Academi-  
cis nostris satis ( vt arbi-  
tror ) diligenter.

Tibi autē, mi Cicero, quā-  
quam in antiquissima, no-  
bilissimaquē philosophia,  
Cratippo authore versa-  
ris, his simillimo qui ista  
pręclara pepererunt : ta-  
men hęc nostra finitima  
vestris ignota esse nolui.  
Sed iam ad instituta per-  
gamus.

Quinque igitur rationi-  
bus propositis officij per-  
sequendi, quarum duę ad  
decus, honestatemq; per-  
tinent, duę ad commoda  
vitę, copias, opes, faculta-  
tes, quinta ad eligendi  
iudicium, si quando ea,  
quę dixi, pugnare inter  
se viderentur : honesta-  
tis pars perfecta est :

because this same thyng &  
is profitable cannot shyne  
forth, except there shoulde  
be a conference of reasons  
expressed vpon both sides.  
But these matters, as I  
suppose, bee diligently &  
enough made plaine in oure  
Academikes.

But although my Cicero,  
you bee exercised in & most  
auncient & most noble phi-  
losophy. Cratippus beinge  
your authoz: a mā full like  
vnto those who haue made  
these notable things: yet I  
woulde not these of ours,  
berye neere vnto yours, to  
you should be vnknownen.  
But now let vs goe on to  
our purpose.

Seing then fīue waies be  
set out of treating vpo du-  
tie: wherof t̄wo do pertain  
vnto comelynesse and ho-  
nesty: other t̄wo belong to  
the commodities of a manys  
life, to aboundance, power  
ryches: the fīfte doth serue  
to & iudgemēt of chosing, if  
euer those, which I spake  
of should seeme to strīue to  
gither: the parte touchinge  
honesty is made an ende of  
whiche

which truely I desire to be  
very well known to you.  
But this, wherof we tret  
now, is the very same, that  
is called profitable.

In y<sup>e</sup> which terme custom  
saylinge hath swarued out  
of the waye: and by little &  
little is brought too thys  
poynt, that it would seuer  
profitable from honest: and  
would make some thing ho-  
nest, which shoulde not bee  
profitable, and some thinge  
profitable, whiche shoulde  
not be honest: thā y<sup>e</sup> which  
no greater danger could be  
brought to mans life.

Philosophers suerlye of  
very great aucthoritie doe,  
grauely no doubt, and ho-  
nestly, in imaginacion son-  
der these thzee confused  
kynds. For whatsoeuer is  
iust, thei also iuge the same  
to be profitable: & likewise  
what so is honest, the take  
the same to be iust: wherof  
is concluded, that whatso-  
euer is honest, the same ys  
profitable. the which thing  
whoe inallye foresce: they  
oftentimes hauinge in ad-  
miracion suttlye witted mē

It. iii.

and

quam quidem tibi cupio  
esse notissimam. Hoc autē  
de quo nunc agimus, id ip-  
sum est, quod vtile appel-  
latur.

In quo verbo lapsa cōsue-  
tudo deflexit de via, sen-  
simquē eō deducta est, vt  
ab honesto vtile secerne-  
ret: & constitueret hone-  
stum esse aliquid, quod v-  
tile non esset: & vtile qd'  
non honestum: qua nulla  
perniciēs maior hominum  
vitę potuit asferri. Summa  
quidem auctoritate philo-  
sophi seuerē sanē, atq; ho-  
nestē hęc tria genera cōfu-  
sa, cogitatione distingūt.

Quicquid enim iustum sit  
id vtile etiam esse cēsēt:  
itemquē quod honestum,  
idem esse iustum. Ex quo  
efficitur vt quicquid ho-  
nestum sit, idem sit vtile.  
Quod qui parum perspi-  
ciūt, hi sepe versutos homi-  
nes & callidos admirātes



## de Officiis.

eorū maliciā sapientiā iudicant. Quorū error eripiendus est: omnisq; opinio ad eā speciē traducēda, vt honestis cōsilijs, iustisq; factis nō fraude & malitiosē intelligāt ea, quę velīt cōsequi posse. Quę ergo ad vitā hominū tuēdā pti- nēt, partim sūt inanimata vt aurū, argētū, vt ea quę gignuntur ē terra, & alia eiusdem generis, partim animata, quę habēt suos impetus & rerū appetitus. Eorū autē alia rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione vtentia. Expertes rationis sunt equi, boues et reliq; pecudes, & apes, quorū opera efficitur aliquid ad hominū vñ, atq; vitā. Ratione autē vtentū duo genera ponuntur, vnum deorū, alterum hominum. Deos placatos pietas efficit et scētitas. Proximē autē et scēdū deos hōines hominibus maximē vtilēs esse pos-

and crafty do repute their wiliness for wisdō. whose error must be taken awaye and their whole opinion is from that to be brought vnto this heap, that by honest counsel, and good dedes, not by guyle, & craftines, they vnderstande themselves in possibilitie to attaine suche things, as they would.

Some things thā which appertain to y<sup>e</sup> maintenāce of mans life, be liuelesse: as golde, and siluer, as these whiche are gotten out of y<sup>e</sup> earth, as other of the same sort: some be liuing, and feeling whiche haue their motions & appetits to things. And some of them be void of reason, some haue y<sup>e</sup> vse of reason. Woide of reason bee horses, oxen, and other cattell, and bees, by whose worke, somewhat is made for mans vse: & life. But of those that haue vse of reason, twoc kindes there bee put: one of gods, another of menne. Deuocion & holinesse will make the gods fauourable. But next of al & after y<sup>e</sup> gods, men to men may be most profitable.

And

And again there is the sãc  
diuision of those thynges,  
which annoy, & hurte. And  
because men do not thinke  
the godds do harne, these  
excepted they suppose mē to  
men too doo moste hurt, or  
profit.

For the most part of those  
same, which we called liue  
lesse be the effectes of mās  
wozke, neither we should  
haue them, except hande, &  
craft had been put thereto  
neither without mens ser-  
uice, wee should vse them.

For neither preseruacion  
of healt, nor saylinge, nor  
ground tilth, & trimminge  
nor the innig, and sauuing  
of corne, and other fruites,  
without labour of menne,  
coude haue been any at all  
Now moreouer both cari-  
age out of those thynges,  
wherewith we were stored  
and conueyance in of those  
which we shold nede, ther  
coude bee don telesse none,  
excepte menne shoulde doo  
those offices. And in lyke  
manner, nother stones  
shold be hewed out of quar-  
reis, necessarie to our vse,  
nother

sūt. Earūq; iterū rerū quę  
noceāt & obsint, eadē diui-  
sio est. Sed quia deos no-  
cere non putāt: his excep-  
tis homines hominib⁹ plu-  
rimū obesse vel prodesse  
arbitrantur. Ea enim ipsa  
quę inanimata diximus,  
pleraq; sūt hominū effec-  
ta opere, quę nec habere-  
mus nisi manus & ars ac-  
cessissēt, nec his sine homi-  
nū administratione vtere-  
mur. Neq; enim valitudi-  
nis curatio, neq; nauigatio  
neq; agricultura, neq; fru-  
gū fructuūq; reliquorū p-  
ceptio, & cōseruatio sin o-  
pera hominū vlla esse po-  
tuisset. Iam vero & earū  
rerū, quib⁹ abūdaremus,  
exportatio, & earū, quibus  
egeremus inuectio certe  
nulla esset, nisi his munerī-  
bus homines fungeren-  
tur. Eademq; ratione, nec  
lapides exciderētur ē terra  
ad vsum nostrū necessarij

## de Officiis.

nec ferrum, & aurū, argen-  
 tū effoderetur penit<sup>9</sup> ab-  
 ditū, sine hominū labore  
 & manu. Tecta verō qui-  
 bus & frigorū vis pellere-  
 tur, & calorū molestie se-  
 darentur, vnde aut initio  
 generi humano dari potu-  
 issēt, aut postea subuenire  
 si aut vi tēpestatis, aut ter-  
 remotis aut vetustate ceci-  
 dissent: nisi cōmunis vita  
 ab hominibus harū rerum  
 auxilia petere didicisset.  
 Adde ductus aquarū, deri-  
 uationes fluminū, agrorū  
 irrigationes, moles apposi-  
 tas fluctibus, portus manu  
 factos: quę nō sine homi-  
 nū opere habere possem<sup>9</sup>,  
 Ex quibus ōnibus multif-  
 quē alijs pspicuum est, qui  
 fructus, quęq; vtilitates ex  
 rebus iisque sūt inanimata  
 piciantur, eas nos nullo  
 modo sine hominū manu  
 atq; opera capere potuisse.  
 qui deniq; ex bestiis fruct<sup>9</sup>

nother yron, golde, brasse,  
 siluer deepe hidden coude  
 be digged vp wout the la-  
 bour & hand of man.  
 Houses also whereby both  
 y sharpnesse of colde might  
 be defended & the noiaunce  
 of heat might be asswaged  
 from whence either at the  
 beginnunge, mought they  
 haue been geuen to man-  
 kind: or after do ease, if ei-  
 ther by vpolence of tēpeste  
 or by earthquakes, or old-  
 nesse they had gon to wrak  
 except comon life had lear-  
 ned of men to aske the ayd  
 for these thinges.  
 Adde hereunto conduites  
 of water, turning of riuerz  
 letting in water ouer gro-  
 undes wharfs made agais-  
 streames. Hauens caste by  
 hand: whiche wout mens  
 work, we might not haue.  
 By al which, and many o-  
 ther thinges, it is euidente:  
 that by no meanes, wout  
 mans hande and trauayle,  
 we coude haue receiued y  
 fruits, and profits, whiche  
 be gotten of those thinges,  
 that be liuclisse.  
 What fruits also of beastes,  
 or



or what commoditie could there be taken? but if men shoulde helpe thereto. For euen they doubtlesse were men, who were the chiefe in deuising, what vse wee might haue of eche beaste nor at this season, without mennes seruice, might we either kepe hozses, or break them, or saue the, or of the take seasonable commodities: and by men also bothe those beastes bee kyled, which doe hurte, and those be taken, whiche maye doe seruyce.

What shoulde I number by a heap of artes? Wout which, mannes life coulde haue been none at all. For who should ease the sick? What delight should there bee amonge the helthfull? What diet? What aparaile? onlesse so many artes should serue vs. With whiche things mans lyfe be furnished, is become so farre different from the feeding, and eate of beastes.

Cities also, without the assemble of menne, coulde neyther bee buylded, nor peopled.

aut que commoditas, nisi homines adiuuarent, percipi posset? Nā et qui principes inueniendi fuerunt quā ex quaq; bellua vsu habere possemus, homines certē fuerūt. Nec hoc tempore sine hominū opera, aut pascere eas, aut domare, aut tueri, aut tēpestiuos fructus ex his capere possemus. Ab eisdēq; & ea, que nocent, interficiūtur, & que vsus possūt esse capiuntur. Quid enumerē artiū multitudinē? sīn quibus vita hominis omnino nulla esse potuisset?

Quis n. egris subuenisset? que esset oblectatio valentiū? qui victus, aut cultus? nisi tam multę nobis artes ministrarentur. Quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum distat, a victu & cultu bestiarum. Vrbes vero sine hominū cōetu nō potuissēt, nec edificari, nec frequentari.

where-

## de Officiis.

Ex quo leges moresq; cō-  
stituti, tum iuris equa des-  
criptio, certa; viuedi dis-  
ciplina, per quas bene bea-  
atq; viuitur, quas res &  
māuetudo animorū cōse-  
cuta, & verecūdia est: ef-  
fectūq; est, vt esset vita mu-  
nitior, atq; vt dādo, & acci-  
piendo, pmutandisq; facul-  
tatibus & cōmōdis nulla  
re egerem? Lōgiore hoc  
loco sumus, quā necesse  
est. Quis est enim cui non  
p̄spicua sunt illa, quę plu-  
ribus verbis a Panetio cō-  
memorantur? neminē ne-  
que ducē in bello, nec pri-  
cipē domi, magnas res &  
salutares sine hominū stu-  
dijs gerere potuisse. Com-  
memorantur ab eo The-  
mistocles Pericles, Cyrus,  
Agēsilaus, Alexāder, quos  
negat sine adiumentis ho-  
minum tantas res efficere  
potuisse.

Vtitur in re non dubia

whereupon ordinaunces,  
and customes were made,  
also an indifferent settinge  
out of law, and a sure rule  
too line after, by whych,  
the lyfe is ledde well and  
swete fully whiche things  
both the mildnes of mynd  
& shamefastenesse hath so-  
lowed, and it is brought to  
passe, that our life shoulde  
bee the more safegarded,  
and that by giuinge and ta-  
king and enterchaunginge  
of goodes, and pleasures,  
we shoulde want nothing.  
We bee longer in this place  
than neede requyres. For  
who is he, to whom those  
thinges are not manifeste,  
which in more wordes bee  
recepted of Panetius? that  
neither any captain in war  
nor prince at home, coulde  
haue atchiened great feats  
and auaylable wythoute  
mennes endeuour. Reher-  
sed of him is Themisto-  
cles, Pericles. Cyrus A-  
gēsilaus, Alexander, whōe  
he denieth to haue been a-  
ble to cōpas so great thigs  
wout the aide of men. In  
a mat̄ no whit doubtfull  
he

hee vsethe witnesses no testibus non necessarijs.  
whit necessarie.

And as we obtain great commodities, by the lyke mind, & consent of menne: so there is none so lothsome a pestilence, which doth not grow to man by man.

There is a booke of Diocarchus, vpon the death of men who was a great Peripatetike, and plentiful: and after the other causes gathered together, as of waterbrakes, of pestilence, of destruction, yea and of the sodein flocking together of beastes, by whose violence hee sheweth how certeyne kinds of men were consumed: afterward, he makes comparisō, how many men haue ben destroyed by mens violence (that is) by warre or rebellion, than by al other misery.

Seeinge then this place hath no manner of doubt, but that men both profite, and hurt men verie much: I point this to bee a proppie of vertue to wyne mens hartes to her, & bynd them to her vse.

Atq; vt magnas vtilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominū, atq; cōsensu: sic nulla tā detestabilis pestis est, quę non homini ab homine nascatur. Est Diocarchi liber de interitu hominū, peripatetici magni, & copiosi: qui collectis ceteris causis eluionis, pestilitię, vastitatis, beluarū etiā repentine multitudinis, quarū impetu, docet quędam hominū genera esse consumpta. Deinde comparat quantō plures deleti sunt homines, hominū impetis, id est bellis, aut seditionibus, quā omni reliqua calamitate. Cū igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus & p̄sint & obsint: propriū hoc statuo esse virtutis, consiliare sibi animos hominū & ad vsus suos adiungere.

Ther=



## de Officiis.

Iraq; quę in rebus inanimis quęq; in vſu & tractatione, belluarū fiunt vtiliter ad hominū vitā, artib; ea tribuūtur operoſis. Hominū autē ſtudia ad amplificationē noſtrarū rerum prompta ac parata virorū preſtantiū ſapientia & virtute excitantur. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus ferē vertitur quarum vna eſt in percipiēdo quid in qua; re verū, ſyncerūq; ſit, quid conſentaneum cuiq;: quid conſequens: ex quo quęq; gignātur: quę cuiuſq; rei ſit cauſa. Alterū, cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos gręci  $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$  nominant: appetitioneſq; quas illi  $\omicron\gamma\mu\alpha\varsigma$  obediētes efficere rationi. Tertiū ijs quibuſcum congregamur vti moderatē & ſciēter: quorum ſtudijs ea quę natura deſiderat, expleta,

Therefore what ſo in thing liuelieſſe, & what ſo in the vſe, & occupping of beaſtes is done profitably to manſ like: it is al appointed to ſ labourſome trades.

But menſ good wylls, that be preſt, and readye to the aduancement of oure eſtate, be ſtirred vp by the wiſedom and vertue of excellent men.

For all vertue in a maner conſiſteth in thzee pointes. wherof one is in thoſe ſeeing what in every thing is true, & perſite what agreeable to ech thing: what is the ſequele: whereof all things growe: what is the cauſe of every thing.

The other to keepe in the troubleſome moode of the minde, which the Greckes name  $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$  and to make the appeytes whiche they call  $\omicron\gamma\mu\alpha\varsigma$  obedient vnto reaſon.

The thirde, to vſe them ſoberly and ſkilfully. with whom we be conuerſat: by whole good wills, we may haue thoſe thinges at full.

and

and heaped, which nature  
desire, yea and by them,  
if any harm be brought vp  
on vs, we may it auoide, &  
maye bee weakened of those  
which haue gon about too  
hilt vs, & may paye them  
with so much punishment  
as equitie, and mans gen-  
tleness doth beare.

But by what meanes  
we may copas mens good  
willes, & retaine the same  
we shall saye, and that not  
long hereafter. But a few  
wordes are to bee sayd be-  
foze.

That a great power ther-  
is in fortune, on either side  
either for welfare, or euille  
fare who is ignozant? For  
bothe when we enioye her  
prosperous blast, we are ca-  
ried to our desired ends, &  
when her wide is turned,  
we are afflicted. This sae  
fortune the hath other cha-  
ces, whiche bee seldomer,  
first, & coe fō things lue-  
lesse, as sea storms, tēpests  
shipwaks doūsaies, bur-  
ninges, then from beastes,  
as stripes, bytinges, ouer-  
runnings

cumulataq; habeam⁹, per  
eosdēq; si quid importet⁹  
nobis incōmodi, ppulsem⁹  
vlciscamurq; eos, qui noce-  
re nobis conati sūt, tātaq;  
pœna afficiamus quanta ē  
quitas humanitasq; patit⁹.

Quibus autē rationibus  
hanc facultatē assequi pos-  
simus vt hominum studia  
cōplectamur ea, teneam⁹  
dicemus, nequē ita multo  
post: sed pauca ante dicē-  
da sūt. Magnā vim esse in  
fortuna in vtramq; partem  
vel ad secundas res vel ad-  
uersas quis ignorat? Nam  
& cūm prospero flatu ei⁹  
vtimur, ad exitus peruehi-  
bimur optatos: & cūm re-  
flauit, affligimur.

Hęc igitur ipsa fortuna  
ceteros casus rariores ha-  
bet: primum ab inanimis,  
procellas, tempestates,  
naufragia, ruinas, in-  
cendia: deinde a bestiis  
ictus, morsus, impetus.

## de Officiis.

petus. Hec igitur (vt dixi) rariora. At verò interitus exercituum: vt proxime triū, sepe multorum clades impetratorum: vt nup summi ac singularis viri, inuidie preterea multitudinis, atq; ob eas bene meritorum sepe ciuium expulsionones, calamitates, fuge. Rursusq; secunde res, honores, imperia, victorie, quanquam fortuita sunt, tamen sine hominum operibus & studiis neutra in parte effici possunt. Hoc igitur cognito, dicendum est quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus.

Que si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis, comparetur. Ita fortasse etiam breuior videbitur. Quaecumq; igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atq; honestandum

runnings. These therefore (as I sayde) be seldomer. But the destruction of armies, as a late of thre, oft of manne slaughter of captains, as late of a noble & singular man, & enuynng; moreouer of the multitude and by reason of the same, oftentimes & banishinets, the miseries, the fleeinges away of the wel deseruing citizens: and againe, prosperitie, honour, empire, victorie, although they bee in fortunes hande: yet without mens trauailes, & studies on neither side they can be brought to passe.

This then knowen: we must declare, by what meanes we may allure, & styre by mens good wils to our profits. The which processe if it be somewhat longe, let it be compared with the greatnesse of the profite: so perhappes euen somewhat to shorpe it shal seeme.

whatsoever then menne giue to a manne, to enriche, and aduance him eyther



ther they dooe it for good  
will, when for some cause  
they beare affection to any  
or els for honours sake, if  
they reuerence anye mans  
vertue, & think him wor-  
thy of moſte fortunate es-  
tate: or in whōe they haue  
a trust, and do ſuppoſe thē  
to prouide well for theyre  
matters or els whose po-  
wer they feare, or cōtrari-  
wiſe of whō they looke af-  
ter ſome what, as when  
blurpers and people plea-  
ſing men lay large guiſtes  
before them, or at laſt, they  
be ledde by meede, and re-  
warde. Which in deede,  
is the byleſt waye, & the  
foſeleſt both to them, who  
are caught with the ſame,  
and to thoſe, who do ſecke  
to haue refuge thereunto.  
For the matter goeth not  
well, when the ſame that  
ſhoulde bee wroughte by  
vertue is attempted by  
money. But becauſe ma-  
ny times this help is ne-  
ceſſary, wee will tell howe  
it ought to be vſed, if firſt  
wee ſhall haue ſpoken of  
thoſe things, which be nec-  
eſſary to vertue.

aut beneuolētię gratia fa-  
ciunt, cū aliqua de cauſa  
quempiam diligūt: aut ho-  
noris ſi cuius virtutē ſuſ-  
piciūt, & ſi quē dignū for-  
tuna quā ampliffima pu-  
tant: aut cui fidē habēt, &  
bene rebus ſuis conſulere  
arbitrātur: aut cuius opes  
metuūt: aut cōtrā a qui-  
bus aliquid expectāt: aut  
cū reges popularesue ho-  
mines largitiones aliquas  
proponant: aut poſtremo  
pretio ac mercede ducun-  
tur. Quę ſordidiſſima qui-  
dē eſt ratio et inquinatiſſi-  
ma, et ijs, qui ea tenentur  
et illis qui ad eam conſu-  
gere conātur. Malē enim  
ſe res habet cū qd' virtute  
effici debet id tentatur pe-  
cunia. Sed quoniam non  
nūquā ſubſidiū hoc ne-  
ceſſariū eſt, quemadmodū  
ſit vtendū eo dicemus, ſi  
prius ijs de rebus, quę vir-  
tuti propiores ſunt dixerim.

¶ An) mus

## de Officiis.

Atque etiam subiiciunt se homines imperio alterius & potestati plurib<sup>9</sup> de causis. Ducuntur enim, aut benevolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis prestantia, aut spe sibi id utile futurum, aut metu, ne vi parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis, promissionisq; capti, aut prostermo, ut sepe in nostra Republica videmus mercede conducti. Rerum autem omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligere, nec alienius, quam timeri.

Preclare enim Ennius, Quem metuunt oderunt, Quem quisque odit perijisse expetit.

Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obistere: si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum.

Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa

And likewise men make themselves subiecte to the rule & auctority of another for dyuers causes.

For they be ledd either with good wil or greatnes of benefites, or excellencye of honour, or hope, it shall bee profitable to them, or feare lest by power they be driuen to yeld: or as taken with hope of large gifts, and promyses: or at least, as wee see often in our common sweale, euen hyred for incede.

And certes of al thinges neither is there anye fitter to maintaine a power then to bee loued, neither anye unfitter then to be feared. Notably saith Ennius. Whom they feare, him they hate alway the moste: Whom any manne hateth, hee wisheth him lost.

But if afore it was knowne, since alate yt is well knowne, that no power can withstand the hated of manye: And truly not onelye the deathe of this tyrant, whom y cyte being oppressed & force of armes

armes did suffer, do the de-  
 clare how muche y<sup>e</sup> hatred  
 of men priuailis to destruc-  
 tion: but the like ends of o-  
 ther tirantes do shewe as  
 much, of whome scarfly any  
 hath escaped the like deth.  
 For feare is an euil keper  
 of continuance: & contrary  
 wile, good wil is faithfull  
 yea for euer. But let a rou-  
 gheness hardely be vsed of  
 the: who by rule doo keepe  
 straighte such as be brou-  
 ght vnder, by force, as of  
 maisters ouer seruants, if  
 they can not otherwise bee  
 staied. But whome in a free  
 cite so order them selues,  
 y<sup>e</sup> they be feared, there can  
 nothing possible bee mad-  
 der then theye bee. For al-  
 though the lawes be sonke  
 by some mans mighte: al-  
 though libertie be al to sha-  
 ken, yet at lengthe theye  
 swimme out again, eyther  
 by secret iudgemētis, or by  
 priuie voicez in auaucing  
 to honour: & certesse y<sup>e</sup> sin-  
 ges of ceased libertie bee  
 sharper, than of liberty cō-  
 tynued. Let vs thenne  
 em-

pertulit ciuitas, interitus  
 declarat, quātū odiū homi-  
 nū valet ad pestē: sed reli-  
 quorū similes exitus tiran-  
 norū, quorū haud ferē quis  
 quā talē interitum effugit:  
 malus enim custos diutur-  
 nitatis metus: contraque  
 beneuolētia fidelis est, vel  
 ad ppetuitatē. Sed ijs, qui  
 vi oppressos imperio coer-  
 cēt, sit sanē adhibenda se-  
 uitia, vt heris in famulos, si  
 aliter teneri nō possūt. Qui  
 verō in libera ciuitate. ita  
 se instruant, vt metuantur  
 his nihil potest esse dēmen-  
 tius. Quāuis enim demerse  
 sint leges alicuius opibus,  
 quamuis tremefacta liber-  
 tas: emergunt tamen hęc  
 aliquando aut iudicijs ta-  
 citis, aut occultis de hono-  
 re suffragijs. Acriores au-  
 tem morsus sunt inter-  
 missæ libertatis, quā  
 retentæ. Quod igitur



## de Officiis.

latissimè patet neq; ad ioco  
luminatè solū, sed etiā ad o-  
pes & potētia valet pluri-  
mū, id āplectamur, vt me-  
r<sup>o</sup> absit, charitas retineatur  
Ita facillimè quę volumus  
et priuatis in rebus & ī Re-  
pub. cōsequemur. Etenim  
qui se metui volēt, a quibus  
metuantur, eosdē metuāt  
ipsi necesse est. Quid enim  
cēsemus superiorē illū Di-  
onisiū, quo cruciatu timo-  
ris āgi solitum, qui cultros  
metuēs tōsorios cādēte car-  
bone sibi adurebat capil-  
lum? Quid Alexadrū Phe-  
reū, quo animo vixisse ar-  
bitremur? qui (vt scriptum  
legimus) cū vxorē The-  
ben admodum diligeret:  
tamen ad eā ex epulis in cu-  
biculum veniēs, barbarum  
& eū quidem (vt scrip-  
tum est) compunctum  
notis Threicijs districto  
gladio iubebat anteire:

embrace that, which moſte  
largely ſpreadeth, & moſte  
auaileth not only to ſaſty,  
but alſo to welth & power:  
ſe feare be baniſhed, & loue  
retained. So moſte eaſelye  
we ſhal obtaine what wee  
deſire, both in priuat mat-  
ters, & in the cōmō welth.  
For who ſo wil theſelues  
to be had in feare, it muſte  
needes bee, ſe they themſel-  
ues feare thoſe ſāe, of whō  
they bee feared. For what  
think we of the firſt Dio-  
niſius? W̄ what tormente  
of feare was he wōt to be  
troubled: Who fearing the  
barbars razers, W̄ a redde  
hore cole ſinged of his owne  
beard. What of Alexander  
ſe Pheraia: with what an  
hert, do we ſuppoſe, he ly-  
ued: Who (as wee reede  
writen) when exceedingly  
hee loued his wiſe Thebe:  
yet cōming to her from bā-  
ketting into the chamber,  
he commaunded a kerne,  
& him alſo (as it is writē)  
being prynced W̄ Threacia  
markes, to goe beefore  
wyth ad rāſone ſweorde,  
and

and he sent of his garde a-  
foze, to ransacke the wo-  
mens cosers, & seke, that  
no weapon were hidde in  
their garments. O misera-  
ble mā, who thought both  
a kerne, & an proubranded  
slauē faithfuller, than hys  
wife. And his opinion did  
not deceiue him for by her  
he was slaine for a ielou-  
sie of spousebreache. And  
truely ther is no strength  
of Empire so gret, which  
with suppressing by feare,  
can be long continuinge.  
witness is Phalaris, who  
se crueltie is famed aboue  
others, who perished not  
by treason, as this Alexā-  
der did, whom euen now  
I spake of, nor by a fewe,  
as this our mā, but agāst  
him the whole cōmons of  
the Agregentines rose  
with violence, what the  
Macedonians, did theye  
not forsake Demetrius,  
and all whole gotte them  
to Pyrrhus, what the La-  
cedemonians rulyng  
vnrighfullye? dyd not  
swelnye all their leag-  
frendes sodenly forsake the

and

premittebatq; de stipatori-  
bus suis, qui pscrutarētur ar-  
culas muliebres, et ne qd  
in vestimētis occultaretur  
telū, exquirerēt. O miserū,  
q̄ fideliorē et barbarum et  
stigmaticū putaret quā cō-  
iugē, nec eū sefellit opinio,  
ab ea est enī ipse ppter pel-  
licatus suspiciōē interfec-  
t⁹. Nec vero vlla vis impe-  
rij tāta est quę premēte me-  
tu possit esse diuturna. Te-  
stis est Phalaris, cuius est  
prēter cēteros nobilitata  
crudelitas: q̄ nō ex insidijs  
interijt, vt is, quem modo  
dixi, Alexander, nō à pau-  
cis, vt hic noster, sed in quē  
vniuersa Agrigentinarum  
multitudo impetum fecit.  
Quid Macedones? nonne  
Demetrium reliquerunt,  
vniuersiq; se ad Pyrrhum  
contulerunt? Quid Lace-  
demonios iniuste impe-  
rantes? nonne repentē o-  
nes ferē socij deseruerūt.

L. ij.

specta-

## de Officiis,

spectatoresq; se otiosos p-  
buerūt Leuctrice calanita-  
tis. Externa libentius in ta-  
li re quā domestica recor-  
dor. Veruntamē quādiu  
imperium popul. Roma. be-  
neficijs tenebatur, nō iniu-  
rijs, bella aut pro socijs, aut  
de imperio gerebātur, exi-  
tus erāt bellorū aut mites,  
aut necessarij: Regū, popu-  
lorū, nationū, portus erat  
& refugium Senatus: nostri  
autē magistratus, imperato-  
resq; ex vna hac re maximā  
laudē capere studebant, si  
prouincias, si socios equita-  
te, & fide defendissēt. Itaq;  
illud patrociniū orbis ter-  
rę verius quā imperium  
poterat nominari. Sensim  
hanc consuetudinē & dis-  
ciplinam iam antea minu-  
ebamus: post vero Syllæ  
victoriā penit<sup>9</sup> amisimus.  
Desitū est enī videri quic-  
quā in socios iniquum, cūm  
extitissēt etiam in ciues tā-

& shewed them selues idle  
lookers on of y<sup>e</sup> ouerthrowe  
at Leuctra: For in exam-  
ples gladiier, than home  
dedes I rather se, in such a  
case. Forertheles as long  
as the empire of the people  
of Rome was vpholdē by  
worthy actes, not by word-  
ges doing, & warres were  
made, eyther for defence of  
leagfrendes, or for empire,  
then weare the endes of  
warres, eyther merciful or  
necessarie. the Senat was  
the hauen and refuge of  
kinges, of peoples, of naci-  
ons. And our magistrates,  
and captains endeavored to  
get great praise, by this on-  
ly meane, if prouinces, yf  
leagfrendes, in right, and  
truth, they had defended,  
Therefore it might haue be-  
named the protecciō more  
truly, thā the empire of the  
worlde. By little and little  
we abated this custome, &  
orde, somewhat afoze, but  
after Syllaes victorie, vt-  
terly we losse it. For men  
ceased to accout any thing  
vnrasonable to ward leag-  
frendz. whē so gret cruelty  
was



was shewd euen against  
citizens. Therfore ther fo-  
lowed in him of an honeste  
quarrel an vn honest victoꝝ  
foꝝ whē y salestasse was  
pight & in y market place  
he sold the goodes both of  
good mē & riche, & those e-  
uen citizē, he was so bold  
to say y he made sale of his  
lawful bootie. One succe-  
ded, who in a wicked cause  
& a moze shameful victoꝝ  
not onely put the goods of  
euery one of the citizens to  
opē sale, but in one state of  
misery enwꝛapped hole p-  
uinces, & regions, & so fo-  
rein nations being vexed,  
& vndone, we saw Massi-  
lia boꝝn about in triumph,  
foꝝ a shew of our Empire  
lost, & triumph made ouer  
y citie. Wout whiche oure  
capteines of warres neuer  
got any triūph, beyond the  
alpes. I could reherse ma-  
ny mo cur sed dedes beside  
done against our leag frē-  
des, if the sonne had scene  
ought, moze hainous, than  
this one. Iustly therfore  
ar we scorged. Foꝝ had we  
not suffred y wyckednes  
of

ta crudelitas. Ergo in illo  
secuta est honestā causā nō  
honestā victoria. Est enim  
ausus dicere hausta posita cū  
bona in foro venderet, et  
bonorum virorū & locu-  
pletū, & certē ciuiū praeda  
se suā vēdere. Secutus est  
qui in causā impia, victoria  
etiā fœdiore, nō solū singu-  
lorū ciuium bona publica-  
ret, sed vniuersas quoq; p-  
uincias, regionesq; vno ca-  
lamitatis genere cōprehē-  
deret. Itaque vexatis, ac p-  
ditis exteris nationibus, ad  
exēplū amissi imperij, por-  
tare in triumpho Massilia  
vidimus & ex ea vrbe tri-  
ūphari, sine qua nūquā no-  
stri imperatores extrā alpe-  
nis bellis triūpharūt. Ma-  
ta preterea cōmemoranda  
nefaria in socios, & in  
no Sol quicquā indignius.  
Iure igitur plecti  
mur. Nisi eaim multorum  
ipunita scelera tulerim.

## de Officiis.

nunquam ad vnum tanta of many to be vnponished,  
 puenisset licentia : à quo such a lawlesse libertie had  
 quidem rei familiaris ad neuer come to the hands of  
 paucos, cupiditatum ad one, from whom sothly the  
 multos improbos venit he inheritance of his goodes  
 reditas . Nec verò vn came to feso, but of his gre  
 quam bellorum ciuiliu dy desires, to many naugh  
 semen & causa deerit, dum tie menne. Noz truely the  
 homini perditu hastam il seede, and cause of ciuile  
 lam cruentam & memine warres shall euer faile, as  
 rint & sperabunt: quam P longe as mischeuous men  
 Sylla cum vibrasset dicta shall bothe remember, and  
 tore propinquo suo, idem hope after that bloody sale  
 sexto & tricesimo anno staffe, which when Pub  
 post à sceleratiore hasta lius Sylla hadde shaken,  
 adem non recessit. Alter hys nie kinsman beinge  
 autem qui in illa dictatu Dictator, the same stepte  
 ra scriba fuerat, in hec fu not once backe from the  
 it questor vrbani . Ex shaking of a lyke more mi  
 quo debet intelligi , tali cheuous staffe, the sixt and  
 bus premijs ppositis nun thirtieth yere after. But y  
 quam defutura bella ciui other, who in the Dictator  
 lia . Itaque parietes vr had been secretarie, in this  
 bis modo stant & manēt, was Tresurer for the city  
 ijq; ipsi iam extrema sce whereupon ought too bet  
 ra metuētes. Ré vero pu vnderstanded, that while  
 blicam penitus amisimus. such booties be layed afoze  
 men, ciuill warres shal ne  
 uer want. And so, only the  
 walles of the citie do stand  
 and remaine, yea and those  
 same cuē now dzedig their  
 last mischief, but the cōmō  
 weale we haue vtterly lost  
 And

and into these destructions  
we are false (for we must  
returne too oure purpose)  
while we hadde rather too  
be feared, thā too be deare,  
and welbeloued. If al this  
coude befall too the people  
of Rome, rulinge vnrigh-  
tfull: what ought euery  
sere man to thinke: which  
thing sith it is euident, that  
the power of good wyll ys  
greate, of feare slender, it  
folowes, that we make dis-  
course, by what meanes  
we may sonest with hono-  
r and vprightnes, attaine  
loue, which we desire.

But all we do not alyke  
stand in neede of the same.  
For to the trading of eche  
mans life it must be appli-  
ed whether it be nedefull,  
of many or sufficiēt, of few  
to bee beloued. Lette this  
therfore be certaine, as the  
thing, which is both princi-  
pall, and most necessarie to  
haue faithfull familiarities  
of frends, louinge vs, and  
hely esteeming oure ver-  
tues. For this is the onely  
meane in deed that ther be  
not muche difference be-  
twene great, & meane men  
and

Atq; in has clades incidi-  
mus (redeūdū est enim ad  
propositum) dum metui,  
quā chari esse, & diligi  
maluimus. Quē si populo  
Romano iniuste imperāti  
accidere potuerūt, quid de  
bēt putare singuli? Quod  
cūm pspicuum sit beneuo-  
lētię vim esse magnam, me-  
tus imbecillē, sequitur vt  
differamus, quibus reb? fa-  
cillimē possimus eam quā  
volumus, adipisci cum ho-  
nore et fide charitatē. Sed  
ea nō pariter ōnes egemus  
Nam ad cuiusq; vitā insti-  
tuendā accōmodādum est,  
ā multis ne opus sit, an fa-  
tis sit a paucis diligi. Cer-  
tum igitur hoc sit, idq; &  
primū et maximē necessa-  
riū, familiaritates habere si-  
das amātium nos amicorū  
& nostra miratiū. Hęc enī  
est vna res prorsus, vt non  
differat multum inter sū-  
mos & mediocres viros:

L. iij.

eaq;



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eaq; est vtriq; propemodū  
cōparanda. Honore & glo  
ria & beneuolētia ciuium  
fortasse nō eque omnes e  
gēt: sed tamē si cui hęc sup  
petūt, adiuuāt aliquātū cū  
ad cētera, tum ad amicitias  
cōparādas. Sed de amicitia  
alio libro dictum est, qui in  
scribitur Lælius. Nunc di  
camus de gloria, quanquā  
ea quoq; de re nostri libri  
duo sūt. Sed attingamus,  
quandoquidē ea in rebus  
maiorib<sup>9</sup> administrādis ad  
iuuat plurimū. Sūma igitur  
& perfecta gloria constat  
ex tribus his. Si diligit mul  
tudo, si fidē habet, si cum  
admiratione quadā hono  
re nos dignos putat. Hęc  
autē (si est simpliciter bre  
uiterq; dicēdū) quibus re  
bus pariuntur à singulis,  
eisdem ferē à multitudine.  
Sed est alius quoq; quidam  
aditus ad multitudinē, vt

& it must be pzocured, in a  
maner of thē both. ffor all  
perchance do stande in like  
needes of honour, & glory, &  
citizens good wils: but yet  
who so hath thē they sur  
der somwhat both to other  
things, and also to the pur  
chasing of frēdships. But  
of frenship we haue spokē  
in the boke, which is enty  
tuled Lælius: nowe let vs  
speak of glozy though of y  
matter also there bee two  
bookes of oures, yet let vs  
touch it, because the same  
auaileth much, in executig  
of greater matters.  
The hiest therfoze, & perfit  
glozy stādeth of these thre  
if the multitude fauour vs  
if they haue a trust in vs,  
if with a certain admiratiō  
they count vs woozthye of  
honour. And if wee muste  
speake it plainly, & briesflye  
as these be gottē at y hāds  
of eucry sere mā, by y same  
means in a maner they be  
obtained of the multitude.  
But there is also a cer  
taine other enterauce in  
to the multitude, that wee  
may

mai (as ye wold say) flow  
into y<sup>e</sup> herts of the whole.  
And first let vs se touchyng  
those thre, which bectore  
I called the preceptes of  
good wil, y<sup>e</sup> which no doubt  
is caught most of al by be-  
nefites. And secundariye,  
good will is alured by a  
wel willing mind, althou-  
gh perhaps abilitie suffy-  
seth not. But wōderously  
y<sup>e</sup> loue of the multitude is  
al to stirred w<sup>th</sup> the same, &  
opinion of liberalitie, boni-  
tousnes, iustice, faithesful-  
nes, & of al those vertues,  
whiche appertaine to the  
mildnes of maners & gētle-  
nes. foz y<sup>e</sup> very same, whi-  
che wee name comly & ho-  
nest, because of it self it ly-  
keth vs, & w<sup>th</sup> his owne na-  
ture, & beautie moueth al  
our minds, & principallye  
shineth (as it were) out of  
those vertues, whiche I  
haue reherfed, therfoze by  
very nature we are enfor-  
ced to fauour them, in  
whom wee thynke those  
vertues to bee. And the-  
se be the weigh-  
tyest causes of fauoring,  
foz other moe lygheter  
there-

in vniuersorū animos tan-  
quā influere possimus. At  
primū de illis tribus, quę  
atē dixi, beneuolētię pcep-  
ta videamus quę quidē be-  
neficijs capitur maximē. Se-  
cundo autē loco beneficia  
volūtate, beneuolētia mo-  
uetur, etiā si res fortē non  
suppetit. Vehemēter autē  
amor multitudinis cōmo-  
uetur ipsa fama & opiniōe  
liberalitatis, beneficētię, iu-  
stitię, fidei, ōniūq; earū vir-  
tutū, quę p̄tinēt ad māsue-  
tudinē morū ac facilitatē.  
Etenī illud ipsū, quod de-  
corū honestumq; dicimus,  
quia p̄ se nobis placet, ani-  
mosq; ōniū natura et spe-  
cie sua cōmouet, maximēq;  
quasi plucet ex ijs, quas cō-  
memorauī, virtutibus: id-  
circo illis, in quibus eas vir-  
tutes esse remur, à natura  
ipsa diligere cogimur. Atq;  
hę quidē causę sunt dilige-  
di grauissimę. Possunt  
enim pręterea nonnullę:

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esse leuiiores. Fides autē vt habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest: si existimabimur ad epti cōiūctā cū iustitia prudētiā. Nā & ijs fidem habemus, quos plus intelligere quā nos arbitramur: quosq; & futura pspicere credimus & cū res agatur, in discrimenq; vētū sit, expedire rē, et cōsilium ex tēpore capere posse. Hanc enim ōnes existimāt vtilē veramq; prudētiā. Iustis autē & fidis hominibus, id est viris bonis ita fides habetur, vt nulla sit in his fraudis iniuriēq; suspicio. Itaq; his salutē nostrā, his fortunas, his liberos rectissimē cōmitti arbitramur. Harū igitur duarū ad fidē faciendā iustitia plus pollet. Quippe cū ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis: prudētia sine iustitia nihil valet ad faciendā fidē. Quō enī quis versutior

there may be beside. But that a trust may bee had in vs, by two things it maye be brought to passe: if wee shal be thought to haue attained prudence ioined w<sup>th</sup> Justice. For both to them we haue a trust, whō wee suppose to vnderstād more than oure selues: & also to them, who we beleue, be able both to foresee things to come & also to dispatche thy busines, & forthwith to take counsaile when the matter is in hand, & standz in hazard. For all men doo iudge this the profitable, and true prudence. But in suche wise credit is geuen to iust, & trustie men (that is) to good men: & in them there is no suspiciou of deceit, & iniurie. Therfore to these our life, to these oure goods, to these our childre we suppose very wel to be committed. Of these two then iustice is of more power to win a credit, because it without prudence hath sufficient authoritie, prudence without iustice is no thinge woorthie to gette credite. For the sutteler,  
and



and the craftier that a mā  
is: so much the more hee is  
hated, and suspected, whē  
the opinion of his honestie  
is pulled aswaye. Wherfore  
iustice ioined with vnder-  
standing, shal haue as much  
power as it list, to purcha-  
se credit, iustice without  
prudence shal be of muche  
power, prudēce without ius-  
tice shal be nothing worth.  
But lest sōc mā haue mar-  
ueille: seing amongst al phi-  
losophers it is plaine & by  
my selfe disputed oftē: him  
that should haue one ver-  
tue, to haue al the vertues  
why I do now sonder thē  
so, as though ther may ani-  
man be iust, which same is  
not prudent. of one sort, is  
that subtilnesse, whē vcrp-  
troth is leueled in disputa-  
cion, & of an other sorte is  
that talk, when it is al ap-  
plied to the cōmon opiniō,  
wherfore we speake so in  
this place, as the common  
sort do, & we call some one  
sort māly, some other good  
mē, sōe other prudēt. For  
by the peoples words, & v-  
sual termes, we must treat  
when

& callidior est, hoc inuisi-  
or & suspectior detracta  
opinione pbitatis. Quam-  
obrē intelligentiē iustitia  
coniuncta quantum volet  
habebit ad faciendam fidē  
virium. Iustitia sine prudē-  
tia multum poterit, sine iu-  
stitia nihil valebit pruden-  
tia. Sed ne quis sit admira-  
tus, cur cū inter omnes  
philosophos cōstet, ā meq;  
ipso sepe disputatū sit, qui  
vnā haberet, ōnes habere  
virtutes: nunc ita seiungā  
quasi possit quisquam qui  
non idem prudens sit, iust⁹  
esse. Alia est illa, cū veritas  
ipsa limatur, in disputatiōe  
subtilitas: alia cū ad opini-  
onē cōmunē omnis accom-  
modatur oratio. Quamo-  
brē vt vulgus, ita nos hoc  
loco loquimur, vt alios for-  
tes, alios bonos viros, a-  
lios prudentes esse dicam⁹  
Popularibus enim verbis  
est agendum & vsitatis,  
cū

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cū loquamur de opinione populari: idq; eodē modo fecit Paneti<sup>9</sup>. Sed ad p<sup>o</sup>positū reuertamur. Erat igitur ex tribus quę ad gloriā pertinērēt hoc tertiū, vt cū admiratione hominū honore ab his digni iudicaremur. Admiratur igitur cōmuniter illi quidē ōnia, quę magna et prāter opinionē suā anīaduertūt, separati autē ī singulis, si p<sup>o</sup>spiciūt nec opinata quidē bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciāt, maximisq; efferūt laudibus in quibus existimāt se excellentes quasdā et singulares virtutes p<sup>o</sup>spicere. Despiciūt autē eos & cōtēnūt, in quib<sup>9</sup> nihil virtutis, nihil a<sup>o</sup>nimi, nihil neruorū putāt. Nō enim ōnes eos cōtēnūt de quibus malē existimāt. Nam quos improbos, maleficos, fraudulentos, putant, & ad faciendam iniuriā instructos, eos haud cōtemnunt quidem

whē we speak of the cōmō p<sup>o</sup>oples opiniō, & y<sup>o</sup> did Paneti<sup>9</sup> after the same sort. But to the purpose let vs returne. Of the thre therfore which should appertaine to glozpe, this was the third y<sup>o</sup> & admiration of men, we might by them be thought worthy of honour. Generally then they haue in admiration doubtlesse al things, which they haue noted to be greate, & beyond their wening, & sette generally in euery seere mā, if they p<sup>o</sup>fitly see good things vnloked for. Therfore they honor these men, & w<sup>o</sup> highest praises set them aloft: in whō they think the selues to becholde certaine passing & singuler vertues. But those they despise, & set at nought: in whom no vertue, no corage, no strength, they iudge. For al mē do not despise thē, of whō they think euil, for whō they deeme dishonest, misreporters, gilefull, & ready framed to do wrong, those theye despise not certesse, but

but of thē they think euill  
 wherfore (as I said afore)  
 they be despised: who ney-  
 ther to them selues, nor to  
 other do good, as they say,  
 in whom ther is no paine-  
 fulnes nor diligence, no ca-  
 rying but they be reueren-  
 sed & a certein admiraciō  
 who are thought to go be-  
 fore others in vertue, & to  
 be about both al vnsemely-  
 nes, & also those vices whi-  
 che other cā not easely &=  
 stand for bothe pleasures,  
 ful flattering dames, do of-  
 tentimes wrest the grete  
 part of the mind from ver-  
 tue, & also when the brāds  
 of paine be layd vnto them  
 most men beyond measure  
 bee all to frayed. Life, dea-  
 the, riches, pouertie, most  
 mightilie moue all menne.  
 which things whoe so on  
 eyther side, withe a losse,  
 & great courage do despise  
 & whē before them is offe-  
 red anye goodlye, & honest  
 thing, it turneth & halethe  
 them whole to it self, then  
 who doth not maruel at y  
 brightnes, and beautie of  
 vertu: Therfore both this  
 despi-

sed de his male existiment.  
 Quāobré (vt ante dixi) cō-  
 tēnūtur ij, qui nec sibi nec  
 alteri, p̄sunt (vt dicitur) in  
 quibus nullus labor, nulla  
 industria, nulla cura est. Ad-  
 miratiōe quadā verō affici-  
 untur ij, qui anteire cēte-  
 ris virtute putātur: Et cū  
 ōni carere dedecore, tū ve-  
 rō ijs vitijs quib' alij nō fa-  
 cile possūt obsistere. Nā &  
 voluptates blādissimę do-  
 minę sepe maiores partes  
 animi a virtute detorquēt,  
 & dolorū cū admouentur  
 faces prēter modū pleriq;  
 exterrētur. Vita, mors, diui-  
 tię, paupertas ōnes homines  
 vehemētissimē pmouent.  
 Quę qui in vtrāq; partē ex-  
 cello animo, magnoq; des-  
 piciūt, cūq; aliqua his āpla  
 & honesta res obiecta est,  
 totos ad se cōuertit, & ra-  
 pit: tū quis non admiretur  
 splendorē, pulcritudinem  
 quę virtutis? Ergo & hęc  
 animi



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animi despic iētia admirabi  
 litatē magnā facit: et maxi  
 mē iustitia, ex qua vna vir-  
 tute viri boni appellatur,  
 mirifica quē dā res multitu-  
 dini videtur nec iniuria. Ne-  
 mo enī iustus esse potest, q̄  
 mortē, qui dolorē, qui exi-  
 liū qui egestatē timet, aut  
 qui ea quē his sūt cōtraria,  
 equitati āteponit. Maximē  
 q̄, admirantur eū, qui pecu-  
 nia non mouetur: quod in  
 quo viro pspectum sit, hūc  
 dignū spectatu arbitratur.  
 Itaq; illa tria, quē pposita  
 sūt ad gloriā, ōnia iustitia  
 conficit, et beueuolentia,  
 quod prodesse vult pluri-  
 mis: & ob eandem causā  
 fidem, et admirationē ha-  
 bet, quod eas res spernit et  
 negligit, ad quas pleriq; in-  
 flammati auiditate rapiū-  
 tur. Ac mea quidem sentē-  
 tia, omnis ratio & in-  
 stitutio vitę adiumenta  
 hominum desiderat. In-  
 primisq; vt habeas, quibus

despising mynd causethe a  
 gret wōdering & specially  
 iustice of which vertue a-  
 lone good mē be named se-  
 meth to & multitude a swō  
 derful thing, & not wōute  
 cause, For none can be iust  
 who dzeadeth death, paine  
 banishmēt oz pouertie, nor  
 any, & before equitie pre-  
 ferreth the cōtraries. And  
 most of al, they wonder at  
 him, who is not tēpted &  
 money, & in what mā that  
 is wel tried, him thik they  
 woorthy to be regarded.  
 Therefore iustice doothe  
 work al these thze, whiche  
 be pointed out for glozpe, &  
 gettes good will also, bec-  
 cause it meanes to profite  
 very many, & for the same  
 cause, it woorkethe credite  
 likewise, and admiracion,  
 because it despiseeth, & nou-  
 ght regarde th, those things  
 wherunto most men en-  
 kindled & greedinesse be ha-  
 led. And surelye after mye  
 iudgement, cuery trade, &  
 order of life requireth the  
 aides of menne: and chief-  
 lye that yee haue some,  
 withe whom you may de-  
 bate in familiar talker:  
 whiche

which is harde, onlesse yee  
 here vpon you the shew of  
 an honest man. Therefore  
 opinion of iustice is neces-  
 sary euen to y alone yuer  
 & one y leades his life in y  
 fieldes, yea and so much y  
 more, because if they haue  
 it not, vniust they shall bee  
 counted, & being garded w  
 no defence shalbe vexed w  
 many iniuries. And to the  
 se also, who doo sell, buye,  
 hye, lette, and be entāgled  
 in bargaining busines, in-  
 stice, to goe thorow withe  
 their matters, is necessary  
 whose power is so greate:  
 that euen they, who be fed  
 with euil doing, and mis-  
 chiefe, can not possible liue  
 without some parcel of iu-  
 stice. For who stealeth, or  
 priuily pyeth any thyng  
 from any of them, & who  
 he goeth a theeuing, he lea-  
 ueth not him selfe a place,  
 no not in robberie, And on  
 lesse hee, whoe is named  
 the archpirate, deupde  
 the pirate gailpe, eyther  
 hee shall bee slaine of his  
 mates, or els forsaken.

yea

cū possis familiares cōferre  
 sermones: quod est diffici-  
 le, nisi speciē prē te boni vi-  
 ri feras. Ergo etiā solitario  
 homini, atq; in agro vitā a-  
 gēti opinio iustitię necessa-  
 ria est, eōq; etiā magis, qd'  
 si eā nō habebūt, iniusti ha-  
 bebūtur: & nullis prēsidijs  
 septi multis afficientur iniu-  
 rijs. Atq; his etiā qui vēdūt  
 emunt, cōducunt, locāt cō-  
 trahendisq; negotijs impli-  
 cantur, iustitia ad rē geren-  
 dā necessaria est. Cuius tā-  
 ta vis est, vt nec illi quidē  
 qui maleficio & scelere pas-  
 cūtur, possint sine vlla par-  
 tícula iustitię viuere. Nam  
 qui eorū cuipiā qui vnā la-  
 trocinātur, furatur aliquid  
 aut eripit, is sibi ne in latro-  
 cinio quidē relinquit locū.  
 Ille autē, qui archipirata di-  
 citur: nisi equabiliter prae-  
 dā dispartiat, aut occiditur  
 à socijs, aut relinquitur.

Quin

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Qui etiā leges latroñ esse dicūtur quib⁹ pareāt, quas obseruēt. Itaq; ppter equabile pcedē partitiōē et Bargul⁹ Illiricus latro (de quo est apud Theopōpū) magnas opes habuit: & multo maiores Viriatus Lucitan⁹ cui quidē etiā exercitus nostri, imperatoresq; cessant: quē C. Lēlius, is qui sapiēs vsurpatur, p̄tor fregit, & cōminuit, f̄erocitatēq; eius ita repressit, vt facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cū igitur tanta vis iustitię sit, vt ea etiam latronum opes firmet, atq; augeat: quantam eius vim inter leges, & iudicia, & instituta Reip. fore putamus? Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum (vt ait Herodotus) sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitię seruandę causa vidētur olim bene morati reges cōstituti:

yea & it is said ther are lawes among the eues, wher to they obey, & doo obserue them. And so by reason of the euen portioning of the prise, both Bargulus, the Illirian robber, of whom mencio is made in Theopopushad great riches: & much greater had Viriatus the Lusitan, to who of trouth, euē our armies, and captaines gaue place whō Caius Lelius, hee y was cōmonlye called the wise, being p̄tor, did discūsite, & abate, & so alayde his fierlenes, y hee left an easy warre to other. Heig then the strength of iustice is so great: y it also stablisheth, & encreased robbers riches, how great suppose we the power therof to be amonge lawes and iudgements, & ordinaunces of a cōmon weale? Certesse me think, not only among the Medes (as telleth Herodotus) butte also amonge oure aunceters, in olde tyme, wēi conditioned kynges haue ben ordeined, for y ende of enioying iustice.



For at the beginning, whē the multitude was oppressed by thē, who had & greater power: for refuge they fledde to some one excellent in vertue, who when he saued the weaker from iniurye, by painting out an equitie, kept the highest & the lowest in difference of lawe.

And the like cause there was of making lawes as of kinges: for euermore an egal right hath ben sought for otherwise it were not a right.

If they obtained & same at the handes of one iustice, and good man, with hym they were contented: whē that chaunced not, lawes were deuised: which wyth al men alwaies in one, and a like voice should speake. Wherefore this is doubtlesse a cleare case: that they were wont to be chosen to gouerne: of whose iustice & opinion of the multitude was great. And this there to adiointed, that they also mighte bee counted wyse: there

Nam cū premeretur initio multitudo ab ijs q̄ maiores opes habebant, ad vñ aliquē confugiebāt virtute pręstantem, qui cū p̄hiberet iniuria tenuiores, equitate constituenda, sūmos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eademq; cōstituendarū legum fuit causa, quę regū. Ius enim semper est quęsitum equabile: neq; enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab vno bono & iusto viro consequebantur: eo erant cōtenti: Cū id minus contingeret: leges sūt inuente, quę cum omnib; semp vna atq; eadem voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero hoc, vt iidem etiam prudentes haberētur.

## de Officiis.

nihil erat qd' homines his there was nothing, & men  
 autoribus non posse cōse- vnder those guydes, shold  
 qui se arbitrarētur. Omni wene themselves vnable  
 igitur ratione colēda & re to attaine. Justice there-  
 tinenda iusticia est, tū ipsa fore is by al maner meanes  
 propter se (nam aliter iusti to be regarded, & maintai-  
 cia nō esset) tū ppter am ned: both it for it selfe sake  
 plificationē honoris & glo (for els it woe not iustice)  
 rię. Sed vt pecunię nō que & also for & enlargemēt of  
 rendē solū ratio est, verū honor & glōry. But as ther  
 etiā collocandē, quę per is a way not onely of get-  
 petuos sūptus suppeditat, ting money, but also of be-  
 nec solū necessarios, sed e- stowing it, which may sul-  
 tiam liberales: sic gloria fice for continual charges,  
 querenda & collocanda not only such as be necessa-  
 ratione est. rie, but also liberal, so glo-  
 ry must be bothe gotten, &  
 ordered by a meane.

Quantū præclarē Socra- Notwithstandinge nota-  
 tes, hanc viā ad gloriā pxi- blye Socrates did saye,  
 mam & quasi compendia- this to bee the nearest, and  
 riam dicebat esse si quis id (as is woe) the gain way  
 ageret, vt qualis haberi vel to glōrye, if a man woulde  
 let, talis esset. Quōd si quis endeouore this, to bee in  
 simulatione, & inani ostē- deede suche as hee woulde  
 tatione & ficto nō modō bee counted.

fermone sed etiam vultu And if anye doe deeme  
 stabilem se gloriam con- themselves able to attayne  
 sequi possentur, yehement- stedfast glōrye, by false, pre-  
 tence, and vaine outshew,  
 farre out of the waye.  
 The

The true glorie taketh  
depe roote, and also shooteth  
abroad, all countefet things  
do soone shedde, as doe the  
little flowers: neither can  
there anye forged thinge be  
durable. witnesses verie  
manie there bee on bothe  
sydes: but for shortnesse  
sake, we wil bee contented  
with one family.

For Tyberius Gracchus  
Publius sonne so long shall  
be praised, as remembraunce  
of the Romanne state shall  
stande.

But his sonnes neither  
liuinge were lyked of good  
menne, and did goe in that  
number of men rightfullie  
put to death. Let them then  
who so the true glorie wil  
attaine, perfourme the du-  
ties of iustice. What those  
were, it was tolde in the  
former booke. But to the  
ende that soone wee maye  
seeme suche manner menne  
as wee bee: althoughe the  
greatest effecte is euen in  
this point, that we be such  
as wee would be comp-  
red: yet certeine preceptes  
are to be geuen.

Vera gloria radices agit  
atq; etiā propagatur: ficta  
omnia celeriter tanquā  
flosculi decidunt: nec si-  
mulatum potest quicquā  
esse diuturnū. Testes sunt  
permulti in vtranq; par-  
tem, sed breuitatis causa,  
familia contenti erimus  
vna. Tibi enim Gracchus  
Publij filius, tamdiu lauda-  
bitur, dum memoria rerū  
Romanarum manebit. At  
eius filij nec viui probabā-  
tur a bonis & mortui nu-  
merum obtinent iure ce-  
sorum Qui igitur adipisci  
veram iustitię gloriam vo-  
let, iustitię fungatur offi-  
ciis: ea quę essent, dictum  
est in superiore libro. Sed  
vt facilimē quales simus,  
tales esse videamur (& si  
in eo ipso vis maxima est,  
vt simus ij, qui haberi ve-  
limus) tamen quędam prę-  
cepta danda sunt.

M.ij.

For



## de Officiis.

Nā si quis ab ineūte etate  
habet causā celebritatis &  
nominis aut a patre accep-  
tā (qd' tibi mi Cicero arbi-  
tror cōtigisse) aut aliquo  
casu atq; fortuna in hūc o-  
culi omniū cōijciūtur, atq;  
in eū quid agat, quā dmo-  
dū uiuat inquiritur & tan-  
quā in clarissima luce ver-  
setur, ita ut nullū obscurū  
potest nec dictū eius esse,  
nec factū. Quorū autē pri-  
ma etas ppter humilitatē  
et obscuritatē in hominū  
ignoratione versatur: hi si  
mul ac iuuenes esse cōpe-  
runt, magna spectare, &  
ad ea rectis studijs debent  
cōtēdere. Quod eo firmio-  
re animo faciēt quia non  
modo non inuidetur illi e-  
tati, verū etiā fauetur. Pri-  
ma igitur est adolescenti  
commendatio ad gloriam  
si qua ex billicis rebus cō-  
parari potest, in qua multi  
apud maiores nostros ex-  
titerunt. Semp. n. ferē

For if any frō his first en-  
tered age hath cause of nāe,  
and fame: either receiued  
of his father, which to you  
my Cicero, I suppose to  
haue happened, or by anye  
chaunce & fortune: on hym  
al mennes eyes are caste: &  
of him there is searchinge,  
what he doth, & how he ly-  
ueth: & so, as though he her  
should lead his life in most  
open lyght, nother wyorde  
nor deede of his can be vn-  
known.

But whose first age is pas-  
sed wout mennes know-  
ledge by reaso of basenes, &  
vunknown name: these, as  
sone as they beginne to bee  
yongmen, ought to loke al-  
ter gret things: & to prease  
vnto y same w direct stu-  
diez. which they shal do w  
so much the better courage  
because the age is not only  
not enuid but also fauou-  
red. The chiefe settig forth  
then for a yong manne to  
glorpe is, if any praise may  
bee gotten by feates of ar-  
mes, wherein manye haue  
shewed them selues, a-  
monge our auncesters, for  
warres were almost cōti-  
nually

nnally kept. But your age  
chaunced vpon that warre  
where the one syde had to  
much mischiese, the other  
little good fortune. In  
which warr yet, whē vñ  
prius had made you Cap-  
taine of y one wing, bothe  
of a man most noble, & of y  
army, you got great praise  
with ryding, & throwyng  
the darte, and sustaynyng  
all thinges with a souldi-  
ourlyke painefulnes. And  
verely that your praise, &  
the common weale fell to  
gether. But of me this tre-  
tise is not taken in hande  
touching you but touchyng  
the whole generalitie.  
wherefore let vs goe for-  
ward to such thinges as do  
remain.

As then in other matters,  
the workes of the mynde  
be much more, than of the  
bodye, so those thinges,  
which with wit, & reason  
we go through, be of more  
grace, then those, whiche  
we do w strength.

The first commendacion  
then proceedeth of sober  
moode, the next of natural  
duity

bella gerebantur. Tua au-  
tem etas incidit in id bel-  
lū, cuius altera pars scele-  
ris nimiū habuit, altera fe-  
licitatis parum. Quo tamē  
in bello cū te Pompei-  
us alē alteri p̄fecisset,  
magnam laudem & a sum-  
mo viro & ab exercitu cō-  
sequebare equitando, iac-  
culando, omniaquē mili-  
tari labore tolerando.

Atq; ea quidem tua laus  
pariter cum Rep. cecidit.  
Mihi autem hęc oratio  
suscepta non de te est, sed  
de genere toto. Quamo-  
brem ad ea, quę restant,  
pergamus.

Vt igitur in reliquis rebus  
multa maiora sunt opera  
animi quā corporis, sic  
hęc res quas persequimur  
ingenio ac ratione, gratio-  
res sunt quā illę, quas vi-  
ribus. Prima igitur com-  
mendatio, proficiscitur  
a modestia, tum pietate

## de Officiis.

in parentes, tum in suos beneuolentia.

Facillimè autem & in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulètes Reipub. contulerunt: quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes quos si bi ipsi delegerūt ad imitandum. Publij Rutilij adolescentiam ad opinionem & innocentie & iuris sciencie P. Mutij commendauit domus.

Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodū, adolescens, nō aliunde mutuatur est: sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione nobili et gloriosa.

Ex qua etate qui exercēt, laudib⁹ affici solēt vt Demosthenē accepim⁹. Ea etate Lu. Crassus ostendit,

duetie toward parentes: y third of good will toward theirs.

But to the best commendacion, yong men be knowne sonest of al: who haue bestowed them selues on noble and wise men, well counselling y cōmon weal: on whom if they be attendant, they bring y people in belief that they wil proue like them, whome they haue chosen themselves to folowe. Publius Mutius house did set out Publius Rutilius youthstate, for opinion both of harmelesse life, and of knowledge in y lawe.

For as for Lucius Crass⁹ when he was a very yong man, he borrowed not from any other place, but swan him self a very great praise by that noble, and glorious accusation.

And in which age they whoc haue exercises, are wonte to bee aduanced with praise as wee haue heard by Demosthenes: in the same age Lucius Crassus, dyd shewe hym selfe



in open court, to do that be  
ry wel, hauing fore studied  
which euen then at home,  
with prayse he might haue  
exercised.

But wher eas ther be two  
sortes of speach, wherof in  
the one is familiar talke in  
the other vehemence it is  
no doubt, but y<sup>e</sup> vehemēce  
of speach may do most, and  
hath the greater furderāce  
to glorie.

For thus is y<sup>e</sup> thing which  
we doo call eloquence, but  
yet it is hard too tell, how  
muche a gentlenes, and fa-  
miliarnes of speache win-  
neth mens mindes.

Ther be letters abroade  
of Philippus too Alexan-  
der, and of Antipater to  
Cassander, and of Anti-  
gonus to Philippus, three  
bery wysemen (for so wee  
haue heard) in which they  
giue rules, that with gen-  
tle speache they allure the  
heartes of the multitude,  
too owe theire good wyll  
and that they please theyr  
souldiours by speakynge  
too theym wythe fayre  
wordes.

But

id se in foro optimè iam  
premeditatū facere: qd' e-  
tiā tum poterat domi cū  
laude meditari. Sed cūm  
duplex ratio sit orationis,  
quarum in altera sit sermo  
in altera cōtentio: non est  
id quidē dubiū, quin cōtē-  
tio orationis plurimū pos-  
sit & maiorē vim habeat  
ad gloriā. Ea est enim, quā  
eloquētiā dicimus. Sed ta-  
mē difficile dictū est, quā-  
topere cōciliet animos ho-  
minū comitas, affabilitas-  
que sermonis. Extant epi-  
stolę & Philippi ad Alex-  
andrū et Antipatri ad Cas-  
sandrum, & Antigoni ad  
Philippum filium, trium  
prudentissimorum (sic e-  
nim accepimus) quibus  
precipiunt vt oratione be-  
nigna multitudinis ani-  
mos ad beneuolentiam al-  
liciāt: militesq; blando ap-  
pellādo sermone deliniāt.

M.iiij.

## de Officiis.

Que autē in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea sepe vniuersam excitat gloriā. Magna est enim admiratio copiosē, sapienterq; dicentis: quem qui audiūt, intelligere etiā & sapere plus quā ceteros arbitrantur. Si verō inest ī oratione mixta modestiē grauitas: nil admirabilius fieri potest: eōq; magis si ea sunt in adolescēte. Sed cū sint plurima causarū genera, quē eloquentiā de siderant: multiq; in nostra Repu. adolescentes, & apud iudices & apud Senatū dicendo laudē assecuti sūt: maxima est admiratio in iudicijs. Quorum ratio duplex est. Nā ex accusatione & defensione constat, quarū etsi laudabilior est defēsiō, tamē etiā accusatio probata p̄sepe est. Dixi paulō āte de Crasso. Idem fecit adolescens

But that oracion, whiche is made amonge the multitude with vehemence oftē times raiseth an vniuersal glorie. For great is y<sup>e</sup> wonderment at him, y<sup>e</sup> plentiful lye, and wisely speaketh: whom y<sup>e</sup> hearers do iudge also too vnderstand more, and to be wiser, than other. And if in the oracion there be graueness mingled with sober moode: nothing there can be done more wonderful: & so muche the more if those be in a yonge man. But whereas ther be verimanie kindes of causes, which do require eloquēce and many yongmen in our comon weale, bothe before the iudges, and beefore the Senate, haue attained praise by speaking in matters: the greatest admiraciō is in iudicial causes y<sup>e</sup> nature wherof is in two pty. For it standeth in accusation, and defence: of which albeit defence is the more commendable, yet also accusation is oftentimes allowed. I spake of Crass<sup>us</sup> a little before: the lyke did  
Mar:

Marcus Antonius, being  
 a pong man: an accusacion  
 also broughte Publius  
 Sulpicius eloquēce to li-  
 ght: whē into iugemēt he  
 called the sedicious, and  
 unprofitable citezē Caius  
 Norbanus but this south  
 he is not often to be doone  
 nor at any time, onlesse ey-  
 ther for the comon weales  
 cause: as dyd the two Lu-  
 cul'i or for proteccion sake:  
 as we did for the Siciliās  
 & for the Sardines: Juli<sup>9</sup>  
 Cesar, for Marc<sup>9</sup> Albuti  
 us did the lyke. Also Luci-  
 us fufius dilligence was  
 knowen in y<sup>e</sup> accusinge of  
 Marc<sup>9</sup> Aquili<sup>9</sup>. Once thē  
 it may be doone, not often  
 certesse. But in case a man  
 must nedes do it often: let  
 him ascribe his office too y<sup>e</sup>  
 comon weale: whose ene-  
 mies too reuenge often, is  
 not to be reproued: yet lette  
 there be a measure present  
 for of a hard harted man  
 or rather scarce a manne it  
 seemes, bpō many to bryge  
 the danger of life: for that  
 both is dangerous to hym  
 selfe, and also a shamefull  
 blotte

Mar. Antonius. P. Sulpitij  
 eloquentiam accusatio il-  
 lustravit: cū seditiosum  
 & invtilem ciuem C. Nor-  
 banum in iudicium voca-  
 vit. Sed hoc quidem non  
 est sepe faciendū, nec vn-  
 quam, nisi aut Reipub.  
 causa, vt duo Luculli: aut  
 patrocinio, vt nos pro Si-  
 culis, pro Sardis: pro M.  
 Albutio Iulius Cesar. In  
 accusando etiam Aquil-  
 io L. Fusij cognita indu-  
 stria est.

Semel igitur aut non se-  
 pe certē. Sin erit cur faci-  
 endū sit sepius. Reipub.  
 tribuat hoc muneris, cuius  
 inimicos vlcisci sepe, non  
 est reprehendēdū: modus  
 tamen adsit. Duri enim ho-  
 minis, vel potius vix homi-  
 nis videtur, periculum ca-  
 pitis inferre multis.

Id enim cū periculosum  
 ipsi est, tum etiā sordidum



ad famam committere, vt  
accusator nominetur.

Quod contigit M. Bruto  
summo genere nato illius  
filio, qui iuris ciuilis in pri-  
mis peritus fuit. Atq; etiā  
hoc præceptum officij dili-  
genter tenendum est, ne  
quem vnquam innocentē  
in iudiciū capitis accersas  
id enim sine scelere fieri  
nullo pacto potest.

Nan quid est tam inhumana  
num, quā eloquentiam a  
natura ad salutem homi-  
num & ad conseruationē  
datam, ad bonorum pestē  
perniciemque conuerte-  
re? Nec tamen vt hoc fu-  
giendum est, ita habendū  
est religioni, nocentem a-  
liquando, et nefarium, im-  
piumque defendere.

Vult hoc multitudo, pa-  
ritur consuetudo: fert e-  
tiam humanitas.

Iudicis est semper in cau-  
sis verum sequi: patrōni

blotte in his name, to giue  
cause, that he bee named a  
promotour.

Which chaunced to Mar-  
cus Brutus, bozne of a no-  
ble stocke, his sonne, whose  
was verye well skiled in  
the ciuill lawe. And therto  
this rule of ductione must be  
diligently kepte, & ye bringe  
no innocent, at any time, in  
iudgement vpon life, for &  
can in noe wyse bee doone  
wythout haynous wicked-  
nesse.

For what is ther so vna-  
turall, as to turne eloquence  
being geuen of nature for &  
sauegard, & p̄seruacion of  
menne, to the harne and  
distructiō of good menne?  
And yet, as this is to be  
eschewed, so it is not to be  
counted contrarie to godly  
nesse, to defend the guiltie o-  
therwhile, & mischeuous  
and wicked.

This & multitudo desireth,  
custome beareth, humani-  
tie also worketh.

The iudges parte is, euer  
more i causes to folow the  
troth, the counsellers parte  
many

many times to defende the  
trouth lyke; though it bee  
not so true: which to write  
I would not be bolde, na-  
mely seing I treat of Phi-  
losophie: but that the same  
liked Panetius, the gra-  
uest of the Stoikes.

But moſte of all by defec-  
ding, bothe glozpe, and fa-  
mour is gotten: & so muche  
the more if euer it befall,  
that he bee defended, whose  
both seeme to be besett, and  
pesssed with the riches of  
any man of power: as oure  
self did, bothe oftē at other  
times, and also being yong  
for Sextus Roscius y<sup>e</sup> A-  
merine, against y<sup>e</sup> might of  
Lucius Sylla, bearynge  
swaye: whiche oration (as  
ye wote) is abroad.

But now we haue sette  
forth yonge mens duities,  
which auaille to the attay-  
ning of glozpe: hereafter we  
must speake of bountiful-  
nes, and liberalitie,  
wherof two maner waies  
there bee.

For liberal dealing is the-  
wed to such, as need either  
by trauail, or with money.

This

nonnunquā verisimile, e-  
tiam si minus sit verū, de-  
fendere. Quod scribere  
(presertim cū de philo-  
sophia scriberē) non aude-  
rem, nisi idē placeret gra-  
uissimo Stoicorū Panetio.  
Maximē autem & gloria  
paritur et gratia, defensio-  
nibus: eōq; maior si quan-  
do accidit, vt ei subuenia-  
tur, qui potentis alicuius  
opibus circūueniri vrge-  
riq; videatur: vt nos, & se-  
pe alias: & adolescētes cō-  
tra L. Syllę dominantis o-  
pes pro Sexto Roscio A-  
merino fecimus: quę (vt  
scis) extat oratio. Sed ex-  
positis adolescentum of-  
ficiis, quę valeant ad glo-  
riam adipiscendam, dein-  
ceps de beneficentia, ac li-  
beralitate dicendum est,  
cuius est ratio duplex.  
Nam aut opera benignē  
fit indigentibus, aut pe-  
cunia.

Facilior est hec posterior, locupletati præsertim: sed illa lautior ac splendidior, & viro forti, claroq; dignior. Quanquã enim in vitroq; inest gratificãdi liberalis voluntas, tamẽ altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur. Largitioq;, q̃ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaust. Ita benignitate benignitas tollit: qua quõ in plures vsus sis, eõ minus in multos vti possis. At qui opera, id est virtute & industria benefici & liberales erunt: primum quõ pluribus profuerint, eõ plures ad benignẽ faciendum adiutores habebunt, deinde consuetudine beneficentiẽ paratiores erunt, & tanquã exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendũ. Prẽclare in epistola quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat

This latter is the easier, specially to the possessor, but that other is the goodlier, and moze glorious, & meete for a manlye, and a noble manne. For though there is a liberall will of pleasuring in both, yet the one out of the cofer, & the other out of vertue is take, & the lauishinge whiche is made of a mannes house goods draweth drye & fountaine of liberalitie, so liberalitie is by liberalitie wasted, and toward the more you doe vse it, the lesse ye can bee able to vse it toward many.

But who so shalbe bountifull, & liberall of traualle (that is) of vertue & diligence, first & mo they have profited, the more furderers they shal haue toward dealing liberalie, afterwarde by customable vsing of bounteousnesse, the redier they shalbe, and (as it were) more practised to deserue wel of many.

Princely doth Philippus, in a certain epistle, accuse Alexander his sonne, that,



that by lausshenesse, he ha-  
teth after the good will of  
the Macedonians.

what reason in a mischiefe  
quod he, hath brought you  
into this hope: & ye should  
think, those woulde bee to  
you faithful, who you had  
corrupted with money.

why? goe ye about thys,  
that the Macedonians may  
think you not their kinge  
but their servant & briber?  
well he said, seruaunt and  
briber, because it is vile for  
a king. Better also he said  
in that hee called large ge-  
uing corruption. For hee  
that receiueth is made the  
worle thereby, and the re-  
uer alwaies to looke for  
the like. This saide hee to  
his sonne, but let vs think  
it geue in precept to vs al.  
wherefore this certeinlye  
is no doubt, but the same  
liberalitie, which standeth  
in trauaile, & diligēce, both  
is honest, and also spred-  
deth farther, and is able to  
profite mo.

Oftentimes yet a manne  
must giue largely, & thys  
kind of liberaliti is not to be  
better

quod largitione beneuo-  
lentiā Macedonū cōsectet.

Quē te malū, inquit, ra-  
tio in istam spem induxit:  
vt eos tibi fideles putares  
fore, quos pecunia corrup-  
pisses? An tu id agis vt Ma-  
cedones nō te regē suum,  
sed ministrū & prebito-  
rem putēt: bene ministrū  
& prebitorem, quia sor-  
didum regi: melius etiam  
quod largitionem corrup-  
telam dixit esse? Fit enim  
deterior qui accipit, atque  
ad id idem semper expec-  
tandum paratior. Hoc ille  
filio: sed preceptum pute-  
mus omnibus.

Quamobrem id quidem  
nō est dubiū quin illa be-  
nignitas, quē cōstat ex ope-  
ra & industria, & hone-  
stior sit, & latius pateat, &  
possit prodesse pluribus.

Nonnunquam tamen est  
largiendum: nec hoc be-  
nignitatis genus cūctino

## de Officiis

repudiādū est: & sepe idoneis hominibus indigētibus de re familiari inptiendū: sed diligēter, atq; moderatē. Multi. n. patrimonia effuderūt incōsultē largiendo. Quid autē est stultius, quā qd' libēter facias, curare ut id diutius facere nō possis? Atq; etiā sequūtur largitionem rapinē. Cū enim dando egere cōperint, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita cū beneuolentię cōparandæ causa benefici esse velint: non tanta studia assequūtur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt.

Quamobrem nec ita claudenda est res familiaris, ut eam benignitas aperire non possit: nec ita referenda, ut pateat omnibus.

Modus adhibeatur, isquē referatur ad facultates.

Omnino meminisse de-

utterly cast of: & wee must manye times giue parte of our substance to meete mē, that haue neede: but wee must do it heedefullye, and measurably.

For diuers haue spoilde out their liuelod, by lausing it vnaduisedly. But what is foolishher, then to cause, that you can no longer do the thing, which ye loue to do: And also spoile foloweth of lanishnes.

For when by giuing they begin to be needie: they begin to lay hand on other mens goods: so when they woulde bee beneficiall for cause of good will getting they purchase not so great loue of theirs, to whome they gaue: as of them they gette hated, from whom they tooke.

Wherefoze neither a mans substance is so to be shutte vp, that liberalitie cannot open it, nor so to be vnlocked, that it lye abroade for euery bodye. A measure is to be kept, & let it be referred to abilitie. In any wise we must remember that

whiche

which with our men is be-  
come oft in vſage, and now is  
come into the cuſtome of a  
prouerbe, that lauiſhneſſe  
findes no bottome.

For what ſtay can ther be  
when both they, who are  
wont too it, and other doo  
deſire one thinge? In all  
there be two ſorts of large  
giuers of whiche the one  
bee called foollarge, the o-  
ther liberall.

Foollarge wee call them  
who with open feaſtes, &  
fleſhgifts, & ſenſeshowes,  
and furniture of lightes, &  
huntings, poſſeſſe out there  
mony on thoſe thinges  
whercof they ſhall leaue a  
memorie eyther ſhorte, or  
none at all.

But liberal thei be named  
who with ther riches doth  
raiſon men take by pray-  
ſekers, or for ther friends  
ſakes, doo becommen ſuer-  
tie for debte, or doo ayde  
them, in theyr daughters  
preferment of mariage, or  
els do helpe them either in  
getting or encreaſing their  
goodes.

And therfore I maruaile,  
What libberall what

bemus id, qd' a noſtris ho-  
minibus ſepiſſimè vſurpa-  
tum, iāq; in prouerbij cō-  
ſuetudinem venit: LAR-

GITIONEM FVN-  
DVM NON HABE-

RE. Etenim quis poteſt  
eſſe modus, cū idem &  
qui conſueuerunt, & idem  
illud alij deſiderent? Om-

nino duo ſunt genera lar-  
gorum, quorū alteri pro-  
digi, alteri liberales. Pro-  
digi qui epulis & viſcerati-  
onibus, et gladiatorū mu-  
neribus, ludorū venatio-

nūq; apparatu pecunias p-  
fundūt in eas res, quarum  
memoriā, aut breuem, aut  
nullam omnino ſint relic-

turi. Liberales autē, qui ſu-  
is facultatibus, aut captos  
a prędonibus redimūt aut  
es alienū ſuſcipiunt ami-

corū cauſa, aut in filiarum  
collocatione adiuuāt, aut  
opitulāt, vel in re querē-  
da vel augēda. Itaq; miror



## de Officiis.

quid in mentem venerit  
Theophrasto in eo libro,  
quē de diuicijs scripsit: in  
quo multa præclarè, illud  
absurdè. Est enim multus  
in laudanda magnificentia  
& apparatione populariū  
munerū: taliūq; sumptuū  
facultatē, fructum diuiti-  
arum putat. Mihi autē ille  
fructus liberalitatis, cuius  
exempla pauca posui, mul-  
tō et maior videtur, & cer-  
tior. Quantō Aristoteles  
grauius & veri⁹ nos repre-  
hēdit: qui has effusiones  
pecuniarū nō admiremur,  
quę sūt ad multitudinem  
deliniēdā: at ij qui ab ho-  
stibus obsidētur si emere  
aquę sextariū mina coge-  
rentur, hoc primo auditu  
incredibile nobis videri,  
omnesq; mirari, sed cū attē-  
derim⁹, veniā necessitati  
dare: in his immanibus iac-  
turis, infinitisq; sūptibus,  
nihil nos magnopè mirari

what came in Theophras-  
tus mind, i y booke, which  
he wrote of riches, wher-  
in he spake many things no-  
tably but this out of course  
For he is much in praising  
great sumptuousnesse, and  
furnishement of people ple-  
sing shewes: & he deemeth  
the ablenesse of suche char-  
ges to be the fruit of riches  
But me thinketh y fruite  
of liberalitie, whereof I  
haue put a fewe examples  
is bothe greater, and more  
certaine.

How much more grauelie  
and trewly doth Aristotle  
reproue vs: who are not in  
a wonderment at these las-  
shynges oute of money,  
which be done to claw the  
multitude: but in case they  
whoe are besieged of ene-  
mies, should be driuen too  
buye a quarte of water for  
tenne crownes: that thys  
at firste hearing, semeth to  
vs vncredible, and all make  
a maruaile at it: but when  
wee haue giuē good hēde  
thereto we hold it necessary  
yet we make no great mar-  
uaile at these exceedig losses  
and

and endlesse charges, whē specially nether necessity is relieved, nor worshippinge increased, & that selfe same clauinge of the multitude shal endure for a short, and a smale while, yea & that, with euery of the lightest minds, and yet in the very same, euen together with the fulnesse, the remembrance also of the pleasure dieth. It is also well gathered, that these shewes bee well liked of children, and women, and slaues, & freemen most like vnto slaues, but that noe wayes they can bee allowed of a sage man, and one, that w<sup>th</sup> a grounded iudgemēt w<sup>o</sup>ld say those thinges, that bee done.

Nevertheless I perceiue in our citie, it hath growen into vse, nowe in this good world: that the gay shewes of the Ediles office is looked for, euen of the best menne. Therefore Publi<sup>9</sup> crass<sup>9</sup> both by surpijs, functus est edilitio nāe rich, & also in substance, kept his Edile office maruelo<sup>9</sup> sumptuously. & soone after

cūm presertim neq; necessitati subueniatur, neq; dignitas augeatur: ipsaq; illa dilinitio multitudinis ad breue, exiguumq; duratura sit tempus: eaq; a leuissimo quoq; animo, in quo tamen ipso vnā cum satietate memoria quoq; moriatur voluptatis. Bene etiam colligitur, hec pueris, & mulierculis, & seruis, & seruorum similimis liberis esse grata, graui vero homini, & ea quę fiūt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse nullo modo. Quamquam intelligo in nostra ciuitate inueterasse iam bonis temporibus, ut spendor edilitatum ab optimis viris postuletur. Itaque P. Crassus cūm cognomine diues, tum etiam conuictus est edilitio. Et paulō post

## de Officiis.

post I. Crassus cū omnium  
hominum moderatissimo  
Quinto Mutio magnificē-  
tissima edilitate fūctus est.  
Deinde C. Claudius Ap-  
pij filius. Multi post vt: Lu-  
cullis, Hortensius, Sylla  
Omnes autem P. Lētulus  
me consule vicit superio-  
res. Hunc est Scaurus imi-  
tatus. Magnificentissima  
vero nostri Pompeij mu-  
nera secundo consulatu: in  
quibus omnibus, quid mi-  
hi placeat, vides. Vitanda  
tamē est suspicio auaritiæ.  
Nā Mamercus homini di-  
tissimo prætermisso edilita-  
tis consulatus repulsam at-  
tulit. Quare & si postula-  
tur à populo, bonis viris si  
non desideratibus, attamen  
approbatibus, faciendū est:  
modò pro facultatibus,  
nos ipsi vt fecimus. Et si  
quando aliqua res ma-  
ior, aut vtilior popula-  
ri largitione acquiritur:

after Lucius Crassus, with  
Quintus Mutius the gre-  
test meankeper of all men,  
kept y<sup>e</sup> time of their Edile  
office moſte royallie. Then  
came Caius Claudius, Ap-  
pius son. Afterward succe-  
ded many as Lucullus Por-  
cius, Syllanus. But Pu-  
blius Lentulus, when I  
was Consul, passed al his  
predecessours, Scaurus fo-  
llowed him. But our Pom-  
peius shewes, in his second  
Consulshippe, were y<sup>e</sup> cost-  
lier of all, in euerie deale  
wherof you se what liketh  
me we must yet auoyd sus-  
picion of couetousnesse.

For the refusall of the E-  
dileshippe brought to Ma-  
mercus, a very riche man,  
a fall for the Consulshippe  
wherfore the thing is to be  
done both if it be called for  
of the people, & good men,  
though they do not require  
it, do yet allowe it, so it be  
according to ones abilitie,  
as we our selfe haue done:  
and also, if anye greater, &  
more profitable thinge is  
wonne at anye time, by  
people pleasinge largesse



as of late, a greate honour  
to Quæstors wer the dinings  
in open waies, in name of  
his tenths. No no: it was  
not counted a reproche too  
Marcus Seius that in a  
berry of cozne, he gaue too  
the people for foure pence a  
bushell. For from a great,  
& a long festered enuie he de  
liuered him selfe, nether by  
a dishonest losse, seinge hee  
was Edile no: yet verpe  
great. But alate, it was  
passinge hie honour to our  
Shilob: because for y commo  
weales sake, which, in our  
safetie consilereth, whered  
sincem hee suppressed all  
Publi? Clodi? attēpts &  
rages, There is therefore  
cause of largesse, if either it  
be necessarie, or profitable.  
And yet in these same, the  
rule of meankeping is best  
Certesse Lucius philipp?  
Quint? sonne, a manne of  
great witte, and moste fa  
mous, was wont to glorie  
th' he, without anye gifte  
geuing, had attained si ma  
ner dignities, which were  
counted most honorable.

The like said Cotta Curia  
wece

vt Orestis nuper pradia in  
semitis, decime nomine,  
magno honori fuerūt. Nec  
Marco quidē Seio vitio da  
tū est, quod in caritate an  
none asse modium populo  
dedit. Magna enim se & in  
ueterata inuidia, nec turpi  
iactura, quando erat edilis  
nec maxima liberauit. Sed  
honori summo nuper no  
stro Miloni fuit, quod gla  
diatoribus emptis Reipub.  
causa, quę salute nostra cō  
tinebatur, omnes P. Clodij  
conatus furoresq; compres  
sit. Causa igitur largitionis  
est, si aut necesse est aut v  
tile. In his autem ipsis me  
diocritatis regula optima  
est L. quidem Phillippus  
Q. Fabij filius magno vir  
ingenio, imprimisq; clarus  
gloriari solebat: se sine  
vllō munere adeptum  
esse omnia, quę haberen  
tur amplissima.

Dicebat idē Cotta Curia.

## de Officiis.

Nobis quoq; licet in hoc quodammodo gloriari. Nam p̄ aplitudine honorū, quos cūctis suffragijs adepti sumus, nostro quidem anno (quod cōtigit eorū nemi-  
ni, quos modo nominavi) sanè exiguus sūptus edilitatis fuit. Atq; etiā illę impēse meliores sūt: muri, naualia, portus, aquarū ductus, omniaq; quę ad vsum Reipub. pertinent. Quamquam quod pręsens tāquā in manu datur iucundius est: tamē hec in posterum gratiora. Theatra, portic⁹ noua tēpla, verecundius reprehēdo propter Pompeiū: sed doctissimi nō probant, vt et hic ipse Panęti⁹ quē multū in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus & Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem principē Gręcię vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in pręclara illa propilęa coniecerit.

we also in this may glorie after a certaine sorte. For doubtles smal was the cost of our Edileship: in respect of such large honoures, as by al mens voices wee attained, euen in oure yeare: Which hath befallen to none of them, whom I named ere while. And also these expences be better, which are bestowed vpon citie walles shipdocks, hauens, conduites, & al y appertein to the vse of the cōmon wele. Although y is more pleasant, which pręsently is geuen (as it were) in hande, yet for time to come these be more acceptable. Sight-courts, galery walks, and new churches, y more reuerently I finde fault w, for Dōpēius sake, but the best learned men do not allow thē: as both y s̄c Pānetius, whō I haue followed much in these booke, & yet not trāslated him, & also Phalerius Demetri⁹ who dispraised Pericles, y prince of Greece, because he laid so much money vpon those goodly porches.

But

But of this kinde vniuer-  
 saly, it is diligently dispu-  
 ted, in those booke, which  
 I wrote of a comō weale.  
 The whole maner the of  
 such largesse generallye is  
 faultye, yet for certaine ti-  
 mes it is necessary, & then  
 y same is both to be refer-  
 red to ones abilitie, & to be  
 tempered w a mean keeping.  
 But in that other kinde of  
 large geuing, whiche pro-  
 ceedes of liberalitie, not al-  
 alike in causes vnlke, we  
 oughte to bee disposed. O-  
 therwise is his case who is  
 pressed with miserie, & o-  
 therwise his, who seeketh  
 more welth, hauing no ad-  
 versitie. Toward the im-  
 serable, liberalitie ought to  
 be forward, except persue-  
 ture they shall bee worthy  
 of miserie, we oughte yet  
 in no wise to be altogether  
 pinchynge towarde those  
 who woulde haue them-  
 selues to bee holpen, not  
 that theye maye feelee noe  
 affliction, but that theye  
 maye ryse to hyper degree:  
 neuerthelesse in choosinge  
 out

Sed de hoc genere toto in  
 his libris quos de Rep.  
 scripsi, diligēter est disputa-  
 tum. Tota igitur ratio tali-  
 um largitionum genere vi-  
 tiosa est, temporibus ne-  
 cessaria: et tamē ipsa & ad  
 facultates accommodāda,  
 & mediocritate moderan-  
 da est. In illo autē altero ge-  
 nere largiendi quod à libe-  
 ralitate pfiscitur, nō vno  
 modo in disparibus causis  
 affecti esse debemus, Alia  
 causa est eius, qui calamita-  
 te premitur, & eius qui res  
 meliores querit, nullis suis  
 rebus aduersis. Propen-  
 sior benignitas esse debet in  
 calamitosos: nisi forte erūt  
 digni calamitate. In ijs ta-  
 mē q se adiuvāri volēt, no-  
 solum vt ne affligantur,  
 sed etiam vt altiorē gra-  
 dum ascendānt, restricti  
 omnino nullo modo esse  
 debemus: sed in diligēdis



## de Officiis.

idoneis iudicium, & diligētia adhibere. Nam preclarē Ennius.

Benefacta malè locata, Good deedes, in case  
malefacta arbitror. Quod they be euil placed,  
autem tributum est bono Euill deedes I count,  
viro & grato, in eo cū ex and clene disgraced.  
ipso fructus est, tum etiam But what so is geue to a  
ex ceteris. Temeritate enī good mā, & a thākful: ther  
remota, gratissima est libe by both there comes frute  
ralitas, eoque eam studio frō hī & also frō other. For  
sius pleriq; laudant, quod so rashnes be auoided, libe  
summi cuiusq; bonitas cō- ralitie is very pleasureful,  
mune profugium est om- & so much y moze earnest-  
nium. Danda igitur opera ly most mē praise it, becau  
est, vt hos beneficijs quam se euery great mā's good-  
plurimis afficiamus, quo- nes is the cōmō refuge of  
rum memoria liberis, po- al. Our endeuour therfore  
sterisq; prodatur, vt his is to be don, y we reward  
ingratis esse non liceat. the w very many benefits  
Omnes enim immemo- to whose childrē, & offsprig  
rem beneficij oderunt, e- a memozy may be leste, so  
amq; iniuriam in dete- y of good right they cā not  
renda liberalitate sibi et- be vnthankful. For all mē  
am fieri: eumq; qui faciat, doo hate the forgetter of a  
good turn, & do deme that  
wrong euen to themselves  
to be doone, in frapinge a-  
way ones liberalitie, and  
they take him, whose cau-  
sethe it to bee a common  
enemye

enemie of the poore. And this liberalitie alio is profitable to y<sup>e</sup> comyn<sup>e</sup> weale, to haue prisoners redeemed out of captiuitie, and the poore enriched.

which wee see written at large in the oratio of Crassus, that it was wont too be done abroade by vs of y<sup>e</sup> Equestriall order. I place therfore this v<sup>s</sup>age of liberalitie before lauishnesse in shewes. This is for graue menne, & great, that other, (as it were) for flatterers of y<sup>e</sup> people, tickeling, as ye would say, the lightnes of the multitud with pleasure. But it is meete for a man both to be liberal in geuing & nothing eger in requiringe, & also in euery matter of bargaininge sellinge buying, hyrre, letting, nye dwellinges, and paraye boundes, to be iust and gentle, & too remitte muche of his due to manye, but from traiters in lawe to refrain as much, as hee maye, and I wote not, whether somewhat more also, than he may.

word law for

comune hostem tenuiorum putant. Atq; hec benignitas etia Reipub. utilis est re dimi e seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores: quod quide vulgo solitu fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo consuetudine benignitatis largitioni munerum longe apono. Hec est grauius hominum, atq; magnorum: illa quasi assentatorum populi, multitudinis leuitatem voluptate quasi titillatium. Conuenit autem tum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum. In omniq; re contrahenda vedendo, emendo, conducendo, locando, in vicinitatibus & confinijis equum & facile, multa multis de iure suo cedentem: a litibus vero quantum liceat (et nescio an paulo plus etiam quam liceat) abhorrentem.

N. iij.

Est

## de Officiis.

Est enī nō modō liberale, paulū nōnūquā de suo iure decedere: sed interdum etiā fructueſū. Habēda autē eſt ratio rei familiaris: quā quidē delabi ſinere flagiōſū eſt: ſed ita, vt illiberalitatis, auaritięq; abſit ſuſpicio. Poſſe enī liberalitate vtī, nō ſpoliatē ſe patri monio, nimirū eſt pecunię fruct⁹ maxim⁹. Recte etiā à Theophrasto eſt laudata hospitalitas. Eſt enim (vt mihi quidē videtur) valdē decorū, patere domos hominū illuſtriū illuſtrib⁹ hoſpitibus. Idq; etiā Reip. eſt ornamento homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in vrbe noſtra nō egere. Eſt etiā vehementer vtile ijs, qui honeſtē multū poſſe volūt per hoſpites apud externos populos valere opibus & gratia. Theophrastus ſcribit quidem Cimonem Athenis etiam in ſuos curiales Laciadas

for it is not only a liberal point to forgo ſomewhat of his right other while, but ſometime alſo profitable. But regard of a mā's well the muſt be had, which be rely to ſuffer to decay, is a foule fault, but ſo, as ſuſpition of niggardynes, & couerouſnes, bee auoided. For no dout it is the greateſt fruit of moneye: that a man be able to vſe liberalitye, not making ſpoile of his liuet hood, well alſo, is hoſpitalitie praiſed of Theophrast⁹. For it is (as me thinketh) very ſcemely, noble mennes houſes to bee open for noble geſtes. And that alſo is an honor to the ſtate: that outlandiſh men in oure citie doo not want this kind of liberalitie. It is alſo excedinge profitable to them who honeſtlye deſire to be able to do muche to preuaile in power, and fauour, by their geaſtes, amonge fozeine nations. Theophrastus in deede writeth, that Cimon at Athenes alſo was a good houſekeeper, for the Laciadang of hys warde. Because



Because he toke order so,  
 & commaunded his baylyes:  
 al thinges should be offered  
 to whatsoeuer Laciadan  
 turned into hys mannour.  
 But these benefites, which  
 bee bestowed by trauaile, &  
 not by large gifts, are em-  
 ptoed both vpon y<sup>e</sup> whole  
 comon weal, and vppon e-  
 uery citizen a part. For in  
 law to geue aduise, wythe  
 counsel to help, & to furder  
 very many with this kind  
 of science, it auailleth verye  
 much, both to the encrease  
 of riches, and also to sauez.  
 Therefore as there sweare  
 many worthy thinges of  
 our auncesters, so alwayes  
 in gret prys was the know-  
 ledge, & the opening of the  
 right well ordeyned ciuill  
 law, which truelye, befoze  
 this turmoile of times, ru-  
 lers receyued in the due  
 estimatiō, now as honour,  
 & as euery degree of wor-  
 ship, so the glozpe of thys  
 science is blotted out. And  
 that is so much the shame-  
 fuller, because this happe-  
 ned at that time: when hee  
 reined, who in knowledge  
 clereye

hospiralē fuisse. Ita enī in-  
 stituisse, & villicis iperauis-  
 sie, vt omnia preberentur,  
 quicūq; Laciades in villam  
 suā diuertisset. Quę autem  
 opera nō largitione, benefi-  
 cia dātur: hec tū in vniuer-  
 sã Rēpub. tū in singulos ci-  
 ues cōferūtur. Nam in iure  
 cauere, cōsilio iuuare, atq;  
 hoc sciēcię genere pdesse  
 quā plurimis, vchemēter  
 & ad opes augēdas ptinet,  
 & ad gratiā. Itaq; cū multa  
 preclara maiorū, tū quā  
 optimē cōstituti iuris ciui-  
 lis summo sē per in honore  
 fuit cognitio, atq; interpre-  
 tatio: quā quidē ante hanc  
 cōfusiōnē tēporū in posses-  
 sione sua principes retinue-  
 rūt. Nūc vt honores, vt o-  
 nes dignitatis gradus. sic  
 huius sciētię splendor  
 deletus est. Idq; cō in-  
 dignius quōd eo tem-  
 pore hoc contigit, cū is  
 esset, qui ōnes superiores,  
 quibus

## de Officiis.

quib<sup>9</sup> honore par esset, sci-  
 etia facile vicisset. Hec igitur  
 opera grata multis, & ad  
 beneficijs obstringēdos  
 homines accommodata. At-  
 que huic arti finitima est  
 dicendi grauior facultas, et  
 gratior, & ornatior. Quid  
 enim eloquentia laudabili<sup>9</sup>  
 & prestabilis vel admira-  
 tione audientium, vel spe in-  
 digentium, vel eorum, qui  
 defensi sunt, gratia? Huic  
 quoq; ergo à maiorib<sup>9</sup> no-  
 stris est in tota dignitate  
 principatus datus, disertis  
 igitur hominis et facile la-  
 borantis quodq; in patrijs  
 est moribus multorum cau-  
 sas & nō grauātē, et gratu-  
 ito defēdentis, beneficia &  
 patrocinia latē patent. Ad-  
 monebat ne res, vt hoc  
 quoq; loco intermissione  
 eloquentiæ, ne dicam in-  
 teritum, deplorarē: nisi ve-  
 rerer ne de meipso aliquid  
 clerely exceeded al his fore-  
 goers, to whom he had be-  
 ppe in honour. This tra-  
 uaille therfore is plesureful  
 to manye, & verye fitte, to  
 bind men with benefitz.  
 And the grauer and grace-  
 fuller, and trimmer seat of  
 oratorie is nere cōsi to this  
 science.  
 For what is more prayse  
 worthy, & better thā clo-  
 quēce: either for the admi-  
 ration of the heares, of the  
 hope of the neders, or for  
 their cause, who haue ben  
 defended. Therfore to this  
 likewise a 'preeminence in  
 al honour was geuen of  
 our elders. The benefites  
 then & the pleading of a fi-  
 ne spoken man, & gladly ta-  
 king paines, & (as it is in  
 his contrey fashion) bothe  
 not vnwillinglye, and also  
 freely defēding many mē  
 causes, be farre spredde a-  
 bzode.  
 The matter hath put me i  
 mind, & in this place also  
 I should bewaile & discō-  
 tinuance, I wil not saye &  
 destructiō of eloquēce: but  
 that I feared, lestē tou-  
 chynge

ching my self somewhat I  
should seeme to complaine  
Notwithstanding we see  
what notable oratozs haue  
been put out of the way: &  
how in a few a hope, in se-  
uer a skil, in many a bold-  
nes there remaines. But  
seeing neither al, nor yet ma-  
ny can be either conning in  
the law, or wel spoken mē  
one yet w<sup>th</sup> trauaill may fur-  
der maney, & shewethe for  
their comodities, & spea-  
keth in their fauour to the  
iudges, & magistrates: that  
sleepeth not ouer an others  
cause: & treateth those s<sup>ac</sup>  
who either bee counsellers,  
or defēders, which who so  
do, they attē verry much  
faour, & their payntines  
floweth al abzode.

How they are not to be ad-  
monished of this (for it is  
wel known) & they take  
hede: when they will helpe  
other, & they offende none.  
For oftentimes either they  
hurt thē, whō they should  
not: or thē, whom it is not  
behoouable, if vnswarclye  
they do it, of negligē it is:

ps

viderer queri. Sed tamē vi-  
demus quibus extinctis o-  
ratoribus quā in paucis  
spes, quanto in pauciorib<sup>us</sup>  
facultas, quā in multis sit  
audacia. Cū autem om-  
nes non possint, ne multi  
quidem, aut iuris periti es-  
se, aut disertī: licet tamen  
opera prodesse multis, be-  
neficia petentem, commen-  
dantem iudicibus, aut ma-  
gistratibus: vigilantē pro  
re alterius, eosq; ipsos qui  
ant consulunt, aut defēdūt  
rogantem, quod qui faciūt  
plurimū gratiē consequū-  
tur, latissimeq; eorum ma-  
nat industria. Iā illud nō  
sūt admonendi (est enim  
in promptu (vt animad-  
uertant, cū iuuare alios  
velint, ne quos offendant  
Sepe enim, aut eos lē-  
dunt, quos non debent:  
aut eos quos nō expedit. Si  
iprudētes, negligētiā est:

fi



## de Officiis.

si scientes, temeritatis. Vt ē  
dū enim est excusatiōe ad  
uersus eos, quos inuitus of-  
fēdas quacūq; possis, quare  
id quod feceris necesse fue-  
rit, nec aliter facere potue-  
ris, certisq; operis & officijs  
erit id quod violatum est,  
compensandum. Sed cūm  
in hominibus iuuandis, aut  
mores spectari, aut fortu-  
na soleat: dictu quidē est  
peliue: Itaque vulgo lo-  
quuntur, sese in beneficijs  
collocandis mores homi-  
num, non fortunam sequi:  
honestā oratio est. Sed  
quis est tādē qui inopis &  
optimi viri causē, non an-  
teponat in opera danda  
gratiam fortunati & po-  
tentis? A quo enim expe-  
ditior & celerior remune-  
ratio ferē videtur, in eum  
ferē est volūtas nostra pro-  
pensior. Sed animaduēr-  
tendum est diligentius,

if wittingly, of rashenes it  
comes. you must vse also to  
them, whom you offend a-  
gainst youre will, suche an  
excuse, as ye maye: for  
what cause & same, & you  
haue done was necessarie,  
and you could not do other  
wise: and that which was  
done offensively, shalbe re-  
compensed with other tra-  
uailes, & frendly doinges.  
But whereas in helpinge  
men, either their cōditions  
are wont too be considered  
or their estate, in dede it is  
soone saide, and so they doo  
commonlye speake, that in  
bestowinge their benefits  
they regarde mens maners,  
and not there estate. In ho-  
nest saying it is, but who is  
ther at al, which in bestow-  
inge his trauaile, doth not  
preferre the fauor of a rich  
man, and one of power, be-  
fore the poore, and a right  
good mans cause, for hō  
whom, we thinke, a spee-  
dier, & redier recompence  
wyl come, too hym wards  
commonly our good wil is  
& more enclyned. But wee  
must mark more diligētly.  
what

What is y<sup>e</sup> nature of thingz  
 for verely though y<sup>e</sup> poore  
 manne can not render due  
 thanks: yet if he be a good  
 man, owe the forsooth hee  
 may: This surely was in  
 place, whosoeuer saide yt:  
 money who haueth in hād  
 hath not payd, & who hath  
 payd, haue h in mind, but  
 thanks bothe who haue  
 payd, haue in minde, and  
 who haue in mind, hath  
 rendered. But these, who  
 count themselues riche, ho  
 norable, & wealefull, wyl  
 not bee once bounde too a  
 man for a pleasure, but they  
 thinke rather that they haue  
 done a pleasure, when, yea  
 although they haue taken  
 some great thing, they suf  
 fer somewhat likewise of  
 them either to be craued or  
 looked for, but they reckon it  
 euen like a deith, that they  
 shoulde seeme to haue vsed  
 ones furdurance, or shoulde  
 be called hāgers on. But y<sup>e</sup>  
 other poore man, thinking  
 him selfe regarded, & not  
 his state, whē any thing is  
 doone vnto him, desyres y<sup>e</sup>  
 he may be thought thāksful  
 not

que natura rerum sit. Ni  
 mirū enim inops ille, si bo  
 n<sup>9</sup> est vir, etiā si referre gra  
 tiā nō potest: habere certe  
 potest. Cōmodē autē qui  
 cunq; dixit, pecuniam qui  
 habeat, non reddidisse: &  
 qui reddiderit, nō habere.  
 Gratiam autem & qui re  
 tulerit habere & qui habe  
 at retulisse. At qui se locu  
 pletes, honoratos, beatos  
 putant, hi ne obligari qui  
 dem beneficio volunt: quī  
 etiam beneficium se dedis  
 se arbitrantur, cū ipsi quā  
 uis aliquid magnum acce  
 perint, atq; etiam a se aut  
 postulari, aut expectari a  
 liquid suspicantur. Patro  
 cinio vero se vfos, aut cli  
 entes appellari, mortis in  
 star putant. At vero ille  
 tenuis cum quicquid fac  
 tum sit, sese spectatum, nō  
 fortunam putat: nō modo  
 illi

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illi qui est meritis, sed etiā illis, à quibus spectat (eget enim multis) gratū se videri studet. Neq; verò verbis auget suū munus, si quo forte fungitur: sed etiam extenuat, videndumq; illud idē, quòd si opulentū, fortunatūq; defenderis: in vno illo aut forte in liberis eius manet gratia. Sin autē inopē, probū tamen et modestū, omnes non improbi humiles (quę magna in populo multitudo est) præsidū sibi paratū vidēt. Quā obrē melius apud bonos, quā apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Danda tamen omnino opera est, vt omni generi satisfacere possimus. Sed si res in contentionē veniet, nimirū Themistocles est author adhibendus: qui cū consuleretur utrū bono viro pauperi, aut min⁹ probato diuiti filiam collocaret

onely to him who haue deserued it, but also to them) for he stāds in neede of many) of whō hee looks for ought. Not yet w<sup>th</sup> wordes he sets out his seruice, y<sup>t</sup> phaps he do anye, but also abateeth it. And this same point is to be considered, y<sup>f</sup> if you defend a rich, and a welthy man, the thank remaines in him alone, or perchance in his childrē, but if you do it for him that is poore, & yet honeste, & discrete: al the mean degree, beig not dishoneste, (which is a great multitude among y<sup>e</sup> people) doo see succoure prepared for thē. wherfore I think a benefit better to be bestowed vpon good mē than vpon riche. yet alwaies we must geue oure endeavour y<sup>e</sup> wee may content al manner of men, but if the matter shal com into cōparison, verely Themistocles is to betaken for an author, who, whē he was asked cōsil, whether one shold bestow his daughter vpon a good poore mā, or a riche manne not so honeste.



I (quod he) do rather like  
a man, who lacketh money  
tha money which wāteth  
a man.

But maners be corrupted  
& marred, by ouer regar-  
ding riches. What doth the  
great stozz therof pertaine  
to euery one of vs: perauen-  
ture it helpeth him, & hath  
it: & y was not alwayes.  
But graūt it helpz, in dede  
he may be the mightier but  
which way may he bee the  
honestest man? And if the  
rich man be also a good mā  
let not his riches hynder  
him, & cause him to finde y  
lesse helpe, so they furder  
him not: and let a mannes  
hole iudgemēt be, not how  
rich, but what manner mā  
eche one is. And in bestow-  
ing benefitts, & traiaile the  
last lesson is that you labor  
nothing againste equiti, &  
nothing with wrong.

For iustice is the ground of  
a cōtinuall cōmendacion, &  
same, without which, no-  
thing can bee prayseable  
But seing we haue spokē  
of such kind of benefitts, as  
belong to eche feneral man  
here=

ego verō inquit, malo vitū  
qui pecunia egeat, quā pe-  
cuniā, q̄ viro. Sed corrupti  
mores, deprauatiq; sūt ad  
miratione diuitiarū: quarū  
magnitudo quid ad vnum  
quēq; nostrū pertinet: illū  
fortasse adiuuat, qui habet  
ne id quidē sēper. Sed fac  
iuuare, potētior sane sit, ho-  
nestior vero quomodo?  
Quōd si etiam bonus erit  
vir: ne impediāt diuitiæ  
quo minus iuuetur, modō  
ne adiuuent, sitq; omne iu-  
diciū non quā locuples,  
sed qualis quisq; sit. Extre-  
mum autē preceptū in be-  
nificijs operaq; danda est,  
ne quid contra equitatem  
cōtendas, ne quid pro iu-  
ria. Fundamentū enim p-  
petuę commendationis &  
fame est iustitia, sine qua  
nihil potest esse lauda-  
bile, sed quoniam de eo  
genere beneficiorū dictū  
est, qd' ad singulos spectāt,  
deinceps

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deinceps de ijs, quę ad vni-  
uersos. quęq; ad Rēp. per-  
tinent disputandū est. Eo-  
rum autem ipsorum parti-  
eiusmodi sunt, vt ad vni-  
uersos ciues pertineāt, par-  
tim singulos vt attingant,  
quę sunt etiam gratiora.  
Danda est opera omninō,  
si possit vtriusq; nec minus  
vt etiam singulis consula-  
tur: sed ita vt ea res aut pro-  
fit, aut certē ne obsit Rei-  
pub. C. Helij, & T. Crac-  
chi frumentaria magna  
largitio fuit, exhauriebat  
igitur ærarium, modica M.  
Octauij, & Reip. tolerabi-  
lis, & plebi necessaria: ergo  
& ciuibus & Reip, saluta-  
ris. In primis autem viden-  
dum erit ei, qui Remp. ad-  
ministrabit: vt suū quisq;  
teneat: neq; de bonis  
priuatorum publicē di-  
minutio fiat. Pernitiosē enī  
Phillippus in tribunatu,

hereafter we must treat of  
those which pertain to all  
men, & to a cōmon weale.  
And some of those sãe bee  
of such sort, y they pteine  
to the whole number of ci-  
tizens, some that they con-  
cerne euery sere mā, which  
be also more sauourfull. &  
diligēce doubtles ther must  
be geuen, if it may, y it bee  
puided for both, & no lesse  
also, for euery one, but so,  
as y thingeither may fur-  
der or at lest not hinder the  
cōmō weale. Caius Grac-  
chus corne dole was grei.  
he wasted therfore y trea-  
surie: Marcus Octavius  
made suche a one, as was  
measurable, & as y cōmon  
weale might bere, & neces-  
sarie for the people, & ther-  
fore wealful both to the ci-  
tizens, & also to the state.  
But specially it muste bee  
seene to of him, who shall  
gouern y cōmō welc, that  
euery man kepe his owne:  
& that there bee no impay-  
ring of priuate mēs goods  
for common charges. For  
Phillippus did dangerous  
lye in his Tribuneshippe.

When he made the law cōcerninge landes, which yet he soone suffered to bee repealed, and therein maruelously he shewed himseife a sober man, but as he dyd cuill, in setting forth many thinges people pleasinglye so this hee spake cuill, that there were not in the citie two thousand men, whose hadde any substance.

It is suerly a mischeuous saying, & soundinge too the making of goodes commō & what greater pestilence canther be, than that: For common wealthes, & countreis are ordeined too this end specially, that men may keepe there owne.

For although men assemble together, nature being gypde, yet they sought the defences of cities, for hope of safe keepinge of theyre goodes,

There muste also good herde be geuen, that (as of ten it happened among our aunceters) for the pozenes of the treasurie, and continuance of the warres, a tribute be not nedefull to be paid

cūm legem agrariā ferret quam tamen antiquari facile passus est, & in eo vehementer se moderatum prēbuit, sed cūm in agendo multa populariter, tum illud malē dixit: non esse in ciuitate duo millia hominum, qui rem haberent.

Capitalis oratio est ad equationem bonorum pertinens,

Qua peste quē potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximē vt sua tuerentur, Resp. ciuitatesq; constitutę sunt. Nam etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen, spe custodię rerum suarum, vrbiū pręsidia querant.

Danda etiam opera est, ne (qd' apud maiores nostri sepe fiebat), ppter e-rarij tenuitatē, assiduitatē-que bellorum tributū sit



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conferendum . Idquē ne eueniat, multō antē erit puidendum. Sin quē necessitas huius muneris alicui Reipub. obuenerit (malo enim alteri quā nostrē ominari, nequē tantum de nostra, sed de omni Reipub. disputo) danda erit opera, vt omnes intelligāt si salui esse velint, necessitati esse parendum.

Atquē etiam omnes qui rempub. gubernabunt, cōsulere debebunt, vt earum rerum copia sit, quę sunt necessarię. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat, & debeat, non est necesse disputare, est enī in prōptu: tantum locus attingendus fuit. Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotij et muneris publici, vt auaricię pellatur etiam minima suspicio,

payde. And longe before it must bee prouided, that it may not fall. But if anye necessitie of this dutie shal happen vpon any common weale (for I hadde rather prophecie to some others, then to ours, & yet I reaso not of oures, but of euerye common weale) ther must be geuen a diligence, & all men may vnderstand, that if they wil be in safety, thei must obey necessitie.

And mozeouer, all suche as shall rule the commonweale, ought to prouyde, that there bee stozz of these thinges whiche are necessarye.

Of which it is not needfull to dispute, what a prouision, is wonte & oughte to bee made, for the matter is manifeste, thys place was no moze but to bee touched.

But the chiefe pointe is, in all administracion of matters, and common weale offices, that euen the leaste suspicio of couetousnesse bee auoyded.

Would

would God, quoth Caius Pontius the Samnite, fortune had reserved mee to those daies, and I had then been bozne, when the Romaines begoon once to take brybes, I would not suffer them anye longer to rule. Hee needed not p<sup>r</sup>is to haue taried for manye worldes.

For of late this mischiese entered into this common weale. Therefore I am wel content, that Pontius rather liued then, if there was in him so much manhode in deepe.

Not yet a hundzed and tenne yeres be past, since the lawe of pillage was made by Lucius Piso, wher as none before had bene.

But afterwarde folowed so many lawes, and euery of the latter, the harder, so many accused, so many condemned, so great an Italiō warre, raised for feare of iugemēt: when lawes and iudgemēt were taken away, so great polling, and robbing of large frindes,

that

vtinam inquit Caius Pontius Samnis, ad illa, tempora fortuna me seruasset & tunc essem natus quando Romani dona accipere cœpissent, non esse passus eos diutius imperare. Nē illi quidē multa secula expectanda fuerūt, modō enim hoc malum in hanc Rempublicam inuasit.

Itaque facile patior, tūc potius Pontium fuisse siquidem in illo tātum fuit roboris. Nondum centum & decem anni sunt, cū de pecunijs repetundis a Lu. Pisone lata est lex, nulla antea cū fuisset.

At vero postea tot leges & proxime queque duriores tot rei, tot damnati, tantū Italicū bellū propter iudiciorū metum excitatum, tanta sublati legibus & iudicijs, expilatio, direptioque sociorum,

O. ij.

## de Officiis.

vt imbecillitate aliorū non  
nostra virtute valeamus.

Laudat Affricanum Panetius, qd' fuerit abstinens, quid ni laudet? sed in illo alia maiora. Laus enim abstinentie non hominis est solum, sed etiam temporum illorum.

Omni Macedonū gaza que fuit maxima, potit' est Paulus: tantū in erarium pecunie inuexit, vt vnus imperatoris pręda finē attulerit tributorū.

At hic nihil in domum suam intulit, pręter memoriam nominis sempiternam Imitatus patrem Affricanus nihilo locupletior Chartagine euerfa. Quid? (qui eius collega in censura fuit) L. Mummius, nūquid copiosior cū copiosissimam vrbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare, quā domum suam maluit. Quanquam Italia

that by the weaknesse of other, not by oure prowess, wee do pręuaile Panctius praiseth Affrican<sup>9</sup>, because he was no taker.

Why should hee not bee praised? But other greater thinges there were in him. For the praise of restraining frō taking is not only y<sup>e</sup> mans, but also that times. Paul<sup>9</sup> got al y<sup>e</sup> Macedonians treasure, which was exceedinge greate, hee brought so much riches into the treasure, that one captaines bootie made an end of tributes: but he bore nothinge intoo his house, saue an euerlasting memory of his name.

Africanus folowed his father, no whit the more enriched by Carthage razed. What of Lucius Mummius who was his office fellow in the Censorshippe? Was hee anye deale the richer when by the grounde he had ouer thron y<sup>e</sup> most rich cite.

He was willing rather to bewtifie Italie, than hys own house, although Italy being



being beautified, his verve  
house seemeth to mee the  
beautifuller. No vice then  
is there forer (that thi-  
ther my talke may return  
from whēce it is strayed)  
then couetousnesse, special-  
ly, in princes and common  
weale rulers.

For it is not only dishonest  
but wicked also, & shame-  
ful to make a gaine of the  
comen welth.

Therefore wher as Apollo  
Dithius gane out by ora-  
cle, that Sparta no other  
way, but by couetousnesse  
should come to destrucciō,  
& lame he seemeth to haue  
prophecied not only to the  
Lacedemonians but also  
to al welthy peoples.

For they who rule ouer &  
common weale, may by no  
meanes sooner wyne the  
good will of the multitude  
then by a refraining hande  
and staidnesse.

But who so wil be people  
pleasers, and for that cause  
do either attempt the mat-  
ter of landes, that the ow-  
ners may be driue frō their  
holds, or els do think mete  
that

ornata, domus ipsa viden-  
tur mihi ornatio. Nullū  
igitur vitiū est tetrius (vt  
eo, vnde egressa est referat  
se oratio) quā avaricia, prę-  
sertim in principibus &  
Remp. gubernantibus.

Habere enim questui rēp.  
non modo turpe est, sed  
sceleratum etiam & nefar-  
ium. Itaq; quod Apollo  
Pythius oraculo edidit,  
Spartam nulla re alia nisi  
auaritia esse perituram, id  
videtur non solū Lacedę-  
monijs, sed etiam omnib;  
opulentis populis prędix-  
isse. Nulla autem re concili-  
are facilius beneuolen-  
tiam multitudinis possūt  
ij, qui Reipub. pręsunt,  
quā abstinētia & con-  
tinentia.

Qui vero sē popula-  
res volunt esse, ob eamq;  
causam aut agrariam rem  
tentant vt possessores suis  
sedibus pellantur, aut pe-  
cunias creditas debitorib;

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condonandas putant, ij that loued mony be remitted to  $\S$  detters: they shake labefactant fundamenta  $\S$  foundations of  $\S$  comon Reipublice, concordiam weal, first they take a way primum que esse non potest quum alijs adimuntur when money is pulled fro alijs condonantur pecunie, & forgeeuen to other neq, deinde equitatem, some, nexte they ban the que tollitur omnis si habe equitie, whiche ys wholy rooted out, if it be not law re suum, cuique non licet. ful for euery man to haue

Id enim est proprium, his owne.  
vt supra dixi, ciuitatis atque vrbis, vt sit libera, & For that is the prop end, as I saide before of a citie and borough, that there be non sollicita sue rei cuiusque custodia. Atq; in hac a free, and no troublesome keeping of euery mannes perniciē Reipub. ne illam owne good.  
quidem cōsequuntur, quā And in this mischief of the comon wealthe, they do not putant gratiam. attaine such fauour as they suppose they do.

Nam cui res erepta est, For he from whom goods est inimicus: cui data est e be taken is become an enemy, he also to whom they tiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse, et maximē in are geue makes as though pecunijs creditis occultat hee is not willinge to take suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse soluendo. them, and moſte of all hee hydes his ioy in loued money forgeeuen, least he may seeme to haue been vnable to pay it.

But

But suerly hee that recei-  
neth the wrong, both bea-  
reth his griefe in remem-  
braunce, and sheweth it in  
sight neither if they be mo-  
re whom wickedly it hath  
ben geuen, than they from  
whom vniustly it hath ben  
take, it solooweth that ther  
fore they bee also moze in  
power.

For these thinges be iud-  
ged not by number, but by  
weight. And what equitie  
is in this? y he shuld haue  
land who hath had none, &  
he should forgo land, who  
hathe had it manie yeares  
yea or hundzedes of yeares  
before continued in posses-  
sion.

But for this kinde of in-  
iurie, the Lacedemonians  
draue oute Lysander the  
Ephozian, and they slewe  
Agis the king, which had  
neuer happened a moog the  
before. Whereof soloowed,  
at that time so great discen-  
sions, that there arose Cy-  
rantes, & their noble men  
were exiled & a very well  
ordered comon weale wet  
to ruine.

At vero ille qui accipit in-  
iuriam & meminit, & pre-  
se fert dolorem suum nec  
si plures sunt. ij. quibus im-  
probè datū est, quàm illi  
quibus iniuste ademptum  
est, idcirco plus etiam  
valent.

Non enim numero hæc iu-  
dicantur, sed pondere.

Quam autē habet equita-  
tē, vt agrum multis annis,  
aut etiam sæculis antè pos-  
sessū, qui nullū habuit, ha-  
beat, qui autē habuit, amit-  
tat? At ppter hoc iniurię  
genus Lacedemonij Lifa-  
drum Ephorum expule-  
runt: Agin regem (quod  
nunquam antea apud eos  
acciderat) necauerunt.

Ex quo tēpore tantę dis-  
cordię secutę sunt, vt tirā-  
ni existerent, et optimates,  
exterminarentur, & pre-  
clarissimè constituta Res-  
publi. dilaberetur.



## de Officiis.

Nec verò solùm ipsa cecidit: sed etiam reliquã Græciam euertit contagionibus malorum, quæ a Lacedæmonijs profectæ manarunt latiùs. Quid? nostros Gracchos Tib. Gracchi summi viri filios, Africanos nepotes, nonne agrariæ contentiones perdidit? At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur: qui cùm eius ciuitas. L. annos a tyrannis teneretur, perfectus Argis Sicyonem, clandestino introitu vrbe est potitus, cùmquæ tyrannum Nicoclem, improuissimè oppressisset, sexcentos exules, qui fuerant eius ciuitatis locupletissimi restituit, Remque publicam aduentu suo liberauit.

Sed cùm magnum animaduertit in bonis & possessionibus difficultatē quòd & eos, quos & ipse

Now truely their state one ly had a sale but also it ouerthrew & rest of Greece with the infections of mischiefs, whiche springinge from the Lacedæmonians, did flowe farther abroad: What of our Gracch<sup>9</sup>, Tiberius Gracchus & noble mannes sonnes, Africanus childers children: dyd not landstriches bringe the to destruction?

But in deede Aratus the Sicyoniā is rightfully commended: who, when his citie was sicke yeares with holden by tyrantes: beyng departed fro Argos to Sicion, & a priuie stoine entrie, gotte possession of the citie: & when, vppon a sodaine, he had ouerthromen the tyrant Nicocles: he restored hōe a gaine six hundred banisht mē, who had been the greatest possessors of the citie: and by his comminge, set the common weale at libertie.

But when he perceiued the great inconuenience in the goodes and possessions because both he thought it verpe

very unreasonable, that they should lack whom he himselfe had restored, whose goods other had possessed, and againe to remoue fifty years possession, he iudged it not very indifferent: because that in so longe a space much by enheritace, much by sale, much by dowry, was holden without wrong, he thought it was necessarie: neither the goodes to be taken from them, nor those to bee vnsatisfied, whose had been before. When hee had then determined, that he shoulde neede mony, for the ordering of the matter: he saide he would make a voyage to Alexandria: and commanded, the matter to remaine vntouched, vntill his returne.

And he with speede went to Ptolomeus, who hadde ben his enterterner: which then reigned the seconde after the building of Alexandria: to whom when hee had declared, that he was minded to set his countie at libertie: and had enforced him of y<sup>e</sup> case: y<sup>e</sup> noble Man

restituerat, quorum bona alij possiderant, egere iniquissimū arbitrabatur: & L. a. norū possessiones mouere non nimis equum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spacio multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebatur, sine iniuria iudicauit, nequē illis adimi, nequē his non satisfieri, quorum illa fuerant, oportere.

Cū igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem conlitiuendam pecunia: Alexandriam se proficisci velle dixit, remquē integram ad reditum suum iussit esse.

Isq; celeriter ad Ptolomeum suum hospitem venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandriam conditam: cui cū exposuisset, patriam se liberare velle, causamquē docuisset: a rege opulento vir summ<sup>9</sup>

## de Officiis.

facile impetrauit: vt grandi pecunia adiuuaretur.

Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes: cum quibus causas cognouit, et eorum qui aliena tenebant, & eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecit que estimandis possessionibus, vt persuaderet alijs vt pecunia accipere malent, & possessionibus cederent: alijs, vt commodius putarent numerari sibi, quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare.

Ita perfectum est, vt omnes constituta concordia sine querela discederent.

O virum magnū, dignūque, qui in nostra Republica natus esset.

Sic par est agere cum ciuib⁹ non (vt bis tam vidimus)

manne soone obtained of a rich king, to be aided with a masse of monye.

Which when he had brought into Sicion, he tooke to him in counsel fiftene of his nobles whome he examined the cases both of them who dyd withholde other mens, and of theirs, who had lost their own, & did put these fiftene in commission for the valuinge of possessions and to perswade some, that they wold be willinger to take monie, and to release their possession, and other some to thinke, that too haue as much payde them in valewe, it were more profite, than to recouer their owne. So it came to passe. that they all departed without complaint, by a well ordered concord.

A manne of much honour, and worthe to haue been bozne in our common weale.

Thus it is meete to deale with citezens, and not as twise alreedy we haue sene to



to pitch salestasse in y<sup>e</sup> mar-  
ket place and to putte the  
goods of the citizens in the  
crysers mouthe. But that  
Greeke thought meete to  
prouide for all, which was  
the parte of a wise, and a  
worthy man. And that is  
the greatest discrecion, and  
wisedom of an honorable  
citizen to defende, not to  
pull aswape the citizens  
commodities, & to containe  
them all within one maner  
of equitie.

But some will say, menne  
may dwel rentfree in ano-  
thers house, why so?

That whē I haue bought  
it, haue buylded it, doo re-  
paire it, do laie charges vpon  
it, thou shouldest haue  
the vse of mine against my  
will: what is this els, but  
from some to take theire  
own, & to some to geue o-  
ther mennes.

And as for the new tables  
what reason haue they:  
but that you may buy lāde  
with my money, & possesse  
it your selfe, & yet I maye  
not haue my money.

where

hastam in foro ponere, &  
bona ciuium voci subij-  
cere preconis. At ille Gre-  
cus, illud quod fuit sapiē-  
tis & prestantis viri, om-  
nibus consulendum pu-  
tauit.

Eaque est summa ratio, &  
sapientia boni ciuis, com-  
moda ciuium defendere,  
non diuellere: atque om-  
nes equitate eadem con-  
tinere.

Habitant gratis in alie-  
no. Quid ita? vt cum ego  
emerim, edificauerim, tu  
ear, impendam, tu me in-  
uito fruare meo, quid est  
aliud alijs sua eripere, alijs  
dare aliena?

Tabule verō nouę quid  
habent argumenti, nisi vt  
emas mea pecunia fun-  
dum, & eum tu habeas,  
ego non habeam pecuni-  
am.

## de Officiis.

Quamobrem ne sit es alie-  
rum, quod Reipub. noce-  
at providendū est, quod  
multis rationibus cauere  
potest hoc si nō fuerit, vt  
locupletes sinū pdant, de-  
bitores lucrentur alienū.  
Nec enim vlla res vehemē-  
tius Rēpub. continet quā  
fides: quę esse nulla potest  
nisi erit necessaria solutio  
rerum creditarum.  
Nunquam vehemētius ac-  
tum est quā me consule  
ne solueretur. Armis &  
castris tentata res est ab  
omni genere hominum &  
ordine quibus sic restiti,  
vt totum hoc malum de  
Repub. tolleretur. Nun-  
quam nec maius es alienū  
fuit, nec melius nec facili-  
us dissolutum est. Fraus-  
dandi enim spe sublata,  
soluēdi necessitas consecu-  
ta est. At vero hic noster  
victor, nunc quidē victus

wherefore it must be prou-  
ided, that there bee no debte  
which may hinder the co-  
mon weale, whiche thinge  
may bee looked, to manye  
waies, if this be not suffe-  
red, that possessioners lose  
theire owne, nor detters  
gaine other mens.

For nothing more strōgly  
preserueth a comon welthe  
then faithfulness, whiche  
can bee none at all, excepte  
there be of necessitie a pay-  
ment of things lōned.

For neuer more earnestlye  
it was gone about, then  
when I was Consull, &  
there should be no paymts.

The matter was attēpted  
with speare and shilde, by  
euerie sorte and degree of  
men, whome in suche wyse  
I withstoode, that this so  
great a mischief was roo-  
ted out of y comon welth.

Neuer was there more  
dettes, neither better nor ca-  
sier paide. For when hope  
of defrauding was taken  
away, necessitie of paymēt  
folowd.

But this our conquerour,  
nowe verelye conquered,  
hath

hath compassed those things, whiche hee purposed, whereas now hee is neuer as whit the better. So great was hys desire to doo noughtely, that euen y very doing of naughtines delighted him, although he had no occasion. They then who shal bphold the common weale, must kepe the away from this maner of large giiftes, that to some they be geuen, and from other they bee taken, & specially must geue their diligence, that by equitie, law and iudgement euery man maye holde his owne, and neyther the poozer sort, for their small abilitie, be deceiued by couin, nor enue maye hinder the ryche either to keepe, or recover their owne. Moreover, by what meanes so euer they canne, eyther in warre or peace, lette thein enlarge the common weale, wth dominion, lande, and custome.

These bee the deedes of noble men, these were practised among our anceters, these

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Hec magnorum hominum sunt, hec apud maiores nostros factitata.



## de Officiis.

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## de Officiis.

Hec genera officiorū qui these kinds of duties who so folowe, shal with verpe  
persequuntur, cum sūma greate profite to the comon  
utilitate Reipublice, mag weal, get themselves bothe  
num ipsi adipiscentur & great fauour and glozy.

But in these precepts of profite, Antipater of Tīre  
In his autem vtilitatum the Stoike, who alate dy-  
preceptis antipater Ty ed at Athens, thinkes, that  
rius Stoicus, qui Athenis two preceptes be ouer les  
nup est mortuus duo pre ped of Panetius, tēdering  
terita cēset esse a Panetio: of healtie, and prouision of  
valetudinis curationem, money.

which thinges I suppose  
& pecunie: Quas res a sū to haue been ouerpassed by  
mo philosopho preteritas the noble philosopher, bee-  
arbitror, quōd essent faci cause they were light mat-  
les, sunt tamen certē vti ters yet wout doubt, they  
les. Sed valetudo susten be profitable.

But helth is preserued by  
tatur notitia sui corporis, knowledge of ones owne  
& obseruatione, quę res body, and markinge those  
aut prodesse soleant aut thinges, whiche are wont  
obesse: & continentia in either to do good, or harme  
victu omni atque cultu, and by a stayednes both in  
corporis tuendi causa, and ap-  
& pretermittendis volupta parel, for cherishing of the  
tibus: postremō arte eorū, body, and also for bearinge  
quorum ad scientiam hęc pleasures, and lastelye, by  
pertinent, their conninge, to whose  
science these thinges per-  
teyne.

But a mans substance must  
Res autem familiaris quę



muste bee gotten, by those  
things which be far from  
dishonesty, and must be sa=  
ued by diligence, & honest,  
sparinge, & by those same  
meanes also, it must be en=  
creased.

Xenophon the Socratican  
hathe gonne thzough these  
things verpe handsomly,  
in that booke which is in=  
titled Economicus, the  
which wee tourned out of  
Greeke into latine, when  
we were at y same age in a  
maner as you are now.

But comparinge of pro=  
fits (because this forwerth  
place was ouer passed by  
Panetius,) is oftentimes  
necessarie. For bothe the  
guifts of the bodie, ar wot  
to bee compared with for=  
tunes guifts, and also for=  
tunes guifts with the bo=  
dies guifts, and those of y  
bodpe one with an other, &  
those that fortune geues,  
likewise one with an other

The bodies gifts be cōpa=  
red w fortunes, after this  
fort, y pe had rather bee in  
helth, thā be rich, fortunes  
giftz be cōpard w y bodies  
in

ri debet ijs rebus a quibus  
abest turpitudine, conser=  
uari autem diligentia & p  
simonia, eisdem etiam re=  
bus augeri.

Has res cōmodissimè Xe=  
nophon Socraticus perfe=  
cutus est in eo libro, qui  
Economicus inscribitur:  
quem nos ista ferè etate  
cū essemus, qua es tu  
nunc, e grecis in latinum  
conuertimus.

Sed vtilitatum cōpara=  
tio (quoniam hic locus e=  
rat quartus a Panetio prę=  
termisus) sepe est necessa=  
ria. Nam et corporis com=  
moda cum externis, & ex=  
terna cum corporis: & ip=  
se inter se corporis: & ex=  
terna cum externis com=  
parari solent.

Cum externis corpo=  
ris, hoc modo cōparatur,  
valere vt malis, quā diues  
esse. Cū corporis externa,

## de Officiis.

hoc modo, diues esse potius quàm maximis corporis viribus.

Ipsa inter se corporis, sic: vt bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati. Externorum autem, vt gloria diuitijs, vestigalia vrbana rusticis.

Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis a quo cùm quæreretur quid maximè in re familiari expediret: respondit, bene pascere. Quid secundum? satis bene pascere: Quid tertium? bene vestire.

Quid quartum? arare.

Et cùm ille qui quæsierat dixisset: quid fœnerari? Tum Cato, quid hominem, inquit, occidere?

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in this wise, that you had rather be riche, than of very great strength.

Those of the body be compared one with an other, thus that good helth be preferred befoze pleasure, and strength befoze swiftnesse. But fortunes guistes be cōpared together, this way that glozy be esteemed befoze riches, & citie tribute befoze the countreis.

Of the which kinde of comparison is that sayinge of Cato y<sup>e</sup> old man, of whom whē it was demaunded, what was most profitable for a mans substance, hee made answer, to feed well, what y<sup>e</sup> seconde, To feede sufficiently well, what the third, To cloth wel, what y<sup>e</sup> fowerth, to plowe. And whē he, who had moued y<sup>e</sup> questiō had saide, what to lende vppon vsurie? then what is it, quoth Cato to kill a man?

whereupon, and of many other things it ought to be gathered, that comparisons of profites are wont to be made, and that this is very well

Wel adtoined for yfoworth & recte  
point of searching oute of  
duties.

But of this whole matter  
of getting money, of besto-  
wing the same, and also of  
using it, farre better it is  
disputed by certain honest  
men, sitting at y middle

Jane, than of any philo-  
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The rest wil we

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esse quartū exquirēdorum  
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hoc de genere, de querēda

de collocāda pecunia, etiā

de vtēda, cōmodius ā qui-

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nū mediū sedētib<sup>9</sup>, quā ab

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de Officiis.

M. TVLLII CICE-  
RONIS, DE OFFI-

cij's Liber ter-  
tius.

¶ MARCVS  
TVLLIVS CICE.

roes thīrd boke of  
duties to Mar-  
cus his sonne.

**P**VBLIVM SCIPI-  
onem, Marce fili, eū  
qui primus Africanus  
appellatus est, dicere  
solitum scripsit Cato, qui  
fuit fere eius equalis, nun-  
quam se minus otiosum es-  
se, quā cū otiosus: nec  
minus solum, quā cū  
solus esset. Magnifica ve-  
rō vox & magno viro ac  
sapiente digna: quę decla-  
rat illum, & in otio de ne-  
gotijs cogitare, & in solitu-  
dine secum loqui solitum,  
vt neq; cessaret vnquam,  
& interdum colloquio al-  
terius non egeret. Itaq;  
duę res, quę languorem  
afferunt cæteris, illum

**H**e same Publi-  
Scipio, sonne  
Marke, who the  
firste Africanus  
was named would cōmōly  
say, as Cato hath writen,  
who was in a maner hys  
like in yerres: That he was  
never more lesurcles than  
when he was leasurcfull:  
& never lesse alone, than  
when he was all alone. A  
noble sayng surely, & mete  
for a worthy, & wise man:  
which declareth, that hee  
both in hys lesure was wōt  
to muse of maters too bee  
done, & also in hys solitari-  
nes, to debate them withe  
him self, so as he was no-  
thing idle at any time, and  
sometime neded not the cō-  
municatiō of other. And so  
these two things, leasure,  
and solitarinesse, whiche  
bring a dulnes vpon other  
made



made him the quicker. I would wish, y<sup>e</sup> we likewise might truly say the verie same. But although by imitation we are not able to attaine so greate excellence of wit, yet doubtlesse in desire we come verie neere.

For both by wicked war, & power, being put of from common weale matters & iudiciall causes, we take oure quiet leasure, & for y<sup>e</sup> cause leauing the citie, and walking abroad in the country, oftentimes we be alone. But neither this leasure is to be compared with Africanus leasure: nor this solitarinesse, with that of his. For hee ceasinge from the goodly ministracion of the common weale, tooke hym selfe leasure otherwhile, & from the prease, and resort of men, nowe and then into a solitarie place, as into a hauen, withdrew himselfe. But our leasure cometh not of desire of rest but for lack of busines. For seynge the Senate is deposed, and iudgementes abolished:

what

acuebant, otium & solitudo. Velle & nobis hoc idem verè dicere liceret. Sed si minus imitatione tantā ingenij præstatiā consequi possumus: voluntate certè proximè accedim<sup>9</sup>. Nā et a Rep. forensibusq; negotijs armis impijs, viq; prohibiti, otium persequimur, & ob eam causam vrbe relicta rura peragantes sepe soli sumus. Sed nec otium hoc cū Africanus otio, nec solitudo hæc cū illa comparanda est. Ille enim requiescēs à Reip. pulcherimis muneribus, otium sibi sumebat aliquando, & a cætū hominum, frequentiaq; interdum tanquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat. Nostrum autem otium negotij inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum est. Extincto enim senatu deletisq; iudicijs

P.ij.

quid

## de Officiis.

Quid est quod dignū nobis  
aut in curia, aut in foro a-  
gere possimus? Itaque in  
maxima celebritate atq; in  
oculis ciuiū quōdā vixim⁹,  
nūc fugiētes cōspectū sce-  
leratorū, quibus ōnia re dū-  
dant, abdimus nos quantū  
licet, & sepe soli sum⁹. Sed  
quia sic ab hominibus doc-  
tis accepimus, non solūm  
ex malis eligere minima o-  
portere: sed etiā excerpere  
ex his ipsis, si quid inesset  
boni: ppter ea & otio fru-  
or, non illo quidē, quo de-  
beat uti is, q̄ quōdā pepe-  
risset otiiū ciuitati. Nec eā  
solitudinē lāguere patior,  
quā mihi affert necessitas  
non volūtas. Quanquam  
Africanus maiore laudem  
meo iudicio assequebatur:  
nulla tamē eius īgenij mo-  
numenta mandata literis,  
nullum opus otij, nullum  
solitudinis munus extat.

what is there, that eyther  
in court, or in place of plea-  
meete for vs, we may do.

Therefore wee, who in the  
greatest assemble, and in the  
eyes of the citizēs sōetime  
haue liued, now fleecinge &  
sight of the wicked, wyth  
whom all places swarme:  
doo withdraue our selues  
as much as we may, & are  
oftentimes alone.

But because th⁹ we haue  
herd of learned men, & not  
only we ought of euyls to  
chese the leaste, but also if  
there were any goodnes in  
thē, to pike it out, therefore  
both I enioy quietnes not  
such iwis, as hee ought to  
haue, who once procured  
quietnesse to the holle city,  
and also doe not suffer that  
solitarinesse too waxe ydle:  
which necessitie brings bp  
pon me, & not myne owne  
desire. Although African⁹  
did get greater praise, euē  
in my iudgemēt, yet no mo-  
numentes of his witte put  
in wyting, no work of his  
quiet life, no fruit of his so-  
litarines remaines abrode.

Wherof

Whercof it must nedes bee gathered, & hee, by earnest occupieng of his minde, and by beatinge out those thinges, which by musing hee attained: was neyther idle, nor at any time alone. but wee, who haue not so great depenes of wit, that by secret musinge wee be drawne from solitarinesse: do turne all our studie, and endeuour to this trauaylle of wryting. And therefore we haue wryten moze in a shorte space, since the state was ouerthrowne, than in many yeres, when it stode. But where as all philosophie, my Cicero, is verie good, and frutfull, nor any parte thereof is barreyne, and waste, yet no place therein is moze yelding, nor moze pleintifull, than the place touching duties, fro which be borrowed the preceptes of liuinge constantly, and honestly. wherefore although I trust you dayly heare, and receaue this same of our Cratippus, prince of Philosophers in these days, neuertheless I holde

Ex quo intelligi debet, illū mentis agitatione, inuestigationeq; earū rerū, quas cogitando consequēbatur, nec otiosū, nec solū vnquā fuisse. Nos autē, qui non tā tū roboris habemus, vt cogitatione tacita ā solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi operā ōne studiū curamq; cōuertimus. Itaq; plura breui tēpore euerfa, quā multis ānis stāte Rep. scripsimus. Sed cū tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera, & fructuosa, nec vlla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit: tamē nullus feracior in ea locus est, nec vberior, quā de officijs, ā quibus cōstanter, honesteq; viuen di p̄cepta ducūtur. Quā rē quanquā ā Cratippo nostro principe huius memorię philosophorū hęc te assiduē audire, atq; accipere confido: tamen



## de Officiis.

conducere arbitror talib<sup>9</sup>  
 aures tuas vocibus vndi-  
 què circūsonare, nec eas, si  
 fieri possit, quicquam aliud  
 audire. Quod cū omni-  
 bus est faciendum, qui vi-  
 tam honestam ingredi co-  
 gitant: tamē haud scio an  
 nemini potius - quā tibi.  
 Sustines enim non parua  
 expectationem imitandæ  
 industrię nostrę, magnam  
 honorum, nonnullā for-  
 tasse nominis. Suscepisti o-  
 nus præterea graue & A-  
 thenarum, & Cratippi ad  
 quos cū tāquam: ad mer-  
 caturam bonarum artium  
 sis profectus, inanem re-  
 dire turpissimum est, de-  
 decorantē & vr̄bis autho-  
 ritatem & magistri. Qua-  
 rē quantum cōiti. animo  
 potes quantum labore con-  
 tendere (si discendi la-  
 bor est potius quā  
 voluptas) tantum fac

holde it profitable, that I  
 ring about your ears with  
 suche soundes, on euerpe  
 syde: & that they, if possy-  
 ble it may bee done, heare  
 none other thinge. whiche  
 both is to be dōe of al those  
 that minde to enter the ho-  
 nest life, and I wotte not  
 whether of any man more  
 than of your selfe, For you  
 carie an expectation, not  
 smal of folowig our trade,  
 great of comminge too our  
 honour, some peraduenture  
 of attaininge too our fame  
 you haue taken vpon you  
 moreouer a greate charge,  
 both by reason of Athens,  
 and also of Cratippus, too  
 the which seing, as too the  
 mart of good sciences, you  
 haue traualled: too retorne  
 cuiptie, a great reproch it  
 is, staining the sworshippe  
 bothe of the citie, and also  
 of your maister. wherfore  
 as muche as by wyte you  
 ar able to compas: as much  
 as by paine you can ende-  
 uour (if to studie be rather  
 a payne, than pleasure)  
 so much see, that you do in  
 deede,

deede, and giue no occasi-  
on that semg al things are  
sufficed by vs, you shoulde  
seeme to haue disapointed  
your self. But of these ma-  
terz hitherto. For we haue  
ofrentimes written muche  
vnto you, in way of exorta-  
tion. Nowe to the part re-  
maynyng of the forsayde  
diuision lette vs retourne.

Paretius therefore, who  
withoute doute of duties  
hathe most diligentlpe dis-  
puted, and whom wee,  
vsinge a certaine correcty-  
ou, haue chiefelpe solowd  
when hee hadde set forth  
three kindes, in which  
manne weare wont to coun-  
sell, and aduise them sel-  
ues of dutie, the one, whē  
theye shoulde doute, whe-  
ther it, wherewith theye  
were in hande, weare ho-  
nest, or dishonest, the other  
whether it were profitable  
or vnprofitable, the thirde,  
if that, which shoulde ha-  
ue the showe of honestye,  
shoulde strue with it, that  
seemed profitable: howe  
it shoulde bee necessarie  
those

vt efficias: nēue commit-  
tas, vt cūm omnia suppedi-  
tata sint à nobis, tute tibi  
defuisse videare. Sed hæc  
hactenus. Multa enim sæ-  
pè ad te cohortandi gratia  
scripsimus. Nunc ad reli-  
quam partem propositę di-  
uisionis reuertamur.

Panætius igitur, qui si-  
ne controuersia de offici-  
js acuratisimè disputauit,  
quemquēnos, correctione  
quadam adhibita, potissi-  
mūm secuti sumus: tribus  
generibus propositis, in  
quibus deliberare homi-  
nes & consultare de offi-  
cio solerent: vno cūm da-  
bitarent honestūm id  
esset, de quo ageretur, an  
turpe: altero vtilenē, an in-  
utile: tertio si id, quod spe-  
ciē haberet honesti pugna-  
ret cū eo, qd' utile videre-  
tur: quomodo ea discerni

P. iiii.

oporte-

## de Officiis.

oportere: de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicauit: de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturū, nec exoluit id qd' promiserat. Quod eō magis miror, quia scriptum a discipulo eius Possidonio est, triginta ānos vixisse Panetiū postquā illos libros edidisset. Quē locū miror ā Possidonio breuiter effectū in quibusdā cōmentarijs: p̄sertim cū scribat nullū esse locū in tota philosophia tā necessariū. Minimē vero assentior ijs, qui negant eū locū ā Panetio p̄termissum: sed consultō relictū: nec ōninō scribendum fuisse, quia nunquā posset vtilitas cū honestate pugnare. De quo alterū potest habere dubitationē, adhibendum nē fuerit hoc genus, quod in diuisione Panetij tertium est, an planē omittendum.

those same to be discerned: of the first two kindes, in thzee bokes he opened hys mynde: & of the third kinde he wrote he would speake afterwarde: & that did hee not perform, which he had promised, wherat I maruaile the more: because it is written bye his scholar Possidonius: that Panetius liued thirtie yeres after he had set forth the those bokes. which place I wonder, it was so brievely touched of Possidonius in certaine abridgements: specially seing he writes, there is no place in all Philosophie so necessarie. But in no wise I agree w̄ them, which denie this place did ouerscape Panetius: but that of purpose it was left out: and that it was not to be written at al, because profit might not striue w̄th honestie. Touchinge the whiche, the one may haue in it a doute: whether this parte, whych in Panetius diuision is the thirde, was to bee added, or utterly to bee leste out, the



the other can not bee doubt-  
ed of, but of Panetius it  
was taken in hande, and  
yet leste vntreated. For  
who so of a threparted di-  
uision twoo partes hath fy-  
nished, too hym the thyrde  
must nedes remain. More-  
ouer, in his thirde booke,  
toward the ende, hee pro-  
miseth, that after ward hee  
will speake of this parte.

Hereto commeth a substā-  
ciall witnesse, Possidoni-  
us who also writeth in a cer-  
taine letter, that Publius  
Rutilius Rufus, whiche  
hadde hearde Panetius,  
was wont to saye, lyke as  
no painter might be found  
who could finishe by that  
part of Venus, which Ap-  
pelles hadde leste vnfini-  
shed: (for the beawetie of  
her face tooke awaye the  
hope of counterfeiting the  
reste of her bodye) so those  
thynges, that Panetius  
hadde ouer passed, and had  
not finished, their was no  
mā to prosecute, bicause of  
the excellence of those mat-  
ters, which he had gone thro-  
we withall, wherefore of

¶

Alterum dubitari non po-  
test, quin à Panetio suscep-  
tū sit, sed relictū. Nā qui de  
diuisione tripartita duas  
partes absoluerit: huic ne-  
cesse est restare tertiā. Pre-  
terea in extremo libro ter-  
tio, de hac parte pollice-  
tur se deinceps esse dictu-  
rū. Accedit eodē testis lo-  
cuples Possidonius, qui e-  
tiā scribit in quadā episto-  
la P. Rutiliū Rufum dice-  
re solere, qui Panetiū au-  
diuerat: vt nemo pictor ef-  
set inuentus, qui Veneris  
eam partem, quam Appel-  
les inchoatam reliquisset,  
absolueret (oris enim pul-  
chritudo, reliqui corpo-  
ris imitandi spem aufere-  
bat) sic ea, quæ Panet-  
ius prætermisisset & non  
perfecisset, propter eo-  
rum, quæ fecisset præstan-  
tiam, neminem esse per-  
secutum. Quamobrem de  
iudicio

## de Officiis.

iudicio Panætij dubitari: nō potest, rectēne autem hāc tertiā partē ad exgrēdū officiū adiūxerit, an sec⁹: de eo fortasse dubitari potest. Nā siue honestū solū bonū est, vt Stoicis placet: siue qd' honestū est, id ita sūmū bonū est (quēadmodū Peripateticis nostris videt') vt ōnia ex altera parte collocata, vix mīnī mōmēti instar habeāt: dubitā dū nō est, quin nūquā possit vtilitas cū honestate cōtēdere. Itaq; accepimus Socratē solitū execrari eos, q primū hęc natura coherētia opinione distraxissent. Cui quidē ita sunt. Stoici assēsi, vt et quicquid honestum esset, id vtile esse censerent: nec vtile quicquam quod non honestū. Quod si is esset Panætius, qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret, quōd ea efficiens vtilitatis esset: vt ij, qui res expetendas

Paneti⁹ iudgement it can not be doubted, but whether hee to the serching oute of dutie this third part adioyned wel or no, therof peraduenture it may bee doubted. If or whether hon. shie be sōly good as liketh y Stoikes, or els honestie in such sort be the soueraigne good (as seemeth to our Peripatetikes) y they count all things, let on y other side, of very smal weight in cōparison, it is not to be doubted, but that profit can neuer be at strife w honestie. Therefore we haue harde say, Socrates was wont to curse thē, who first parted a sonder in opiniō these that by nature were coupled together, to whō doubtles the Stoikes so assēted that what so were honest, the same also thepe iudged to be profitable, nor anye thing to be profitable whiche weare not honeste. If Paneti⁹ were y mā, who would saye, that vertue therefore should be honored, because it is y cause of profite, as thepe, whose measure thinges meete

to be desired either by pleasure, or vngrieffulnes: hee might maintein that honestie sometime striues with profit. But seeing he is y<sup>e</sup> man who iudgeth y<sup>e</sup> onely good which is honest, & that mans life is made neuer the better, by encrease of suche things, as be repugnant to honestie vnder a certaine sort of profite, nor by decrease of them the worse, it seemes he should not haue brought in such manner talking of aduilement, wher in that, which should seme profitable, should be compared with that, which is honest. For that, which of the Stoikes is called the soueraign good, as to liue agreeably to nature, it hath (as I suppose) this meaning, with vertues alwaies to agree, & other things, which should be accordig to nature, so to chuse, if to vertu they wer not repugnant. Whiche seeinge it is so, some suppose, this comparison was not well brought in: nor any thinge at al, touchinge the branch should

vel voluptate, vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere honestatē aliquando cū vtilitate pugnare. Sed cū sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet quod honestū sit: quę autē huic repugnent specie quadā vtilitatis, eorū neq; accessione meliorem vitā fieri, nec decessione peiorem, non videtur huiusmodi debuisse deliberationē introducere: in q̄ quod vtile videretur, cū eo, qd' honestū est, cōpararetur. Etenim quod summum bonū à Stoicis dicitur, cōueniēter naturę viuere, id habet hanc (vt opinor) sētentiā naturā cū virtute cōgruere sēper, cētera autē q̄ secundum naturā essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent. Quod cū ita sit, putant quidem hanc cōparationem non esse rectē introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquā precipi-



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precipiendū fuisse. Atq; illud quidē honestum, quod propriè verèq; dicitur, id in sapiētibus est solis, neq; a virtute diuelli vnquām potest. In ijs autē in quibus sapiētia pfecta nō est ipsū illud quidē pfectū honestū nullo modo, sed similitudines honesti esse possūt. Hec enim ōnia officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant: & ea cōmunia sūt, & latè patēt: quæ & ingenij bonitate multati assequuntur, & progressionē discēdi. Illud autē quod rectū ijdē appellāt, pfectū atq; absolutū est: et vt ijdē dicūt ōnes numeros habet nec præter sapiētē cadere in quēquā potest. Cū autē aliquid actū est, in quo media officia cōparātur, id cumulatè videtur esse pfectū propterea quod vulgus quid absit à perfecto, ferè non ex toto intelligit: quatenus autem in-

should haue been taughte. And surely that honestie, which is properly, & truly so called, is in the wise only, and from vertue can neuer be seuered, but in those in whom is not perfect wise dome, doubtles & sãe pfecte honestie cā in no wise bee, sēblaunces of honestie ther may bee. All these dueties therfore, whereuppon in these booke wee dispute, & Stoikes call the mean dueties: & those be cōmon dueties, & do spred farre, whiche many atteine bothe by goodnes of wit, & by going forward in learnynge. But that whiche they call Rectum, is the perfit and absolute dutie, & as theye also say, it hath al his partes, neither can happen to any, but a wise man. And when any thing is doone, wherein the meane duties may appere, it semeth to be fully perfit because the cōmon people almost vnderstandeth not at al, what it wanteth of perfyte, but as farre as they vnderstand, theye

they think nothing is leste  
 vndoone. And whereas it  
 comonly chaunceth in mee-  
 ters, & pairings, & in other  
 things mo, that the vnskil  
 full bee delited, and praise  
 those thinges, that are not  
 to be praised, for that cause  
 I beleue they doo so, that  
 in those ther is some good  
 grace, that catcheth the ig-  
 norant, who in dede be not  
 able to discern, what fault  
 is in euery thig. And ther-  
 fore whē they be taught of  
 the skilful, they sone fal frō  
 their opinion. The Stoi-  
 kes then say, that these du-  
 ties, whereuppon in these  
 booke wee treat, bee (as  
 who sayth) certain second  
 sortes of honestie, not pro-  
 per only to the wise but co-  
 mō also to al maner of mē  
 Therfore al be allured &  
 these, in whō ther is a for-  
 wardnesse of vertue. And  
 when the two Decij, or  
 two Scipioes be vouched  
 for manly mē, or elz when  
 fabrizi⁹, or Aristides bee  
 alleged as iust, neither of  
 the for mālinez, nor of the-  
 se for iustice the exāple is  
 brought

telligit, nihil putat præter-  
 missū. Quod autē in Poe-  
 matibus & in picturis vsu  
 venit, in aliisq; cōpluribus,  
 vt delectentur imperiti lau-  
 dentq; ea quæ laudanda  
 non sint, ob eā credo cau-  
 sam, quod insit in his ali-  
 quid probi, quod capiat ig-  
 naros, qui ijdem quid in  
 vna quaq; re vitij sit, neque  
 ant iudicare. Itaq; cū sint  
 docti a peritis, facile desis-  
 tūt à sententia. Hæc igitur  
 officia de quib⁹ his libris  
 differimus, quasi secunda  
 quedā honesta, dicunt esse  
 nō sapiētū modō propria,  
 sed cū ōni hominū genere  
 cōmunia. Itaq; his ōnes, in  
 quibus est virtutis indoles,  
 cōmouētur. Nec vero cū  
 duo Decij, aut duo Scipio-  
 nes, fortes viri cōmemorā-  
 tur, aut cū Fabritius, aut A-  
 ristides iustus nominatur,  
 aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut  
 ab his iustitiæ tāquā à sapiē-  
 ribus

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tib' petitur exēplū. Nemo enī horū sic sapiēs est, vt sapiētē volumus hic intelligi. Nec ij, q̄ sapientes habiti sūt et nominati M. Cato, & C. Lelius sapiētes fuerunt, nec illi quidē septē, sed ex mediōrū officiorū frequentia, similitudinē quandā gerebant, speciēq; sapientum. Quocircā nec id, quod vere honestū est, fas est, cū vtilis repugnantia cōparari: nec id, quod comuniter appellamus honestū, quodq; colitur ab ijs, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt cum emolumentis vnquam est comparandum. Tamq; id honestum, quod in nostrā intelligentiam cadit, tuendum, conseruandumq; nobis est, quā illud, quod propriē dicitur, verēq; est honestum sapientibus. Aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

brought, as of perfite wise men. For none of these in such sort is wise, as in this place we wil haue a wise man taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Catus Lelius who were counted, & called wise, were perfite wise men: no nor those seuen sages of Greece: but by the often visting of the mean, & cōmon duties, they bore a certain semblaunce, & shew of wise men. wherfore neither is it lawfull & the thing which in dede is honest, be compared w̄ the contrarietie of & profitable: neither & which cōmonly we cal honest, & which is exercised of the who wil haue them selue good men to bee counted w̄ cōmodities at any tyme is to be cōpared, and as well & honestie, which falleth into our vnderstanding, is of vs to be mainteined, and kept as & is, of & wise whiche pperly is called, & in dede is honestie. For otherwise it can not bee holden on, if there be attempned as nye proceeding too vertue.



But this we say by them  
 who by keeping of duties  
 are esteemed for good men.  
 But who doe measure all  
 things by profits, & com-  
 modities, & will not y same  
 to bee uerweied with ho-  
 nestie, these are wont in ad-  
 uisement taking to compare  
 honestie with it, whiche  
 they reke profitable, good  
 me vsc not so to do. Ther-  
 fore I thinke, Panetius,  
 when he said, men ar wot  
 in this comparison to deute,  
 ment the verpe same y hee  
 spake, that rien onelye are  
 wot, but not, y they must  
 nedes. For not only to iud-  
 ge the thing, that seemeth  
 profitable moze worth thā  
 that which is honest, but  
 also to compare these toge-  
 ther, & in them to cast dou-  
 tes, a verpe foule shame it  
 is. What is it then, y man  
 times is wont to bringe a  
 doubtfulnes: & seemeth me-  
 te to be considered? I sup-  
 pose it is, if at anye tyme  
 ther befall a doubtfulnes:  
 what maner of thi it is,  
 wherof cōsideratiō is takē

For

Sed hæc quidem de ijs, qui  
 cōseruatione officiorū ex-  
 istimantur boni. Qui autē  
 ōnia metiūtur, emolumen-  
 tis & cōmodis, neq; ea vo-  
 lunt prēpōderari honesta-  
 te, hi solent in deliberādo,  
 honestum cū eo, quod v-  
 tile putant, comparare: bo-  
 ni viri nō solent. Itaq; existi-  
 mo Panetium cū dixerit  
 homines solere in hac cō-  
 paratione dubitare, hoc ip-  
 sū sensisse, quod dixerit, so-  
 lere modo, non etiā opor-  
 tere. Etenim nō modō plu-  
 ris putare quod vtile vide-  
 atur, quā illud quod ho-  
 nestū, sed hæc etiam inter  
 se cōparare, & in his dubi-  
 tare turpissimū est. Quid  
 est ergo quod nōnūquā ad  
 dubitationē afferre soleat,  
 considerandumq; vide-  
 atur? Credo si quando  
 dubitatio accidit, quale sit  
 id de quo consideretur.

Sepe

## de Officiis.

Sepe enī tēpore fit, vt qd' plerūq; turpe habere soleat, iueniatur nō esse turpe. Exēpli causa, ponatur aliquid quod pateat latius. Quod potest esse mai<sup>9</sup> scelus quā nō modo hominē, sed etiā familiarē occidere. Nū igitur se obstrinxit scelere, si quis tirānū occidit, quāuis familiarē? Populo quidē Romano non videtur qui ex ōnibus prēclaris factis illud pulcherimū existimat. Vicit igitur vtilitas honestatē, immō vero honestas vtilitatē secuta est. Itaq; vt sine vllō errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intelligimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus vtile, formula quedam constituenda est, quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquā recedemus.

For often by the time, it comes to passe, & it which for & most part is wont to be counted dishonest is found not to be dishonest. For examples sake let ther be put some case, & more largeye extendethe, what greater mischief can ther bee than onc to kil not oneiy a man but also his familiar? Hath he than giltied himself of murder, who hath slain a tirant, although he were his familiar? To the peple of Rome doutles it semeth not so, who of al woorthye dedes esteemeth & the noblest, with them therefore profit passed honestye: yet rather honestye followed after profit.

Therefore that withoute any error we may bee able to iudge, if euer &, whiche we cal profitable, shal seme to strue with it, which is knowen for honest: a certaine rule is to be appointed, which if wee wil followe in the comparyson of thynges, from duetye wee shall neuer swarue.

Ind

And this rule shal be most agreeable with y<sup>e</sup> trade, and doctrine of the Stoikes: which verily in these booke we therfor folow, because althoughe of the auncient Academikes, and our Peripatetikes (who wer once alone with y<sup>e</sup> Akademiks) those things, which be honest bee preferred beefore such, as seme pfitable: yet these more goodly be disputed of y<sup>e</sup> Stoikes: to whō what so is honest: y<sup>e</sup> same semeth pfitable: & nothing semz pfitable which is not honeste thar. it is of those who reckon somewhat to be honest and not profitable, or somewhat profitable, and not honest. But to vs our Academia giues great libertie: that whatsoeuer most prouable comes in place, y<sup>e</sup> same by our prerogatiue we may lawfully defend. But I return to the rule. To pul away thē any thing frō an other, & a man to encrease his cōmodities with an other mans discommoditie, it is more against nature: thā death, than pouertie, than payne,

¶ i.

and

Erit autē hec formula Stoicorū rationi disciplineq; maximē cōsentanea: quā quidē in his libris ppter ea sequimur qd' quanquā a veteribus Academicis & Peripateticis nostris quōdā ijdē erāt, qui Academiciq; honesta sūt āte ponuntur ijs, quę vidētur vtilia: tamē splendidi<sup>9</sup> hec ab eis differuntur, quibus quicquid honestū est, idē vtile videtur, nec vtile quāquam, qd' non honestum quā ab ijs, quibus aut honestū aliquid nō vtile, aut vtile nō honestū est. Nobis autē nostra Academia magnā licētiā dat: vt qd' cūq; maximē pbabile occurrat id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulā. Detrahēre igit' aliqd alteri, & hominē hominis in cōmodo suū augere cōmodum, magis est contra naturam quā mors, quā paupertas, quā dolor



## de Officiis.

quàm cetera quę possunt  
aut corpori accidere, aut  
rebus externis. Nā princi-  
pio tollit cōiunctū humanū  
& societate. Si enim sic e-  
rimus affecti, vt ppter suū  
quisq; emolumentū spoli-  
et aut violet alterū, distrū-  
pi necesse est eā, quę maxi-  
mē est secūdū naturā hu-  
mani generis societate. Vt  
si vnūquodq; mēbrū sen-  
sū hūc haberet, vtposse pu-  
taret se valere, si proximi  
mēbri valetudinem ad se  
traduxisset, debilitari & in-  
terire totū corpus necesse  
esset, sic si vnusquisq; no-  
strū rapiat ad se commo-  
da aliorum detrahatq; qd'  
cuique possit, emolumentū  
sui gratia, societas hominū  
& cōmunitas euertatur ne-  
cesse est. Nam vt sibi quis-  
que malit qd' ad vsum vi-  
tę pertineat quàm alteri  
acquirere, concessum est  
non repugnante natura.

and other thinges whiche  
maye happen either to the  
bodye, or to the outewarde  
state For first of all it takz  
awaye the conuersacion, &  
fellowship of mē. For if we  
shalbe so disposed: that eue-  
rie man, for his owne con-  
moditie, spoile, & wrong an  
other: y fellowship of man-  
kinde whiche is moste ac-  
cordinge to nature muste  
nedes be broken. As if eue-  
ry part of the bodie should  
haue this ymaginacion: to  
think, it might be strong, if  
it had conuected to it self the  
strength of y next limmes:  
of force it should folowe y  
the whole body shoulde be  
weakened, & perishe, euen  
so if euery one of vs catche  
too himselfe the commo-  
dities of other, and pullath  
from eche man what he cā  
for his owne profits sake, y  
fellowship, & common com-  
panie of mē must nedes be  
ouerthrowne. For it is suf-  
ferable, & nature not agāst  
it: y euery mā be more wil-  
ling for himself, thā for an  
other mā to get what so p-  
teineth to y vse of his life.

Thys

This doubtlesse nature doth not suffer & wyth the spoyle of other, we create our riches, substance, and welth. And not onely it is ordained by nature, that is to witte, by the vniuersal law of naciōs, but also inlike manner, by y<sup>e</sup> lawes of people, wherby in euery Citie & common wealth is byholden, & it shoulde not be lawfull, for a mans own profiters sake, to hurt another. For the lawes tēde to this, & this they meane that the felowship of citizens bee in safetie, whiche who so riuē a sonder, those with death, banishment, prisonment, & penalties, they pounishe. And thys much more doth the vnye course of nature require, which is y<sup>e</sup> lawe of God & mā, & whiche who so is willing to obey (al traly wil obey it, & haue a mīd to liue accordinge to nature) shall neuer so offend, & an other mans goodes he would couet, & take to himself, that he hath pulled frō an other for much more according to

Illud quidē natura nō patitur, vt aliorū spolijs nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. Neq, verō hoc solum natura, id est, iure gentiū sed et legibus populorum, quibus in singulis ciuitatibus Resp. cōtinetur, eodē modo cōstitutū est, vt nō liceat sui cōmodi causa, nocere alteri. Hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt: incolumen esse ciuium coniunctionē, quā qui dirimunt, eos morte, exilio, vinculis, damno coercent. Atq; hoc multō magis exigit ipsa naturę ratio, quę est lex diuina & humana: cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt qui secundum naturam volunt viuere) nunquam committet, vt alienum appetat, & id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat. Etenim multō magis est, secundum

Q.ij.

## de Officiis.

naturam celsitas & animi  
magnitudo, itēq; cōmuni-  
tas, iustitia, liberalitas, quā  
voluptas, quā vita, quā di-  
uitiē. Quē quidē cōtēnere  
& pro nihilo ducere cōpa-  
rantē cum vtilitate cōmu-  
ni, magni animi & excelsi  
est. Detrahēre autē alteri  
fui cōmodi causa magis est  
contra naturā quā mors,  
quā dolor, quā cetera ge-  
neris eiusedē. Itemq; magis  
est secundum naturam p  
omnibus gentibus (si fieri  
possit) conseruādis, aut iu-  
uandis maximos labores  
molestiasq; suscipere, imi-  
tantes Herculem illū, quē  
hominum fama beneficio-  
rum memor in concilio ce-  
lestium collocauit, quā vi-  
uere in solitudine nō mo-  
do sine vllis molestiis, sed  
etiā in maximis voluptati-  
bus abūdātē omnibus co-  
pijs, vt excellas etiam pul-  
chritudine & viribus.

to nature is the highest, &  
greatnesse of courage: and  
likewise comon felowship,  
iustice and liberalitie: then  
pleasure, then life, then ry-  
chesse.

which things doubtles for  
a man to despise and set at  
naught, in comparison of  
common profit: is a sygne  
of a great, and hawte co-  
rage.

But to pull from another,  
for ones own profits sake  
is more against nature: than  
death, then sozowe, than  
rest of the same kinde.

And in like maner, more  
acorde to nature yt is,  
for the sauing and ayding  
of nations (if it may possi-  
ble be done) to vndertake  
great traualles, and pains  
folowinge that notable  
Hercules whom mens re-  
port (y recorder of desertz)  
hath placed in the compa-  
nye of them aboue: than to  
liue in solitarie nesse, not on-  
ly without any paines, but  
also in great pleasures, fol-  
lowing ful of all riches: pra-  
though more ouer you mai  
excell all other, in beautye  
and strength.

Wherco



Wherfore euery man of the best, and most noble disposition, preferreth & life far before this. Wherof it comes to passe, that a man obedient to nature cannot hurte a man.

Furthermore, who so wrongeth an other, that himselfe may get some commodity: either beleue, that he doth nothing against nature, or sweares & he should shonne death, poverty, sorrowe, the losse also of children, kinsfolke, frindes, rather than & doing of iniury to any man. If he thinketh nothing to be done against nature, in wronging of manne: what should you reason with him which cleane takes awaye man from man? But if hee plainly thinketh & mete to be auoided: & yet these hee deeme much worse, death, poverty sorrowe: he is in this point out of the waye: that he taketh anye discommodity either of the bodye, or of fortune to be sorer, than the vices of the minde.

Wherfore there must be in all manne one intent: that

Quocirco optimo quisque splendidissimoque ingenio longè illam vitam huic anteponebat. Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturam obedientem, homini nocere non posse. Deinde qui alterum violat, ut ipse a liquid commodi consequatur aut nihil se existimat contra naturam facere: aut magis fugienda censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum, quam facere cuiusquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo differas, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? Sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo quod vllum aut corporis aut fortunæ vitium, animi vitij grauius existimat. Ergo vnum debet esse omnibus propositum

## de Officiis.

vt eadem sit vtilitas vnus cuiusq; & vniuersorū: quā si ad se qsq; rapiat, dissoluetur omnis humana cōsociatio. Atq; si etiā hoc natura p̄scribit, vt homo homini quicūq; sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quōd is homo sit, cōsultūm velit: necesse est secundū eandem naturam, omnium vtilitatem esse cōmunē. Quod si ita est, vna cōtinemur omnes, & eadem lege nature. Idq; ipsum, si ita est, certē violare alterum nature lege prohibemur, verū autem primum, verū igitur et extremum. Nam illud quidem absurdum est, qd' quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nichil detracturos commodi sui causa. Sed aliam rationem esse ciuium reliquorum. Hi si bi nihil iuris & nullam societatem communis vtilitatis causa statuunt esse cū

that alike may be the p̄fite of euery sere man, & of al vniuersally. Which profit if eche man pluck vnto himself, al mā's felowship shal be diuolued. And if nature doth also appoint this, that man should haue men prouided for, whatsoeuer hee be, yet euen for this same respect, because he is a mā it must needes folow that accordinge to the same nature the profit of all bee in common. Which if it be so, &c al bee contained in one, & the like lawe of nature. And if y same be so, doubtlesse, by the lawe of nature, wee are forbidden ont to wrong another.

Now, the antecedent is true, therfore true also is the consequent. For that verely is reasonlesse, that some say, frō their parent or brother, they will take nothing away, for cause of their owne profit, but of other citizens, that there is another respect to be had. These be in oppinion, that they haue no lawe, nor felowshippe to keepe wyth

ciii

citizens, for a common pro=  
fits sake, whiche opinion  
doth rippe a sunder all the  
societie of a citie.

And they that say, there  
must regard be had of citi=  
zens, & none of forreiners  
do ryue a sunder the com=  
mon felowship of manne=  
kinde, which being destro=  
ped, al bountifulnesse, libe=  
ralitie, goodnesse, & iustice,  
is vtterly rooted vp. which  
who so take a waye, euen  
towards the gods immor=  
tall are to bee compted ir=  
religious. For such do o=  
uerthrow the felowshippe  
by them among men orde=  
ned. Of the whiche felow=  
ship the surest bonde, is to  
thinke it to be more agai<sup>st</sup>  
nature, for one man to vse  
excoztion to another, for  
his owne profittes sake,  
then to suffer all discom=  
modities, either outwarde  
or of the bodye, yea or of y<sup>e</sup>  
mynde: whiche happen w<sup>th</sup>  
out iust deseruing.

For this vertue Justice,  
of al vertues is the ladye,  
and Queene.

Per=

ciuibus: quę sententia om=  
nē societatem distrahit ci=  
uitatis. Qui autem ciuium  
rationē dicunt esse haben=  
dam, externorum negant,  
hij dirimunt communem  
humani generis societate:  
qua sublata, beneficentia,  
liberalitas, bonitas iusticia  
funditus tollitur. Quę qui  
tollunt, etiam aduersus  
deos immortales impij iu=  
dicandi sunt, ab his enim  
constitutam inter homi=  
nes societatem euertunt:  
cuius societatis arētissimū  
vinculum est, magis arbi=  
trari esse contra naturam  
hominem homini detra=  
here sui commodi causa,  
quā omnia incommoda  
subire vel externa, vel cor=  
poris, vel etiam ipsius ani=  
mi, quę vacent iusticia.

Hęc enim vna virtus om=  
nium est domina & regi=  
na virtutum.

Q. iiii.



Forsitan quispiā dixerit, Parauēture, some wil say:  
 nonne igitur sapiens, si fa- Shall not then the wyse=  
 me ipse cōficiatur, abstule- man, if he be driuin by fa=  
 rit cibū alteri homini ad- mine, take away meate frō  
 nullā rē vtili? minimē vero an other man good for no=  
 thing? no doubtlesse.  
 Nō enim mihi est vitamea For my life is no moze pro=  
 vtior, quā animi talis af- fitable to mee, then suche a  
 fectio, neminē vt violē cō dispositiō of mynd, that I  
 modi mei gratia. Quid si wrong no body for my pro=  
 fits sake.  
 Phalarim crudelē tyrānū What if a good man could  
 & immanem vir bonus, ne spoile the cruell, & beaste  
 ipse frigore cōficiatur, ve- tirant Phalaris of his clo=  
 stitu spoliare possit, nonne thinge, that hee should not  
 faciat? Hęc ad iudicandū die for cold him self? might  
 sūt facilimā. Nā si quid ab he not do it? These be full  
 homine ad nullā partē vti- easie to iudge.  
 litatis tuę causa detraxeris For if you take ought frō  
 inhumanē feceris, cōtraq; a man on no behalf profita=  
 naturę legem, Sin autem ble, for loue of your owne  
 is tu sis, qui multā vtilita- comoditie: ye shall doe vn=  
 tem Reip. atq; hominū so- kindly, and against y<sup>e</sup> lawe  
 cietati, si in vita remaneas of nature: but if you be the  
 asferre possis, si quid ob eā man, who mai bring much  
 causam alteri detraxeris, profit vnto y<sup>e</sup> cōmon weal,  
 non sit reprehendum. Sin and y<sup>e</sup> felowship of men, if  
 autem id non sit eiusmodi you remain aliue: in case ye  
 di, suum cuique incōmo- take away ought frō ano=  
 dum ferēdum est potiūs, ther, vpo y<sup>e</sup> consideraciō: yt  
 is not to bee reprovēd: but  
 if y<sup>e</sup> matter stādeth not euē  
 so: euery man must rather  
 bear his owne discōmodity,  
 than

then pul a way of anotherz  
commodities. Sickenesse  
thā oz pouerty, oz any such  
like is not more against na-  
ture: thā extorcion, & gredi-  
nesse of another mannes  
goods. But to leaue alone  
y cōmon profit, is againste  
nature: for it is vniust.

Therefore the very laswe of  
nature, which preseructh,  
& maintaineth mens pfit:  
appointeth wout doubt: y  
frō the ydle, and vnprofita-  
ble manue, necessary thin-  
ges to liue with be cōuey-  
ed to the wise, the good &  
the manly man: who if hee  
should dye for want, shold  
drawe a waye wyth hym  
much of the common pro-  
fit: and yet so hee must doe  
it: that neither by ouerswe-  
ning in him self, nor louing  
of himself to well, he make  
this a pretended coloure to  
doe wrong. Therefore al-  
waies let him do his duty,  
prouyding for the profit of  
men, and that felowship  
among men, which I oftē  
times repeat. For as tou-  
chinge Phalaris case, the  
iudgement is very easie.

For

quàm de alterius cōmodis  
detrahédū. Nō igitur ma-  
gis est cōtra naturam mor-  
bus aut egestas, aut quid e-  
iusmodi, quā detractio at-  
quē appetitio alieni. Sed  
cōmunis vtilitatis derelictio  
cōtra naturā est: est e-  
nim iniusta. Itaq; lex ipsa  
naturę quę vtilit' hominū  
cōseruat, & cōtinet, decer-  
nit pfecto, vt ab homine  
inerti atq; inutili ad sapiē-  
tē, bonum, fortemq; virū  
transferantur res ad viuē-  
dum necessarię, qui si occi-  
derit, multum de cōmuni  
vtilitate detraxerit: modō  
hoc ita faciat, vt ne ipse de  
se bene existimans, seseq;  
diligens, hāc causā habeat  
ad iniuriā. Itaq; semp offi-  
cio fungatur, vtilitati con-  
sulēs hominū, & ei, quam  
sepe cōmemoro, humane  
societati. Nā qd' ad Plaleri  
attinet, pfacile iudiciū est.

## de Officiis.

Nulla. n. nobis cū tyrannis  
societas est, sed potius sū-  
ma distractio, neq; est cō-  
tra naturā spoliare eum si  
possis, quē honestū est ne-  
care. Atq; hoc omne gen<sup>9</sup>  
pestiferū atq; impiū ex ho-  
minū cōmuniāte extermi-  
nandū est. Etenim vt mē-  
bra quedam amputantur,  
si et ipsa sanguine & tan-  
quā spiritu carere cōperūt  
et nocent reliquis partib<sup>9</sup>  
corporis: sic ista in figura  
hominis feritas & imma-  
nitas beluę a cōmuni tan-  
quā humanitate corporis  
segreganda est. Huius ge-  
neris quęstiones sūt ōnes  
eę, in quibus ex tēpore of-  
ficiū exquiritur. Eiusmodi  
igitur credo res Panetium  
psecuturū fuisse, nisi ali-  
quis casus aut occupatio  
cōsiliū eius peremisset. Ad  
quas ipsas consultationes  
ex superioribus libris sa-  
tis multa precepta sunt,

For with tyrāts we haue  
no societie, but rather be at  
extremie dissension w<sup>th</sup> thē,  
neither is it against nature  
to spoils him, if ye can whō  
it is honest to kill, and all  
such pestilent and wicked  
rables are to be driue out  
of the companies of men.

For euen as certein limms  
be cut of if they once begin  
bothe to lacke blood, & lyfe  
(as you would say) & also  
do hurte the other parts of  
the bodye, so thys sauage-  
nesse, and cruellnesse of a  
beaste, vnder the shape of a  
manne, must be parted (as  
it were) from the common  
naturalnesse of a mannes  
bodye.

Di this sorte be all those  
quęstions, wherin duty is  
sought out by circumstance  
of time.

Such matters therfore I  
belceue Panetius woulde  
haue treted of, had not sōe  
chaunce or businesse pre-  
uented his purpose. Con-  
cerning which maner of ta-  
king of aduysment, in my  
books afoze, many thinges  
bee sufficiently taught, by  
which



which, it may be perceiued, what is to bee auoided, for dishonestye, & what is not to be shonned, because it is not dishonest.

But forasmuch as of our worke begonne, yet almost ended, now (as who saith) we sett on the rooffe, as the Geometers are wont not to proue al, but to require, that certeine thinges bee granted then, to the intent they may more easely sette out their purpose, so do I require of you my Cicero, that ye graunt mee, yf ye may, that nothing but that which is honest, is for it self to be desired.

But if it may not be granted, because of Cratippus, yet this no doubt you wil graunt me, that the thyng which is honest, is chieflye for it selfe to bee desired. Whether ye wil, is ynough for mee, and bothe the one, and the other seemes the more prouable, neyther any thing els appeareth proueable.

And first, in this pointe Panctius is to be defended because

quibus perspicui possit qd sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum, quid sit id, qd idcirco fugiendum non sit quia omnino turpe non sit. Sed quoniam operi inchoato prope tamen absoluto tanquam fastigium imponim, vt geometre solent non omnia docere, sed postulare vt quedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius que velint explicent: sic ego a te postulo mi Cicero, vt mihi concedas, si potes, nihil preter id, quod honestum sit, esse propter se expetendum.

Sin hoc non licet, propter Cratippum: at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi vtriusque satis est: & tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur: nec preterea quicquam probabile. Ac primum Panctius in hoc defendendus est,

## de Officiis.

quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat) sed eaque videntur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum: Nihil honestum quod non idem utile sit sepe testatur: negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse, quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint.

Itaque non ut aliquando antepongeremus utilia honestis: sed ut ea sine errore iudicaretur, si quando inciderent, induxit eam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantia.

Hanc igitur partem relictam explebimus, nullius adminiculis, sed (ut dicitur) Marte nostro. Neque enim quicquam de hac parte post Panetium explicatum est,

because he said not, & profitable things at anye tyme strive with honest (for yt was not lawfull for him so to saye) but those whiche seme profitable might strive with honesty. But he oft witnesseth, that nothing is profitable: which same ys not honest, nor honest which same is not profitable: & he denieth any greater pestilence to have crept into mans life: than their opinion, whome have devided these two a sunder.

Therefore he brought in & repugnance: which did seme to bee & was not in dedde: not that, at anye time, wee shoulde preferre profitable thinges before honest: but that without erreure, wee might discerne the, if ever they fell in place.

This parte therefore lefte untouched, we wil supply with no others aide, but (as they say in warre) even with our owne force. For touching this parcel, there hath bene, since Panetius wrote, nothinge sett oute that

that liked me: of al, that euer came to our handes.

Wherefore, when anye shewe of profit is offered vs we must nedes be stryded: but if, when ye geue good heede, ye se dishonesty ioynd with that thing which bringeth a shewe of profite, then the profit is not to be desired, but wee must think, where dishonesty is there profit canne not be.

Now, if nothing ther be so muche againste nature, as dishonesty (for nature doth desire good, & conuenient & steadfast thinges, & despiseth the contrarie) & again ther is nothing so accordig to nature, as profit, doubtles in the same profitable thing dishonesty can not be. And also, if we be bozne to honestie: and it is eyther onely to be desired, as too Zeno it semed, or in all estimation is to be compted of more value, thā al other thinges, as pleaseth Aristotle, it muste nedes bee, that the thinge, whiche is honest, is either the onely,

or the

quod mihi quidē pbaret, de ijs, quę in manus meas venerūt. Cū igitur aliqua species vtilitatis obiecta est: nos cōmoueri necesse est. Sed sicūm animū attēderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quę speciē vtilitatis attulerit: tūc nō vtilitas requirenda est: sed intelligendum, vbi turpitude sit, ibi vtilitatē esse nō posse. Quōd si nihil est tam cōtra naturam quam turpitude (recta. n. & conueniētia & constantia natura desyderat aspernatur quę cōtraria) nihilq; tam secūdū naturam, quā vtilitas, certē in eadē re vtili turpitudō esse, nō potest. Itēq; si ad honestatē nati sumus, ea; aut sola expectēda est, vt Zenoni est vīfū: aut certē omni pōdere grauior habēda, quā reliqua oīa, qd' Aristoteli placet: necesse est quod honestū sit, id esse aut solū,



aut summum bonum: qd' or the soueraigne good, &  
autem bonum id certè v- what so is good, the same  
tile. Itaque quicquid ho- doubtlesse is profitable.  
nestum, id vtile. Quare er And so al that is honest, is  
ror hominum nō proba- profitable.  
rum, cū aliquid, quod v- Wherefoze when the error  
tile visum est arripuit: id of menne not honest hathe  
continuō secernit ab ho- caught holde of somewhat  
nesto. that seemeth profitable, by  
a by it deuydes the same  
from honesty.

Hinc sic, hinc venena, Hereof murders, hereof  
hinc falsa testamenta nas- poisonings, hereof counter  
cuntur: hinc furta, pecula- fe: willes do spring, here-  
tus, expilationes, direptio- of felony, hereof robbing y  
nesq; sociorum & ciuium: treasure, pillage, and ex-  
hinc opum nimiarum po- torcions from leagifrendes  
tentie non ferendę: postre and citizens, hereof grow-  
mō etiam in liberis ciuita- eth the power of two exce-  
tibus existunt regnādi cu- ding richesse, not to be suf-  
piditates: quibus nihil nec fered, & finally in free citiez  
tetrius, nec foediūs exco- there bee the desires of ru-  
gitari potest. Emolu- ling, whereas nothing ey-  
menta enim rerum, falla- ther moze cruell, then they  
cibus iudicijs vident, pæ- or moze detestable can bee  
nam, non dico legū, quas ymagined.  
sepe perrumpūt, sed ipsi- For with deceivable cies  
us turpitudinis, quę acer- they se the gaine of things,  
bissima est non vident. but the punishment I wil  
not say, of y lawes which  
they often break throughe  
but of dishonestye it selfe,  
which is soest of all, they  
see not.

wher-

wherefoze let fuche takers  
of aduifement be dzutuen frō  
among vs (foz they are al-  
together wicked, & vngod-  
ly) who vse aduifement  
whether y may folowe y,  
which semes to be honest,  
or wittinglye staine them  
selues w dishonesty.

foz in y very doubting a  
great faulte theire is, all-  
though they neuer come to  
the doing of it.

therfoze those things are  
not to be aduised on at all,  
in which y very taking of  
aduifement is dishonest.

And also in al deliberaciō,  
the hope, & opinion of con-  
cealinge, & hidinge of mat-  
ters is to be put asway.

foz fully (in case we haue  
any whit profited in philo-  
sophie) we ought to be per-  
swaded, though we coulde  
hide it from all goddes, and  
men, that nothing yet come  
tously, nothig vniustly, no  
thing wātōly, nothing vn-  
staiedly is mete to be done.

Here vpon that Gyges ys  
brought in by Plato, who  
when the earth had opened  
in certaine greete stormes  
went

Quamobrem hoc quidē  
deliberantiū genus pella-  
tur e medio (est enim to-  
tum sceleratū et impium)  
qui deliberant vtrū id se-  
quatur qd' honestū esse vi-  
deant, an se sciētes scelere  
cōtaminent. In ipsa enim  
dubitatione facinus inest,  
etiam si ad id nō perucne-  
rint. Ergō ea deliberanda  
omnino non sūt, in quib⁹  
est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atq; etiam ex omni deli-  
beratione celandi, & oc-  
cultandi spes opinioq; re-  
mouēda est. Satis enim no-  
bis (si modō i philosophia  
aliquid pfecimus) persua-  
sum esse debet, si ōnes de-  
os hominesq; celare possi-  
m⁹, nihil tamē auarē, nihil  
iniustē, nihil libidinosē, ni-  
hil incontinenter esse faci-  
endum. Hinc ille Gyges  
inducitur a Platone, qui  
cū terra discessisset ma-  
gnis quibusdam imbribus,

in illum hiatum descēdit, went doſwne into y gaping  
 eneumq; equum ( vt ferūt hole : and ſpyed a brazen  
 fabulę) animaduertit, cu- hoſe, (as the fables tel) in  
 ius in lateribus fores eſſēt, whoſe ſydes ſwere doozes:  
 quibus aptis, hominis mor the coſie of a dead manne,  
 tui vidit corpus magni of an vnſwonted hugenelle  
 tudine inuſitata, annulūq; and a gold ring vppon hys  
 aureū in digito, quē vt de- finger: which as ſone as he  
 traxit, atq; ipſe induit (erat pulled of, hee put it on hys  
 autem regius paſtor) tum oſwn finger ( This Gyges  
 in conſiliū paſtorū ſe rece was the kinges ſheppard)  
 pit: ibi cūm palam eius an Then he got himſelf again  
 nuli ad palmam conuerte to y cōpany of ſheppardes.  
 rat, a nullo videbatur, ipſe There whē he had turned  
 autē omnia videbat: idem the hed of y ringe toſwarde  
 rurfus videbatur, cūm in the palme of his hand: hee  
 locum anulum inuerte- was ſcene of no bodye, yet  
 rat. Itaqūe hac oportuni- he ſaw euery thing and hee  
 tate anuli vſus, reginę ſtu- was ſeen again, when hee  
 prum intulit: eaq; adiutri- had turned y ring in ſight.  
 ce regem dominum inte- And ſo vſing this vantage  
 remit, ſuſtulitquē quos ob of the ring, he lay ſwith the  
 ſtare arbitrabatur, nec in queene: and by her ayd, hee  
 his quiſquam eum facino- ſlew the kinge his may-  
 ribus videre potuit: ſic re- ſter: and made diſpatche of  
 pentē anuli beneficio rex them, whome hee thought  
 exortus eſt Lidyę. to ſtand in his way. Ney-  
 ther could any man ſe him  
 being about theſe miſchie-  
 uous deedes.

So by the commoditie of  
 his ring, hee became ſodēly  
 king of Lydia.

This



This same ringe then if a  
parfit wise mā shold haue  
he would think it no more  
lawfull for him to offende,  
thā if he had it not. For ho  
nest thigs, not secret thigs  
by good men be sought.

And in this place certaine  
philosopherz, and those not  
of the worst, but yet not all  
of y finest say: that Plato  
tolde a fayned, and deuised  
fable, as though he defen-  
deth, that eyther the thing  
was done, or was possible  
to be done.

This is the effecte of  
this ringe, and of this ex-  
ample: if no mā shold knowe  
or no mā shold one suspect,  
when you shold doo any  
thing, for regard of riches,  
power, rule or lust yea if it  
shoulde bee ynknowne for  
euer both of god, and man:  
whether you would do it,  
or no. They denye it possi-  
ble to befall: and althoughe  
it cannot so befall in deede:  
yet I demaunde, in case y  
might befall, which they de-  
nye too bee possible what  
wold y do? They force on,  
grossely in good sothe.

For

rent? Vrgēt sanē rusticē:

R. i.

Hunc igitur ipsum anulū  
si habeat sapiens, nihilō  
plus sibi licere putet pec-  
care, quā si non haberet.  
Honestā. n. bonis viris nō

occulta queruntur. Atque  
hoc loco philosophi qui-  
dā, minimē mali illi quidē,  
sed non satis acuti, fictā  
& commentitiā fabulā  
dicunt prolatam a Plato-  
ne, quasi vero ille aut fac-  
tum id esse, aut fieri potu-  
isse defendat. Hec est vis  
huius annuli et huius ex-  
empli: si nemo sciturus,  
nemoue suspicaturus qui-  
dem sit, cū aliquid diui-  
tiarū, potentię, dominatio-  
nis, libidinis causa feceris:  
si id dijs, hominibusq; fu-  
turum sit semper ignotū,  
sis ne facturus? Negant id  
fieri posse quanquam po-  
test id quidem. Sed que-  
ro: quod negant posse id  
si posset, quidnam face-  
rent? Vrgēt sanē rusticē:

## de Officiis.

negat enim posse, & in eo perstant. Hoc verbum, si, quid valeat, non vident.

Cum enim querimus, si possint celare, quid facturi sint, non querimus, possint ne celare: sed tanquam tormenta quedam adhibemus: ut si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur: si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum reuertamur. Incidunt sepe multe cause, que conturbant animos utilitatis specie, non cum hoc deliberetur relinquenda ne sit honestas propter utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est) sed illud, possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter.

For they holde, it is but possible, and therein they stay still.

What this word, if, importeth, they see not. For when we demaund, if they be able to conceale, what they will doe: we doo not demaund whether they be able to conceale it or no, but we laye before them as yt were the rack, and certein manikles, that if they answer, they would do what them liked, beeing sure to scape scotfree, they confesse them selues to bee wicked if they say, they would not they graunt all dishoneste things for theselues meete to be eschewed. But now we let vs returne to our purpose. Ther do oftentimes befall diuers matters, whiche trouble mens mindes, vnder a shew of profit, not when this is aduised vpon whether honesty is to bee left for y greatnes of profit (for y plainelye is wicked) but whether y thinge which semeth profitable mai be done wout dishonesty.

When

when Brutus toke away the rule from Collatinus Tarquinius, his office sc- lowe, he might haue beene thought to do it vniustlye, for in dypuing out y<sup>e</sup> kings, he had bene Brutus assis- tant, and apder also of hys counsels.

But when the rulers had agreed thus in counsell, that the kyared of Superbus, & the name of the Tarqui- nians, & the memozy of the kingdom should be vtterly diuyn out, because it was profitable too prouide for their countreys y<sup>e</sup> same was in such wise honest, y<sup>e</sup> euen bery Collatinus ough to haue lpyked it. And so pro- fit preuayled, because of honesty, without whiche, profite could not haue ben at all.

But with the king, whoe buylded this citie, it fared not so. For a shew of pro- fit strake in his mynde, to whō when it apcered more profitable for him to rule alone, then with an other, he slew his brother. This mā forgot both godlynesse, and

Cūm Collatino Tarqui- nio Collegē Brutus impe- rium abrogabat: poterat videri facere id iniustē, fu- erat enim in regibus ex- pellendis socius Bruti cō- filiorum, & adiutor.

Cūm autem cōsiliū hoc principes cepissent: cogna- tionem superbi, nomenq; Tarquiniorum, & memo- riam regni esse tollendā: quōd erat vtile patrię con- sulere, id erat ita honestū, vt etiā ipsi Collatino pla- cere deberet. Itaqūe vti- litas valuit propter hone- statem, sine qua nec vtili- tas quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege qui vrbē condidit, non ita. Species n. vtilitatis animum impu- lit eius cui cū visum esset vtilius solū se, quā cum altero regnare, fratrem in- teremit.

Omisit hic & pietatem  
R.ij.



## de Officiis.

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At in eo rege qui urbē condidit, non ita. Species n. utilitatis animum impulit eius cui cū visum esset vtilius solū se, quā cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit.

Omisit hic & pietatem  
R.ij.

## de Officiis.

& humanitatem, vt id, quod vtile videbatur, neque erat, assequi posset: & tamen muri causam opposuit specie honestatis, nec probabilem, nec satis idoneam. Peccauit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

Nec tamen nostre nobis vtilitates omitte de sunt alijque tradende, cum his ipsi egeamus: sed sua cuique vtilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, seruendum est.

Scite Chrisippus, vt multa, Qui stadium (inquit) currit, eniti & contendere debet quam maxime possit, vt vincat: supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet.

and naturalnesse: that hee might obtaine the thyng, that seemed profitable, & was not so in deede, & yet his brothers leaping ouer the wall hee alleged, for a colour of honestye, neither allowable, nor sufficient enough.

He offended therefore, that by Quirinus, Romulus fauour I may say it.

Notwithstanding we ought not to leaue our owne commodities, and geue the to other, when our selues do neede the same, but euery man must serue his owne profit so farre, as without anothers iniurie it may be doone.

Feately said Chrisippus in this, as he did in manye thinges mo, who so, quoth hee, runneth in the race, ought to endeuour, and labour, as much as he may, that himselfe may winne the game, but in no wise hee ought to trip him, & whoe he runnes, or to keepe him of with his hand.

Winning in a race So



So in this life it is not by lawfull for euerie man too get himselfe, & many scrue his vse, but to pul from al other, it is no right.

But most of al duties bee put out of order in frendshippes, in the which it is against duty, both not to do that rightfully you maye, and to do, that is not lawfull. But of all this matter a shorthe, and no harde rule ther is.

For these, whiche seeme profitable, honours, riches, pleasures, and other of the same kind, are never too be preferred afore frendship. And a good man, for his frends sake, nother will do against the common weale nother against his othe, & promises, no not though he shal be iuge vpon his own frende. For he puts of the personage of a frend, when he takes vpon him the person of a iudge. Thus much he shall leane too frendship & he had rather, his frends cause were true, & that hee will graunt him time tho roughly to plead his cause as

Sic in vita sibi queng; petere, quod pertineat ad vsum, non iniquum est: alteri diripere, ius non est.

Maximè autem perturbantur officia in amicis, quibus & non tribuere qd' rectè possis, & tribuere qd' non sit equum, contra officium est.

Sed huius generis totius breue & non difficile preceptum est. Quæ enim videntur vtilia, honores, diuitiæ, voluptates, ceteraq; generis eiusdem, hæc amicitie nunquam antepone da sunt. Ac nequæ contra Remp. neq; contra iusurandum, ac fidem amici sui causa vir bonus faciet: nec si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico. Ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tatum dabit amicitie, vt veram amici causam esse malit, & vt perorande liti tempus,

## de Officiis.

quod per leges liceat, accō as much as by the law hee  
modet. Cū verō iurato maye. But when by his  
dicenda sententia sit, me othe he is to geue sentence:  
minerit Deum se adhibe- he must remēber he taketh  
re testem, id est (vt ego ar God to witnesse, that is to  
bitror) mentem suam, qua meane (as I suppose) his  
nihil homini dedit deus ip cōscience, for nothing more  
se diuinius. Itaq; præclarū godlike than it is, hath god  
a maioribus accepim⁹ mo him self geuen to man.  
rem rogandi iudicis (si eū Therfore of our aunceters  
teneremus) quæ salua fide we haue receiued a goodly  
facere possit. Hæc rogatio maner of desiring y fauour  
ad ea pertinet, quæ paulo of a iuge if we would kepe  
ante dixi, honestè amico it: To do what he may sa-  
iudice posse concedi. Nam uing his oth. This request  
si omnia facienda sint quæ is referred to those things:  
amici velint, non amicitie which a litle before is said,  
tales, sed cōiurationes pu might honestly be granted  
rande sunt. Loquor autē by a iudge to his frend.  
de communibus amicitiiis. For if al things should be  
Nam in sapientibus viris done which frundes would  
atq; perfectis nichil po desire, such were to be cou-  
rest esse tale. Damonem & ted not amities, but cōspi-  
Pythiam Pythagoreos fe- racies.  
runt hoc animo inter se I speake now of common  
fuisse, vt cū eorum al- friendshipes. For in men  
teri Dionysius tyrannus wise and perfite, there can  
diem necis destinauisset, be no such thing. As en say  
and

and he, who was condem-  
ned too dye: had required  
certain daies of respice, for  
y<sup>e</sup> disposing of hys thinges:  
the other became bound bo  
dye for body, for his forth-  
comminge, vpon condicion  
that if he retourned not at  
his day, he would himseke  
dye for him. who, when at  
his day he was cōe again:  
the tiraunt wonderinge at  
ther faithfulness, required,  
that they wouid take him  
in for the thirde in thaire  
frendship. When therefore  
that which in frendshippe  
seemeth profitable, is com-  
pared with that, which is  
honest: let the show of pro-  
fit yelde, and honestye pre-  
uaile.

But when in frendshippe  
those things shall be requir-  
ed, which bee not honest,  
let religio, & vprightnes be  
preferred before frendship:  
& so shall y<sup>e</sup> choyce of diu-  
tye be had, which we seke af-  
ter. But vnder the shewe  
of profit, in y<sup>e</sup> cōmon weal  
ther is often times doinge  
amisse, as our mē did in y<sup>e</sup>  
razing of Corinth.

Dozer

& is, qui morti addictus  
esset, paucos sibi dies cō-  
mendandorum suorū cau-  
sa postulauisset: vas factus  
est alter eius sistendi: vt si  
ille non reuertisset ad diē:  
moriendū esset ipsi. Qui  
cū ad diem se recepisset,  
admiratus eorum fidē ty-  
rannus petiuit vt se in a-  
micitiam tertium ascribe-  
rent.

Cū igitur id quod vti-  
le videtur in amicitia, cum  
eo quod honestum est,  
comparatur, iaceat vtili-  
tatis species, valeat hone-  
stas.

Cū autem in amicitia,  
quę honesta non sunt po-  
stulabuntur: religio & fi-  
des anteponantur amici-  
tię. Sic habebitur is, quem  
exquirimus, delectus of-  
ficij. Sed vtilitatis specie  
in Republi. sepius mē  
peccatur, vt in Corin-  
thi disturbance non.

R. iij.



durius etiam Athenienses,  
 qui statuerunt, ut Aeginetis,  
 qui classe valebant, pol-  
 lices praeciderentur. Hoc  
 visum est utile: nimis. n. im-  
 minebat propter propin-  
 quitatem Aeginae Piraeo. Sed  
 nihil, quod crudele, utile. Est  
 enim hominum natura, quam se-  
 qui debemus, maxime ini-  
 mica crudelitas. Male etiam  
 qui peregrinos urbibus ur-  
 bi prohibent, eosque exter-  
 minant: ut Petronius apud  
 patres nostros, Papius nu-  
 per. Nam esse pro ciue qui  
 ciuis non sit rectum est non  
 licere: quam tulerunt legem  
 sapientissimi consules Cras-  
 sus & Scquola, usu vero  
 urbis prohibere peregri-  
 nos: sane inhumanum est.  
 Illa preclara in quibus pub-  
 licae utilitatis species pro  
 honestate continetur. Ple-  
 na exemplorum est nostra  
 Respublica. cum sepe alias,

Sozer also delt the Athe-  
 nians, who made a decree  
 that the Eginets thumbs,  
 who were skilled in navi-  
 gation, should be cut of.

This was thought profi-  
 table: for Egina did too  
 much ouerlooke Pireum,  
 by reason of the neere bor-  
 dering. But nothing, that  
 is cruell is profitable. For  
 to mannes nature, whiche  
 we ought to follow, crueltie  
 is most enemy.

They also doe euil, who  
 barre strangers from vsing  
 their citie, and doe banishe  
 them: as did Petronius, in  
 our fathers daies, and Pa-  
 pius of late yeres.

For one to goe for a citize,  
 who is no citizen, it is rea-  
 son, it should not be lawfull  
 the which law very wise  
 Consuls, Crassus, & Sce-  
 uola did make: but to for-  
 bidde strangers the vse of  
 the citie, it is doubtlesse an  
 vnciuil part. Those doings  
 be notable, wherewith show of  
 comon profit is despised: in  
 respect of honesty. Our com-  
 mon weal is full of examples,  
 both often at other tymes,  
 and

& chiefly in the second Punicke warre: which after y<sup>e</sup> ouerthrow take at Canai had greater corages, then euer in prosperity, no token there was of feare, no mention of peace. So great is the force of honestye, that it diminisheth the showe of p<sup>r</sup>ite.

When the Athenians no way were able to withstand the assault of the Persians: and were determined that leauing the citie, and settig their wiues and childre in Troezen, they would take their ships, & defende y<sup>e</sup> liberty of Grece, with their nauie, one Cysilus they stoned to death, who p<sup>r</sup>swaded with them to kepe still the citie, & receiue Xerxes. And hee seemed to folowe profite: but that was none wher honestye gainstood it. Themistocles, after y<sup>e</sup> victorie of that battel, whiche was holden with y<sup>e</sup> Persians, saide in the open assembly, that hee had wealfull counsell for the state, but it was not expediēt, it shoulde be openly known, he re-

tum maximè bello punico secundo, quæ Cānensi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit, quā vnquā rebus secundis. Nulla fuit timoris significatio, nulla mētio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, vt speciē vtilitatis obscuret. Atheniēses cū Persarū impetū nullo modo possent sustinere, statuerentq; vt vrbe relicta coniugibus & liberis Trozene depositis, naues cōscenderent, libertatemq; Græciæ classe defenderent, Cirsilū quendā suadentē, vt in vrbe manerent, Xerxemq; reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atquē ille sequi vtilitātē videbatur: sed ea nulla erat repugnante honestate. Themistocles post victoriā eius belli, qd' cū Persis fuit, dixit in concilio se habere concilium Reipub. salutare, sed id sciri opus non esset.

postulauit vt aliquem populus daret, qui cum communicaret. Datus est Aristides. Huic ille, classem Lacedemoniorum, quę subducta esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quofacto frangi Lacedemoniorum opes necesse esset.

Quod Aristides cum audiisset, in concione magna expectationē venit: dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles afferret, sed minimē honestum. Itaque Athenienses quod honestum non esset, id ne vtile quidem putauerunt: totamque eam rem, quam ne audiuerat quidem, authore Aristide repudiauerunt.

Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas inimicos, socios vectigales habemus.

Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit

he required that the people should assigne some man, to whome hee should tel it. Aristides was appointed. He tolde him the nauye of the Lacedemonians, which was conueied to Gytheu, might priuily be set a fyre: by which act, the Lacedemonians strength should of necessitie be abated.

Which thing when Aristides heard, hee came to the open assemble, with their great expectation, & said, it was very profitable counsel, whypche Themistocles dyd gyue, but nothings honest

Therefore the Athenians, the thing, that was not honest, did not count profitable at all: and being aduertised by Aristides, thei reiected the whole matter, whiche they had not once hearde.

Better did they then wee do, who haue Pyrats punished, and leage frindez tributarie.

Let this therefore stande for a conclusion, that the thing which is not honest,



is neuer profitable: no not  
euen then, when ye attaine  
the thing, which you reckē  
to bee profitable. For the  
same to thinke profitable,  
which is dishonest, a mile  
table case it is.

But often times (as I  
said before) there so befall  
cases, when profit seemeth  
to striue against honestye,  
that is to bee considered,  
whether altogether it doth  
gainstande it, or maye bee  
made agree with honesty.

Of that kinde be these  
questions: if, for examples  
sake, a good manne depart-  
ing from Alexandria, shal  
bring to Rhodes a greate  
quantitie of corne, in the  
time of scarcitie, & famine,  
& extreme dertth of corne a-  
mong the Rhodians, in case  
the same man know, that  
many marchants be already  
sette forth from Alex-  
andria: and sawe theyre  
shippes, freighted w<sup>th</sup>  
corne, in theire course ma-  
kinge towarde Rhodes:  
whether hee oughte to de-  
clare it to the Rhodians,

id nunquam esse vtile: ne-  
tum quidem, cum id, quod  
esse vtile putes, adipiscare.  
Hoc enim ipsum vtile pu-  
tare, quod turpe sit, cala-  
mitosum est.

Sed incidūt (vt supra di-  
xi) sepe cause, cum repug-  
nare vtilitas honestati vi-  
deatur: vt animaduerten-  
dum sit, repugnetne pla-  
ne, an possit cum honesta-

te coniungi. Eius generis  
hę sunt questiones. Si, ex-  
empli gratia, vir bonus ab  
Alexandria pfectus Rho-  
dum magnum frumenti  
numerum aduexerit in  
Rhodiorum inopia, & fa-  
me summaque annone ca-  
ritate, si idem sciat cōplu-  
res mercatores Alexandria  
soluisse, nauesque in cursu  
frumento onustas peten-  
tes Rhodum viderit: dic-  
turus ne sit Rhodij id,

## de Officiis.

an silentia suum quā plurimō venditurus?

Sapientem & bonum virum fingimus: de eius deliberatione & consultatione querimus: qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet: sed dubitet an turpe non sit.

In huiusmodi causis aliud Diogeni Babilonio videri solet magno & graui Stoico, aliud Antipatro discipulo eius homini acutissimo.

Antipatro omnia patefacienda, vt ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret. Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iuris ciuili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidijs agere: & quoniam vendat, velle quā optime vendere. Aduexi, exposui,

or with silence shoulde sell his owne for as muche as he might.

We put the case here, of a wise and good man: touching his deliberacion and taking of aduiscement, wee question, who woulde not hide it from the Rhodians if he thought it dishonest: but hee doubteth whether it be dishonest or no.

In such maner cases, one thing Diogenes the Babilonian, a greate & graue Stoik, is wont to thinke, an other thing Antipater, his scholer, a verpe sharpe switted man.

Antipater holdeth that all must bee opened, that the buyer be ignorant of no manner thing, which the seller knoweth. Diogenes saith, & seller ought to tel & faultes, that as farre as is appointed by & ciuil law and the rest to do wout deceit & seeing he selleth, to desire with the best auantage to sell.

Whither haue I brought it, I haue set it forth to sale, I sell

I tel mine for no more thā  
other do, perchance also for  
lesse, seeing I haue greter  
store, to whō is the wrong  
done: There groweth a dis  
putation by Antipater, of  
the contrary side, what go  
ye aboute? Sithens ye are  
bounde to profit men, & to  
serue the felowship of man  
& ye are bozne vnder suche  
a law, that ye should keepe  
those principles of nature,  
which ye ought to obey, &  
alwaies to folow, y<sup>e</sup> poure  
profit shoulde bee common  
profit, againe, and as well,  
common profit shoulde bee  
yours: wil you hyde from  
men both what commodi  
tie and what store also is  
at hand for them?

Diogenes peraduenture  
wil answer thus: It is  
not all one thinge to hyde  
from menne, and to holde  
ones peas, neither doe I  
noswe hyde it from ye,  
though I tel ye not, what  
is the nature of Goddes,  
what is the ende of good,  
which things we know  
shoulde profite you more,  
then

vendo meum non pluris  
quā ceteri, fortasse etiam  
minoris, cū maior est co  
pia, cui fit iniuria? Exori  
tur Antipatri ratio ex al  
tera parte.

Quid agis? tute cū ho  
minibus consulere debeas  
& seruire humane societa  
ti: eaque lege natus sis, &  
ea habeas principia natu  
re, quibus parere, & que  
semper sequi debeas, vt v  
tilitas tua communis sit v  
tilitas, vicissim & eque cō  
munis vtilitas tua sit, ce  
labis homines, quid his ad  
sit cōmoditatis, & copie?  
Respondebit Diogenes  
fortasse sic, aliud est ce  
lare, aliud tacere, neque  
ego nunc te celo, si ti  
bi non dico, quæ natura  
Deorum sit, quis sit fi  
nis bonorum: quæ tibi  
plus prodesent cognita,



## de Officiis.

quā tritici vtilitas. Sed nō  
quicquid tibi audire vtile  
est, id michi dicere necesse  
est, immo vero, inquit ille,  
necesse est: Si quidē memi-  
nisti esse inter homines na-  
tura cōiunctam societate.  
Memini inquit ille. Sed  
num ista societas talis est,  
vt nihil suum cuiusq; sit?  
Quod si ita est ne vēdēdū  
quidē quicquā est, sed do-  
nandum.

Vides i hac tota disceptati-  
one non illud dici, quāvis  
hoc turpe sit, tamē quoniā  
expedit, faciā: sed ita ex-  
pedire, vt turpe nō sit. Ex  
altera autem parte, ea re,  
quia turpe sit, non esse fa-  
ciendum. Vendat q̄des  
vir bonus propter aliqua  
vitia, quę ipse norit, ceteri  
ignorent: pestilentes  
sint, & habeantur salu-  
bres: ignoretur in omni-  
bus cubiculis apparere  
serpentes: malē materiātē,

then y cheapnes of wheat,  
But it is not necessary for  
mee to tell, whatsoeuer is  
profitable for you to hear.  
yes verely saith hee, it is  
necessarie, if so bee, you re-  
member y felowship knitt  
among men by nature.

I remember it, saith the o-  
ther, but is thys felowship  
such y eche man may haue  
nothing of his owne? In  
case it be so nothing doubt-  
lesse is to be sold, but to be  
geuen.

You see, in all this contro-  
uersie, this is not sayde:  
though it bee vn honest, yet  
because it is profitable, I  
will do it, but y in suchwise  
it is profitable, as it is not  
dishonest, & of the contrary  
side, y therefore it is not to  
be done, because it is disho-  
nest. Put the case, a good  
mā sel a house, for certeine  
discommodities, which he  
knoweth, and other know  
not, let case it be cōtagious  
& is taken for hollom: be it  
so, it be vnknowne, that in  
all the chambers do appere  
venomous creeping beastes  
& that it is euill timbered,  
and

and ready to fall, but thys none knoweth but the owner, I demaund, if the seller opē not this to y byers, & selles the house for much more then hee thought, hee should haue done, whether he doth iustly or vnhonestly: he verely dothe dishonestly saith Antipater.

For what other thing is it, than not to shewe the wanderer his way (which at Athens was forbidden vpon paine of cōmon curses) if this be not it: to suffer y byer to rushe suddenly and runne headlong by error into a greate deceite: yea it is more, then not to shewe a manne the waye. for it is wittingly to lead one out of the waye into a false belief.

Diogenes replyeth again, did hee compelle ye to buy, who not once moued ye to it: hee sett to sale that lyked him not: you bought, that lyked ye.

If they who offer to sell a good farme, & wel buyed as they sett it out, bee not thought to haue deceiued,

*caused y good not ai-*  
*mon for saye*

ruinosę: sed hec præter do-  
minum nemo sciat: quero  
si hec emptoribus vëditor  
non dixerit, & desq; vendi-  
derit pluris multo, quàm  
se venditurū putarit: num  
id iustē aut improbē fece-  
rit? Ille verō improbē, in-  
quit Antipater. Quid.n.  
est aliud erranti viam non  
monstrare (quod Athenis  
execrationibus publicis  
sancitū est) si hoc nō est,  
emptorem pati ruere, & p  
errorem in maximā frau-  
dem incurrere: plus etiam  
est quàm viam non mon-  
strare: nam est scientem in  
errorem alterū inducere.

Diogenes contra: num  
te emere cogit, qui ne hor-  
tatus quidem est? ille  
quod non placebat pro-  
scripsit, tu quod placebat  
emisti. Quod si qui pro-  
scribunt villam bonam,  
benequē edificatam, non  
existimantur fefellisse,

etiam si illa nec bona est, nec edificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudant. Vbi. n. iudiciū emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quæ potest esse?

Sin autem dictū non omne prestandū est, quod dictum non est id prestādū putas? Quid verō est stultius, quam venditorē eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdū, quā si domini iussu ita præco prædicet: domū pestilentem vendo. Sic ergo in quibusdā causis dubijs ex altera parte defenditur honestas: ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur ut id, quod vtile videatur, non modō facere honestū sit, sed etiam non facere, turpe. Hec est illa, quæ videtur vtilium fieri cum honestis sepe dissensio.

Quæ dijudicanda sunt,

although it be neither good nor well buy'ded, muche lesse then they, who haue not praised their house.

For where the buyers eye is his chapmā, there what deceit can there be of y seller? and if euerye saying is not to be pfourmed, thinke ye that meete to be pfourmed, that was not sayde? But what is more foolish then the seller to tel y faulces of the thing, whiche he puts to sale? And what so fonde a hearing is ther, as if, at the owners comaūde mēt, the cryer thus should make a noyes? I haue a contagious house to sell.

Thus therefore in some doubtfull cases, of the one part is honestye defended, of the other parte, there is speakinge of profite, that it is not onlye honest to doe, but also dishonest not to do it, that seemeth profitable.

This is that dissencion, whiche seemeth often to be fall beetweene profitable thinges, and honest, which points are to be discussed.

For



for we haue not set them  
forth to make questioꝛs, but  
to open them.

We thinke then, nether  
that same Rhodian coꝛne  
marchaunt, nor his house-  
seller ought to haue hidden  
the foresaide thinges from  
the biers. For whatsoeuer  
you kepe in silence, you do  
not fully so muche, as it is  
to hyde, but whe, for youre  
profittes sake, ye woulde  
haue those ignorant of that  
you know, whom it standz  
vpon to knowe it. Nowe  
this kind of hidig of what  
nature it is, and what ma-  
ner of mannes, who seeth  
not. Doubtlesse it is a  
parte not of a plaine, not of  
a simple, not of a gentle,  
not of a iuste, not of a good  
man: but rather of a suttile  
witted, close, swylie, deceit-  
ful, gileful, craftie, foxlike,  
& a verpe dubler. These so-  
manie, & other moe names  
of vycies to enter into, is it  
not vnprofitable? If they  
bee disprayseworthy, who  
haue held ther peace: what  
is to bee thought of those,  
who haue vsed a vainnesse  
of

Non enim vt quereremus  
exposuimus, sed vt explica-  
remus. Non igitur videtur  
nec frumentarius ille Rho-  
dius, nec hic ædium ven-  
ditor celare emptores de-  
buisse. Neq; enim id est ce-  
lare, cum quid reticeas, sed  
cum quod tu scias, id igno-  
rare emolumentum tui cau-  
sa velis eos, quorum inter-  
sit id scire. Hoc autem  
celandi genus quale sit, &  
cuius hominis quis non  
videt? Certè non aperti,  
non simplicis est, non inge-  
nui, non iusti, non viri bo-  
ni: versuti potius, obscuri,  
astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, ca-  
lidi, veteratoris, vafri.  
Hec tot & alia plura, non  
nè inutile est vitiorum su-  
bire nomina?

Quòd si vituperandi sunt  
qui reticuerunt: quid de ijs  
existimandum est: qui ora-  
tionis vanitatem adhibue-

S. i.

runt

runt? C. Cannius æques  
 Romanus, homo nec in-  
 facetus, & satis literatus,  
 cum se Siraculas otia di (vt  
 ipse dicere solebat) nō ne-  
 gotiandi causa contulisset,  
 dictabat se hortulos ali-  
 quos velle emere, quō inui-  
 tare amicos, & vbi se ob-  
 lectare sine interpellatori-  
 bus posset. Quod cum per-  
 crebuisse, Pythius ei qui-  
 dam, qui argentariam face-  
 ret Siraculis, dixit venales  
 quidem se hortos non ha-  
 bere, sed licere vti Cannio  
 si vellet, vt suis, & simul ad  
 cenam hominem in hor-  
 tos inuitauit in posterū di-  
 em. Cum ille promississet,  
 tum Pythius vt argentari-  
 us qui esset apud omnes or-  
 dines graciosus, piscatores  
 ad se conuocauit: et ab is pe-  
 tituit vt ante suos hortulos  
 postera die piscaretur: dix-  
 itq̃ quid eos facere vellet.

of talke.

Cayus Cānius, of the E-  
 questrial order in Rome, a  
 man not vnpleasaut, and  
 wel ynough learned, when  
 he had gotte him to Siras-  
 cula, euen for pleasure, and  
 not for business (as he was  
 wont to tel) he bruted, y he  
 would buy some place of  
 plesure, whether he might  
 hyd his frends, & wher he  
 might delight himselfe w-  
 out troubles. Which when  
 it was spzed abroade, one  
 Pythius who kept a bank  
 of exchaunge at Siracusa  
 saide, that he had in deede  
 a pleasaut plat, howebeit  
 not to sel, yet Cānius if yt  
 pleased him, might vse it as  
 his owne, & therewith had  
 him to supper, against the  
 next day, when he had pro-  
 mised, then Pythius spke  
 a banke? who was wel in  
 fauour & al degrees, cal-  
 led vnto him certaine fy-  
 shermen, & required them,  
 that the nexte daye theye  
 woulde fische beefore his  
 ground & told them what  
 he woulde haue them doo.

Cannius

Cāni<sup>9</sup> came at his time to supper. Sumptuouslye there was prepared a number of fisherboates were befoze their eies. Eche man for his part, brought: that he had takē. The fish was powzed down at Pythius secte. Then quoth Cāni<sup>9</sup> I pray ye Pythius, what is this: y there is so great store of fish, so gooly a sort of boates: what maruaile? quod he again: for what so euer fish ther is about Syracusa, it is in this place: here is the watering place this ground these citizens can not wel spare. Cānius kindled with a desire to it, was earnest w Pythius, y he would sell it him. He made it strange at the first what nede many words: He obtaineth it: the mā being in loue w it, and riche, bought it for so much, as Pythius would aske: and bought it furnished: he putteth in suerties: & makes by the bargaine, Cānius the next day, desired his acquaintance thither, and came hū selfe beetymes: he

Ad cœnam tempore venit Cannius, erat opiparê à Pythio apparatus conuiuũ. Cymbarum ante hortulos multitudo, p se quisq; qd ceperat, afferebat: ante pedes Pythij pisces abijciebatur. Tum Cannius: queso inquit, quid est ô Pythi, tantumne piscium? tantumne Cymbarum? Et ille. Quid mirum, inquit hoc loco est, Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Cannius cupiditate, contendit à Pythio, vt venderet: grauatê ille primò: Quid multa? Impetrat: emit homo cupidus & locuples, tanti, quanti Pythius voluit et emit instructos, nomina facit, negotium conficit: Inuitat Cāni<sup>9</sup> postridiê familiares suos: venit ipse matu  
S.ij. rē scal-



## de Officiis.

scalmū nullū videt, querit  
ex proximo vicino, nū fe-  
rie quedā piscatorū essent.  
quōd eos nullos videret.  
Nulle (quod sciā) inquit il-  
le, sed hic piscari nulli solēt  
itaq, heri mirabar, quid ac-  
cidisset. Stomachari Canni-  
us, sed quid faceret? nōdū  
enim Aquilius collega &  
familiaris meus pertulerat  
de dolo malo formulas: in  
quibus ipsis cū ex eo que-  
reretur quid esset dol<sup>9</sup> ma-  
lus, respōdebat, cū esset ali-  
ud simulatū, aliud actum.  
Hoc quidē sanē luculēter  
vt ab homine perito defi-  
niendi. Ergo & Pythius:  
& ōnes aliud agētes, aliud  
simulantes, perfidi, impro-  
bi, malitiosi sunt. Nullum  
igitur factum eorum po-  
test vtile esse, cū sit tot  
vitijs inquinatum. Quōd si  
Aquiliana definitio vera  
est, ex omni vita simulatio

he saw neuer a bote: he en-  
quired of his next neighbour  
whether it were not some  
holy day & the fishermen,  
because he saw none of the  
None that I know quoth  
hee: but here none of them  
are wont to fische: & there-  
fore yesterday I maruey-  
led what chance was befall-  
ne. Canius began to chafe,  
but what could he do: for  
as yet Aquilius, my office  
scellow, & familiar, had not  
set forth the cases, & shold  
be coumpted couine, In &  
which same, when I de-  
maūded of him, what was  
Couine: he answered, whē  
one thing was pretended,  
and another done. Chys-  
doutlesse was very plaine-  
ly answered, as of a man  
skillfull in defining. There-  
fore both Pythius, and al,  
that do one thing, and pre-  
tend an other, bee false,  
wicked, and gilefull. Noe  
deede then of theirs can be  
profitable, when it is &  
so manye faultes be spot-  
ted. If Aquilius defini-  
tion bee true, oute of all  
māns life must false pretē-  
dinge, and

ding, & dissembling be banished. So every good man shall neither falsely pretend, nor dissemble, that he may buy or sell the better. And this couine also was punishable by the lawes: as deceitful gardschip, in the twelue table: and craftye beggylng yōgmen of thsir goods, by the lawe Lectorian: and without lawe, by iudgements, where the bill is put in, vpon good conscience. But of all other iudgements these woordes be most notable, that be of course in a case of arbitrement of mariage: the better, the iuster: and in a case of trust or confidence: That among honest men ther be honest dealing. What ther: either in þ. which is þ better, & iuster: can ther be any point of couine: or when it is said, among honest men let ther be honest dealing: can any thing disceitfullye or gilefully be donne: But couine (as saiethe Aquilius) is contained in fained pretence, and dissimulation. All ypinge therefore in makinge of bargaines is vtterly to be excluded. Let

dissimulatioq; tollenda est Ita nec vt emat meli<sup>9</sup>, nec vt vēdat, quicq; simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus Atq; iste dolus malus etiam legibus erat vindicat<sup>9</sup>, vt tutela. XII. tabulis & circumscrip̃tio adolescentium lege Lectoria, & sine lege iudicijs, in q̃bus ex fide bona agitur. Reliquorum autē iudiciorū hęc verba maximē excellunt, in arbitrio rei vxorię, melius, equius. In fiducia, vt inter bonos bene agier. Quid ergo aut in eo quod melius æquius est, potest vlla pars in esse fraudis: aut cūm dicitur inter bonos benē agier, quicquam agi dolosē aut maliosē potest? Dolus autem malus simulatione & dissimulatione ( vt ait Aquilius ) continetur. Tollendum est igitur in rebus contrahendis omne mendacium

## de Officiis.

non licitatore venditor,  
nec qui contra se liceatur,  
emptor opponet, vterq; si  
ad eloquendū venerit, nō  
plus quā semel eloquetur.

Quintus quidem Scevola  
P. fili<sup>9</sup>, cū postulasset, vt  
sibi fundus, cuius emptor  
erat, semel indicaretur, idq;  
venditor ita fecisset, dixit-  
setq; se pluris estimare, ad-  
didit centū millia: Nemo  
est qui hoc viri boni fuisse  
neget, sapientis negant: vt  
si minoris quā potuisset vē-  
didisset. Hec igitur est il-  
la pernicies, qđ alios bo-  
nos, alios sapientes existi-  
mant. Ex quo Ennius.

Nequicquam sapere sa-  
pientem, qui sibi ipsi pro-  
desse nequeat.

Verē id quidem, si quid es-  
set prodesse, mihi cum En-  
nio conueniret. Hecato-  
nem quidem Rhodiū dis-  
cipulum Panetij video,

not the seller sette a rayser  
of the price against y buier  
let not the buyer set one y  
may lower the price againe  
for him. If they both come  
to communication, theye  
shal talk but oce of y mat-  
ter. Whā Quint<sup>9</sup> Scevo-  
la, Publius sonne, had re-  
qured, y y price of y ground  
wherof he was a cheaper,  
should oce be shewed him,  
if y seller had so done, hee  
said, he valued it more wor-  
the, and gaue him more by  
xxv. hundred crowns. Ther  
is no mā y can denie, but  
this was y part of a good  
mā, a wise mā's part they  
deny it to be, euen as if the  
other shold haue sold it for  
lesse, than hee might haue  
gottē. This therfore is the  
mischief because they rec-  
kē good to be one sort, and  
wise of an other. Wherupō  
quoth Ennius.

The wise man his wit  
very vayn he may cal,  
If profit he can not  
himself therwithall,  
It were true in dede, if I  
agreed with Enn<sup>9</sup>, what



it is to profit. I se Vercato  
 & Rhodia Daneti<sup>r</sup> scholer  
 saeth in those boke, whi  
 che of duties hee wrote to  
 Quintus Tubero, that it  
 is a wise mans part doing  
 nothing against customes,  
 laws, & ordinaunces to ha-  
 ue a respect to his substāce.  
 For he couet not only for  
 our selues to bee riche, but  
 for our children, our kins-  
 folk, our friends, & specially  
 for y<sup>e</sup> cōmō weale. For the  
 substāce, & welth of euery  
 scire mā is the richnes of a  
 citie. Scenolaes dooinge,  
 wherof I spake a litle be-  
 fore, cā in no wise like Ve-  
 rato, for Scenola viteriye  
 denieth, y<sup>e</sup> he wil do ought  
 for his own gainsake, that  
 is not lawful. To this mā  
 nether gret praise oz thānk  
 is to be geuen. But, whe-  
 ther both false pretending, &  
 also dissembling be couine oz  
 no, few matters ther bee,  
 wherē this couin hath noc-  
 edo, & wheather, hee bee a  
 good mā, who p<sup>r</sup>ses whō  
 he mai, & hurts no bodi, ful  
 wel a iust mā, but net ly-  
 ghtly a good mā. Wee shall  
 finde. It

in ijs libris, quos de officijs  
 scripsit, Quinto Tuberoni  
 dicere, sapiētis esse nihil cō-  
 tra mores, leges, instituta sa-  
 cientē, habere rationē rei  
 familiaris. Neq; enim solū  
 nobis diuites esse volum<sup>us</sup>  
 sed liberis, propinquis, ami-  
 cis, maximēq; Reipub. Sin-  
 gulorū enim facultates &  
 copiē, diuitiē sunt ciuitatis  
 Huic Scenole factū ( de  
 quo paulō āte dixi) place-  
 re nullo modo potest. E-  
 tenim ōnino se negat fac-  
 turum cōpendij sui causa,  
 quod non liceat. Huic nec  
 la<sup>us</sup> magnatribuēda est, nec  
 gratia. Sed siue simulatio  
 & dissimulatio dolus mal<sup>us</sup>  
 est; perpaucę res sunt, in  
 quibus dolus ille malus  
 non versetur. Siue vir  
 bonus est is, qui prodest  
 quibus potest, nocet nemi-  
 ni; recte iustū virum, bo-  
 num nō facile reperiemus  
 S. iij. Num

## de Officiis.

Nunquam igitur est vtile peccare quia sepe est turpe: & quia sepe est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est vtile. Ac de iure qui de prediorum facitum est apud nos iure civili, ut in his vendendis vitia etiam dicerebantur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam cum ex XII. tabulis satis esset cautum ea praestari, quae essent lingua nuncupata, quae qui inficiatus esset duplicem poenam subiret: a iure consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta. Quicquid enim est in praedio vitij, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. Ut cum in arce augurum Augures acturi essent, iussissentque Titum Claudium Centimalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri

It is neuer profitable the to do euill, because it is euerinoze dishonest: & because it is alwaies honest to be a good man, it is alwaies profitable. And surely touching the title of land, it is ordeined with the law by ciuile law: in selling of it, the faultes also should be told, whiche were knowen to the seller for wheraz by the twelue tables it was sufficiente provided: & those thinges should be pfozmed whiche were declared in woorde: which who so would deny, should forsaite double damage: ther was also by the Judges of the lawe, a paine set for concealement for what soeuer fault were in the lande: if the seller knew it, except expresselye he had declared it: they decreed, & it ought to be made good. As when in the towne the Augures were about their pphesying by the foules flight: & had commaunded Titus Claudius Centimalus, whoe had houses in mount Celie, to pul those downe,

down, whose height should  
 let thei prophesying: Clau-  
 dius did set them to sale, &  
 sold the Ilande: Publius  
 Calphurnius Lanarius  
 bought it. He was cōmaū-  
 ded the verpe same by the  
 Augurs and so, whē Cal-  
 phurnius had pulled them  
 downe. & vnderstoode, that  
 Claudius had set the hou-  
 ses to sale, after he had bē  
 cōmaunded of the Augurz  
 to pulle them downe: hee  
 draue him to arbitrement:  
 for al y he oughte in that  
 case to recōpence him, of  
 good conscience. Marcus  
 Cato, this our Catoes fa-  
 ther, made the award. for  
 as other ar named frō their  
 fathers: so this who begat  
 such a star is to be named  
 frō his sonne. He therfore  
 as iudge, gaue sētence th<sup>o</sup>  
 y seing he knew the thing  
 at the putting of it to sale,  
 and did not declare it: hee  
 ought to render y hier hys  
 damages. He therfore iud-  
 ged, it stode w good consci-  
 ence: that the fault whiche  
 the seller knew should bee  
 knowen to the bier. That  
 and

cas, quorū altitudo office-  
 ret auspicijs: Claudius pro-  
 scripsit insulam: vendidit:  
 emit Publius Calphurnius  
 Lanarius. Huic ab Auguri-  
 bus illud idem denuncia-  
 tum est. Itaq; Calphurnius  
 cū demolitus esset, cog-  
 nouissetq; Claudium edes  
 postea proscriptisse, quā  
 esset ab Auguribus demoli-  
 ri iussus: arbitrum illum ad-  
 egit: quid sibi de ea re face-  
 re oporteret ex fide bona.  
 M. Cato sententiam dixit,  
 (hui<sup>o</sup> nostri Catoñ pater)  
 Vt enim ceteri ex patrib<sup>o</sup>,  
 sic hic, qui illud lumen pro-  
 genuit, ex filio est nominā-  
 dus. Is igitur iudex ita pro-  
 nunciavit: cū in venun-  
 dando rem eam scisset, &  
 non pronunciauisset, ēpto-  
 ri damnum prestare o-  
 portere. Igitur ad fidem  
 bonam statuit ptinere, no-  
 tum esse empori vitium,  
 qd' nosset vēditor. Quod  
 si



## de Officiis.

si rectè dijudicauit, non and if he gaue a true iudg-  
 rectè frumentarius ille, nō ment, neither well did the  
 rectè ædium pestilencium corn marchant afore, ney-  
 venditor tacuit. Sed huius ther wel did this cōragio?  
 modi reticentia iure civili house seller in holding hys  
 ones comprehendi nō pos concealementes can not all  
 sunt: quæ autē possunt, di be comprehendeb in y ciuil  
 ligenter tenentur. M. Mari lawe, but such as may, bee  
 us Gratidianus propin- per sitlye contayned. Mar-  
 quus noster C. Sergio cus Marius Gratidianus,  
 ratę vendiderat edes eas our kinselman, had solde to  
 quas ab eodem ipse pau- Caius Sergius Orata y  
 cis ante annis emerat. He house, which he had boght  
 Sergio seruiebant, sed hoc of him a few yerez before.  
 in mancipio Marius non This house did a certaine  
 dixerat, adducta res in iudi seruike to Sergi<sup>us</sup>, but Ma-  
 cium est. Oratam Crassus, ri<sup>us</sup> had not declared y<sup>e</sup> sam  
 Gratidianum defendebat in y<sup>e</sup> tinerie of Serlin. The  
 Antonius. Ius Crassus, matter was brought to y<sup>e</sup>  
 gebat, quod vitium vendi law, Crass<sup>us</sup> pleaded for O  
 tor non dixisset, sciens rata, Antoni<sup>us</sup> for Gratidi-  
 id oportere prestari, equi- an<sup>us</sup>. Crass<sup>us</sup> stode vpon the  
 ratem Antonius :: quoni- letter of the lawe, because  
 am id vitium ignotum Ser y seller, knowinge the dis-  
 gio non fuisset, qui illas commoditie, had not tolde  
 des vëdidisset, nihil fuisse it, that it ought to be made  
 good, Antonius enforced  
 the equitie of the lawe, by-  
 cause that dyscommoditie  
 was not vnknoſe to Ser-  
 gi<sup>us</sup>, who had sold the same  
 house, that it was nothing  
 needefull too bee declared,  
 and

and that he was not deceyued, who vnderstoode, of what title it was that hee hadde boughte. To what purpose tendes all this? That ye may perceiue, y couine lyked not our auncestours. But one way the lawes condemn couine, another way y philosophers, the lawes, as farre as by open dedde they can gather vppon matters, the philosophers, as far as by reasonne, and vnderstandinge they can comprehend. **W**ea so therfore requireth this, that nothinge suttelly nothinge fainedly, nothinge deceitfully be done. Is it the anye deceite, to ppyche the toyle, although you go not about too rouse, nor chase y game? For y very game lights vpon it oftentimes. When no body folowes the. So when you offer poure house to sale, youe sette vppour byll, as a nette, yoswe sell the house, because of y faultes, some body happes vppon it vnware of them, though I see, this thorough corruption of vse, neither

necesse dici: nec eū esse deceptū qui id quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret. quorū sum hec? vt illud intelligas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos. Sed aliter leges, aliter Philosophi tollūt astutias. Leges, quatenus manu tenereres possunt: philosophi quatenus ratione et intelligētia. Ratio igitur hoc postulat, ne qd infidiosē, ne quid simulatē nequid fallaciter. Sunt nē igitur insidię, tendere plagas, etiā si excitaturus non sis bestiam, nec agitaturus. Ipse ferē nullo insequente sepe incidunt. Sic tu cū edes proscribas, tabulam tanquam plagam ponas, domum propter vitia vendas, in eam aliquis incurrat imprudens; hoc quāquam video ppter deprauationem cōsuetudinis neque

neque more turpe haberi  
neque aut lege sanciri, aut  
iure civili: naturę tamē le-  
ge sancitum est. Societas  
enim est (quod etsi sæpe  
dictum est, dicendū tamē  
est sepi⁹) latissimē quidem  
que pateat hominū inter  
homines: interior eorū qui  
eiusdem gentis sunt: propi-  
or eorum, qui eiusdem ci-  
uitatis. Itaque maiores al-  
liud ius gentium aliud  
ius civile esse voluerunt.  
Quod enim civile non idē  
continuō gentium: quod  
autem gentium, idem ciui-  
le esse debet. Sed nos ve-  
ri iuris, germanęque iusti-  
tię solidam & expressam  
effigiem nullam tenemus,  
vmbra & imaginibus uti-  
mur: eas ipsas utinam  
sequeremur. Feruntur e-  
nim ex optimis naturę &  
veritatis exemplis.

Nam quāti sunt verba illa

neither by custome is call-  
ed dishonest, neither by or-  
dinance, or ciuil law of de-  
crees: yet by the law of na-  
ture it is forbidden. For  
ther is a felowship of mē  
amongst men (which thing  
although it hath ben often  
times spoken of, yet often-  
ner it must be spoken) whi-  
che in dede very largely ex-  
tendeth: & a nerer ther is of  
those, who be of one naciō:  
& a nier of them, who bee  
of one citie. Therfore our  
aunceters woulde needes  
haue the law of natiōs to  
be one thing, and the ciuil  
law another. For what so  
is the ciuil lawe, the same  
is not cōsequently the law  
of nations: but what so is  
the law of natiōs, the sãe  
must nedes be y ciuil law  
But we kepe no sounde, &  
expresse forme of very law  
& meere iustice: we vse y  
shadow and images ther-  
of: yea and euen those same  
I would, we did followe.  
For thei be taken out of y  
best principles of nature, &  
paterns of troth. For how  
precious be those wordes.  
That



That not by you, or your  
pines, I be snared or de-  
ceiued, how golden words  
be those: that among good  
men good dealing ought to  
bee without deceiuinge.

But who be good men, &  
what is good dealing, it is  
a great question. Quintus  
Sceuola the chiefe bishop  
saide, there was gret sub-  
stance of matter in al those  
arbitrements, in whyche  
they should be tretting ac-  
cording to good conscience  
and the name of good con-  
science he iudged to reache  
very farre: and that it had  
adoo in gardinships, com-  
panies, matters of truste,  
comaundements, thinges  
bought, sold, hired, and let  
out: by which y<sup>e</sup> scelowship  
of many life is vpholden:  
in these thinges he saide, yt  
was the office of a greate  
iudge to determine, what  
eche man should do to ano-  
ther, specially seing y<sup>e</sup> iud-  
gements in moste menne  
bee contrarie one to ano-  
ther, wherfore couin must  
bee vtterlye auoyded: and  
that wyllynesse whyche  
will

Vt ne propter te, fidemue  
tuam, captus fraudatusue  
sim? quàm illa aurea? Vt in  
ter bonos benè agier oportet  
& sine fraudatiōe. Sed  
qui sint boni, & quid sit  
benè agere, magna quæstio  
est. Quintus quidem  
Sceuola Pont. Max, sum-  
mam vim esse dicebat in  
omnibus ijs arbitrijs, in qui-  
bus adderetur ex fide bo-  
na. Fideique bonæ nomen  
existimabat manare latissi-  
mè: idquæ versari in tu-  
telis, societatibus: fiducijs  
mandatis, rebus emptis, vē-  
ditis, conductis, locatis, qui-  
bus vitæ societas contine-  
tur. In his magni esse iu-  
dicis, statuere (presertim  
cū in plerisque essent iu-  
dicia contraria) quid quæ-  
q; cuiq; præstare oportere-  
ret. Quocirca astutiæ tol-  
lende sunt, eaque malitia.  
quæ vult quidem videri  
se

## de Officiis.

se esse prudentiā, sed abiectum Will needes haue it selfe  
 ab ea, distatq; plurimum. seeme to bee prudence, but  
 Prudentia est enim locata it is farr from it, & differs  
 in delectu bonorum, et ma- very muche. For prudence  
 lorum. Malicia si omnia, que is placed in the choyse of  
 turpia sunt, mala sunt, ma- good, and euill, wilines, if  
 la bonis, anteponit. Nec ve al things be euill, which be  
 ro in preclis solum ius ciui dishonest, preferreth euill be  
 le ductū à natura malitiā, fore good. And not only in  
 fraudemq; vindicat, sed et in matters of land, the ciuile  
 am in mancipiorum vendi law, & hath his original of  
 tione venditorum fraus om nature, doth punish wily-  
 nis excluditur. Qui enim nes, & couine, but also in  
 scire debuit de sanitate, de sale of slaues & nies, al co  
 fuga, de furtis, prestat edic uine of the sellers is forbid  
 to edilium. Heredū alia cau den. For he & should haue  
 sa est. Ex quo intelligitur, known of their heltheful-  
 quoniā iuris natura fons sit, nez, of their fugitiuenes of  
 hoc secundū naturā esse, ne their theuishnes, doth ma-  
 minem id agere, vt ex alte ke satisfaction by & Ediles  
 rius preclatur inscitia. Nec decree. Otherwise is & case  
 vila pernitias vite maior of inheritours. Whereof is  
 inueniri potest, quā in done to vnderstand because  
 malitia simulatio intelli nature is the fountaine of  
 gentia. law, & this is according to  
 Ex quo illa innumerabilia nature & no mā go aboute  
 nascuntur; vt vtilia cum by anothers ignorance, to  
 make his own gain. For  
 any greater destruction of  
 mans life can be found thā  
 of a wilines, falsely to dis-  
 semble ones vnderstanding  
 whereof those innume-  
 rable inconueniences do  
 growe, that profitable  
 things

things seeme to fight with  
 honest. For how many wil  
 be found, who being sure to  
 be free from punishment, and  
 knowledge of all men, can re-  
 strain from doing wrong: Let  
 vs make a proof (if it please  
 ye) in those examples, where-  
 in the common sort of men per-  
 haps do not think they do  
 amisse. For it falleth not in  
 this place to speak of mur-  
 derers, poisoners, wilfo-  
 gers, thieves, & robbers of  
 the common treasure, who not  
 by swords, & reasonings of  
 Philosophers, but by chain-  
 es & prisonment are to bee  
 punished. But these things  
 let vs consider which they  
 do, who be counted, good.  
 Certain men brought out  
 of Grece to Rome a coun-  
 terfet will of Lucius Mi-  
 nuci<sup>9</sup> Basil<sup>9</sup>, a very rich  
 man, & to the intent they  
 might the easelier proue it  
 they did put in as heirs to  
 them Marcus Crassus, &  
 Quintus Hortens<sup>9</sup>, men  
 of most power in the sa-  
 me citie. Whoe when they  
 suspected it to be forged, &  
 were not guilty of any fault  
 in their owne conscience  
 there

honestis pugnare videatur  
 Quotus enim quisq; reperi-  
 etur, qui impunitate & ig-  
 noratione omnium, proposita ab-  
 stinere possit iniuria. Peri-  
 clitemur (si placet) et in ijs  
 quidem exemplis, in quibus  
 peccari vulgus hominum for-  
 tasse non putat. Neque enim de  
 sicarijs, veneficis, testame-  
 ntarijs, furibus, peculatorib<sup>9</sup>  
 hoc loco differendum est, qui  
 non verbis sunt & disputacio-  
 ne philosophorum, sed vici-  
 lis et carcere castigandi. Sed  
 hec consideremus que faci-  
 ut ij. q. habetur boni. L. Mi-  
 nutij Basilij locupletis ho-  
 minis falsum testamentum quod  
 a Grecia Roma attulerunt.  
 Quod quo facilius obtine-  
 rent, scripserunt heredes se-  
 cum M. Crassum & Quintum  
 Hortensium, homines eius-  
 de civitatis potentissimos,  
 qui cum illud falsum esse  
 suspicarentur, sibi autem  
 nullius esset conscij culpe  
 alieni



## de Officiis.

alieni facinoris munusculū they refused not & p̄ety re  
 non repudiauerunt. Quid ward of an other falsehood  
 ergo? sat in hoc est, vt non what saye wee then? Is  
 deliquisse videantur? Mihi this inough that thei seme  
 quidē non videtur: quan not to haue done any fault  
 quā alterū amaui viuū, al- To me truly it semes not  
 terū non odi mortuū. Sed so: although the one I lo-  
 cūm Basilii. M. Satyrium ued being aliue, & other I  
 sororis filium nomen suū hate not being deade. But  
 ferre voluisset, eumq; fecif when Basilii would ha-  
 fet heredem, hūc autē dico ue had Marcus Satirius  
 patronum agri Piceni & his sisterz sonne to bere his  
 Sabini (ō turpē notā tem- name: and had made him  
 porū illorum) non erat æ his heir: I mean him who  
 quū principes ciuitatis rē was protectour of & coun-  
 habere, ad Satyrium nihil trey of Picene, & Sabine,  
 prēter nomen puenire. E (A shamful stain, in those  
 tenim si is, qui non defēdit daies) it was not reason, &  
 iniuriam, neq; propulsat a the rulers of the citie had  
 suis cū potest, iniustē facit the goods, and nothing but  
 vt in primo libro disserui the name descended to Sa-  
 qualis habendus estis, qui tirius. For if hee, & dothe  
 non modō nō repellit, sed not fence of iniurie, & kepe  
 etiam adiuuat iniuriam. it a way from his, whē hee  
 Mihi quidem etiam verē may, doth vniustlye: as in  
 hereditates non honeste my first booke I haue dis-  
 videntur, si sint malitio- puted: what maner a man  
 sis blanditijs officiorum, is he to bee coumpted: who  
 not only doth not fence of,  
 but also fundereth an iniu-  
 rie? And true inheritance  
 also seemes to mee not  
 honest if it be purchased by  
 wply flatteringe ducties:  
 and

and not by truthe, but by false faining, But in suche cases, one thinge is wont sometime to seme profitable, an other, honest. yet vntruelye it so seemeth: for alike is y rule of profit, as of honestie. who foreseeth not this: no guile, no myschief shal faile in him. For th<sup>e</sup> imagin<sup>g</sup>, this in dede is honest, but this is profitable: he wil take vpon hym by error to sonder thinges coupled together by nature which is y wellspring of al deceptes, wycked deedes, and mischises. Therfore if a good mā haue such power y if he do but beck with his finger, his name maye crepe into the testamēt of y riche let him not vse this power: no not thoughe hee know for certenite, that no man at all wyll once mistrust it. But if ye shoulde giue this power to Marc<sup>o</sup> Crass<sup>o</sup>, that with a beck of his finger, he might be put in as heire, beinge no heire i dede he wold (beleue me) leape for ioy in y opē strete. But a iuste man, and hee, whom

nō veritate, sed simulationē quēsitē. Atqui in talibus rebus aliud vtile interdū, aliud honestū videri solet falso. Nā eadē vtilitatis, q̄ honestatis est regula, qui hoc nō prouiderit: ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus: Sic enim cogitās: Est istud quidē honestū, verū hoc expedit, res a natura copulatas audebit errore diuellere, qui fons est fraudū, maleficiorū, scelerum omniū. Itaq; si vir bonus habeat hanc vim vt si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletū testamēta nomen eius irrepere, hac vi nō vtatur: nec si exploratū quidē habeat, id omninō neminē vnquā suspicaturū. At si dares hāc vim M. Crasso, vt digitorū percussione heres posset script<sup>o</sup> esse qui re vera nō esset heres: i foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo autem iustus, isq;

## de Officiis.

quē sentimus virū bonū,  
nihil cuiquam, quod in se  
transferat, detrahet. Hoc  
qui admiratur, is se, qui sit  
vir bonus, nescire fatetur.

At verō si quis voluerit a-  
nimi sui complicatam no-  
tionē euoluere: iam se ip-  
se doceat, eum virū bonū  
esse, qui profit quibus pos-  
sit, noceat nemini, nisi la-  
cessitus iniuria. Quid er-  
gō hic nō noceat, qui quo-  
dam quasi veneno pficiat  
vt veros heredes moueat,  
in eorum locum ipse suc-  
cedat? Non igitur faciat  
(dixerit quis) quod vtile  
sit, quodq; expediat? im-  
mō intelligat, nihil nec ex-  
pedire, nec vtile esse quod  
sit iniustum, hoc qui non  
dedicerit, bonus vir esse  
non poterit. Fimbriam cō-  
sularem audiebam de pa-  
tre nostro puer, iudicem  
M. Luctatio Pythiē  
fuisse equiti Romano,

whō we count a good mā,  
will catch nothing from a-  
ny man. to call it by his  
selfe. who so hath wonder  
at this: hee confesseth hym  
self not to know, who is a  
good man. But if a manne  
will vnfold the secret know  
ledge of his minde: by and  
by hee may enforme hym  
selfe, that he is a good man  
who doth good to whō hee  
may: and hurteth no body,  
but prouoked by iniury.

Howe then? dothe not hee  
hurte another, who wylz  
(as it were) with a certein  
popson: that the true heirs  
he may displace. and make  
him selfe succede in theire  
roume? May hee not then  
doo that, wyl some saye,  
whiche is profitable, and  
whiche is auailable? May  
let him know that nothing  
neither auailleth, nor is pro-  
fitable, whiche is vniuste.  
This who so hath not ler-  
ned, cannot be a good man  
I heard of my father, whē  
I was a boy: & Fibria sō  
time Consul, was iuge to  
Marc? Luctati? Pithias  
one of & Equestriall order  
of Rome.



of Rome, in deede honest: sanē honesto cū is sponti-  
 whē he had put in suerties onē fecisset, ni bonus vir  
 to answer the action, if hēc esset. Itaq; ei dixisse Fim-  
 were not found a good mā briam, se illā rem nunquā  
 that therfore Fimbria said iudicaturum: ne aut spo-  
 vnto him, he would neuer liaret fama probatum ho-  
 giue iugement of the case: minē, si contra iudicasset:  
 lest he shoulde either rob a aut statuisse videretur vi-  
 tried mā of his good name rum bonum aliquē esse, cū  
 if he had iudged agāst hī: ea res innumerabilib⁹ of-  
 or els shoulde seeme to haue ficijs & laudibus contine-  
 determined, ȳ there is sōc retur . Huic igitur viro  
 good man: wheras ȳ thng bono, quē Fimbria etiam,  
 consisteth in duties, & com nō modo Socrates noue-  
 mendacions innumerable. rat, nullo modo videri po-  
 Too this good man then, test, quicquā esse vtile, qd'  
 whōe also Fimbria, & not nō honestū sit . Itaq; talis  
 onely Socrates had cōcei- vir non modō facere: sed  
 ued: can no way ought ap- nec cogitare quidē quic-  
 peare to be profitable, that quā audebit, quod nō au-  
 is not honeste. Therefore deat predicare. Hoc nōne  
 such a man wyll not be so est turpe dubitare philoso-  
 bolde to do, no nor purpose phos, quē ne rustici quidē  
 any thinge, whiche he dare dubitent? a quibus natum  
 not auer. It is not a shāe est id , quod iam tritum  
 for philosophers to dout in est vetustate prouerbi-  
 these thinges, whercof the um. Cūm enim fidem ali-  
 clownes of the cōūtrie doo cuius, bonitatēq; laudant:  
 make no dout at al? From  
 whom is sprong that pro-  
 uerbe, which nowc is well  
 wzorne by cōtinuance. For  
 when they praise any mā's  
 conscience, and goodnesse:  
 they

## de Officiis.

dignū esse dicūt, quicū in tenebris mices. Hoc quam habet vim, nisi illā, nihil expedire quod non deceat, etiam si id possis nullo re-fellente obtinere? Vides nē igitur hoc prouerbio, neq; Gygi illi posse veniā dari, neq; huic quē paulō ante fingebam, digitorum percussione hereditates omniū posse conuertere? Vt enim quod turpe est, id quāuis occultetur, tamen honestū fieri nullo modo potest: sic qd' honestum non est, id vtile vt sit effici non potest, aduersante & repugnante natura. At enim cū permagna prēmia sunt, est causa peccandi. C. Marius cū a spe cōsulatus longe abesset, & iā septimum annum post prēturam iaceret, nequē petiturus vnquam cōsulatum videretur Q. Metellum cuius legatus erat,

they say, he is such a man, as ye may play w<sup>th</sup> him blūd fold. What other meanynge hath that, but this, y<sup>e</sup> no-thing is expediēt, which is not comelye, although you may obtain it without any mans resistāce. Do ye not se thā by this prouerb, that neither y<sup>e</sup> same Gyges, can be bozne w<sup>th</sup>, nor this other whom erewhile I sayned w<sup>th</sup> the wagging of his finger to bee able to turne to him self al incennes inheri-tance: For as the thinges whiche is dishoneste, although it be closelye kept, can no way yet be made honest, so y<sup>e</sup> thīg which is not honest, cannot be brought to passe to be profitable, e-uen nature being againste it, & w<sup>th</sup>standing it. But yet where ver ye great bybes be, ther is occasion of euill doing. When Caius Ma-rius was farre of frō hope of y<sup>e</sup> Cōsulship, & vii. yeres after his Prētōrship, laye stil nor seemed as one, y<sup>e</sup> e-uer woulde labour for the Cōsulshippe, to the peo-ple of Roine hee accused

Quin-

Quintus Metellus, a noble man, & citizen, whose  
 ambassador he was, when he was sent too Rome from  
 him, being his captain how he prolonged the warres,  
 & saide, if they had made him Consul, he would in  
 a short space haue brought Jugurtha, either quicke  
 or dead, intoo they subiection of the people of Rome  
 And so in deede hee was made Consul, but he swar-  
 ued from all truste, & iustice, who by false accusation,  
 brought in an enuie a very good, & graue citize whose  
 ambassador hee was, and from whom hee was sent.  
 For our Gracidianus truelye did the dutie of a  
 good man, when hee was Pretor, & the Tribunes of  
 the people had called vnto the company of the Pre-  
 tors, that they might be set a standerd of the coynge by a  
 comon consert. For in those daies the mony was made  
 so too fall, & rise, & no man could know, what he had.  
 They penned a decree by a comon agrement vpon a pain;  
 and

summum virū; & ciuē, cū  
 ab eo imperatore suo Ro-  
 mam missus esset, apud Po-  
 pu. Roma. criminatus est,  
 bellum illū pducere: si se  
 COS. fecissent breui tem-  
 pore aut viuū, aut mortu-  
 um Iugurtham se in pote-  
 statē Po. Ro. redacturum.  
 Itaq; factus est ille quidem  
 COS. sed a fide, iusticiaq;  
 discessit: qui optimum &  
 grauissimū ciuem, cuius le-  
 gatus, & a quo missus esset  
 in inuidiā falso crimine ad-  
 duxerit. Nec noster quidē  
 Gracidianus officio boni  
 viri functus est, tunc cū  
 pretor esset collegiumq;ue  
 pretorum tribuni plebis  
 adhibuissēt, vt res numma-  
 ria de communi sententia  
 constitueretur. Iactabatur  
 enim temporibus illis nū-  
 mus, sic vt nemo posset  
 scire quid haberet. Con-  
 scripserunt, communi-  
 ter edictum cum pœna,



## de Officiis.

atque iudicio: constitue- and condemna- tion: and ap-  
runtq; vt omnes simul in pointed, that they altogea-  
rostra post meridiem def- ther at after noone, would  
cenderent, & ceteri quide go down into Rostra. And  
alius alio. Marius a subse- then al the reste went eche  
lijs in rostra recta, idque man his way: Marius fro  
quod communiter com- the Senatours benche got  
positum fuerat, solus edi him straight to Rostra, &  
xit, & ea res (si queris) ei alone proclaimed y, which  
magno honori fuit: omni by a common consent was  
bus vicis statue facta: ad made, and that thing, if ye  
eas thus & cerei. desire to know, was to hi  
Quid multa? Nemo vn- a greate honour, in all the  
quam multitudini fuit cha streets, images were made  
rior. Hec sunt, que contur him, and to the same offe-  
bant homines in delibera- red was incense & lightes  
tione nonnunquam: cum of waxe. what nede manpe  
id, in quo violatur equi- wordes? No manne was  
tas, est non ita magnum: there euer more beloued of  
illud autem quod ex eo y multitude. These be the  
paritur, permagnum vi- things which trouble men  
detur, vt Mario preripere oftentimes, in takinge of  
collegis, & tribunis pleb- aduise-ment, when y thing  
popularem gratiam, non wherin equitie is broke, is  
ita turpe: consulem ob not counted so greate, but  
eam rem fieri, quod si- that, whiche is gotten by  
bi tunc proposuerat, such dealing, semeth mar-  
and the Tribunes, but to ueylous great As to Ma-  
bee made Consull for that  
doing, which the he had set  
before

before his etc, yt seemed be  
 rie profitabl. But one rule  
 there is of all, whiche I  
 would faine haue you tho-  
 roughly to know, either  
 thing which semeth profit-  
 table, let it not be dishonest  
 or if it be dishonest, lette it  
 not seme profitable. What  
 shal we then say? May we  
 either take this Marius,  
 or y other, for a good mā?  
Wende & straine your vn-  
derstandinge, to see what  
shape, forme, and ymage  
of a good mā is in it. Doth  
 it then commonly befall in  
 a good man to lye for his  
 profit, to accuse, to preuent  
 or deceiue? Or a suretye  
 nothing lesse. Is there the  
 any thing so precious, or a-  
 ny gaine so much to be de-  
 sired, y ye shoulde there  
 fore lese the glozpe, & name  
 of a good manne? What is  
 there so much, that this y  
 fit (as they cal it) is able to  
 bring vs, as it may pul frō  
 vs, in case it take away the  
 name of a good mā, & spoil  
 vs of trouthe, and iustice?  
 for what differēce is ther  
 whether one shape turn hi  
 selfe

valdè vtile videbatur. Sed  
 omniū vna regula est, quā  
 cupio tibi esse notissimam  
 aut illud, quod vtile vide-  
 tur, turpe ne sit: aut si tur-  
 pe est, ne esse vtile vide-  
 tur. Quid igitur possum  
 nē, aut illū Mariū virū  
 bonum iudicare, aut hūc?  
 Explica, atque excute in-  
 telligentiam tuam, vt vi-  
 deas quē sit in ea species,  
 forma, & nocio viri boni.  
 Cadit ergo in virum bo-  
 num mentiri emolumentū  
 sui causa, criminari, preri-  
 pere, fallere? Nihil profec-  
 tū minus. Est ergo vlla  
 res tanti, aut commodum  
 vllum tam expetendum,  
 vt viri boni et splēdorem  
 & nomen amittas. Quid  
 est qd' afferre tantū vtili-  
 tas ista, quē dicitur, possit,  
 quātū auferre, si boni viri  
 nomen eripuerit, fidē iusti-  
 ciāq; detraxerit. Quid enī  
 interest vtrū ex homine

# de Officiis.

se cōuertat quis in beluā: an in hominis, figura im-  
nitate gerat beluē? Quid  
qui ōnia recta & honesta  
negligunt dummodō po-  
tentia cōsequantur? Nōne  
idē faciunt quod is, qui e-  
tiam socerum habere vo-  
luit eum, cuius ipse auda-  
cia potens esset? vtile e-  
nim videbatur plurimū  
posse alterius inuidia. Id  
quā iniustū in patriam, &  
quā turpe esset, nō vide-  
bat. Ipse autē socer in ore  
sēp grēcos versus Euripi-  
dis de Phēnissis habebat,  
quos dicā, vt potero, incō-  
dite fortasse, sed tamē vt  
res possit intelligi.

self from a man to a beast,  
or vnder the fourm of mā,  
beares in him the brutishe  
cruelnesse of beast: what of  
them, who set at nought al  
good & honest thinges, so  
they may attaine to pow-  
er: do they not, euen as hee  
did: whoe woulde needes  
haue him to his father in  
lawe, by whose bolde en-  
terprises he might beare a  
swey: For to him it see-  
med pfitable to be of much  
power, by anothers enuy,  
but he saw not how vniust  
how vnprofitable, how vn-  
honest it was for his coun-  
trei. But as for his father  
in law, he had alwaies in  
his mouthe Euripides  
greke verses of y<sup>e</sup> Phēnissi-  
ans, which I wil expresse  
as well as I can: Per-  
chance wout their grace,

NAM SI VIOLAN-  
DVM EST IVS, REG-  
NANDI GRATIA VI-  
OLANDVM EST, A-  
LIIS REBVS PIETA-  
TEM COLAS.

but yet so as the meaning  
may be conceiued.  
If breach of lawes, a mā  
shal vndertake:  
Hee must them boldlye  
break for kingdōs sake:

*In eche thing els: looko  
you regard the right  
ezechiel 13/16  
that will be in laqua tuu*



Vainous was & Etioles  
or rather Euripides: who  
excepted not onely this,  
which was moſte detesta-  
ble. Why do we the gather  
theſe trifling caſes, as con-  
cerning inheritaunce, mer-  
chandiſe & deceitfull ſale?  
Maye beholde hym, that  
ſought to be king ouer the  
people of Rome, & al nati-  
ons, & broughte it to paſſe.  
This kinde of deſire who  
ſo counteth honeſt, hee is  
not well in his ſwitt: for he  
alloſweth the ouerthrow of  
lawe and libertie, and the  
cruel, & deteſtable oppreſſi-  
on of them he rekens a glo-  
rious matter.

With what kinde of chldig  
the, or rating rather maye  
I attēpte to turne hun frō  
ſo great an errour, who cō-  
feſſeth, it is not honeſt to  
raigne as king in that city  
which both hath ben, and  
ought to bee free, & yet ac-  
counts it profitable for him  
that can bring it to paſſe.

For, O ye goddes immoz-  
tal, can the moſt ſhamefull  
& cruell murder of a mans  
own cōtrei be profitable,  
yca

Capitalis Etioles vel po-  
tius Euripides, qui id vnū  
qd' omniū ſcleratiffimum  
fuerat, exceperit. Quid igi-  
tur minuta colligimus, he-  
reditates, mercaturas, ven-  
ditiones fraudulentas?

Eccē tibi qui rex po. Ro.  
dominusq; omniū gentiū  
eſſe cōcupierit, idq; pſece-  
rit. Hāc cupiditatē ſi quis  
honeſtā eſſe dicit, amens  
eſt, probat enim legū & li-  
bertatis interitum, earūq;  
oppreſſionē tetram & de-  
teſtabilem, glorioſam pu-  
tat.

Qui autē fateatur ho-  
neſtum nō eſſe ī ea ciuita-  
te, quę libera fuit, quęquē  
eſſe debeat, regnare: ſed ei  
qui id facere poſſit, eſſe v-  
tile: qua hunc obiurgatio-  
ne, aut quo potius conui-  
cio a tanto errore coner-  
auerere? poteſt enim (dij  
immortales) cuiquam eſſe  
vtile ſœdiſſimum & ter-  
rimū paracidiū patrię?

## de Officiis.

quantuis is qui se eo obstri-  
xerit, ab oppressis ciuibus  
parens nominetur? Hone-  
state igitur dirigenda uti-  
litas est & quidam sic, ut  
hec duo verba inter se di-  
screpare, sed tamen vnum  
sonare videantur. Nūc ha-  
beo ad vulgi opinionē, q̄  
maior utilitas quā regnādi  
esse possit? Nihil contra in-  
utilius ei, qui id iniuste cō-  
secutus sit inuenio, cū ad  
veritatē cepi reuocare ra-  
tionem. Possunt enim cui  
quā esse utiles angores, so-  
licitudines, diurni & no-  
cturni metus, via insidia-  
rum periculorumq; ple-  
nissima? **MULTI INI-  
QUI ATQVE INFI-  
DELES REGNO :  
PAUCI BONI SVNT**  
inquit Accius. At cui reg-  
no? quōd a Tantalo & Pe-  
lope proditum iure obti-  
nebatur : Nam quantō  
plures ei regi putas, quicū

pea though he that hath be-  
trayed himself in such blood  
be cleaped of the oppressed  
subiects parent of the com-  
mon weale? Profit there-  
fore is to be directed by ho-  
nestie, and that so, as these  
two wordes may seeme to  
differ in them selues in ter-  
mes, and yet too sounde all  
one in meaninge. Nowe to  
the opinion of the common  
people. What greater pro-  
fite can there bee, than too  
raigne, and too rule? Con-  
trarie wise I find nothing  
more vnprofitable for him,  
who vniustly hath attained  
it when I apply reason to  
y<sup>e</sup> trowth. For can greues,  
cares, daylie, and nightye  
fearcs, & a life ful of snares  
and dangers bee profita-  
ble to any man?

About y<sup>e</sup> sekig of y<sup>e</sup> crown:  
many euil & faithlesse be.  
But few good mē i such a  
a mā shal lightly se (case  
quod Acti<sup>9</sup>. But to which  
crown: The same, y<sup>e</sup> from  
Tantalus, and Pelops  
descēding, was by iust titl  
possessed For how manye  
mo, think ye were vntre,  
vntre

but truste to þ king: who  
 with an army of Romaine  
 people oppressed þ people  
 of Rome: and forced that  
 citie to bee subiect to hym:  
 which was not only fre of  
 it self, but also a ruler of o-  
 ther nations: what bloteth  
 of conscience, suppose you,  
 had hee in his heart: what  
 woundes of remorse: But  
 whose lyfe canne be ought  
 worth to himself: when þ  
 state of his life is such, that  
 who so takes it frō hym,  
 shalbe in most fauour and  
 fame: In case these thinges  
 be not profitable, which spe-  
 ciall seeme so to be: because  
 they be full of shame & re-  
 proch, we ought now to be  
 fully perswaded, þ nothings  
 is profitable, which is not  
 honest. Notwithstandinge  
 the same, both at diuers o-  
 ther times, & namely in the  
 warres of Pyrrhus, was  
 so adiudged by Caius Fa-  
 bricius in his second Con-  
 sulship, & also by our Se-  
 nate. For when king Pyr-  
 rhus vnprovoked had mo-  
 ued warre against þ people  
 of Rome, & þ fight was al  
 about þ empire & þ noble,  
 and

exercitu Populi Romani  
 populū ipsū Romanū op-  
 pressisset, ciuitatemq; non  
 modo liberam, sed etiam  
 gentibus imperantem, ser-  
 uire coegisset? Hunc tu  
 quas conscientie labe in  
 animo sese habuisse? que  
 vulnera? Cuius autem vi-  
 ta ipsi potest utilis esse cū  
 eius vite ea conditio sit, vt  
 qui illam eripuerit, in max-  
 ima & gratia futurus sit &  
 gloria? Quod si hec utilia  
 non sunt, que maximē vi-  
 dentur, quia plena sūt de-  
 decoris ac turpitudinis, fa-  
 tis persuasum esse debet,  
 nihil esse vtile, quod nō ho-  
 nestum sit. Quanquam id  
 quidem cū sepe alias, tū  
 Pyrrhi bello a C. Fabritio  
 COS. iterum & a Senatu  
 nostro iudicatum est. Cū  
 enim rex Pyrrhus Popu-  
 Romano bellū vltro intu-  
 lisset, cūq; de imperio certa-  
 mē esset cū rege generoso



ac potente, perfuga ab eo  
 venit in castra Fabricij, ei-  
 q; est pollicitus, si premiū  
 ei proposuisset, se, vt clam  
 venisset, sic clam in Pirrhi  
 castra rediturum, & eum  
 veneno necaturum. Hūc  
 Fabritius reducendū cura-  
 uit ad Pyrrhum: idq; eius  
 factum a senatu laudatum  
 est. Atqui si speciem utili-  
 tatis, opinionemq; queri-  
 mus, magnum illud bellū  
 perfuga vnus et grauem  
 aduersarium imperij sustu-  
 lisset, sed magnum dede-  
 cus & flagitium: quicum  
 laudis certamen fuisset,  
 eum non virtute, sed sce-  
 lere superatum. Vtrum  
 igitur utilius vel Fabritio,  
 qui talis in hac vrbe, qua-  
 lis Aristides Athenis fuit:  
 vel senatui nostro, qui nū-  
 quam utilitatem a digni-  
 tate seiunxit, armis cum  
 hoste certare, an venenis?

& puissaunt prince, a runa-  
 way traitour wēt frō him  
 to Fabritius campe, and  
 promised, that if Fabriti<sup>9</sup>  
 would offer him a good re-  
 ward, as he came priuily,  
 so he would return priuily  
 to Pyrrhus pavilion, and  
 dispatch him with poison,  
Fabriti<sup>9</sup> caused him to be  
caried back again to Pyr-  
rhys, and that deede of his  
 was wel commended of  
 Senate. But if we seke  
 shew, and respecte of pro-  
 fit, true it is, this one run-  
 away might haue made an  
 ende of the greate warre, &  
 that greuous enemy of the  
 Empire, but it had been a  
 great shame, & fowle deede,  
 to haue had him subdued  
 not by proweesse, but by tre-  
 chery, & whome the sight  
 was all for glory. Whether  
 then was it more profitabf  
 eyther for Fabritius, who  
 was such a one in our city  
 as Aristides was at A-  
 thenes, or for our Senate,  
 who neuer seuered profite  
 from honour, to warre a-  
 gainste theire enemy with  
 armes, or with popson?

If empire bee to be sought  
for cause of gloze, lette tre-  
chery be eschewed, wherein  
can be no gloze, againe, if  
riches be sought any maner  
way, they cannot be profit-  
table, if they come w<sup>th</sup> infam-  
y. Therefore that aduise  
of Lucius Phillippus,  
Quintus sonne, was not  
profitable, that those cities  
which Lucius Sylla, for  
a certain somme of money,  
had discharged of trybutes  
by decree of the Senate,  
should again be tributary,  
and yet wee should not re-  
store them y<sup>e</sup> money, which  
for their beeing free, they  
had disbursed. The Se-  
natehouse agreed all wyth  
him. A sleaunder it was to  
the gouernement. For of  
Pirates better is the pro-  
mise, then of the Senate.  
Yea but the tributes (they  
will say) were thereby aug-  
mented, therefore it was  
profitable. How long will  
they bee bolde to call anye  
thing profitable, y<sup>e</sup> is not ho-  
nest: Can hatred, & infamy  
be profitable to any state  
that should bee vpholde w<sup>th</sup>  
gloze,

Si glorie causa imperium  
expetendum est: scelus ab-  
sit, in quo non potest esse  
gloria. Sin ipse opes expe-  
tuntur, quoquo modo non  
poterunt esse vtilis cum  
infamia. Non igitur utilis  
illa L. Philippi Q. filij  
sentencia, quas ciuitates  
L. Sylla pecunia accep-  
ta ex sena. cons. liberaui-  
set, vt eę rursus vectigales  
essent: neque his pecuni-  
am, quam pro libertate de-  
derant redderemus, et se-  
natus est assensus. Turpe  
imperio. Pyratarum enim  
melior fides, quam sena-  
tus. At aucta vectigalia.  
Vtile igitur, quousque  
audebunt dicere, quic-  
quam vtile quod non  
honestum? potest au-  
tem vili imperio, quod  
gloria debet fultum esse,

## de Officiis.

& beneuolentia sociorū,  
 vtile esse odiū & infamia?  
 Ego etiam cum Catone  
 meo sepe deſſenſi. Nimis  
 enim mihi videbatur pre-  
 fractē erarium, veſtigalia-  
 q; deſedere: omnia publi-  
 canis negare, multa ſocijs,  
 cū in hos benefici eſſe  
 deberemus, cum illis ſic a-  
 gere, vt cū colonis noſtris  
 ſoleremus. Eoq; magis, qd'  
 illa ordinum coniunctio  
 ad ſalutem Reip. pertine-  
 bat. Malē etiam Curio, cū  
 cauſam Tranſpadanorum  
 equam eſſe dicebat, ſem-  
 per autem addebat, vin-  
 cat vtilitas, potius diceret  
 non eſſe equam, quia non  
 eſſet vtilis Reipub. quam  
 cū vtilem eſſe diceret,  
 non eſſe equam fateretur.  
 Plenus eſt ſextus liber de  
 officijs Hecatonis talium  
 queſtionū ſit ne boni viri  
 in maxima caritate an-  
 nonq; familiam non alere,

glozie, & good will of theire  
 leagfrendz: I my ſelf oftē  
 time haue diſagreed euē w  
 my Cato: for ouerſtiſtime  
 though he defended & trea-  
 ſurie gaine, & tributs: & de-  
 nied al maner of aloſwāces  
 to & ſarmerz of our cuſtōe,  
 & many, to our leagfrides:  
 wheras toſward theſe ſhōe  
 ſhould bee beneficiall: & ſo  
 deale w thoſe: as we were  
 wont to do w our citizens  
 ſēt to inhabite new toſwns  
 & ſo muche & moze, becauſe  
 & knittig togither of thoſe  
 degrees of mē did pertaine  
 to the ſafetie of the commō  
 welth. Curio alſo did euill,  
 in that he ſaid & Tranſpa-  
 danes matter was iuſt but  
 yet euer moze he cried. Let  
 profit preuaile. He ſhoulde  
 rather haue ſayd th: r mat-  
 ter was not iuſt, becauſe it  
 was not pfitable for & cō-  
 mō welth thā whē he ſaid  
 it was iuſt, he ſhould grant,  
 it was vnprofitable.  
 Hecatoes ſixt booke of du-  
 ties is ful of ſuch queſtiōs:  
 whether it be fit for a good  
 mā, in a veri gret dearth of  
 corn, to giue ouer houſke-  
 pingē?



ping? He disputes y mat-  
ter on both sides: but yet at  
last he thinketh, duitie is di-  
rected rather after profite,  
then after humanitie.

He puttes the case, if one  
must needes take losse by  
sea: whether should he ra-  
ther beare y losse of a horse  
muche woorthie, then of a  
suaue little worth. In this  
case, priuate profit leades  
a mā one way, & humani-  
tie an other. If a foole in a  
shipwrecke catch hold of  
a boord: shal a wise manne  
take it frō him, if hee can?  
He saith no, because it were  
iniurious. What maye the  
owner of y ship do: shal he  
take his owne? No, no  
more then hee maye caste a  
passenger out of y ship in-  
to y sea, because it is hye.  
For vntil they arriue at y  
place, whether y ship was  
hired: y ship is not the ow-  
ners, but theirs y sal in it.  
What if two in a shipwreck  
light vpon one boorde: & they  
both be wise mē: should ei-  
ther of thē put it to himself  
or one giue ouer his hold to  
y other: yea, he should giue  
ouer: but

in vtranq; partē disputat:  
sed tamen ad extremū v-  
tilitate non putat officiū  
dirigi, magis quā humani-  
tate. Querit si in mari ia-  
ctura facienda sit, equi ne  
preciosi potius iacturā fa-  
ciat, an seruuli vilis? Hic  
aliō res familiaris, aliō du-  
cit humanitas. Si tabulam  
de naufragio stultus arri-  
perit, extorquebit ne e-  
am sapiens, si potuerit?

Negat, quia sit iniurium.

Quid dominus nauis? E-  
ripiet ne suum? Minimē.

Non plus quā si naui-  
gantem in alio eicere de  
nauis velit, quia sua sit.

Quoad enim peruentum  
sit eo, quō sumpta nauis  
est, non domini nauis, sed  
nauigantium.

Quid si in vna tabula  
sint duo naufragi, hūc  
sint sapientes: sibi vter-  
que rapiat? an alter ce-  
dat alteri? cedat vero:

sed ei, cuius magis interfit  
 vel sua vel Reipub. causa  
 viuere. Quid si hec paria in  
 utroq;? Nullum erit cer-  
 tamē, sed quasi i sorte, aut  
 in dimicando vict⁹, alteri  
 cedat alter. Quid si pa-  
 ter fana expilet, cuniculos  
 agat ad erarium, indicet nē  
 id magistratibus filius?  
 Nefas id quidem est, quin  
 etiam defendet patrem, si  
 arguatur. Non igitur pa-  
 tria prestat omnibus offi-  
 cijs? immō verō, sed ipsi  
 patrię conducit, pios ha-  
 bere ciues in parentes.  
 Quid si tyrannidem oc-  
 cupare, si patriam prodere  
 conabitur pater, filebit nē  
 filius? immō verō obse-  
 crabit patrem ne id faci-  
 at: si nihil proficiet, accu-  
 sabit: minabitur etiam  
 ad extremum: si ad perni-  
 ciem patrię res spectabit

but to him, whom it were  
 more expedient to lyue, ey-  
 ther for his owne or y co-  
 mon weales sake, what if  
 these be alike in both: The  
 there shalbe no struiuing be-  
 twene thē: but y one must  
 yeld to the other, as the lo-  
 ser doth in lots, or at y I-  
 talian playe & the fingers  
 called Tocco.  
 what if y father rob chur-  
 ches: or vndermine y wal-  
 les of the treasury: shoulde  
 the sonne open it to y ma-  
 gistrates: That were sure-  
 ly a cursed dede, yea rather  
 he shoulde defend his father  
 if he were accused thereof.  
 Is not our countrey then  
 aboue al duties: yea truly  
 but it is profitable for ones  
 countrey, to haue y inhabi-  
 ters reuerēce their parēts.  
 what if ones father shoulde go  
 about to vsurp, as a tyrāt,  
 or to betraye his contrey,  
 shall the sonne conceale it?  
 May he shall desire his fa-  
 ther not to do it, if hee no-  
 thing preuaile, he shal blāe  
 him, & threaten him also.  
 And last of all, if the mat-  
 ter tende to the destruccio  
 of

of his countrie: he shall pre-  
ferre the lastie of his coun-  
trie before the safetie of his  
father.

He puttes a question also:  
if a wise man be swares re-  
ceiued counterfet mony in  
steede of good: after he per-  
ceiues it, whether he shold  
paye it out againe for good  
monye, if he were indetted  
too anye bodye? Diogenes  
sayeth, he may. Antipater  
denye it, to whome I ra-  
ther agree.

He, that wittingly selleth  
swine; & will not last: whe-  
ther ought he to declare it,  
or no? Diogenes thinkz, it  
is not nedefull: Antipater  
reckenz it & dutie of a good  
manne. These bee (as ye  
would say) & cases, in con-  
trouerfie, in the Stoikes  
matters of lawe. Whe-  
ther, in selling a bondman,  
his faultes are too be tolde  
or no? I meane not those,  
whiche vnles you declare,  
the bondman may be tour-  
ned home againe by the ci-  
uil law: but these, that hee  
is a lyer, a dyer, a pyker, a  
brokard: some think meete  
to

patrię salutę ante ponit sa-  
luti patris.

Querit etiam si sapiens  
alulterinos nummos acce-  
perit imprudēs pro bonis,  
cū id rescierit soluturus nē  
sit eos, si cui debeat pro bo-  
nis. Diogenes ait. An-  
tipater negat: cui potius  
assentior.

Qui vinum fugiens ven-  
dat sciens debeat ne dice-  
re? non necesse putat Di-  
ogenes: Antipater viri bo-  
ni existimat. Hęc sunt qua-  
si controuerfa iura Stoico-  
rum, in mancipio venden-  
do dicenda ne vitia? Non,  
nisi ea quę si non dixeris,  
redhibeatur mācipium iu-  
re ciuili.

Sed hęc mendacem esse  
aleatorem, furacem, ebi-  
osum alteri dicenda, vi-  
dentur,  
V. i.



## de Officiis.

dētur, alteri nō videntur. Si quis aurū vendens, orichalcū se putat vendere, in dicetne ei vir bonus aurū illud esse an emat denario qd' sit mille denariorum? Perspicuū iā est, & qd' mihi videatur, & quē sit iter eos philosophos, quos nomi nauī, cōtrouersia. Pacta, & promissa sēper ne seruāda sint, quē nec vi, nec dolo malo, vt prētores solent dicere facta sint. Si quis medicamentū cuipiā dederit ad aquā intercutē, pepigeritq;, si eo medicamento sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamento vnq̄ postea vteretur: si eo medicamēto sanus factus sit, & annis aliquot post inciderit in eundē morbum, nec ab eo qui cū pepigerat impetret, vt itē coliceat vti, quid faciendum sit. cū sit is inhumānus, qui nō cōcedat vti nec ei quicquā fiat iniuriæ.

to be told some other, not so. If one sellinge golde, supposeth he selles but copper, should a good man of duitie tel him, & it is gold? or he may buy for a peny & is worth a thousand? It is alreedy verpe plaine, bothe what I thinke, & what & controuersie is among the Philosophers, whō I named. Whether are couenātes, & promises alwaies to be kept, which bee (as the Platores vse to speke) made neither by cōpulsio, nor by couenaunt. If one minister to an other a medicine for the dropsie, and bindes the patient by couenaunt. that he shall neuer after vse the same medicine, in case hee bee made hole by that medicine, and within a fewe yeares after, do fall into y<sup>e</sup> same dysease, and can not obtaine of him, to whome he made y<sup>e</sup> couenaunt; that he may vse yt likewise againe, what is to be done, seeing he is so vngentle, and will not graunt him to vse it, and yet hee shoulde take no harme thereby.

The

The mā must haue regard Virę & saluti consulendū  
to his own life and health. est.

What if a wiseman bee re-  
quired of one, who makes  
him his heire, where two  
millions, and siue hundred  
thousand crownes be leste  
him by testament, that, be-  
fore he haue the possession  
of it, he daunce openly on y  
day time, in y market, and  
he promisseth, so to doo, be-  
cause otherwise the man  
woulde not put him in, as  
his heire, shoulde hee doo  
then, that hee promised:  
or no? I would wishe, he  
had made no such promise  
and that, I think, had ben  
a pointe of grauitie, butte  
seeing he promised it, if hee  
count it dishonest to daunce  
in y market, hee shal with  
the more honestie goe from  
his worde, if hee take no-  
thing of y inheritance, ex-  
cept peraduenture he will  
bestowe y same monie by-  
pon the common wealth in  
sometime of gret necessitie  
y it maye bee no shame for  
him euen too daunce when  
he shall procure the wealth  
of his countrie.

Quid? si quis sapiens  
rogatus sit ab eo qui eum  
heredem faciat, cū ei te-  
stamento sestertiū milies  
relinquatur, vt antequam  
hereditatem adeat, luce  
palam in foro saltet, id-  
que se facturum promise-  
rit, quōd aliter eum here-  
dem scripturus illē non es-  
set: faciat quod promiserit  
nec ne? promissū nolle  
& id arbitrār fuisse graui-  
tatis. Sed quoniam promi-  
sit, si saltare in foro turpe  
ducat, honestius mentietur  
si ex hereditate nihil cō-  
perit, quā si cōperit nisi  
fortē eam pecuniā in Re-  
ipublice magnum aliquod  
tempus contulerit: vt vel  
saltare eum, cū patrię  
consulturus sit, turpe nō-  
sit.

V.ij.

Ac

## de Officiis.

Ac ne illa quidem pmissa seruanda sūt, quę non sūt his ipsis vtilia, quibus illa promiseris.

Sol Phaetonti filio (vt redeamus ad fabulas) facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset: optauit vt in currum patris tolleretur, sub iutus est insanus, atq; qua constitit ictu fulminis de flagrauit, quanto melius fuit erat in hoc promissum patris non esse seruatum, Quid, quod Theseus exigit promissum a Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset: optauit interitum Hippolyti filij sui, cum is patri suspectus esset de nouerca: quo optato impetrato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus.

Quid? Agamēnō cum deuouisset Dianę quod i suo regno pulcherimum natū

For those promises are to be kept: which be not profitable euen for thē to whō you made them.

**T**itan (& we may returne to fables) said to Phaeton his sonne: hee woulde doe whatsoeuer he woulde desire. He desired to be taken vp into his fathers charet: the mad sole was hoisted vp: and on the side where he stode, with a flashe of lyghtninge hee fell all on a fire. How much better had it ben, his fathers promes had not ben in this performed?

What shall we say to & promes, that Theseus required of Neptunus: too whom whē Neptunus had granted thzee boones: Theseus asked & death of Hippolytus, his sonne: when his father had him in a ielousie for his stepmother, which boone being obtayned, Theseus fell into verie great lamētacion.

What of Agamēnon: whē he had vowed to Diana & sayrest creature, & shoulde



be borne that yeare in his  
kingdom: he offered vp in  
sacrifice his daughter Iph  
higenia: who was y fairest  
creature borne that yeare

The promise rather should  
not haue beene kepte, than  
so hainous a dedede should  
be comitted. *Judg. 11/39*

Wherefoze promises also  
many times, are not to be  
perfourmed.

Not at al times, things  
layd to keepe are to be resto  
red. As if one, well in his  
witte: shal leaue a sweord  
with ye to keepe and aske  
it againe, when he is mad:  
it weare a sinne to restore  
it, & ductie to keepe it.

What if one who hath left  
money with you to keepe,  
would make war againste  
your countrey: shal ye res  
toze, that was layde ye to  
keepe? Noe as I suppose:  
for pcc shal do againste the  
comō welth, which ought  
to be most deree vnto you.

So many thinges whiche  
by nature seeme to bee ho  
nest by change of times be  
come dishonest.

To

esset illo anno immolauit  
Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat  
eo quidem anno natū pul  
chrius. Promissum potius  
non faciendum, quā tam  
tetrū facinus admitten  
dum fuit. Ergo et pmissa  
nō facienda nonnunquam  
neque sēper deposita red  
dēda sunt.

Si gladium quis apud te sa  
na mente deposuerit, repe  
tat insaniens, reddere pec  
catum sit, non reddere of  
ficiū.

Quid? si is qui apud te  
pecuniam deposuerat, bel  
lum inferat patrię: reddes  
nē depositum? Nō credo.

Facies enim contra Rem  
publi. quę debet esse cha  
rissima. Sic multa, quę na  
tura honesta vidētur esse,  
temporibus fiunt non ho  
nesta.

V. iij.

Facere

## de Officiis.

Facere promissa, stare con-  
uentis, reddere de posita,  
commutata vtilitate fiunt  
nō honesta.

Ac de his quidem quę vi-  
dentur esse vtilitatis cōtra  
iustitiam simulatione pru-  
dētię satis arbitror dictū.

Sed quoniam à quatuor  
fontibus honestatis primo  
libro officia duximus: in e-  
isdem versabimur cū do-  
cebimus ea, quę videntur  
esse vtilia, nequę sint, quā  
sint virtutis inimica.

Ac de prudentia quidem  
quam vult imitari malitia,  
itemquę de iustitia, quę sē-  
per est vtilis, disputatū est.  
Reliqua sunt duę partes  
honestatis: quarum al-  
tera in animi excellentis  
magnitudine, & pręstantia  
cernitur: altera in confir-  
matione & moderatione  
continentię & temperan-  
tię.

To performe promises,  
to stand to couenantes, too  
restoze that is laid yea too  
keepe, when it otherwyle  
behoueth, it becommeth not  
honest. And of these which  
seeme to be cases of profit,  
contrarie to iustice, vnder  
pretence of wisdome, I  
think it sufficiently decla-  
red.

But for as much as in our  
first booke, we haue drawn  
al duitiez, out of foure foun-  
taines of honestie, we shall  
continue still in the same,  
when we teach, what ene-  
mies of vertu those things  
be, which seeme to be profit-  
table, & are not so in deede.

And thus of wisdome,  
whom wilnes would re-  
semble, & likewise of ius-  
tice which is alwaies pro-  
fitable we haue discoursed

The other two partes  
of honestie remaine, wher-  
of the one is sene in y gret-  
nesse, and worthines of an  
excellent courage, y other,  
in the framing, and measu-  
ring of staiednes, and tempe-  
raunce

It seemed profitable to  
Ulysses (as some tragicall  
poets haue it set out, for in  
Homer, the best author,  
ther is no such suspitiō of  
Ulysses) but the tragedies  
doo laye it as a reproche to  
him, that by counterfey-  
tyng madnesse, he woulde  
haue scaped going a war-  
fare. It was no honest  
deuise.

Yet profitable it was (as  
somme peradventure will  
say) to rule, & to liue quiet-  
ly at Ithaca, with his  
parents, with his wife, &  
with his sonne.

Think you anye honour,  
got in dayly dangerz, and  
trauailes, is to be cōpared  
with this quietnes of life?  
I verely iudge it meete to  
be despised, & reiected, be-  
cause what so is not ho-  
nest, I count it in no wise  
to be profitable.

For what thinke you Ulysses  
should haue hard, if he  
hadde continued stil in his  
counterfeitig? whoe hauing  
done great feats in warre,  
yet heard these woordes of  
Ajax,

Vtile videbatur Vlyssi, vt  
quidam poetæ tragici pro-  
diderunt: nā apud Home-  
rū optimū authorē talis de  
Vlysse nulla suspicio est:  
sed insimulant eum trage-  
dię, simulatiōe insanię mi-  
liātī subterfugere voluisse  
nō honestum consiliū: ac  
vtile (vt aliquis fortasse dix-  
erit) regnare, & Ithacę vi-  
uere otiosē cum parentib⁹  
cū vxore, cū filio. Vllū tu  
decus in quotidianis peri-  
culis & laboribus cum trā-  
quilitate hac conferendū  
putas? Ego vero istam cō-  
tēpnendam & abiiciendā:  
quoniam quę honesta nō  
sūt, ne vtilem quidem esse  
arbitror. Quid enim audi-  
turum putas fuisse Vlyssē  
si in illa simulatione perse-  
uerasset? qui cum maxi-  
mas res gesserit in bel-  
lo, tamen hęc audiuit ab  
Aiace.

For

Cuius



## de Officiis.

Cuius ipse princeps iussu. For al the consciēce of  
randi fuit, that oth, he passed not

Quod omnes scitis, solus a fly,  
neglexit fidem.

vvhich he himself pro-  
cured first, ye wote, as  
vvel as I.

Furere assimulauit, ne co-  
iret: institit.

He coulde put on a fai-  
ned face, & fare as hee  
vvere mad.

Quod ni Palamidis per-  
spicax prudentia,  
Istius percepisset malitiosa  
audaciam,

And not to goe vvithe  
thē, he vvrought vvith  
al the vviles he had,  
His fly boldnes but Pa-  
lamede by depe pollicy  
did spye:

Fide sacratū ius perpetuū  
falleret.

The sacred lavve of so-  
lempne othe, the freke  
vvould still denye.

Illi vero non modō cum  
hostibus, verum etiam cū  
fluctib⁹, id quod fecit, di-  
micare melius fuit, quā  
deserere consētiētē Græ-  
ciam ad bellum barbaris  
inferendum.

For him no dout it was  
better to fight not only w  
his enemies, but also w  
the wauez of the sea, as he  
did: than to shrink frō thē  
of Grece, who had conclu-  
ded together to make war  
vpō the Troians. But let  
vs leaue of both fables, &  
sozeyne

Sed omittam⁹ et fabulas et

for in examples, and come  
we to trouth, and dedes.  
When Marcus Attilius  
Regulus, beyng seconde  
time Consull, was taken  
by a trayne in Afrik: Xan-  
tippus the Lacedemonian  
being the guide: & Amilcar  
Annibals father, the gene-  
ral, he was sent to the Se-  
nate vpon his othe, that ex-  
cept certayne gentlemen  
take prisoners were resto-  
red to the Venes, he shold  
himselſe retourne to Car-  
thage.

When hee was com to  
Rome he saw wel y shewe  
of profit, but as the matter  
proueth, he iudged it very  
vaine, whiche was but on  
this sort, to tary still in his  
countreye, too bee at home  
with his wyfe, and chyl-  
dern, to kepe his degree of  
Consular estate, & to take  
the miserie whiche hee had  
felt in warre, to be comon  
to warfaring fortune.  
who can deni these things  
to be pfitable, what think  
you, Greatnes of courage,  
& manlines saith nay to it.  
Loke

externa, ad rem factam  
nostramque veniamus. M.  
Attilius Regulus, cum  
COS. iterum in Africa  
ex insidijs captus esset, du-  
ce xantippo Lacedemo-  
nio, Imperatore autem pa-  
tre Annibalis Hamilcare,  
iuratus missus est ad sena-  
tum: vt nisi redditi essent  
Pænis captiui nobiles qui-  
dam, rediret ipse Cartha-  
ginem.

Is cum Romam venisset,  
utilitatis speciem videbat  
sed eam (vt res declarat)  
falsam iudicauit: quæ erat  
talis, manere in patria, esse  
domi suæ cum vxore, cum  
liberis, quàm calamitatem  
accepisset in bello, commu-  
nem fortunæ bellicæ indi-  
cantem, tenere consularis  
dignitatis gradum. Quis  
hec neget esse vtilia? quid  
censes? Magnitudo animi  
& fortitudo negat.

Nuu

Num locupletiores queris  
 authores? Harum enim est  
 virtutum proprium, nil ex-  
 timescere: omnia humana  
 despiciere, nihil quod homi-  
 ni accidere possit intollerā-  
 dum putare. Itaque quid  
 fecit? In senatum venit, mā-  
 data exposuit: sententiam  
 ne diceret: recusavit: quā-  
 diu iureiurando hostiū te-  
 neretur, non esse se senato-  
 rem. Atque illud etiam (O  
 stultum hominem, dixerit  
 quispiam, & repugnantem  
 utilitati suę) reddi capti-  
 uos negavit esse vtile. Illos  
 enim adolescentes, & bo-  
 nos duces, se iam confectū  
 senectute. Cuius cū va-  
 lisset auctoritas, capti-  
 ui retenti sunt, ipse Cartha-  
 ginem rediit. Neque eum  
 charitas patrię retinuit, nec  
 suorum.

Neque vero tū ignorabat

Loke ye for moze substā-  
 al authorities: For of the  
 se vertues is it y propertie  
 to bee ascerde of nothyng,  
 to dispise al worldly vāi-  
 ties, to think nothing vn-  
 sufferable that no mā may  
 befall.

Therefore what did he: he  
 came into y Senate: decla-  
 red that he had in cōmā-  
 demēt: refused to geue his  
 sentence, & said he was noe  
 Sen atour as long as hee  
 was bound by othe miny-  
 stred by his enemies. yea  
 & this moze ouer he sayde  
 (O foolish man, wil some  
 say, & against his own pro-  
 fit) y it was not expediet  
 to haue the captiues resto-  
 red. For he alleged thepe  
 were yong, & good captai-  
 nes: wheras he was woꝝ-  
 ne, & spentē w age. whose  
 authoritie when it had pre-  
 uailed: the captiues were  
 kept stil: he himself retur-  
 ned to Carthage, and ney-  
 ther loue of his countreye,  
 nor of his kinnsfolke stayed  
 him.

yet was it not vnknown  
 to him-



him, that hee returned to a  
verie cruel enemy, and to  
extreme torments: but hee  
thought his othe meete to  
be perfourmed. Wherefore  
even at the time, when hee  
was put to death with co  
tinual waking: he was in  
better state: than if he had  
remained an aged captiue,  
& a periured Senatour at  
home.

But fondly wil som say,  
he did: who not onely iud  
ged it vnmete, that the cap  
tiues shoulde bee restored,  
but also dissuaded it.

Now, I pray yee, did hee  
fondly, did ye so, seeing he  
auailed the comon weith?  
May that be profitable for  
any citizen, which is vnpro  
fitable to the state? Whē do  
weest those foundaciōs whi  
che nature layeth: when  
they seuer profite from ho  
nesty. For we al couet pro  
fit, & to it be caried, noz by  
any meanes otherwise cā  
we do. For who is he that  
steeth profit? or who rather  
is ther & soloweth not the  
same most diligently?

But

se ad crudelissimum hostē,  
& ad exquisita supplicia p  
ficisci: sed iusiurandum cō  
seruādū putabat. Itaque tū  
cum vigilando necabatur  
erat in meliore causa, quā  
si domi senex, captiu⁹ per  
iuris, consularis remāssisset.  
At stultē: quī nō modo nō  
censuerit captiuos remittē  
dos, verum etiam dissu  
aserit.

Quomodo stultē? etiam  
ne si Reip. conducebat. Po  
test autē quod inutile Re  
ip. sit, id cuiquam ciui vtile  
esse? puerunt homines e  
a, quę sunt fundamenta na  
turę cū vtilitatem ab ho  
nestate seiungunt. Omnes  
enim expetimus vtilitatē,  
ad eamq; rapimur, nec  
facere aliter vllō modo  
possumus. Nam quis est  
qui vtilia fugit? aut  
quis potius, qui ea non  
studiosissimē persequatur?

Sed

## de Officiis.

Sed quia nusquam possumus, nisi in laude, decore honestate utilia reperire: propter ea illa prima & summa habemus utilitatis nomen non tam splendide, quam necessarium ducimus. Quid est igitur (dixerit quis) in iureiurando non iratum tenemus Iouem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotij dicunt, et nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam, qui Deum semper agere aliquid, et moliri volunt. Nunquam nec irasci Deum, nec nocere. Quid autem iratus Iupiter plus nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus? Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis, quae tantam utilitatem peruerteret. Annem turpiter faceret: primum minima de malis. Num igitur tantum mali turpitudine ista habebit

But because no where we can find things profitable but in praise semeliness, & honestie: therefore we esteeme those as chief, and highest: & the commendation of profite we count not so honorable as necessarie. What is there then in othe: wil some say are we asurd, Jupiter wil be angry? May this is common among all philosophers not onely those, who hold, & God himselfe hathe nothing to doo, and nothing appoints to an other body: but them also, who wil needs haue God alwaye doing and meddling with som what: & God is neuer angry, nor euer hurteth any creature, what greater harm coulde Jupiter haue done, being offended, then Regulus did to himselfe: Ther was the no respect of religion, that might ouerturne so greate a profite. What should hee haue doone dishonestly? First, of evils the lest were to bee choosen. Shall then this dishonestye haue in it so much discommoditye, as

tie, as had that tozment:

Whoe ouer this saying, & is in Accius.

Hast thou thy faithed promise broke?

My faith I neither gaue nor giue,

To any faithlesse, while I liue.

Though of a wicked king it be said yet it is excellent lye saide.

Hereunto they adde, & as we say, some things seeme profitable, which are not so in dede: & they in like manner say, some things seeme honest, which are not so in dede: as for example, thys same seemeth honest & hee did returne to tozment, for the sauing of his othe: but it became dishonest: because & whiche had be wrought by & violence of his enemies should not haue been by him confirmed. Thepe laye also to this, & who so is verpe profitable & same groweth likewise to be honest, although it seemed not so at firste.

These

quantum ille cruciatus?

Deinde illud etiam apud Accium.

Fregistine fidem? neque dedi, neque do infideli cuiquam.

Quanquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculentè tamè dicitur.

Addunt etiam, quemadmodum nos dicamus, videri quedam vtilia, quæ non sint, sic se dicere videri quedam honesta, quæ non sint, vt hoc ipsum videtur honestum conseruâ di iusiurandi causa ad cruciatum reuertisse. Sed fit non honestum, quia quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse nō debuit. Addunt etiam quicquid valde vtile sit, id fieri honestum, etiam si âtea nō videretur.

Hac



## de Officiis.

Hec ferè contra Regulum **These things cōmonly be**  
 Sed prima videamus. Nō **alleged against Regulus.**  
 fuit Iupiter metuendus, ne **But lette vs consider the**  
 iratus noceret: qui neq; i- **firste.**

rasci solet, neq; nocere. **Jupiter was not to bee**  
 feared, least he should hurt

Hec quidem ratio nō ma- **him in his anger, because**  
 gis contra Reguli, quā **neither to be angrie, nor to**  
 contra omne iusiuran- **do harme he is accustomed**

dum valet. Sed in iureiu- **This reaso surely maketh**  
 rando, non qui metus, sed **nomore against Regulus,**

que vis sit, debet intelligi. **than againste al kinde of**  
 Est enim iusiurandum af- **othes. But in the oth ma-**  
 firmatio religiosa. Quod **king, not what the feare,**

autē affirmatē, quasi Deo **but what the vertue of it**  
 teste promiseris, id tenen- **is, ought to be considered.**

dum est. Iam enim non ad **For an othe is a religious**  
 iram deorū, quē nulla est: **assuring of any thing. And**

sed ad iustitiam & ad fidē **what so assuredly you ha-**  
 pertinet. Nā preclarē En- **ue promised, as taking God**

ni<sup>9</sup>: O fides alma, apta pē- **to witnes, it oughte to bee**  
 nis & iusiurandū Iouis. **obserued. For y othe nowe**

respects not the wrathe of  
 y gods, which is nōe at al  
 but iustice, & faithfulnessse.

For notably said Ennius.  
 O heuēly Faithe, tye to  
 thye wings, the othe of

Ioue alio.

whoe so then stayneth  
 his othe, hee stayneth Las-

die faithe, whom, as it  
 apperces in Catons oratio

our

our auncestours woulde  
needs haue to stand in our  
Capitole, nexte vnto they  
great, & mightie Ioue.

yea but Iupiter, beinge  
displeased, coulde not haue  
don moze harm to Regul<sup>o</sup>  
thā regul<sup>o</sup> did to himselfe.  
That is true if there were  
nothings euill, but to feele  
payne. But the Philoso-  
phers, that be of the grea-  
test authoritie, do affirme,  
that it not onely is not the  
uttermost euill, but also no  
euill at all. For whome, I  
praise ye, doo not refuse too  
take Regul<sup>o</sup>, as no meane  
witnes, but (I beleue) the  
grauest of all. For what  
moze substantial wytnesse  
do we looke for, thā a pere  
of the common weale whō  
for the continuance of his  
duetie, did willingly enter  
into toznetts. For wheras  
I say, of euils the leaste are  
to be chosen, meaning it is  
better dishonestly, than mi-  
serably to liue, is ther anye  
greater euill, than disho-  
nesty? whiche if in the de-  
formitie of the bodye it  
breedeth somme offence,

howe

maiores nostri esse volue-  
rūt. At enim ne iratus qui-  
dē Iupiter pl<sup>o</sup> Regulo no-  
cuisset, quā sibi nocuit ip-  
se Regulus. Cert ē si nihil  
malumeffet, nisi dolore: Id  
autem non modo non sū-  
mum malum, sed nec ma-  
lum quidem esse maxima  
authoritate philosophi af-  
firmant.

Quorum quidem testē nō  
mediocrē, sed haud scio an  
grauissimū Regulū, nolite  
quēso vituperare.

Quem enim locupletio-  
rem quērimus quā princi-  
pem. Po. Ro. qui retinendi  
officij causa crutiatū sub-  
ierit voluntarium?

Nam quod aiunt minima  
de malis, id est vt turpiter,  
poti<sup>o</sup> quā calamitose: an  
est vllum maius malū tur-  
pitudine? Que si in defor-  
mitate corporis habeat a-  
liquid offensionis?

quanta

## de Officiis.

quanta illa deprauatio & feditas turpificati animi debet videri. Itaque neruosi-  
us qui ista dixerunt, solū  
audent malum dicere, id  
quod turpe sit: qui autem  
remissius, hi tamen non  
dubitant summum malum  
dicere. Nam illud qui-  
dem.

Neq. dedi, neq. do infideli  
cuiquam.

Idcirco recte à poeta dici-  
tur, quia cum tractaretur  
Atræus, persone seruiendū  
fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sumant  
nullam esse fidem, quę in-  
fideli data sit, videant ne  
queratur latebra periurio.  
Est autem ius etiam bel-  
licum fidesq; iurandi se-  
pe hosti seruanda. Quod  
enim ita iuratum est, vt mēs  
cōciperet fieri oportere

How much must nedes &  
corruptiō, and filth of a de-  
filed mind appeare:

Therefore they who more  
pithily debate these mat-  
ters are bold to call y<sup>e</sup> on-  
ly euill, which is dishonest  
& y<sup>e</sup>, who dispute them not  
so earnestly, do not stick to  
call y<sup>e</sup> same y<sup>e</sup> vtterest euill.  
As for that saying.

My faith I neither gaue  
nor giue:

To any faithlesse, while  
I liue.

It is therfor wel brought  
in of y<sup>e</sup> Poet, because whē  
Atræus part should go in  
hand, it was meete & spea-  
che should serue for his per-  
son. But if hereof they ta-  
ke theselues a rule, y<sup>e</sup> it is  
no promes y<sup>e</sup> is made to a  
promes breaker: let the ta-  
ke hede, ther be not sought  
a starting hole for perurie.  
The law of armes, & the  
promes of an othe is manye  
times to be kept withoure  
enemi. For what so in such  
sort is sworne, y<sup>e</sup> the mind  
of y<sup>e</sup> swearer conceiuethe,  
it is



it is necessarie to be done: & id seruandum est, quod ali  
 fac is to be obserued: what ter, id si nō feceris, nullum  
 so falleth otherwise: & same periurium est. Vt si prædo-  
 if one do not, it is no perin- nibus pactū pro capite pre-  
 rie. As if you bring not the tium non attuleris, nulla  
 sume of money that ye pro fra<sup>9</sup> est, ne si iuratus quidē  
 mised rousers for your life: id non feceris. Nam pirata  
 there is no deceiuing in yt, nō est ex perduellium nu-  
 no, though he beeing sworne mero definitus, sed comnu-  
 therto ye do it not. For a nis hostis omnium, cū hoc  
 pirate is not counted in the nec fides debet, nec iusu-  
 number of enemies to ones randum esse commune.  
 countrey, but a cōmon ene- Non enim falsum iurare  
 my to al men. With such a peierare est, sed quod ex  
 one neither pines, neither animi tui sententia iuraue-  
 oth ought a like, as & vs ris, sicut verbis concipitur  
 to be kept. For to swere an more nostro, id non face-  
 vntruth, is not to forswere re, periuriū est. Scitē enim  
 but not to persourme that, Euripides.  
 which according to the mea Iuraui lingua mentem  
 ning of your hert pee haue iniuratum gero.  
 sworne, as by our custome  
 is exprest in a certain forme  
 of wordes: surely it is per-  
 iurie. For scatty saide Eu-  
 ripides:

In worde I sware, but  
 hert vnsworne I bare.  
 But it was not fit for Re-  
 gulus with periurie to dy-  
 stourbe the cōditions, & co-  
 uenāts with his enemies,  
 & of warre. For with a iust  
 and

Regulus veró non debuit  
 cōditiones, pactionesq; bel-  
 licas et hostiles perturbare  
 periurio. Cum iusto enim  
 X.i. &

& legitimo hoste res gere- & lawfull enemye the thing  
 batur: aduersus quem & was done: towarde whom  
 totum ius feciale & multa both al the fecial law, & di-  
 sūt iura communia. Quod uers other laws be in com-  
 ni ita esset, nunquam cla- mon which if it were not  
 ros viros senatus vinctos so: the Senate would ne-  
 hostibus dedidisset. At ve- uer haue deliuered to their  
 ro T. Veturius & Sp. Post enemies, noble men beinge  
 humius cū iterum Coss. prisoners. But yet Titus  
 essent, quia cū male pug Ucturi<sup>9</sup>, & Spurius Pos-  
 natum apud Caudium ef- thumius, the second time,  
 fect, legionibus nostris sub they were Consuls, becau-  
 iugum missis, pacem cum se, whē they had not fou-  
 Samnitibus fecerant, dedi- ght it well at Caudium, &  
 ti sunt his, iniussu enim Po our legions beinge subdued  
 Senatusq; fecerant. Eodē they had made a peas & y  
 que tempore T. Numitius Samnits: they were deli-  
 Q. Aemilius, qui tum u- red vnto thē, for Route  
 tribuni plebis erant, quōd cōmissiō of the peple, & the  
 corū autoritate pax erat Senate, they had done it.  
 facta dediti sunt, vt pax And at y same time, Tit<sup>9</sup>  
 Samnitium repudiaretur. Numitius, & Quint<sup>9</sup> E-  
 Atq; huius deditionis ipse milius, who were then the  
 Posthum<sup>9</sup>, q̄ dedebatur su Tribunes of the people, be-  
 asor et author fuit. Quod cause y peas was made by  
 idē multis ānis post C. Mā- their authoritie, were deli-  
 uered also, y the peas & y  
 Samnites might be reiu-  
 sed. And Posthum<sup>9</sup> selfe  
 who was deliuered, was  
 y perswader, & causer of  
 the same deliuerie. whiche  
 likewise Caius Mācinus  
 dōd, manye peaces after:  
 who,

who, that he might be deli-  
 uered to the Numantines  
 with whō without autho-  
 ritie of the Senate hee had  
 concluded a leage, perswa-  
 ded y<sup>e</sup> p<sup>r</sup>icular law, which  
 Lucius Furi<sup>9</sup>, & Sextus  
 Attilius made by y<sup>e</sup> decree  
 of y<sup>e</sup> Senate, & whē it was  
 receiued, he was deliuered  
 to the enemies. This man  
 delt more honestly, thē qui-  
 tus Pompeius, by whose  
 intercessiō, whē he was in  
 y<sup>e</sup> s<sup>a</sup>e case it was, brought  
 to pas, y<sup>e</sup> the law was not  
 receiued, with him y<sup>e</sup> thing  
 which seemed profit, preui-  
 led more thā honestie. W<sup>h</sup> y<sup>e</sup>  
 other aforesaide, the false  
 shew of profit was suppl-  
 sed by the authozite of ho-  
 nestie. But y<sup>e</sup> whiche was  
 done by violēce, neded not  
 to haue ben confirmed. As  
 who shoulde saye, violence  
 could be done too a manlye  
 man, why then dyd hee go  
 to the Senate, namely see-  
 ing he was purposed to dis-  
 swade them from y<sup>e</sup> deli-  
 uerie of the captiues: that  
 in him was most commen-  
 dable, y<sup>e</sup> same ye disallowe

For

cinus, qui vt Numantinis,  
 quibus cum sine senat<sup>9</sup> au-  
 thoritate fœdus fecerat, de-  
 deretur, rogationem sua  
 sit eam, quam Lucius Furi-  
 us & Sext<sup>9</sup> Attili<sup>9</sup> ex sen.  
 con. ferebant: qua accepta  
 est hostibus deditus. Hone-  
 stius hic, quā Q. Pompei-  
 us, quo, cū in eadem cau-  
 sa esset, deprecante accep-  
 ta lex non est. Hic ea quæ  
 videbatur utilitas, plus va-  
 luit, quā honestas. Apud  
 superiores vilitatis speci-  
 es falsa, ab honestatis au-  
 thoritate superata est. At  
 non debuit ratum esse,  
 quod erat actum per vim,  
 quasi verō forti viro vis  
 possit adhiberi. Cur igitur  
 ad senatum proficif-  
 cebatur, cū presertim de  
 captiuis dissuasurus esset.  
 Quod maximum in eo  
 est, id reprehenditis.

X.ij.

Non



Non enim suo iudicio stetit: sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus: cui nisi ipse author fuisset, captiui profecto Pœnis rediti essent. Ita incolumis in patria Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patrie non utile putauit: idcirco honestum sibi, & sentire illa & pati credidit. Nam quod aut, quod valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, immo vero esse, non fieri. Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec quia utile honestum est, sed quia honestum, utile. Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis, haud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius, aut prestantius. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli, vnum illud est admiratione dignum: quod captiuos retinendos

For he stode not to his own iudgement, but toke & matter in hand & it might bee & iudgement of the Senat wherunto if he had not bene a counseler, the captiues no dout had ben restored to & Cartaginens. So had Regulus remayned safe in his countrey, which because he toke it not to be profitable for his contre, therfore he thought it honesty for him to bee of the minde, & so to suffer. For wher they say, & it which is very profitable, dooth becomm honest, nay they should say it is indeede, & not become honest. For there is nothing profitable, which sãc is not honest, & not because it is profitable, it is honest, but because it is honest, therfore it is profitable. Wherefore of many marueilous exãples a mā shall not lightely tell either a more cõmendable or a more goodly example than this. But in all thys praise of Regulus this one thing is worthe of admiration, that he thoughte it best, the prisoners shoulde bee

bee kept still. For in that  
hee returned I think it no  
wonder at all, because in  
those days, he could not do  
otherwise. Therfor, & cō-  
mendacion is not the manz  
but the times. For our an-  
ceters were of this minde,  
& ther is no straiter bonde  
to bynd a mannes promes  
than an othe. The lawes  
in y<sup>e</sup> twelue tables declare  
& our holpe orders declare  
y<sup>e</sup> same, & our leagues de-  
clare no lesse, wherbi bound  
is y<sup>e</sup> promes made euen w<sup>th</sup>  
the enemye, the enteries, &  
punishmentes of the Cen-  
sors declare as much, who,  
about no matter more hede-  
fully gaue iudgement, thā  
about keeping of othes.

Marc<sup>us</sup> Pomponi<sup>us</sup>, Tri-  
bune of y<sup>e</sup> people, did sum-  
mō Luci<sup>us</sup> Manli<sup>us</sup>, Aul<sup>us</sup>  
son, whē he was Dictator  
to appere at a day, because  
he had takē vpon him y<sup>e</sup> oc-  
cupyng of his dictatozship  
a fewe daies leger than he  
shold, & accused him also, &  
he had drinē his sōn Tit<sup>us</sup>  
who after ward was caled  
Torquatus

cenfuit. Nam quod redijt,  
nobis nunc mirabile vide-  
tur: illis quidem tempori-  
bus aliter facere nō potuit  
Itaq; ista laus nō est homi-  
nis, sed temporum. Nullū  
enim vinculum ad atrin-  
gendam fidem iureiuran-  
do maiores arctius esse vo-  
luerunt. Id indicant leges  
in. XII. Tabulis, indicant  
sacra, indicant fœdera, qui  
bus etiam cū hoste deuin-  
citur fides, indicant nota-  
tiones, animaduersionesq;  
Cens. qui nulla dere dili-  
gentiūs quā de iureiuran-  
do iudicabant. L. Manlio  
Auli filio, cū Dictat. su-  
isset, M. Pomponius trib.  
pl. diem dixit, quod is pau-  
cos sibi dies ad dictatu-  
ram gerendam addidisset,  
criminabatur etiam, quod  
Titum filium qui Torqua-  
tus postea est appellatus  
X. iij. ab

## de Officiis.

ab hominibus relegasset, et ruri habitare iussisset, quod cum audiisset adolescens filius, negotiū adhiberi patris, accurrisse Romam, & cum prima luce Pōponij domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset nuntiatum, quod illum iratum allatum ad se aliquid cōtra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit ē lectulo, remotisq; arbitris ad se adolescentem iussit venire. At ille vt ingressus est, confestim gladium distinxit: iurauitq; se illum statim interfectorum, nisi iusiurandum sibi dedisset, se patrem missum esse facturum. Iurauit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius, rē ad populum detulit, docuit cur sibi ā causa desistere necesse esset. Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis iusiurandum valebat. Atq; hic

Corquatus, frō companie of men: & had cōmaunded him to dwell in the contrey which when the yongmā, his sōne, once herd of, that his father was brought in trouble, it is said, he ranne to Rome, & by brek of day came to Pōponius house. To whō whē it was told because hee thought, & hee being offended wold bring some matter vnto him against his father, hee arose out of his bedde, & al hears being voided out of y place, he commaunded, the yongman should come too him. But he, as sone as he entred, by & by drew hys sword, & sware he woulde kill him out of hād, excepte he made an othe vnto him, y he woulde discharge hys father. Pomponius, constrained with this terror, made an othe so, he opened y matter to the people, hee esourmed thē, why it was necessarie for him to let fall the accion. Hee discharged Manlius. So gretly was an othe had in regarde, at those daies. And this Cit<sup>y</sup>

Manli-



Hannibal is he, who got his  
 surname, at the river of A-  
 nien, of a chain, y<sup>e</sup> hee pul-  
 led fro<sup>m</sup> a Frenchmā, who  
 he slew, being dogged by  
 him, in whose third Con-  
 sulship, y<sup>e</sup> Latines at Ule-  
 is were discomfited & put  
 to flight. A very noble mā  
 doctlesse, & one, whose not  
 long afore being louing to-  
 ward his father, became  
 so w<sup>r</sup>er, & seuerer against his  
 s<sup>on</sup>e. But as Regulus is  
 to be cōmended, in keepinge  
 his othe, so those ten, who  
 Annibal after the Cannenū  
 an fight sent to the Senat  
 vpon their othe, that theye  
 should returne into y<sup>e</sup> Cap  
 wherof the Carthaginers  
 were then in possession: ex-  
 cept they obtained his re-  
 quest, for the rāisomming  
 of certain prisoners: are to  
 be dispraised, if theye dyd  
 not return. Touching who  
 al men w<sup>r</sup>ite not after one  
 sort. For Polibius, a spe-  
 cial good autho<sup>r</sup>, w<sup>r</sup>ite h:  
 that of the tenne chosen  
 gentleme<sup>n</sup>e, whose then  
 were sent, nyne returned:  
 when

T. Manlius is est qui ad A-  
 nienim Galli, quem ab eo  
 prouocatus occiderat, tor-  
 que detracto, cognomen  
 inuenit: cuius tertio consu-  
 latu Latini ad Veferim fu-  
 si & fugati sunt. Magnus,  
 vir in primis, & qui perin-  
 dulgens in patrem, idem a-  
 cerbè seuer<sup>9</sup> in filium. Sed  
 vt laudandus Regulus in  
 conseruando iureiurando  
 sic de ceteris illi, quos post  
 Cannensem pugnam iura-  
 tos ad senatum misit Anni-  
 ball, se i castra redituros es-  
 quorum potiti erant Peni-  
 nisi de redimēdis captiuis i-  
 petrauissent, si non redie-  
 runt vituperandi: de qui-  
 bus non omnes vno mo-  
 do. Nā Polybius bonus au-  
 thor in primis scribit, ex de-  
 cem nobilissimis qui tunc  
 erant missi, nouē reuertisse  
 senatu

à senatu re non impetrata:  
 unum ex decem, qui paulo  
 post quā egressus erat è ca-  
 stris redisset, quasi aliquid  
 esset oblitus, Romę re-  
 mansisse. Reditu enim in  
 castra liberatum se esse iu-  
 re iurando interpretabatur  
 Non recte. Fraus enim di-  
 stringit, non dissoluit per-  
 iurium. Fuit igitur stulta  
 calliditas puerse imitata  
 prudentiam. Itaq; decre-  
 uit senatus, vt ille vetera-  
 tor & callidus vinctus ad  
 Annibalem duceretur. Sed  
 illud maximū: octo homi-  
 num milia tenebat Anni-  
 bal: non quos in acie cepit  
 set aut qui periculo mortis  
 diffugissent: sed qui relictis  
 in castris fuissent à Paulo  
 & Varone Cos. Eos sena-  
 tus non censuit redimen-  
 dos: cum id parua pecu-  
 nia fieri posset: vt esset  
 insitum militibus nostris

When the matter could not  
 be obtained of the Senate:  
 and that one of the tenne,  
 who a little after, hee was  
 gone out of the campe, re-  
 turned back, as though he  
 had forgotten somwhat: re-  
 mained stil at Rome For  
by his retozne to the camp  
hee took himself to bee dis-  
charged of his oth, but that  
was not true. For gile con-  
firmeth, & not dischargeth  
periuire. It was then a fo-  
lish craftines, that did pe-  
uishly counterfet wisdom.  
Therfore y<sup>e</sup> Senate made  
a decree: y<sup>e</sup> the same Turtle  
& wyly fox sholde be caried  
pinnioned vnto Anniball.  
 But this is a maruaylous  
 matter: Annibal had i hold  
 eight thousand of our men  
 who he took not in battle,  
 nor as fled away for fear  
 of deathe: but y<sup>e</sup> were leste  
 behinde in y<sup>e</sup> cape, by Pau-  
 lus, & Varro, the Cōsuls.  
 The Senate did not thik  
 it good to raunsome them:  
 wheras they mighte haue  
 doone it for a litle mo-  
 ney, y<sup>e</sup> it mighte sink into  
 our souldiours hertes, ey-  
 ther

ther to winne the victorie; or manfully to dye. which thing whē it was known the saide Polibius writtez, that Anniballes hert was daunted therewith bicause y<sup>e</sup> Senate, & people of Rome euen in chaunces of aduersitie, were of so loftie a courage. Thus the thinges, which seeme profitable, be ouerweied by cōparison of honestie. But that same Acilius who wrote the storie in greeke, saith: their were moe, which returned to y<sup>e</sup> cāpe, vnder y<sup>e</sup> s<sup>a</sup>c gile: that they might be discharged: of there othe, and that they were noted by the Cēsores w<sup>th</sup> al maner of infamy. Here an ende of this pcell. For it is euident, that suche thinges as be done with a fearful, seruile, dastardlye, & weake hart, as y<sup>e</sup> doinge of Regul<sup>9</sup> had been, if eyther he had thought, cōcerning the prisoners, that he saw expedient for him self, & not for the cōmon weal, or els woulde haue taried stil at home) be not profitable, because y<sup>e</sup> bee reproch=

full

aut vincere, aut emori. Qua quidem re. audita, fractum animum Annibalis scribit idem: quōd S. P. q<sup>ui</sup> R. rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis cōparatiōe, ea quę videntur vtilia vincuntur. Acilius autem, qui gręcē scripsit historiam, plures ait fuisse, qui in castra reuertissent, eadem fraude, vt iureiurando liberarentur: eosq; a Cens. omnibus ignominijs notatos. Sit iam huius loci finis. Perpicuum est enim ea quę timido animo, humili, demisso, fractoquē fiant (quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captiuis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod Reip, censuisset, aut domi remaneri voluisset) non esse vtilia, quia sint flagitiosa, fœda



fæda, et turpia. Restat quæta pars, quæ decore, moderatiõe, modestia, cõtinentia, tẽperantia continetur. Potest igitur quicquã esse vtile quod sit huic talium virtutũ choro cõtariũ. At qui ab Aristippo Cyrrenaici atquẽ Annicerii philosophi nominati, õne bonũ in voluptate posuerũt: virtutemq; cẽsuerũt ob eã rẽ esse laudadã, quod efficiens esset voluptatis, quibus obsoletis floret Epicurus, eiusdẽ ferẽ adiutor, authorq; sententię. Cũ his, velis quisq; (vt dicitur) si honestatẽ tueri, ac retinere sententia est, decertadum est. Nã si nõ modo vtilitas, sed vita õnis beata, corporis firma constitutione, eiusq; cõstitutionis spe explorata (vt à Metrodoro scriptum est) continetur: certẽ hæc vtilitas & quidem summa sic enim censent)

full, vile, and dishonest. The fourth part is now behind, which consisteth in semelnes, measure keeping sober moode, staiednes, and temperance. May then anything be profitable, that is contrary to such an assemblie of vertues: But y Cyrenæikes, & Annicerians, who had there name of philosophers frõ Aristippus, placed all felicitie in pleasure: and therefore they iudged vertue to bee commendable, bicause it was a causer of pleasure. & when these wer worn out of estimation: thẽ flourished Epicurus, a furderer, and author swelnye of the same opiniõ. Against them must we striue with toothe, and naile (as they saye) if wee meane to defende, and preserue honesty. For if not only profit, but also all happy life cõsisteth in the good complexiõ of the body, & in a sure trust to y same complexiõ, as by Metrodorus it is wõritten, doubtles this maner profit, yea & y vertue chief (for so do they holde)

will

Will strue with honesty. cum honestate pugnabit.  
 For first of al, Where shall Nam vbi primum pruden-  
 there be a place appointed tie locus dabitur? an vt  
 for wisdom? what mean they, y on euerye side thee conquirat vndique suavi-  
 should seke after delicacies tates? quā miser virtutis fa-  
 How miserable a seruyce mulatus seruientis volupta-  
 were it for vertue, to bee a ti? Quod autē munus pru-  
 waiter vpon plesure. But dentis? An legere intelli-  
 what should bee the office gēter voluptates? Fac ni-  
 of wisdom? Whilfully to hil isto esse iucundius, qd  
 chose out plesures? Admit cogitari potest turpius?  
 there be nothing pleasan- lam qui dolorem summū  
 ter, thā so to do, what can malum dicat, apud eum  
 there be imagined more di quem habet locum fortitu-  
 honest? How with him, do, quē est dolorum labo-  
 who saieth, y pain is y vt rumq, contemptio? Quan-  
 terest euil, what place shal uis enim multis locis di-  
 manimesse haue, which ca cat Epicurus (sicut hic di-  
 res not for aye paines, or cit) satis fortiter de dolore  
 trauailz, y be offered? For tamen non id spectandum  
 although Epicur<sup>9</sup> spekes est quid dicat, sed quid cō-  
 in many places, touchyng sentaneum sit ei dicere:  
 paine (as hee doth in this) qui bona voluptate termi-  
 stoutly inough: neuerthe nauerit, mala dolore:  
 lesse it is not to bee regar vt si illum audiam de con-  
 ded what hee saieth, but tinentia & temperantia.  
 what is meete for him to dixit  
 say, who hath poited out y  
 limits of good thigs to be  
 in plesure, & of euil things  
 in paine: as, if I should  
 here him speak of stayed-  
 nesse, and temperaunce.

He

dixit ille quidē multa multis locis, sed aqua heret, vt aiūt. Nā q̄ potest tēperātiā laudare is, qui ponat sūmū bonū in voluptate? Est enim tēperātiā libidinū inimica, libidines autē cōsectatrices voluptatis. Atq; ī his tamē trib⁹ generib⁹ quoquo modo possūt, nō incallidē tergiuersantur. Prudētiā introducūt, sciētiā suppeditātē voluptates, depellētē dolores. Fortitudinē quoq̄ aliquo modo expediūt: cū tradūt rationē negligendę mortis, ppetiēdiq; doloris. Etiā tēperātiā inducūt nō facillimē illi quidē, sed tamē quomodo possunt. Dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinē doloris detractio fieri. Iustitia vacillat, vel iacet potius: ōnesq; hę virtutes, quę cōmunitate cernuntur, & in societate generis humani. Neq; enim bonitas, nec liberalitas, nec comitas esse potest,

He talks in dede in many places many things, but he is myered by the wape, as they say. For how can hee praise tēperāce, that settes the soueraigne good in pleasure? For tēperāce is enemy to lust, & lust is a waitinge seruaunt to pleasure. And yet in these thze kinds not without sattletie, they fall to their shifts. Theye bring in wisdom, as a science ministring pleasure, a boyding paines. Theye set vs out also manlinesse, after a certain sort: whē they teche a way to despise deth & endure paine. Theye also fetch in tēperaunce, withe much a do doutles, but yet as well as they maye. For they hold, that the greines of pleasure ariseth by puttinge of all paine. Justice staggereth with them or rather lieth vnder foote, & al those vertues, that shewe thē selues in y cōmō knot, & feloship of mē. For there can be neither goodnesse, neither liberalty, not ciuilitie, no moze then frendship may if they be not soughte after



after, for them selues, but  
 be referred to plesure, or to  
 profit. Let vs the driue our  
 matter into few words for  
 as we haue taught there is  
 no profit, which is contrary  
 to honesty, so we say, al vo-  
 luptuosity is contrary to  
 honesty. And so much the  
 more I take Callipho, &  
 Dinomach<sup>9</sup> worthy to be  
 repued who thought, they  
 should end the controversy,  
 if they made a ioyninge of  
 voluptuosity & honesty,  
 as of beast & man, honesty  
 admits not this knot, but  
 both abhorre, & reiecte yt.  
 For truly the end of good  
 & euil, which ought to bee  
 after one sort, may be min-  
 gled, & tempered & things  
 disagreeable. But heare of  
 hitherto for it is a weigh-  
 ty matter, and in another  
 place discoursed more at  
 large. Now to the purpose  
 After what sorte then the  
 matter is to bee resolved,  
 if at anye tyme profite  
 in apparunce doothe stri-  
 ue w<sup>th</sup> the honesty, it is  
 befoze sufficiente de-  
 bated. But if voluptu-  
 osity

nō plus quā amicitia si hec  
 nō p se expetatur : sed ad  
 voluptatē, vtilitatē uē refe-  
 ratur. Cōferamus igitur in  
 pauca. Nā vt vtilitatē nul-  
 lā esse docuimus, quē hone-  
 stati esset cōtraria: sic onē  
 voluptatē dicim<sup>9</sup> honesta-  
 ti esse cōtrariā. Quō magis  
 reprehēdēdos Calliphonē  
 & Dinomachū iudico, qui  
 se direpturos cōtrouersia  
 putauerūt si cū honestate  
 voluptatē, tāquā cū homi-  
 ne pecudē copulauiſſēt, nō  
 recipit istā cōiūctionē ho-  
 nestas: aspernatur, repellit.  
 Nec vero finis bonorū et  
 malorū, qui simplex esse de-  
 bet, ex dissimilibus reb<sup>9</sup> mi-  
 sceri, et tēperari potest. Sed  
 de hoc (magna enim res  
 est) alio loco plurib<sup>9</sup>. Nūc  
 ad propositum. Quemad-  
 modum igitur, si quando  
 ea, quē videretur vtili-  
 tas, honestati repug-  
 nat: dijudicanda res sit  
 satis est supra disputatum.

## de Officiis.

Sin autē speciem vtilitatis etiā voluptas habere dicatur: nulla potest esse ei cū honestate cōiūctio. Nā vt tribuamus aliquid voluptati, condimenti fortasse nō nihil, vtilitatis certē nihil habebit.

### PERORATIO OPERIS,

Habes à patre mun⁹ Marce fili, mea quidē sētentia, magnū, sed perinde erit vt acceperis. Quanquā & hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi Cōmentarios tanquam hospites erunt recipiendi. Sed vt si ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factū nisi me ē medio cursu clara voce patria reuocasset) aliquādo me quoq; audires: sic quoniā his voluminibus ad te profecta vox mea est: tribues histēporis, quātū poteris: poteris autem quantum voles. Cū vero itellexero, te hoc

ousnes also bee counted to haue a shew of profit it cā haue no felowship & honestie. For be it so, wee some-what esteeme pleasure someswete perhaps it shal haue in it, but surely noe profite at all.

**T**he conclusion and dedication of his booke, & an exhortacion to his sonne

You haue frō your father a present sonne Marke, in my opinion verelye muche worth, but it shal bee euen so as ye take it. Notwithstanding these thre bookes are, as straungers, to be enterceyned of you, amonge Cratippus notes. But as ye shold see haue herd me also, if I had come to Athenes, which had bē done in dede, but by my country called mee back with open mouth, in the midst of my iourney, so seeinge in these volumes my voice is conuected vnto you, ye shal be as much tie vpo thē as you mai. & so much you mai, as you wil. But whē I shal vnderstande by you that

take pleasure in this kind sciēcie genere gaudere: tū  
 of knowledge, the I both & presens tecum ppediē  
 present there shortly, as I (vt spero) & dum aberis  
 trust, and in your absence, absens loquar. Vale igitur  
 absent wil speake to you, mi Cicero, tibiq; persuade,  
 fare you well therefore, te mihi quidem esse charis-  
 my Cicero, & assure youre simum, sed multo fore  
 self y you are to me doubt- chariorem, si talibus  
 lesse right here, & yet farre monumētis, prę-  
 dearer shalbe if in such ceptisq; læ-  
 bookes, and lessons, tabere,  
 you will sette  
 your de-  
 lite.

¶ Imprinted at London

in Fleetstreet within Temple

Barre at the signe of the hand  
 and Starre by W<sup>m</sup> R<sup>o</sup>pe  
 charde Tottel.

1568.

Φυσικώτατον ἐστὶ τὸ γεννᾶν ἑαυτὸ ὁμοιον. Aristot.  
 — ἐκ τῆς οὐρανίας γίνεται τὸ ἐξωτὸν πρῶτον.  
 — τὸ οἰκῆον πᾶσι ἄλλο τριῶν δὲ ἐμείλει. πρῶτον δὲ ἀδύνατον  
 — Νικᾶν ἐν ἑοδοντίας ἐπὶ τὸ ἐξωτὸν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν.  
 — Καὶ δόμει ὅς κεν δῶ, καὶ μὴ δῶκε ὅς κεν μὴ δῶ. Ηγεῖται.  
 — ὁμοιοι ὁμοιον φίλοι. Σώματα μὲν δύο, ψυχὴ δὲ μία.  
 — Qui duo corporibus, mentibus unus erat. Quid